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November 4, 2016
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May 8, 2000
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November 2, 1989
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Approved For Release 2/t? - 00789R001800710001-4 SE-RET SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAM VI LVAT'. WARNING SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES OR METHODS INVOLVED. NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS. THIS COVER SHEET OR ENVELOPE WILL BE USED AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE DOCUMENT TO ALERT RECIPIENTS OF THE SENSITIVITY INVOLVED. CLASSIFIED BY: DIA/DT DECLASSIFY: OADR Approved For Release 20csbEE QEww96-00789R001800710001-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001800710001-4 Approved For ReleaseFAo0/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001800710001-4 Approved For Release~9J9R/0~/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001800710001-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001800710001-4 SUN STREAK EVALUATION WARNING NOTICE: THIS MATERIAL IS RESTRICTED TO THOSE WITH VERIFIED ACCESS TO SUN STREAK LEVEL 3 (SS-3). 9 I! PREPNOFORN SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAM CLAS` 1 IED BY: DIA/ST DECI.A SIFY BY: OADR Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001800710001-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001800710001-4 SUN STREAK EVALUATION WARNING NOTICE: THIS MATERIAL IS RESTRICTED TO THOSE WITH VERIFIED ACCESS TO SUN STREAK LEVEL 3 (SS-3). FORN SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAM CLASSIFIED BY: DIA/ST DECLASSIFY BY: OADR Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001800710001-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001800710001-4 UNCLASSIFIED CONTENTS PURPOSE -------------------------------------- I BACKGROUND ---------------------------------------1 II EVALUATION ---------------------------------------3 1. Database 2. Evaluation Techniques 3. Evaluation Results APPENDIX I. PROJECT RECORD DETAILS II. DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS TO ANALYSTS/DATA REVIEWERS Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001800710001-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789ROO1800710001-4 LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE 1. Number of Projects as a Function of type FIGURE 2. Data Categories FIGURE 3. Evaluation Scales FIGURE 4. Summary Data Evaluation Sheet---Example FIGURE 5. Overall Data Correlations FIGURE 6. Overall Averages for all Project Types FIGURE 7. Expected Results for Approximately 70% Data Accuracy---Selected Personnel Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789ROO1800710001-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001800710001-4 SUN STREAK EVALUATION PURPOSE: (S/NF/SS-2) Purpose of this report is to provide an evaluation of the SUN STREAK operational projects conducted since 1986. Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001800710001-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001800710001-4 I BACKGROUND (U) (S/SF/SS-2) SUN STREAK is an in-house DIA project for developing an operational psychoenergetics (i.e., remote viewing) capability for the Intelligence Community. Twelve General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP) billets were authorized for DIA in 1986 for this activity. Personnel from the ARMY INSCOM CENTER LANE Project were transferred to DIA to form the SUN STREAK core group. DIA had earlier (1985) received operational control from HQ DA for this 6-person Army unit. (S/NF/SS-2) In 1985, the DIA SUN STREAK Program Manager prepared an Action Plan that: (1) detailed the steps necessary to transition the CENTER LANE unit to DIA; (2) identified SUN STREAK staffing and support needs; and (3) set forth key programmatic requirements for the SUN STREAK activity. The Action Plan anticipated that the time required for achieving a prototype operational capability would be approximately 3 years. (S/NF/SS-2) Key aspects of this Action Plan, along with additional procedural information, were sent to congressional committees in 1986. The IC staff was also briefed at this time on the Action Plan and on anticipated SUN STREAK operational development and data evaluation procedures. (S/NF/SS-2) Programmatic and operational requirements identified in the Action Plan were to: (1) gain Special Access Program (SAP) status (accomplished in March 1985); (2) gain human use approval (granted in March 1985); (3) set up a Senior Oversight and a Task Coordinating Committee (accomplished -- though not currently activated); (4) establish tight project controls along with an automated database management and records system (accomplished); and (5) to establish an R/D link for supporting operational capability development (accomplished via HQ SGRD funding and a DARPA MIPR). (S/NF/SS-2) The R/D link, via SRI International, has yielded improved data evaluation procedures, has identified potential personnel selection techniques, and has contributed to training/development methods that are currently in project use. The activity at SRI has received and continues to receive extensive oversight by a 9-member peer review panel to insure that scientific rigor is maintained in all their activities. (S/NF/SS-2) The basic approach