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Approved For Release 2000/ RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED RESEARCH IN PSYCHOENERGETICS (S) Prepared By: SG1J SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 Approved For Release 2000/ RDP96-00789ROO2200440001-9 SUMMARY (U) (S/NF) Since 1972, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and various elements of the Department of Defense (DoD) have participated in psychoenergetics research. During this time almost 11 million dollars were spent. This is an average of nearly 600,000 per year. While this points out the magnitude of the research effort, it is also important to note that this was not a single sponsor program, rather, there were several programs, funded by a variety of funders, some lasting only a few months. Although it was noted in the early seventies, a basic dichotomy of effort plagued the program for many years. It was apparent that much basic research was needed before applications of the phenomena would be possible. However, the sponsors had no charter to do basic research and hence pursued the application aspects of the program. (S/NF) During their short participation the CIA attempted to utilize remote viewing (RV) to collect operational level intelligence. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) also pursued that goal, but additionally looked at countermeasures and some aspects of psychokinesis. The Foreign Technology Division (FTD) initiated research that would assist them with providing a threat assessment of foreign psychoenergetics research. The Navy had a short participation early in the program also, but looked only for physiological markers during psychoenergetic functioning. Several Army elements were involved in the research. Again, applications were stressed until 1986 when Army provided funds for some basic R&D. (S/NF) The psychoenergetics research sponsored by the CIA and DoD elements was conducted almost exclusively at SRI International. The reasons for this were twofold. First, when funding averages just about 600,000 per year it is difficult to parcel it out to several different laboratories. Additionally, there are only a few labs doing state-of-the-art research. Late in the program an attempt was made to sub-contract some of the work, but was not very successful. (S/NF) As one looks over the research experiments done since 1972 it is apparent the emphasis was placed on making RV an operationally useful tool. Projects aimed at various aspects of this goal were carried out. Much effort was placed on screening and selection to find people with SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 Approved For Release 2000/ RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 natural talent for RV, Training people to improve their ability was tried. Ways to increase the signal and decrease the noise were looked at. Support activities were also researched, these included such things as evaluating results, the role of feedback and ways to direct the viewer to the target. (S/NF) As the project draws to a conclusion some overall evaluation of all the research should be made. To that end, the staff at SRI International is preparing a meta-analysis of each research topic. In general, it can be said that the researchers worked hard, were honest and always gave their best effort. The quality of the work, however, varied from excellent to poor. This should not be surprising as in any new field of scientific research many mistakes are made. So, rather than looking back we should look at the quality of the research going on now. It is creditable and the SRI research greatly exceeds the work on psychoenergetics being done at other laboratories. (S/NF) Perhaps the most important aspect that needs to be looked at is, "where are we now?" It is immediately apparent that we are now much further along than we were 15 years ago. The crux is that, currently we are not at a point where complete and accurate descriptions of any and every operational target is possible. It appears we are many years away from being able to do that. Target descriptions by remote viewers still contain a considerable amount of incorrect data and some good data. Over the years the research has made inroads toward increasing the proportion of good data. Does this mean that we should abandon the research or the goal of making it an intelligence collection tool? I think not. (S/NF) So, where do we go from here? Two things must be done. The first is that we need to curtail applications research and increase basic research to gain a better understanding of phenomena and of the variables that affect it. Then it must be honed to a fine edge and applied to those areas of intelligence that are particularly susceptible to the application of RV. In addition, we need to stop thinking of RV as a methodology for complete descriptions of everything. In any RV it is conceivable that most of the data may be wrong, but if one tangible facet is correct and this propels the analyst into a better understanding of whatever he is seeking, then it must be labeled a successful effort. There has already been at least one such occurrence. SG1A SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 SG1A Approved For Release 2000/ RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 (S/NF) Based on that in ormation the analysts explored that possibility and found that, that was exactly what happened. Again, all the other data in the viewer's description could have been incorrect, but the session would have to be rated as extremely successful. SG1A SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 Approved For Release 2000/08 O? $ RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 TABLE OF CONTENTS (U) SUMMARY (U) ..............................................................ii LIST OF FIGURES (U) ...................................................... vii LIST OF TABLES (U) ...................................................... viii PREFACE (U) ............................................................. viiii I SECTION 1. THE EARLY YEARS--CIA (U) ........................... 1 II SECTION 2. THE SERVICE YEARS--ARMY, NAVY, AIR FORCE (S/NF) . 7 A. Navy (S/NF) .................................................. 7 B. Air Force (S/NF) .............................................. 9 C. Army (S/NF) ................................................. 25 III SECTION 3. EARLY DIA SUPPORT (S/NF) .......................... 33 IV SECTION 4. THE JOINT SERVICE PROGRAM (U) ................... 36 A. FY 1981 (U) ................................................. 36 B. FY 1982 (U) ................................................. 43 C. FY 1983 (U) ................................................. 45 V SECTION 5. THE GRILL FLAME EVALUATION (S/NF) .............. 48 A. Training (U) .................................................. 50 B. Remote Viewing Enhancement (U) ............................... SO C. Search (U) ................................................... 50 D. Evaluation (U) ................................................ 50 E. Data Base Management (U) ..................................... 50 F. Countermeasures (U) .......................................... 50 G. Foreign Psychoenergetics Research (U) ............................ 51 VI THE FOLLOW-ON PROGRAM (U) ................................. 52 A. FY 1984 (U) ................................................. 52 B. FY 1985 (U) .................................................53 Approved For Release 2000/68TOT:-CTATRDP96-00789R002200440001-9 Approved For Release 2000/0 Q8C$ t DP96-00789ROO2200440001-9 TABLE OF CONTENTS (U) - (Continued) VII THE FIVE YEAR PROGRAM (U) ................................... 54 A. The First Year--FY 1986 (U) ................................... 54 B. The Second Year--FY 1987 (U) ................................ 56 C. The Third Year--FY 1988 (U) .................................. 58 VIII THE DIA PROGRAM--FY 1989 (U) ................................. 59 SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 Approved For Release 2000/08 CC :I DP96-00789R002200440001-9 LIST OF FIGURES (U) 1. Comparison of Target Site and Drawing by Remote Viewer (S/NF) ............... 