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July 10, 1984
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THE WALLS prdW" 1 AC[I Ref m ZVQ~/ i CIA-RDP96-OO789ROOO1OO16OOd ~, From Arms Control to Controlled Security By ZBIGN!EW BRZEZINSKI warhead yields-per-warhead-weight appear poses the reliance on the The prospects for a comprehensive and to be leading rapidly to a downturn, per. stroke create circumstances beyond our both sides on defensive strategic sysstemsf complex U.S.-Soviet arms-control agree- haps to an eventual demise of the once-as- capacity to foresee either its social or his- The Times of London put it correctly when ment, building on the foundations laid by cendant and now dominant ICBMs of the torical consequences. Of course such a sud- it stated editorially on June 13: "The So- SALT I and SALT II, are increasingly period 1960 to 1985. This trend holds both In den-attack scenario remains unlikely, but viet Union is now naturally worried about slim. Indeed, it Is quite possible that arms the United States and in the U.S.S.R." one can disregard it entirely only at the the consequences of a burst In American control as we have known it has come to Highly mobile and extraordinarily pre- greatest peril. Given the relative openness spending on missile defense. It casts doubt the end of the road. Once the great hope of cise delivery systems are coming into be- of American society, the precise location of on Soviet plans for offensive systems since those who believed that the U.S.-Soviet ri- ing and are beginning to be deployed. By key U.S. assets can be much more easily the possibility of any missile defense-even valry could be limited by joint agree- way of example, the CEP (circular error ascertained and effectively targeted than an Incomplete one-would radically alter ment-with some even seeing in arms con- probabilities) of a Soviet SS-19 has been those of the Soviets. That makes the U.S. the cost calculation of offensive systems. trol the catalyst for a genuinely friendly approximately 1,200 feet; that of a Minute- more vulnerable to such. a strike, and It In the long run a defensive program would American-Soviet relationship-comprehen- man III, 700 feet; of an MX, 450 feet; and would be escapist to assume that Soviet enhance arms control by reducing the po- sive arms control (on the model of the of a Pershing 2, with terminal guidance, planners would choose to ignore such an tential ive SALT agreements) is likely to be the vic- about 100 feet. The latest Soviet missiles option altogether. gains from be a dg paraoffensdoxical tam of the bloody-mindedness of the pres- also involve similarly impressive opera- Moreover ja bolt out of the- blue could that the age of deterrence has so confused ent Soviet leadership and of the dynamics tional improvements. create such init%l"disbeli of the technological revolution. It will be increasingly difficult to lm- decision makers that they would be unable tat ors thattheir reaction to a purely defen: The present Soviet leadership recently pose effective and verifiable limits on to make a prompt response. Even without save system is to suggest that it Increases has done something quite remarkable in these weapons. The verification problem Is a special Soviet effort to disrupt or destroy danger." the history of the U.S.-Soviet competition, becoming increasingly acute, given the U.S. decision makers, a sudden massive The fact is that strategic defense has It has publicly postulated that there will be mobility of the new systems and the oppor- attack would put the American leaders un- become feasible not in the sense that It can no arms-control talks unless the U.S. is tunities for rapid reloading and covert de- der extraordinary psychological pressure, safeguard society but because it can In- prepared to accept a public humiliation ployment. The question of how to control capable of Inducing erratic behavior and creasingly complicate the planning and ex- and a political defeat: the dismantling of qualitative Improvements plagued SALT II hesitation. One can hardly imagine how ut- ecution of an effective first strike. In other the relatively few Pershing 2s and cruise negotiators and, at best, only a partially terly dumbfounding would be the situation words, strategic defense can somewhat ne- missiles so far deployed in Western Eu- satisfactory response was developed. Their in which the 'president would find himself gate the offensive advantages of increas- rope as a response to the hundreds of SS- difficulties pale in comparison to the com- awakened. in the middle of some night, ingly sophisticated strike systems, restor- 20s deployed by the Soviet Union over the plexities posed by the new systems. Ade- confronted with the following life-and- log the element of deterrence simply by past several years. In effect, the Soviet quate verification of both qualitative and death decision tree (as based on public creating again greater uncertainty as to Union has made arms control a hostage to quantitative limits would require access to .sources): the attainment of a truly major geopoliti- storage facilities and even perhaps to prod- Re consequences of a first strike. cal objective: the severance of the U.S.- uction centers. As a consequence, it is real= 0 Time (minutes) Respective Vulnerability European security connection. istic to conclude that for both political and 0 Massive attack launched. technological I SLBMs detected. For the U.S., or it it t especially A No-Win Situation reasons, the chances of a 2 ICBMs detected. live option for t permits to y, exthe to exploit it the The Sdemand is thus unaccepta truly comprehensive agreement, which can 4-6 Confirmation of attack; uncer, b1eThe Soviet advantages of high technology, an area of the demand s thus n ccwho e to- be reliably verified, are rapidly fading. tainty over scale; U.S. decision process U.S. superiority. This provides us with gen- bay Even the the discourse over foreign In that context, we are likely to see re- begins. uine potential for offsetting the military affairs within eject t Soviet demand, and strike scenario. Since the mid-1950s, acqui- Altitude EMP attack; SAC launched Soviet Union, and would put pressure on the Reagan administration enjoys wide- con Soviet Union to return to serious alms spread backing here and in Europe in re- control negotiations. fusing to bow to it. The Soviets