employed by SUN STREAK toward developing a prototype operational Remote Viewing (RV) capability is to locate personnel with potential RV capability Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001800710001-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001800710001-4 and to develop these abilities via appropriate training/ development procedures. Once satisfactory progress is noted on simple-to-verify training tasks, these individuals are presented advanced training and operational simulation targets. Operational simulation targets are usually US military or US scientific targets where ground truth is totally known or can be readily determined. Satisfactory performance on these tasks qualify an individual for operational projects of interest to the intelligence community. In many of the operational projects, however, ground truth is usually not known (or is only partially known). Consequently, complete evaluation of the viewer's data cannot be made until a later time when ground truth does become available. In the interim, reasonable estimates of the overall validity of the viewer's data can be made for many of the operational projects worked, based on what is generally known or suspected about the target. These interim evaluation results are updated whenever new ground truth is received. (S/NF/SS-2) The operational projects pursued by SUN STREAK are approved by the Program Manager and are, in part, based on the Program Manager's familarity with Intelligence Community (IC) needs and on solicitation from others within the IC who have been briefed into the SUN STREAK program. (S/NF/SS-2) The Evaluations performed for this report cover all the operational and operational simulation projects (approximately 200) that have been worked by SUN STREAK personnel since 1986. A few of the special operations called upon consultants from the SRI talent pool. These results are also included in the overall evaluation. Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001800710001-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001800710001-4 S wr II EVALUATION (U) 1. DATABASE (U) (S/NF/SS-2) The SUN STREAK project maintains an extensive record of all project activity. Details include project timing, people involved (i.e., viewers, interviewers, and possibly observers), and a variety of other data considered essential for good record keeping and for evaluating project results. This data, along with project summaries, are maintained in an automated data base for convenient retrieval. Copies of project summaries are also sent to the Program Manager for his review. In addition, all raw data (i.e., sketches, viewer's notes) are maintained in a separate file that is available for review and analysis (Additional project record details are in appendix I). (S/NF/SS-2) Evaluations conducted for this report involved a complete re-examination of the entire SUN STREAK operational database. Many of the earlier projects had only been partially evaluated, or not evaluated at all, due to lack of suitable ground truth at the time they were completed. These projects were re-evaluated at this time to adjust for new intelligence data that has since become available. (S/NF/SS-2) For this evaluation, the database was subdivided into 6 main project types: (1) Scientific and Technological (S/T); (2) Counterterrorist (CT); (3) Counternarcotics (CN); (4) Counterintelligence (CI); (5) Document Contents (Doc Cont); and (6) predictive (pred).- Total projects worked for these categories are shown in Figure 1. (S/NF/SS-2) Of the nearly 200 projects worked, approximately one-half cannot be evaluated since ground truth is not sufficiently known at this time. For approximately one- fourth of the projects, ground truth is totally known (or highly certain), and for the other one-fourth, ground truth is only partially known but considered sufficient for making a reasonable interim evaluation. (S/NF/SS-2) Some of these project categories can overlap. For example, prediction data is also an aspect of most of the CN, many of the CT and a few of the S/T projects. The prediction category in Figure 1 refers primarily to an exercise in which the viewers' were asked to predict significant military/political occurrences. Such general tasking did not seem to hold much promise. Therefore in future analysis, predictive data will be evaluated as a separate aspect of the otherwise specific project categories. Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001800710001-4 3 Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001800710001-4 z 2. EVALUATION TECHNIQUES (U) (S/NF/SS-2) Techniques used for evaluating the SUN STREAK operational and simulated operational database depend on the nature of the task and type of project. S/T projects are the most difficult to evaluate. This difficulty arises from the general complexity existing at most S/T target sites, from possible ambiguous aspects of the target site, and from the nature of the information desired. The sources' raw data will usually contain a mixture of clear and unclear-elements. Unclear data arises when the source, generally unfamiliar with the technology involved, tries to describe the intended target in terms of similarities within his experience. A degree of subjectivity will therefore be involved when assessing the most likely meaning of such data. (S/NF/SS-2) To assist