3 2. Remote Sensing EEG Experiment (S/NF) .................................... 8 3. Penetration Strategies (U) ................................................ 11 4. Local Target in Palo Alto (U) ............................................ 12 5. Long Distance Target, The Louisiana Super Dome (U) ........................ 13 6. Coordinate Remote Viewing, Air Supported Building at Sylvania Near Palo Alto (U) 14 7. Rocket Test Site (U) .................................................... 16 8. Remote Viewing, A Soviet Airport (U) ..................................... 18 9. Target Objects in Metal Containers (U) ..................................... 19 10. "Pyrophoric" Explosion of Nuclear Material (S/NF) .......................... 24 11. Stanford Art Museum Target (U) .......................................... 28 12. Stanford Shopping Center Target and Response (U) .......................... 30 13. Target Slide, and Viewer (U) ............................................. 31 14. Schematic Representation of Remote Viewer Response to CRV Situation (U) ...... 35 15. Grill Flame Funding Plan (S/NF) .......................................... 37 16. Grill Flame Funding Actual (S/NF) ....................................... 38 17. Data Flow Plan (S/NF) .................................................. 39 18. Data Flow Actual (S/NF) ................................................ 40 19. Contract Monitor--Proposed (S/NF) ....................................... 41 20. Contract Monitor--Actual (S/NF) ......................................... 42 21. The DIA Missions and Program Development (C) ............................ 46 22. The Army Mission and Program (C) ....................................... 47 ,,..J vii SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 Approved For Release 2000/0%V - Cjt DP96-00789R002200440001-9 LIST OF TABLES (U) 1. Laboratories with Remote Viewing Research (U) ............................. 10 2. Known Elements in Remote Viewing (S/NF) .............................. 20-21 3. Rewarding RV Applications (U) ........................................... 23 4. CRV Stages of Target Acquisitions (U) ..................................... 34 5. FY 1981 Research Areas (U) ............................................. 43 6. FY 1983 Tasks (U) ..................................................... 45 7. Grill Flame Intelligence Publications (S/NF) ................................. 51 8. FY 1984 Tasks and Spending (S/NF) ...................................... 53 SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : IA- DP96-00789R002200440001-9 Approved For Release 2L0fY / I ftKff 15% OQ789R002200440001-9 PREFACE (C) This report reviews government sponsored research in the field of psychoenergetics from 1972 through 1988. The work was supported by CIA and the Department of Defense (DoD). Most of the DoD program was paid for by various intelligence organizations. The research currently under way (January 89) will be written up and published as an addendum to this report as will subsequent research. (C) Most of the research was conducted at SRI International in Menlo Park, California and the author is indebted both to the professional and clerical staffs for their assistance in compiling the data and making it ready for publication. (C) This document, while large in size, attempts to cover a set of reports that would occupy at least two complete file drawers. So, if a reader is sufficiently interested in a particular topic, there are probably several individual reports on that topic. (C) This report is a summary of psychoenergetic research that has taken place over the past 16 years. The aspects included are: funding source and amount, topics covered, research results, applications for intelligence and difficulties encountered. In addition foreign research and countermeasures are reviewed. Considering the funding level, time and the many difficulties encountered, the project should be considered a success. To realize this one need only look at what we knew in 1972 about psychoenergetic and what we now know. The growth has been phenomenal. It must be added, however, that much remains to be solved by future research, should sponsors be found. (U) The author of the report is Defense Intelligence Agency, DT-5A Washington D.C. 20340-6053 SG1J CONFID Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : &Ji'!bO789ROO22OO44OOO19 Approved For Release 2000/OSRRI f TDP96-OO789ROO22OO44OOO1-9 SECTION 1. THE EARLY YEARS--CIA (U) (S/NF) The Central Intelligence Agency was the first government organization to investigate parapsychology as it pertains to intelligence collection. Their work was initiated in 1961 when the Office of Technical Service OTS (then the Technical Services Division) became interested in ESP claims. Under the auspices of Project ULTRA, Stephen I. Abrams, Director of the Parapsychological Laboratory, Oxford University, England, reviewed parapsychological research and prepared an article stating that, at most, ESP had been demonstrated but was neither understood or controllable. After that effort, the field lay dormant at CIA for 10 years. (S/NF) In 1972 Russell Targ, then a SRI, conducted the CIA to discuss paranormal abilities. He proposed a demonstration of psychokinetic abilities at SRI. For the demonstration, a subject with psychokinetic abilities was taken to a super conducting shielded magnetometer and was able to visibly disturb the output signal by placing his attention on the interior of the magnetometer. This was followed by an additional few days of work in August, 1972, where further demonstrations of psychic ability were presented. The cost for this effort was $874.00. Another work order for $2,500 was then issued to develop a complete research plan. The result was a $50,000 contract for an expanded effort in parapsychology. It was at this time that the work caught the interest of the office of Research and Development (ORD) at the CIA. (S/NF) As part of the expanded effort, a remote viewing (RV) experiment was conducted in the summer of 1973 that further stimulated CIA sponsored investigations of parapsychology. Geographic coordinates of a vacation property were given to an SRI subject. Having no more information than the coordinates, he described the site as being a military-like facility. As the coordinates were for a vacation cottage, the response was believed to be incorrect. However, the CIA went to the site several months later to investigate it more thoroughly and discovered a sensitive government installation a few miles from the vacation property. The subject was then asked to view the interior of the installation. When all the data were reviewed the quality of the experimental results was judged to be mixed. SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789ROO2200440001-9 Approved For Release 2000/Oif6C C`Ik RDP96-OO789ROO22OO44OOO1-9 (S/NF) The mix of good and bad results from RV experiments continued throughout the next 10 years. Only in the last few years have we begun to understand some of the causes of wrong data. When CIA reviewed the experiments conducted, they thought the results impressive enough to warrant a jointly funded program (ORD and OTS) to begin in February, 1974. In this program, the ORD funds were to be used for basic scientific studies, such as the identification of measurable physiological or psychological characteristics of psychic individuals, and to develop experimental protocols for validating paranormal abilities. The ORD project did demonstrate psychic functioning, but critics found fault with the equipment, the experimental designs, and the analysis of data (such fault-finding is a recurrent problem in parapsychological research). In addition, ORD's new director was admittedly skeptical of parapsychology and his skepticism began to affect others, including some in OTS. (S/NF) Despite these pressures, SRI attempted the first intelligence collection operation using parapsychology. The target was Unidentified Research and Development Facility-3 at Semipalatinsk in the Soviet Union. The results were again mixed. While most of the data were either wrong or could not be evaluated, the subject did produce some amazing and accurate