have thus The time has come to lay to rest the expectation But even with such negotiations, the de- backed themselves into a no-win situation, that arms control is the secret key to a more amicable velopment of some defensive strategic ca an act of unprecedented diplomatic stupid AmersCalt 5O712et relationship. pability will remain desirable. It is often In order to extricate themselves, they said that an imbalance might arise when have tote] one side sees the other side acquiring a y proposed separate negotiations sition by the Soviets of a respectable nu preemptively; confirmation of scale of relatively invulnerable shield while itself in Vienna on an anti-satellite weapons clear capability meant that a first strike- attack; final U.S. decision process. remafore become vulnerable. tempting. In fact, might agreement. President Reagan was wise in inherently messy and unpredictable in its 10-12 U.S. decision needed: Ride-out not likely to oap en. The I fact, that is responding affirmatively to the proposal consequences-was until recently not an or respond; first SLBMs detonate over defensive nsive strategic happen. acquisition yIs like for negotiations, but he Is equally wise In attractive option for either side. A messy U.S. SLBM bases and National Com? purchasing an umbrella, which n not lianticipating no real progress in them. attack with large and relatively inaccurate mand Authority. pud against he rain which one ngn the But in the meantime the hostage Is dy- warheads (the only kind possible) would 12-14 Final window for initiating re- fold at Is bound t raiap r leaving the Ing. The primary victim of this situation is still precipitate an almost equally messy sponse; launch under attack, atone. Io iea be a protracted triaarms control-not In Its unrealistic utopian counterattack. But with the deployment of 16-20 Delta SLBMs launched from and-error piecemeal deploying with both version but as a modest and practical way extraordinarily accurate systems, a first home ports hit SAC. and experimenting, deploying partially, de- of somewhat ense 0 spending controlling the and wspirals of en sstrike apkeidy i respo p slou pponnt's x0.30 ICBM attack initiates possible hander one at adjusting any point in the , rat 15 5h oo ne 2e f cumulat on bets sides. The weapons eb refusal to uegoon cps ct to r es of through the Soviet - t of its fopre-e and X rgyspin down and begins impact on n truly vul B e years feeling it is truly invulnerable to the ate simply means precious. time Is being through the decapitation of its command How in these circumstances would the a lost, and as a result it will be even more structure can again become a viable plan- ? other side, even though over time the re How e and?feHow Lational deccnve vulnerability of each side to a difficult in the future to reach a truly am- ning option. From an offensive point of then chain ofocomm bltious and comprehensive agreement, a first strike by the other will gradually be better version of SALT II. view, a sudden attack by highly precise would be the choices made in response to declining. and very numerous nuclear weapons is initially unbelievable information? Could Through such a process, a measure of This is because the political paralysis in more profitable than an exchange resulting incoming information regarding the nature reciprocal stability will be acquired and the negotiations is being outpaced by the from a political crisis prompting both sides of the attack be rationally related to the security of both sides will gradually be en- dynamics of the weapons revolution. The to gear their forces to maximum alert. needed response? We are dealing here with hanged, though the process will not yield simple fact is that both the U.S. and the In the years ahead, one can envisage truly sensitive and disturbing operational the kind of restraint in defense expendi- SovIet Union are rapidly moving-while several ways in which nuclear weapons as well as psychological questions. tures that many have associated with the the arms-control negotiations remain stale- might be used In anger and by delibera- The advent of increasingly numerous hoped-for arms control. But the time has mated-to acquire Increasingly sophists- tion. Four basic variants summarize the and accurate systems is making it possible come to lay to rest the expectation that cated weapons systems, making existing range of possibilities: (1) a massive sur- for planners of a strategic attack to envis- arms control is the secret key to a more ICBMs anachronistic. As pointed out in a prise attack; (2) through crisis escalation; age a first strike that leaves the opponent amicable American-Soviet relationship or recent study in the Naval War College Re- (3) by contagion from non-superpower con- strategically crippled, capable of only a even to the enhancement of mutual secu- view by James Westwood: "The 1980s is a flicts; (4) by terrorist attack. Of those, in spasmodic, disorganized and strategically rity. The maintenance of such security will time of rapid transition and readjustments the years ahead probably the fourth is the aimless response-or none at all. This still remain an ambiguous and protracted pro- to technological changes in missilery. On most likely since it Involves a relatively does not make a first strike attractive cess requiring unilateral actions by both the horizon are stealth-type bombers simple operation, and It can be undertaken from a moral or even political point of sides, and increasingly so in the area of launching stealth cruise missiles (ALCM) by a limited group of individuals with little view, given the stakes, but the point is that strategic defense. and precision-guided munitions (PGMs), concern for society and motivated by their gradually the military attractiveness of further obviating the role of ICBMs. Scien- own peculiar brand of rationality. this option Is again increasing. tific and technological achievements in But while the employment of a nuclear Accordingly, with the stalemate In arms Mr. Brzezinski served as assistant to guidance, navigation, aerodynamics, elec- device in a terrorist attack ma be he t a inane circuitry and componen We~t ~ 5$t:20&Wj~a~ ck C ?~ t}?lRg7Faesttdent jar National Security Affairs i1cMj~ tb" o Ig77.1981, Approved For Release 2004/08/25 : CIA-RDP96-00789R000100160005-9 Approved For Release 2004/08/25 : CIA-RDP96-00789R000100160005-9