in reducing overall subjectivity of evaluating complex S/T targets, the viewers' data is examined and compared to ground truth with several data categories in mind. These categories are shown in Figure 2, and include geographic descriptions, large and small scale objects, large and small scale functions, personality data, and predictive data. Not all these categories may be relevant to a specific project, and in some cases may even be part of the RV targeting procedure used (e.g., when a photo of target building is used as an RV targeting reference for accessing its unknown contents). (S/NF/SS-2) After identifying the appropriate data category, the next step is to examine the viewers' raw (or summarized) data for comparison to known or estimated ground truth and to make a best judgement on what approximate degree of data correlation actually exists. Figure 3 defines the scale ratings used along with their approximate degree of data correlation. (Appendix II contains detailed instructions for analyst consideration when reviewing the data). (S/NF/SS-2) Final evaluations and summaries are prepared by the Program Manager and/or his project representative (who is not part of SUN STREAK staff) in conjunction with the responsible system or Area Analyst or Intelligence Community point-of- contact. Latest intelligence data and reports on that target site are also reviewed during this process. In some cases, area analysts and the IC points-of-contact provide written appraisals to assist in the final evaluation process. These evaluations are recorded on summary forms and are maintained in the Program .Manager's files. (S/NF/SS-2) An example of an S/T target evaluation is in Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001800710001-4 5 SG1A Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001800710001-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001800710001-4 ik Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001.800710001-4 EVALUATION SCALES APPROX. DEGREE OF NUMERICAL DATA CORRELATION RATING . PERCENT 0 0-10 1 10-30- 1+ 30-50. 2 50-70' 2+ DESCRIPTION LITTLE .OR NO CORRELATION MIXTURE OF RELEVANT AND INCORRECT DATA WITH MAJORITY INCORRECT MIXTURE OF RELEVANT AND INCORRECT DATA WITH MAJORITY CORRECT 70-90 AND UNAMBIGUOUS 90-100 _ VERY HIGH TARGET CORRELATION WITH ESSENTIALLY. NO AMBIGUOUS DATA SP5353.11 FIGURE 3 Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : GIA-RDP96-00789Rd01800710001-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001800710001-4 SECRET SG1A (S/NF/SS-2) A more sophisticated analysis methodology has been recently developed by SRI for use in evaluating complex projects. This method's main advantage is that it allows quantitative estimates to be made for each and every data element generated by the viewer with respect to both actual target existence and importance. This technique is currently being examined for use in the SUN STREAK program and has been applied to a few projects. However, it is a labor intensive technique that will probably be used only for select high interest projects in the future. (S/NF/SS-2) Most of the other SUN STREAK project types do not require a complex analysis methodology. For example, due to the nature of what type of data is desired (and availability of collection assets that can be cued), most of the CT, CN, or predictive projects where ground truth is known can be evaluated in a "black or white" manner. The viewers' data, even if not acted upon, either correlates with the subsequent location of the fugitive or ship, or it does not. The event predicted did, or did not, happen. Thus, overall results for many of these projects are simply a matter of counting hits and misses. Hit ratios or percentages of hits/misses form the basis of overall data correlations made in this report for these types of projects. Additional data analysis is, of course, performed to determine how close to ground truth the data actually was. This may be of value in understanding how to conduct future projects of this nature. SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001800710001-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001800710001-4 SUMMARY DATA EVALUATION SHEET 0-3 SCALE DATA.. CATEGORIES PROJ CMPLTD . SESS SRCS a; b. c. d. e. f. g. COMMENTS GEO. OBJ L.S. OBJ S.S. FN L.S.. FN S.S. PENS PR 8701 870611 12 003 2 .2 1 1+ {1) - 0- ESTIMATE 018 - - 0 1 0 021 1 2 (1) - - - - 101 1 2+ 2+ 1+ (1) - YES PRED 6 MON IN ADV Approved For Release 2I808 : CIA-RDP96-00789 R001800710001-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001 80071 0001-4 3. EVALUATION RESULTS (U) (S/NF/SS-3) Overall data correlations for all SUN STREAK operational and operational simulation projects performed since 1986 are shown in Figure 5. These results were obtained by averaging the data entered on the Summary Data Evaluation sheets for each project primarily for two data categories (i.e. large scale and small scale object and function). The top lines on the bar charts reflect data averages obtained from the proven or experienced viewers. For some projects, especially some of the CN and CI projects, the distinction between large scale and small scale is not clearcut; furthermore, this differentiation may not be too important. For the predictive category and most of the CN projects, data correlations were based mainly on a hit/miss calculation. (S/NF/SS-3) Figure 