descriptions of a crane, shown in Figure 1. In addition, buildings under construction and some spherical tank sections were described accurately. However, the ORD officers concluded that the lack of control experiments with which to compare the data reduced their legitimacy to the status of "lucky guesses." (S/NF) At this point the contractors were claiming the experiments a success while the CIA officers were saying that the experiments were not meaningful because of poor experimental design. To resolve this dissonance, a critique of the investigations by a disinterested consultant was requested. After reviewing the parapsychology file and looking at the CIA data, he concluded that there is "a large body of reliable experimental evidence that points to the inescapable conclusion that extra sensory perception does exist as a real phenomenon albeit characterized by rarity and lack of reliability." This judgment gave impetus to continued investigations into parapsychology. Since then, considerable research has been devoted to improving the quality and reliability of data obtained by psychic means. SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789ROO2200440001-9 Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 SECRET FIGURE 1 (S/NF) COMPARISON OF TARGET SITE AND DRAWING BY REMOTE VIEWER Approved For Release 2000/08 qW- DP96-00789R002200440001-9 Approved For Release 2000/15EC.RFATtDP96-00789R002200440001-9 (S/NF) As OTS was then sponsoring psychic research, although they were "not in the research business," they asked that something of genuine operational significance be done. To meet this challenge, Pat Price, a person with purported psychic abilities, was tasked to locate code rooms in two foreign embassies. He located both correctly. He also provided a lot of additional information, much of which was vague or incorrect. The operations officer stated, "It is my considered opinion that this technique--whatever it is--offers definite operational possibilities." However, the ORD project officers concluded that the research was not productive or even competent and that research support to SRI should be dropped. In OTS, the feeling was that their charter would not allow them to fund basic research. Therefore, all agency funding in paranormal research was stopped. As the operational utility was still conceivable, it was decided that Price would work for CIA under a personal service contract. (S/NF) Price was then given a set of geographic coordinates in Libya. He described a guerrilla training site and an underwater sabotage training facility several hundred kilometers away on the sea coast. The new information produced by Price was later verified by reconnaissance and the undersea facility was similar to the description given by a collateral agent. The Libyan desk officer quickly asked for more data and these requests were given to Price. Two days later, however, Price died of a heart attack and the CIA-sponsored intelligence collection tests were ended. (S/NF) At this point the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) became interested in the field. The DIA interest resulted from an intelligence production request. This request resulted in the publication of a 1972 study entitled, "Controlled Offensive Behavior--USSR." A great deal of interest was shown in this study, particularly the sections on parapsychology. Several members of DIA met with CIA action officers to review the results of CIA parapsychology experiments. The DIA did not, however, fund any research until 1978. Between the point in 1975 when the CIA left the field and DIA's entry in 1978, various research projects at SRI were sponsored by the Army, Navy and Air Force. Each of these will be discussed later. (S/NF) In his 1977 summary article on the CIA's involvement with parapsychology ("Parapsychology in Intelligence: A Personal Review and S G11 Conclusions,") makes a number of interesting points that should be examined in light of current information. He says, "It is my opinion that, as it relates to intelligence, sufficient understanding and SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 Approved For Release 2000/OSIE C RIE-7RDP96-OO789ROO22OO44OOO1-9 SG1I SG1I assessment of parapsychology has not been achieved." He then alludes to observations and experiments that defy explanation by other means. believes that the principal problem is that the research has been funded by military and intelligence organizations. These agencies all wanted quick and relevant results with no attention to fundamental mechanisms or experimental variables. He further concludes, "Unless there is a major breakthrough in understanding, the situation is not likely to change." Unfortunately, remarks went unheeded for nearly ten years. During that time, the sponsoring agencies insisted on applications research, while the elements needed for a fundamental understanding of the phenomena were given scant attention. Recognizing the points made by _ and S G11 noting the participation of various DoD elements in funding parapsychology experiments, the DIA initiated a joint service research program in 1980. The goals of this program were to continue the applications-oriented work, but also to fund basic scientific experiments. It was also hoped that a joint contract would result in better utilization of funds. This program, called "Grill Flame," was moderately successful as will be discussed in detail in a later section. It was not until 1985, however, that an R&D organization financed a program to look for fundamental mechanisms, and basic science investigation began. (This, too, is covered in a later section.) (S/NF) In summary, the CIA spent $195,000 from 1971 to 1975 on parapsychology research. Various experiments were conducted and the experimental data gathered were very frustrating. A large portion was completely wrong, another portion was questionable, but there were almost always a few gems (e.g., the Price crane) that defied explanation and whetted the appetite for more. Other problems experienced by CIA projects were inconsistency and lack of reproducibility of experimental results. There were also problems with experimental design. Such problems will accompany this kind of research for many years, until we understand their causes and how to prevent them. Lack of adequate funding is also a persistent problem. Ultimately though, it appears that the CIA abandoned the research field, more because of internal political problems, than any scientific consideration. (S/NF) The CIA-funded research, did establish that remote viewing of geographical and technical features is possible, "i.e.,results cannot be assigned to any other known cause," and that descriptive aspects are better described than analytical concepts. Most important, the projects SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789ROO2200440001-9 Approved For Release 2000/01f tf L61RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 showed that obtaining operationally useful data is possible. This was, to DoD funding agencies, the most critical finding as the operational potential was the element that made funds available. Additionally, the CIA work showed that a target can be accessed by geographical coordinates as well as by means of a person at the target site. while few data were acquired, it was postulated that standard medical/psychological screening is of little use. SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 Approved For Release 2OOO/031E R!TtDP96-00789ROO2200440001-9 SECTION 2. THE SERVICE YEARS (U) (S/NF) Service funding for parapsychology from 1975 to 1979 was as follows: SG1A DATES ORGANIZATION BUDGET ($K) 1975-1976 NAVALEX $ 74 1976-1979 FTD $300 1977-1980 MIA $281 1978-1980 AMSAA $230 (S/NF) In addition, during these years, the DIA provided $228,000 from 1978 to 1980. In all, about $1,293,000 was spent over five years or an average of $258,600 per year. The annual funds could support only a very few researchers, so that the chances for significant progress were correspondingly limited. Note that the $1,293,000 was not for a single program over five years, but rather seven different programs each with its own goals and objectives. These programs are discussed below. (S/NF) In the NAVALEX program, the ability of individuals to perceive remote faint stimuli at a noncognitive level of awareness was investigated. To do this, changes in a subject's brainwave (EEG) production were monitored while light flashes were generated on a random schedule in a remote laboratory. A diagram of the experimental apparatus is shown in Figure 2. A statistical correlation was observed, but it was very weak and would require additional research. SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789ROO2200440001-9 Approved For Release 2000/0$/K QIk-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 D SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 Approved For Release 2000/08tF: kf DP96-00789R002200440001-9 B. (U) AIR FORCE 1. (U) FTD (S/NF) The Foreign Technology Division (FTD) USAF was tasked by DIA to follow and report on foreign research in psychoenergetics. FTD funded research at SRI to provide the needed basis for assessing the psychoenergetic process as an advanced threat technology. FTD sought to determine the state of the art in psychoenergetics and, more important, its applications feasibility. RV could be shown to be a real and robust phenomenon but not of use to the intelligence community. (S/NF) The field holding the greatest potential for intelligence applications, however, is clearly RV. In this perceptual process, certain individuals access and describe information blocked from ordinary perception by distance or shielding (see Figure 3). To immediately begin testing its operational possibilities, a number of Soviet sites of intelligence interest were exploited using RV. The accuracy and value of the RV results were then assessed and found to contain a considerable amount of correct information. This, of course, presents the possibility that the Soviets may be remote viewing U.S. sites. In general, the questions posed to SRI by FTD were: ? Is remote viewing possible? ? is distance a factor? ? Can coordinates be used to target a viewer? ? Can real time events be remotely viewed? ? Can shielding be used to block remote viewing? (S/NF) These are discussed in turn below. IS REMOTE VIEWING POSSIBLE? (U) (C) After reviewing their own and other research data, the SRI investigators conclude that RV is indeed a human perceptual ability. In support of their conclusion, they cited a number of other studies in which other labs and investigators had replicated the RV research at SRI. Based on this evidence, the FTD believed that there was good reason to pursue the field but with moderate funding. Since that time there have been a SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 Approved For Release 2000/Kg ft WDP96-00789R002200440001-9 number of labs where successful RV research has been performed. these are shown in Table 1. Table 1 (U) LABORATORIES WITH REMOTE VIEWING RESEARCH ? Princeton University ? University of Chicago ? Mundelein College ? University of California, Davis ? Lawrence Berkeley Consciousness Research Group ? Institute for the Future ? Midwest Parapsychology Research Institute ? Mind Science Research Laboratory IS DISTANCE A FACTOR? (U) (S/NF) To determine this, SRI conducted a series of remote viewing experiments with targets several thousand miles away in such places as New York, Dayton, the Artic, and the Soviet Union. One of the local targets is shown in Figure 4, and one of the distant targets in Figure 5. After comparing a number of such experiments, it was concluded that there is no degradation in accuracy or resolution as a function of distances of up to 5000 km. CAN MAP COORDINATES BE USED TO TARGET A VIEWER? (U) (S/NF) Using a beacon person (someone at the site) had already been tried and was successful. To investigate the use of coordinates, the SRI investigators did a series of experiments where the viewer was given only the coordinates of a target. A successful trial is shown in Figure 6. From this and a number of other attempts, the researchers concluded that targeting by coordinates yields results comparable to beacon targeting. SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 Approved For Release 2UN?8A(S4IM1O00789R002200440001-9 FIGURE 3 (U) PENETRATION STRATEGIES UNCLASSIFIED Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 CPYRGHT UNCLASSIFIED FIGURE 4 (U) LOCAL TARGET IN PALO ALTO 1'A' e122 S Approved For Release 2090/DQk'f?-kElgp00789R002200440001-9 Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 UNCLASSIFIED CPYRGHT FIGURE 5 (U) LONG DISTANCE TARGET, THE LOUISIANA SUPER DOME Approved For Release 2&A0)OC8T6^C11~(P00789R002200440001-9 Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 UNCLASSIFIED Approved For Release 2U01U~1&A~1INAP36-00789R002200440001-9 Approved For Release 2000/2 RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 (S/NF) it is well known in the choice selection (the target is a n difficult than describing a remote infinite, The problem with a force distracted by mental images from hi noise in the RV channel. Later, it field of psychoenergetics that forced mber between one and ten) is more ocation where the target pool is choice is that the viewer can be memory; this is a major source of was discovered that coordinates can also constitute a source of noise for sing several subjects in a series of u the same reason. SRI did a study trials where the target was to name letters of the alphabet being displayed at a remote location. Their conclusion was that alphabet letters displayed at a remote location could be identified to a statistically significant degree. The level was not, however, high enough to even approach operational utility. After these studies, some changes in protocol were made. First, a person who claimed she read things in her dreams was used as the subject. Then the subject was asked to describe the target as if it were an RV exercise rather than naming the letter. With these modifications, increased accuracy was achieved. This work further suggests that, to increase resolution, the perception of the target must be separated from the analysis. SG1A CAN REAL TIME EVENTS BE REMOTELY VIEWED? (U) CAN SHIELDING BE USED TO BLOCK REMOTE VIEWING? (U) (U) With regard to shielding, only electrical shielding was tested and it was shown not to be effective. The shielding problem will be looked at in greater detail over the next several years. Should RV develop into an operationally useful phenomenon, a program must be available to develop countermeasures. (C) At this point, it should be noted that not all RVs are successful. In fact, a good many are not. This mix of good and bad will continue over many years while researchers attempt to resolve the nature of the psychoenergetic signal and dampen the noise. This and other ongoing efforts to examine the many variables encountered in RV has improved the signal-to-noise ratio, but much remains to be done. For SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 SG1A Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 SG1A Approved For Release 2000/0,8' It k ff DP96-00789R002200440001-9 example, at this time no definitive method to evaluate RV results has been developed, there are still questions about how to target a viewer, and the role of feedback has not been completely settled. (C) Also, in the 1978-79 time frame, the sponsoring agencies gave some consideration to investigating the relevant physical principles and laws governing paranormal functioning. This effort will continue for many years: the proof of principle is very elusive and delimiting its characteristics is a giant undertaking; also, such basic work is difficult to do when sponsors are, as they must be, applications oriented. (S/NF) Once SRI had answered many of the questions posed by FTD, FTD proposed some new areas for the next year and asked that several of the previous year's topics be further explored. The next questions were: ? Can RV be used as a form of communication? ? What is the spatial resolution of RV? ? What is the role of feedback in RV? ? Can audio signals be remotely sensed? (C) Psychokinesis (PK) was also included as a topic for study. Psychokinesis is the production of physical effects, such as perturbation of equipment or instrumentation