5 indicates that, on the average, data from proven SUN STREAK viewers for S/T projects will tend to have a 20 percent to 30 percent correlation with ground truth for small scale targets, and a 30 percent to 50 percent correlation with ground truth for large scale target features. Likewise, for CT or CN projects, about 20 percent to 50 percent of SUN STREAK data would be expected to correlate with ground truth. Caution must be exercised in interpreting this data, however, since the database with known ground truth is quite low in these categories. For CI and Document Reading projects, SUN STREAK data shows a 40 percent to 60 percent correlation level with ground truth; however the size of this database is also quite low. The Document Reading projects were, however, carefully isolated and in a known or designated location. Predictive data of political/military situations) when no context is provided the viewer, shows a very low data correlation (i.e., reliability) of about 10 percent or less. (S/NF/SS-3) If all SUN STREAK projects are averaged together, as shown in Figure 6, data correlation would range from about 20 percent for small scale aspects to about 40 percent for large scale aspects. While "averaging" such data may indicate overall results in the long run, such averaging tends to washout those results that have singular high merit, such as the identification several months in advance of a specific area in the US where a fugitive was later found. In this case, SUN STREAK data was not acted upon; fortunately, the fugitive was nevertheless captured in this area due to the alertness of a local law enforcement official. (S/NF/SS-3) Another way of considering overall SUN STREAK project data correlation is to consider only the proven viewers. This data is shown in Figure 7, for times when these experienced Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001800710001-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001800710001-4 PERCE-1,17. OF DATA. '.#'ORRELATION r m m m i Approved For Release 2000/08/OStcCAA-RDP96-00789 R001800710001-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001800710001-4 SELECTED PERSONNEL m m m m w m DATA ? 1101 a" L 9:1 Approved For Release 2000/08/05ir, GIA-RDP96-00789 R001800710001-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001800710001-4 viewers received a 2 or 2+ in the numerical ratings assigned to their data correlations. Only two types of data are presented here; S/T, and Personality data as obtained from the various CT, CN and CI projects. For S/T projects, proven viewers would be expected to receive a high (i.e. approx. 70 percent) data correlation rating on about 20 percent of the S/T projects attempted. For Personality projects (i.e., background, state-of- the-health, specific activities), around 50 percent to 60 percent of the projects would yield high results. Essentially, this chart indicates certain strengths/weaknesses of the present SUN STREAK staff and suggests that more projects on foreign or CI target personalities are warranted. Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001800710001-4 14 Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001800710001-4 III FINDINGS (U) (S/NF/SS-3) Although the overall data correlations provided in the previous section have, in some instances, have a low overall average, the results are unique enough to warrant further attention and continued SUN STREAK activity. Even in the lowest reliability case (i.e., predictive), identification of even one important future event out of ten could in fact be highly significant for cost or life saving. These "averages" do not do justice to the single unique cases that cost little to act upon, as in the case of the fugitive location cited in section 3. (S/NF/SS-3) Specific findings that resulted from in-depth review of the entire SUN STREAK data base include: o Individuals' performance correlates with project type. This observation has already assisted in better task/person matching, and overall data correlations would be expected to improve in the future. o SUN STREAK has a distinct potential for direct contribution to certain CI, CN and CT cases, as born out by specific instances over the past two years. o Predictive data is promising under certain conditions, such as near term events or situations that do not involve dynamic, complex interactions. o S/T data, though having promise for select tasks, does not yield parametric data. o SUN STREAK viewers work well under operational stress. It may be that an environment of operational stress generates a clear and immediate need. This situation seems to foster conditions that enables RV to function better. o Obtaining highly reliable RV data and then applying it to real operational projects is difficult. However, it is evident that continued work with RV data does result in greater insight on how best to use RV data and on how best to utilize RV talent available. Thus, it is anticipated that RV data utility will increase as experience of the SUN STREAK team grows. Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001800710001-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001800710001-4 APPENDIX I PROJECT RECORD DETAILS UNCLASSIFIED Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001800710001-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001800710001-4 E X A M P L E 3L ..,, !r~/NOFORN-SKEET CHANNELS ONLY PROJECT SUN STREAK (U) Session Procedures Report INSTRUCTIONS WARNING NOTICE: INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED Item Number: 1. (U) Control Number: Indicate the control number provided for use in the total mission package. This number will consist of the two letter year code (e.g. 85, 86, 87 etc.), followed by the sequential mission number for that calendar year, (e.g. 86011-86-02, 8603 ? etc )?. 2. (U) Date of Session: Indicate the date of the session, (or sessions when the report contains a composite of mulitple sessions). Date should be written in military sequence,-e.g.,' 1 August 1986. For composite reports of multiple sessions, the date of each session should be indicated, e.g., 1,3,4 Aug 86. 3. (U) References: Indicate by title and date the most recent Session Procedure Report and any other, written documentation which may impact on this report. 4. (U) Date of Report: Indicate the date the report is prepared in draft form. 5. (S/NF/SK) Technique Utilized: Indicate the initials ERV, CRV or SRV. ERV indicates the Extended Remote Viewing technique, (Hella Hammid; CRV indicates the Coordinate Remote Viewing technique (Ingo Swann) and SRV indicates the Spontaneous Remote Viewing technique, (data provided to the viewer in a sealed envelope without the assistance of a CLASSIFIED 8Y: DTS-DIA DECLASSIFY: OADR Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001800710001-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001800710001-4 E X A M P L E OFORN-SKEET CHANNELS ONLY PROJECT SUN STREAK (U) Session Procedures Report FORMAT WARNING NOTICE: INTELLIGENCE S.O.URCES AND METHODS INVOLVED Control Number: Nickname: Date of Session: Target Country: References': Session-Number: Date of Report: Mission Status: Technique Utilized: Source identifier: 1. ( ) OPERATIONAL DATA: a. ( ) Targeting Material Provided to Interviewer Prior to Session b. to Session c. 2. ( ) 3. ( ) 4. ( ) Targeting Material Provided to Source Prior Feedback Provided to Source Following Session UNUSUAL OCCURRENCES: SYNOPSIS OF RAW DATA PROVIDED BY SOURCE: PRODUCTION DATA: (INTERVIEWERS SIGNATURE) CLASSIFIED BY: DT-DIA DECLASSIFY: OADR Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001800710001-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001800710001-4 EUflET/NOFORN-SKEET CHANNELS ONLY monitor/interviewer to structure the reporting of the results). The initials ERV, CRV and SRV are in themselves unclassified terms. 6. (U) Nickname: Indicate any internal or Headquarters nickname or codename assigned to this mission. 7. (U) Target. Country: Utilize. the standard US Government -two ? letter country codes to ? indicate :all -countries act-urally mentioned in this report. If no specific country is mentioned indicate "Unknown" in this heading., 8. (U) Session Number: Indicate the sequential number(s),. of the sessions described in: this report. This number must coincide sequentially with the previous Session Procedures Report for this mission. This number refers only to sessions held for each particular mission. 9. (U) Mission Status: A mission is either "(Initial) Continuing", ".Continuing" or "Closed". "(Initial) Continuing'.' indicates that this'.:is-'.ahn initial session for, this miss"ibn and that other sessions are contemplated. 10. (U) Source Identifier: Indicate the coded number of the Source. Under -no circumstances is the Source Ito -ever ~-be identified. or described in any official documentations or correspondence (internal or external) which pertains to a specific SUN STREAK (U) mission. It is permissible to refer to the Source by gender for ease of composition. This page unclassified when separated from classifed enclosure. E?i?/NOFORN-SKEET CHANNELS ONLY Approved For Release 2000/08/08: CIA-RDP96-00789R001800710001-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001800710001-4 APPENDIX II DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS TO ANALYST/DATA REVIEWERS Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001800710001-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001800710001-4 INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION SHEET INFORMATION and INSTRUCTIONS: The information in this report was obtained in direct response to an intelligence collection requirement provided by your office. The material furnished to you has been acquired through a unique and highly sensitive collection technique. Your care in evaluating this information will form the basis by which USI can assess this technique and/or modify and refine the technology to improve its overall value. While formulating your evaluation the following comments concerning this unique collection technique may be helpful. Foremost it must be stated that the information obtained through this technique is likely. to consist of a mixture of correct, incorrect or at times apparently, irrelevant data. Given this anomaly the consumer should be sensitive to the following: a. Conceptual descriptive data tends to be more reliable than analytic labeling. As an example, a source may inappropriately report (label) a body of water in an artificial holding device at a designated target as a "recreational swimming pool," when in fact it is a water purificati.on sewage pool. More critical however, is that an aircraft fuselage may be erroneously labeled by the