that appears to be well shielded against human influence or otherwise inaccessible. During this contract period, SRI developed equipment to detect and measure PK. (C) After it was determined that RV is indeed possible and can be done over long distances, the resolution capability was examined. To do this, SRI concealed small objects in light-tight metal cans (35-mm film cans) and asked a subject to describe the objects. The results are shown in Figure 9. These data indicate that the psychoenergetic functions have a spatial resolution down to at least one millimeter. At this point it SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 SG1A Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 Approved For Release 2Qgq,(Q8Lq,8AAR,preb00789R002200440001-9 U "IT'S DEFINITELY SOMETHING THIN AND LONG... WITH A NAIL HEAD AT THE END . . . SILVERED COLORED." "LIKE A MINIATURE TOWER . . . SCALLOPED BOTTOM . . . LIGHT BEIGE." "LIKE A PENGUIN . . . GREY AND BLACK AND WHITE ... POINTED OR SLIGHTLY ROUNDED OFF AT THE TOP ... OPEN OR POINTED AT GREY AND WHITE QUILL I THE BOTTOM." FIGURE 9 (U) TARGET OBJECTS IN METAL CONTAINERS 19 Approved For Release 2YOY0$/II8 ~alfAPP-00789ROO2200440001-9 Approved For Release 2000/&EC:PC5kTRDP96-00789R002200440001-9 (C) may be useful to summarize what has been learned thus far about RV (see Table 2). (C) To expand the applications of remote viewing and further explore its parameters a communication experiment was attempted. The experiment involved placing remote viewers in a submersible in 500 feet of sea water and approximately 500 miles from the target sight. A series of six targets were associated with six possible communications, and at an arranged time an experimenter went to a target and a remote viewer in the submersible prepared a description of a target. The description was then compared with the list of potential targets and a choice was made as to which one most nearly resembled the viewer's description. Correct identification of this target, which was coupled with a particular message, constituted delivering the message. Because of various technical problems, only two trials were completed and the correct message was transmitted in both. As the experiment was shielded by sea water, it was further concluded that ELF transmission was not a possible mechanism for remote viewing. The stress induced on the viewer by being underwater did not appear to degrade the quality of their remote viewing. (S/NF) The FTD, as part of their threat assessment responsibility, asked SRI to replicate a Soviet experiment where the transmission of 105 out of 135 digits was accomplished. SRI did the experiment and obtained results that were not significantly greater than chance. There are a number of possible explanations for the failure. The author's choice is that the state of the art was being exceeded. At that time, reasonable descriptions of macro targets were being confirmed. To give very refined descriptions of much smaller objects, letters and numbers in particular, has had a history of failure (or a very low level of success). If this ability is ever used in an intelligence mode, there are more rewarding areas where it may be better applied. Some of these are shown in Table 3. (C) Remote viewing, as the name implies, is a visual task. There have been, however, several instances where signals from other sensory modalities were reported. SRI developed an experiment with an audio target and initial results suggest that remote audio perception is possible but additional experiments would be needed to confirm its strength and reliability. In some cases data reported from other sensory modalities at times have been better than visual data. SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 SG1A Approved For Release 2000/0S8/08 : ~DP96-00789R002200440001-9 (S/NF) KNOWN ELEMENTS IN REMOTE VIEWING ? Target acquisition--Subjects can acquire target site on the basis of the presence of a known person at the site; targeting by geographical coordinates without the presence of a known person at the site yields results comparable to those obtained in experiments in which a person known to the subject is used as a beacon. This observation offers evidence for goal-oriented as opposed to means-oriented interpretation of the "laws" that appear to govern psychoenergetic functioning. ? Target attributes sensed--Descriptive aspects (shape, form, color, material) are described better than analytical concepts (function, name), although at times the latter come through excellently. Written target material is correct only occasionally. Alphabet targets are successful only statistically. In addition to visually observable detail, subjects sometimes report sounds, smells, electromagnetic fields, and other phenomena that can be verified as existing at target locations. ? Target attributes sensed--Descriptive aspects (shape, form, color, material) are described better than analytical concepts ? Spatial and temporal resolution--The channel functions with spatial resolution down to at least one millimeter. Real-time activities at the target site are often perceived. ? Distance effects--Accuracy and resolution are not sensitive functions of subject-target distance over intercontinental distances. ? Shielding--Faraday cage or sea water electrical shielding are not effective shields. ? Factors that appear to inhibit success in remote viewing--These are a priori subject knowledge of target possibilities, absence of feedback, application of the ability to trivial tasks (testing for the sake of testing), and use of repetitive target sequences. ? Factors that appear to enhance success in remote viewing--These are interest factors for the subject, a priori necessity for obtaining information and relevance (i.e., seriousness of purpose), the presence of a facilitating monitor to ask questions and direct the subject's attention, and practice with feedback. SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08 8 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 Approved For Release 2000/08/08 E DP96-00789R002200440001-9 R Table 2, Continued (S/NF) KNOWN ELEMENTS IN REMOTE VIEWING ? Accuracy and reliability--Analysis of remote viewing transcripts generated by experienced subjects indicates that on a given target site roughly two-thirds of the subject's generated material constitutes an accurate description of the site while about one-third is ambiguous, general, or incorrect. ? Repeatability of phenomena--Continuing demonstrations in this program, and replications in other laboratories, indicate that the capability known as "remote viewing" is a repeatable human perceptual ability. ? Distribution of psychoenergetic capacity in the population--Abilities appear widespread although latent; volunteers with no previous history of psychoenergetic functioning exhibit ability in screening experiments, indicating that reliance on the availability of special subjects may not be necessary. Unknown, however, are the percentage of population trainable or with natural talent, the optimum screening procedures, and the medical or psychological profiles of good subjects. ? Threat potential--Remote viewing, through the use of geographical coordinates as designators, has in many cases provided meaningful descriptions of East-Bloc military facilities designated as targets by the sponsor. Evaluation by appropriate intelligence community specialists indicates that a subject is able by this process to generate useful data corroborated by other intelligence data. As is generally true with human sources, the information is fragmentary and imperfect, and is therefore best utilized in conjunction with these other resources; nonetheless, the data generated by this process appear to exceed any reasonable bounds of chance correlation or acquisition by ordinary means, and therefore constitute a potentially exploitable information source. Approved For Release 2000/0AP C%-- P96-00789R002200440001-9 Approved For Release 2000/0c,8E 8 URDP96-00789R002200440001-9 RET (C) As a beginning to researching the many variables that could affect the quality of data obtained by remote viewing, the role of feedback was examined. Its role in a learning task is well known, so it is a natural element to test. There is an added complication, however,when the role of feedback in remote viewing is examined. That is, some researchers claim that a remote viewing subject obtains all his information precognitively from the feedback. Table 3 (U) REWARDING RV APPLICATIONS ? Finding lost objects ? Tracking SG1A REMOTE VIEWING ? Description of geographical feature ? Access to targets obscured to other intelligence collection techniques ? Descriptions of buildings, weapons, etc. ? Descriptions of the inside of buildings, laboratories, weapons storage, or housing ? Information that indicates the function of a site (C) In these feedback experiments two subjects were initially tested in 13 trials. All those with feedback were successful and those where no feedback was provided were not successful. To eliminate the psychological difficulties of the "no feedback mode" a series of experiments were performed where feedback was provided on a random basis. From the results of these experiments, the SRI researchers conclude that, "while it appears that feedback may be an extremely important psychological factor and may have some substantive role, it is not absolutely essential for successful remote viewing." Approved For Release 2000/08/Og":gR RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 SG1A Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 SG1A Approved For Release 2000/ U87D : DTATRDP96-00789R002200440001-9 (S/NF) Prior to the formation of a joint service DoD contract, three Army units were sponsoring research efforts at SRI. 1. (U) Missile Intelligence Agency (MIA) (S/NF) The objective of the MIA program was to determine the degree to which selected personnel are able to interact with and influence, by mental means only, sensitive electronic equipment and to ascertain how this phenomenon might be exploited for Army-designated applications. While there have been a number of studies in psychokinesis, many of those studies were considered to be incomplete in some of the more significant details. Many had no controls or afforded insufficient details about experimental apparatus. A proper experiment on mental means of influencing electronic equipment needs two things besides an individual who will attempt, by mental means alone, to change the random source's output: a source of true random electronic output and an accepted statistical technique. (S/NF) The MIA program had two phases. In Phase I a computer-based binary random number generator (RNG) was constructed. The system was tested by a series of standard, fixed-length statistical tests and found to meet all criteria for randomness. In Phase II, subjects were selected and trials begun. When all were completed, the SRI investigators concluded that there was an anomalous, unexplained effect on the electronic system which could not be accounted for by engineering considerations only. Two possible mechanisms could be responsible for the results: The first is that the subject, without physical intervention, produced a physical change in the electronic system. A second possibility is that the subject scanned the unperturbed binary sequence ahead in time SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 SECRET and selected the proper time to initiate the trial. The military implications of the remote perturbation would depend on which of the two mechanisms is correct. The data from these experiments were inconclusive. 2. (U) Army Material Systems Analysis Activity (AMSAA) (S/NF) Another Army Unit,AMSAA, contracted SRI to remote view daily field tests being conducted at Hunter-Liggett Military Reservation. These tests were generally unsuccessful. The SRI conclusion was that repetitive targeting on familiar sites is more difficult than viewing strategic targets. When the tests were successful, the site descriptions were of a higher quality than the tracking data. Since no final reports were produced on this work, it is difficult to evaluate its contribution to the field. This, however, may be an example of the penalty for attempting to acquire operational level data without having done enough ar S G1I basic research. We were warned of this source of error as early as mid-1970 at CIA. Even now, research has not yet established how to search for or how to track a target. 3. (U) Intelligence And Security Command (INSCOM) (S/NF) A third Army unit, INSCOM, provided $75,000 for research at SRI in 1979-1980. INSCOM and DIA would later form a joint service program (described in detail in section 5). Only their work prior to the joint program will be discussed here. It was also INSCOM that compartmentalized the area of psychoenergetics under the code name Grill Flame., (S/NF) In 1978, INSCOM was tasked by the Army to determine if parapsychology could in any way be used to collect intelligence. Specifically, INSCOM was tasked to determine if remote viewing can be used as a collection modality to gain operationally useful data. They chose to test the issue empirically. A unit was assembled and organized in 1979. The initial training phase was conducted at SRI during that summer. This was followed by an INSCOM in-house training program. The first operational sessions at INSCOM were conducted in September 1979. In December, the in-house remote viewing unit was declared an operational Approved For Release 2000/08/E cg t ,96-00789R002200440001-9 Approved For Release 200016c LTA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 unit having the capability to remote view targets of intelligence interest and provide accurate and useful data. INSCOM accepted tasks from a variety of DoD and other government organizations. Since no comprehensive analysis of their data was made, their success must remain a mystery. it again appears that applications were demanded too early in the program. (S/NF) INSCOM's greatest contribution was that their operational nature provided a proving ground for the ongoing research. They were also able to pose questions and identify problems they encountered in their operational sessions that could then guide research that could aid applications efforts. (S/NF) To screen a large number of individuals and select those most likely to be good remote viewers is a difficult task. In establishing the INSCOM unit, attempts were made to establish physiological and/or psychological parameters that would differentiate high performers from low performers. After a large number of tests were administered, no clear profile parameters emerged on which an a priori screening procedure could be based. SRI did, however, postulate that individuals who do successful remote viewing would be confident, outgoing, adventurous, broadly successful, and have an artistic bent. In 1988, the problem of identifying potentially good remote viewers was re-examined and a major research effort is now under way . (S/NF) Because SRI had been doing research in remote viewing for seven years, INSCOM sent six individuals to SRI to be trained to do remote viewing. The goals were to familiarize the individuals with SRI remote viewing protocols and attempt to achieve enhanced levels of functioning. Four of the six participants produced results that departed significantly from chance expectations. An example of a successful viewing is shown in Figure 11. This work was instrumental in establishing that remote viewing is a transferable technology. As the DoD becomes more involved in this particular technology, transferability is an important point. In the second phase of the INSCOM orientation training program, five of the six original participants returned to SRI for an additional two weeks of instruction. SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 Approved For Release 2000/08/08 SS I F I E ~s-00789R002200440001-9 CPYRGHT FIGURE 11 (U) STANFORD ART MUSEUM TARGET Approved For Release MmtsA~a!kAM-00789ROO2200440001-9 Approved For Release 2000/Q8ft:kff DP96-00789R002200440001-9 (S/NF) In addition to the training, SRI investigated several other research topics for INSCOM. In one experiment, the viewers were targeted on 35-mm slides of Bay Area locations. SRI was attempting to determine if the viewer would describe the slide with the same accuracy as an