source as a submarine hull. Caution is therefore advised when a source's descriptions evidence a great deal of analytic labeling. Again, conceptual descriptive data tends to be more'reliable than analytic labeling. b. Certain anomalies may exist in the overall descriptive reporting. A report on a known three building complex may, for example, only contain data pertaining to two buildings. Furthermore, significant buildings or facilities may be attributed to a site when it is known that such "additions" do not exist. Such gaps or additions are neither intentional nor an attempt to fabricate information. In fact, they occasionally may prove useful with careful analysis on the part of the consumer. Whe'a this type of serious gap or addition is encountere,?it should only be weighed in the context of the actual tasking and how it affects the results of the information sought. In other words, if you were initially seeking the purpose of a deep circular hole in the ground, do not be concerned about additional descriptions of a nearby lake when previously confirmed information indicated no lake is present at the site. Instead, focus your evaluation on the data pertaining to the deep circular hole, while-within reason, ignoring extraneous data. Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001800710001-4 Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001800710001-4 c. At times, some data may appear to be abstract with no apparent importance even though other data tends to confirm and improve upon the known data base on a target. Information of this nature may, at a later date, be valuable. For example, a reported lack of personnel at a normally bustling defense installation may seem incongruous until it is learned at a later date that this particular reporting period coincided with a evacuation drill. d. The consumer should be aware that for reasons of security, strict compartmentation and operational effectiveness, the actual collectors (sources) of this data are given only general guidance. Therefore, the collectors may tend to report on many seemingly extraneous facets of a target as well as the specific area of interest to the consumer. If this otherwise superfluous data is known to be true, the veracity of the source's other descriptions is enhanced. It is recommended that the consumer first examine the information provided to isolate the data already known, if any, about the target. From this data base the consumer should extract any new and heretofore unknown information relevant to the specific target. The "irrelevant" information should be examined carefully in light of the comments listed above. Patently false or irrelevant information should be. weighted as a facet of your evaluation only when this data contradicts previously confirmed information pertaining to the target. If you have any questions regarding this letter, the Intelligence evaluation Sheet (IES), or any information provided to you by this activity please contact this office at any time. Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001800710001-4 U) For the summary evaluation, plrats check the following boxes as to the accuracy of the submitted material. Approved For Release 2000/0840QRDP96-00789 R001800710001-4 Little Correspondence 0 S) Geographical locale descrip- tion (terrain, wnter, etc.) S) Large-scale manmade elements (cities, buildings, silos, docks, railroad lines, airfields, etc.) S) Small-scale manmade elements (antennas, computers, tanks, a missiles, offices, etc.) S) General target ambience (re- search, production, adminis- ments, naval activity, air monitoring, etc.) Personality information (physical descriptions, actions, responsibilities, plans, etc.) Sit nta C t e o c , with Not Mixed Results Good Excellent Unknown App licable 1 2 3 D ^ M El El 0 a M Q Q Q Q EJ Q t t I L J U U . 0 a 0 Q tI ------------------------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Cannot be de- Overall utility - - - - - None Marginal Useful 0 Very Useful 0 termined at this time E U) Definitions for the accuracy scale: 0 - Little correspondence . . . . Self explanatory. 1 - Site contact with . . . . . . . Mixture of correct and incorrect elements, but enough of the former to mixed results indicate source has probably accessed the target site. 2 - Good . . . . . . . . . . . . . Good correspondence with several elements matching, but some incorrect information. 3 - Excellent . . . . . . . . . . Good correspondence with unambiguous unique matchable elements And relatively little incorrect information. Approved For Release 200G/O8 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001800710001-4 activity, weapbns testing, etc.) Relevant specific activities (nuclear testing, missile firing, CAW storage, ELINT 0 Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001800710001-4 INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION SHEET IES Control Number: Collection Requirement: Collection Requirement Generated By: (ICR/CIR/DIRM/INITIATIVE/OTHER) Does the information YES IN PART NO CANNOT BE satisfy your Intelli- -DETERMINED gence Collection r-i r-i- -11 r-1 Requirement? L-j j j -j ----------------------------------------------------------------- A narrative explanation is required: (Use a continuation sheet if necessary.) (classification) Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001800710001-4