actual target site. The slide was thought to represent a finer resolution task and a more ephemeral target. Evaluation of the data led SRI to conclude that viewers can describe target slides and that the content of the transcripts indicates that the target slides were viewed, not the actual target locations. (S/NF) A second area, precognition, was also investigated using 35-mm slides as the targets. In this experiment the viewer was asked to describe a slide that would be shown to him at a later time, although the slide was not chosen until after the viewing was completed. This ability is significant, because many of the things clients would be interested in would involve knowing about a future event. SRI staff concluded that results from future remote viewings are comparable to the results obtained with real-time targets. Examples are shown in Figures 12 and 13. (U) At the suggestion of one of the viewers, SRI conducted some experiments on spontaneous extended remote viewing (ERV) which are associated with rest or sleep and take an hour or more to do. The results showed that ERVs are also comparable to other forms of remote viewing. In another experiment, a viewer was targeted on alphabet letters. The results were encouraging, but not definitive. (S/NF) Finally during this time period, SRI renewed their investigation of the use of geographic coordinates to target viewers. At this time it is not known how or why a viewer can describe an area when he is given only its geographic coordinates. However, the same results are achieved even when an arbitrarily constructed coordinate system is used. It is known that it works, but not why. The coordinates may be only a permission-granting device or the information may come from future feedback and the targeting technique may be immaterial. This would, however, support the notion that the psychoenergetic process is a goal- oriented phenomenon. SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 CPYRGHT FIGURE 12 (U) STANFORD SHOPPING CENTER TARGET, AND RESPONSE C z m Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 CPYRGHT UNCLASSIFIED FIGURE 13 (U) TARGET SLIDE, AND VIEWER 31 cc nn Approved For Release 20J/NcAcc I 4$tf gb789R002200440001-9 Approved For Release 2000/ J Et:ifff DP96-00789ROO2200440001-9 (S/NF) Later research shows that not even coordinates are needed to get the viewer to the target; the need for the information is what must be present. This could explain why operational trials where the data are needed by the intelligence community often produces information of a higher quality than laboratory or experimental trials. Formerly, it was believed that it was the monotony and repetitiveness of a lab drill that dampened the results. An equally plausible explanation is that the information is not really "needed." SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 Approved For Release 2000/0St0tRETDP96-00789ROO2200440001-9 SECTION 3. EARLY DIA SUPPORT (S/NF) (S/NF) The military services provided most of the money to support psychoenergetics research at SRI from 1975 to 1980. During this time, however, $228,000 were provided to SRI by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) . (S/NF) The DIA sought to investigate remote viewing as an aid in assessing the Soviet RV research. As the phenomenon has intelligence- collection potential, countermeasures and other factors that inhibit remote viewing were also of interest. The DIA program did not seek proof of principle but restricted its efforts to applications research and to actual attempts to collect intelligence. Thus, the research was confined to delineating factors that appear to affect the reliability and accuracy of RV and to develop a methodology to minimize the deleterious effects and then incorporate the findings into an RV training methodology. (S/NF) Since SRI, by now, had considerable experience with coordinate remote viewing (CRV), the factors that affect it were chosen for investigation. To improve the signal to noise ratio, it is necessary either to increase the signal or reduce the noise. Many attempts, mostly unsuccessful, had been made to increase the signal; therefore, it was decided to look at that causes of the noise and try to dampen them. Four major sources of noise were identified: 1. Analytical Overlay--Extrapolations to fill gaps in the data. 2. Associational Overlay--The stimulation of existing mental formations that are associationally related to the target. 3. Monitor Overlay--The encroachment of the monitor into the viewer's awareness 4. Environmental Overlay--The intrusions of environmental objects into the viewer's awareness. (S/NF) At this point, a model of how RV works (Figure 14) was developed. Upon presentation of the stimulus (a coordinate), a burst of data appears which then fades away. The stimulus is again presented and there is another burst of data. It is in the time gap between SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 Approved For Release 2000/(SE(:kEkTRDP96-00789R002200440001-9 presentations of the stimulus that the viewer fills in his own interpretations and analysis of the data. (S/NF) These are not psychically derived, and they are usually not accurate. To avoid this noise, a procedure where the stimulus is repeatedly provided and where the viewer responds with quick-reaction data bytes was developed. This procedure, the use of a featureless room with homogeneous coloring, and limiting the monitor's behavior are the solutions offered to reduce the noise. (C) To improve the signal, a progressive multistage target acquisition process was postulated where increasing contact is made with the target through a series of steps (Table 4). It was hoped that training viewers to know these stages and report their data within that format would increase the amount of correct data. Initial training results seemed to confirm that the amount of inaccurate data dropped. Table 4 (U) STAGES OF TARGET ACQUISITION 1. Recognition and decoding of Gestalts 2. Achieving sensory contact with target 3. Experiencing motion and mobility within target 4. Recognizing and decoding minor signals 5. Decoding special characteristics of target 6. Analytical recognition and decoding of significant aspects of the target (C) To determine the applications possible, SRI chose and explored a series of targets using CRV. The results were encouraging and provided some hope that using RV for collecting intelligence may be possible, and that the training mechanisms seem to improve the signal-to-noise ratio. (C) The training program was directed at training participants to bring their remote viewing ability under more conscious control, and to recognize and overcome factors that limit RV reliability. One of the larger limiting factors was the viewer mixing data from his memory and imagination with the psychic data. This could account for the final set of data having accurate and inaccurate information intermixed. SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96=00789R002200440001-9 ~F IV) uNC1.ASS 35 ~S~F~ED vNG`A Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 Approved For Release 2000/&ECWRDP96-00789R002200440001-9 SECTION 4. THE JOINT SERVICE PROGRAM (U) (S/NF) By 1980, a number of DoD elements were contracting for a variety of psychoenergetics tasks at SRI. As a result, a briefing was given in April 1980 to launch a joint service program. High ranking officers and civilians in Army, Navy, and Air Force Intelligence were present along with representatives of DIA and other DoD offices. It was hoped that a joint service program would redress the problems of not enough funds, no central management, and no termination point. The details on the structure and function of this program are available in the DoD Grill Flame Progress Report (Mid-Year FY 1981), Appendix I. In brief, the program established a working group to deal with policy matters and to establish broad general guidance for the psychoenergetics external assistance contract. Provisions were also made for a primary contract monitor who would attend to the day-to-day research progress, (S/NF) With regard to funds for the program, the budget for FY 1981 was $456,000. Funding at that level did keep the program alive but, it was estimated that a minimum of $600,000 to $1,000,000 per year would be needed to fund the research program properly. A three-year contract was proposed but only a one-year effort was contracted. At the end of three years a decision would be made whether or not the program would be continued. A. (U) FY 1981 (S/NF) The joint service proposal was accepted and work began in September 1981. Almost immediately a great number of problems were encountered. The sparse funding for the first year has already been mentioned. DoD Grill Flame Progress Report, Mid-Year FY 1981 gives the details of a number of other problems. The most serious difficulty was that the sponsoring group would include only the DIA and Army INSCOM. For various reasons all the other potential members chose not to participate. There were also some significant administrative differences between the DIA and INSCOM. In short, where a union had been envisioned a confederacy developed. That is, each participant maintained its separate funding, and requirements, and both engaged in managing and monitoring the research. As a result, the Grill Flame Program was only an overlay on what already existed. Figures 15 through 20 point out how the program was conceived SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 Approved For Release 2000/Q,6pt:IfMDP96-00789R002200440001-9 REQUIREMENTS POOL GRILL FLAME PROGRAM SRI CONTRACT OTHER CONTRACTS FIGURE 15 (S/NF) GRILL FLAME FUNDING PLAN SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 Approved For Release 2000/0%~c:PC&TRDP96-00789R002200440001-9 REQUIREMENTS $ POOL ARMY I DIA GRILL FLAME PROGRAM TASK POOL OTHER CONTRACTORS FIGURE 16 (S/NF) GRILL FLAME FUNDING ACTUAL SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 Approved For Release 2000/( Et:*E9RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 REQUIREMENTS ARMY L DoD GRILL FLAME PROGRAM L CONTRACTOR RESEARCH FIGURE 17 (S/NF) DATA FLOW PLAN SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 Approved For Release 2000/(fp?:R;rATRDP96-00789R002200440001-9 FIGURE 18 (S/NF) DATA FLOW ACTUAL 40 SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 GRILL FLAME ARMY REQUIREMENTS DIA PROGRAM DIA S.O.W. ARMY [DIA] CONTRACT CONTRACT MONITOR MONITOR CONTRACTED RESEARCH ARMY DIA Approved For Release 2000/0geCRlE DP96-00789R002200440001-9 REPORT TO ? REQUIREMENTS ? EXPERIMENTS ? OPERATIONAL TARGETS REPORT RESEARCH RESULTS GRILL FLAME SPONSORS REPORT PROGRAM INTERPRETED L-1SRI : I REPORT TO FIGURE 19 (S/NF) CONTRACT MONITOR--PROPOSED SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 Approved For Release 2000/OSPC. RIfyDP96-00789R002200440001-9 DIA REQUIREMENTS OP TARGETS R IMENTS SECRET Approved For Release 2000/0 /08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 and how it actually functioned. The areas pursued in FY 1981 are listed on Table 5. Details on the accomplishments for FY 1981 can be found in FY 1981 DoD Grill Flame Report, November 1981. In brief, however, SRI developed an RV training procedure and transferred it to three experienced viewers. An intelligence study on Soviet psychoenergetics was written and one on China was begun. Initial steps were taken toward the development of an RV data base management system and a list of possible countermeasures was compiled. In audio analysis, a target-independent audio/linguistic measure was correlated with RV accuracy. Some progress was made on the targeting issue, but as it was seen to be a very difficult problem, it was reported that it would require several more years of research before a result could be expected. In addition to the above tasks, approximately 16 operational remote viewings were completed at SRI. Table 5 (U) FY 1981 RESEARCH AREAS ? Reliability of RV/OP Targets ? Intelligence Assessment ? Feasibility of data base management for RV data ? RV Countermeasures (S/NF) Before the FY 1982 Program is discussed, several points should be made with regard to the participants in the joint program. The overall goal for both was to develop the capability to do high-quality, high- resolution remote viewing of operational targets of intelligence interest. When one examines the tasks pursued over the three years, the common thread that runs throughout the research would have led to the development of this capability. Initially, however, the DIA and INSCOM efforts appear to have diverged. INSCOM had only one mission, to explore those factors that would improve the functioning of their existing in-house operational SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 SG1 B Approved For Release 2000/09/A k ff DP96-00789R002200440001-9 RV group. Targeting, audio analysis, and training members of their in-house group, all fit well within their mission. The DIA, however, had three missions: ? Prepare for developing an in-house capability ? Identify countermeasures to psychoenergetic phenomena ? Evaluate and report psychoenergetics research in foreign countries. (C) Figures 21a and 22 depict these missions and the program's development over the entire three years. (U) Funding problems again reduced the amount of work that was done. The amount of money was not the only problem, it was the late date at which it arrived. The DIA FY 1982 money arrived on 10 February 1982, and the Army funds on 6 August 1982. This meant that for nearly five months the project was paid for on SRI overhead. The point should not be belabored, but its effect on the amount (and sometimes the quality) of the work should be noted. (S/NF) The FY 1982 research projects were, for the most part, follow-on efforts to the FY 1981 research. In the RV enhancement program, research on training procedures was continued and the task of transferring the technology was begun. Instead of training experienced remote viewers, as in FY 1981, SRI trained novice viewers. Several of them were Army personnel who were to be members of the INSCOM in-house RV team, (C) During FY 1982, one of the most difficult problems in the field of psychoenergetics was probed: how do you evaluate the results of a remote viewing session? Nothing else can proceed in a normal way until researchers can measure their results. Only then can they detect the effect of altering the variables. In FY 1982, a procedure having three distinct phases was developed: SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 Approved For Release 2000/OS( RIE-1 DP96-00789R002200440001-9 ? Reduction of remote viewing response data. ? Target/task related assessment. ? Analysis procedure. Instructions for using the evaluation system can be found in Remote Viewing Evaluation Techniques, December 1986. C. (U) FY 1983 (S/NF) While the funding picture for FY 1981 and FY 1982 was bleak, it became much worse in FY 1983, when Congres removed all the Army INSCOM funds for psychoenergetics research from the FY 1983 budget. As INSCOM funds were being counted upon to support half of the research for that year, this action threatened the existence of the project. However, other funding was found and the work continued. The Grill Flame program was to last only three years and, at the close of FY 1983 it was ended by Congressional dictate. Congress further specified that no NFIB funds were to be spent for psychoenergetics research in FY 1984 or beyond. Thus, funding outside the NFIB had to be found to continue the research. (S/NF) Also in FY 1983, the Grill Flame Project was reviewed by a panel of distinguished scientists. Over a period of several days, they took a hard look at the scientific aspects of the program, including experimental design and analysis of data. In general, they were impressed by the work and found no major flaws in it. A summary and discussion of their report can be found in Psychoenergetic Research, 7 August 1984. (S/NF) The tasks pursued in FY 1983 are shown in Table 6. All except one, search methodology, are follow-on efforts to work begun in or before FY 1982. This search methodology task is essentially the inverse of the kind of remote viewing that had received the greatest amount of attention at SRI. Whereas, SRI had always asked "tell me what is at location X," now the question was "where is what I want, where can I find it?" Over the next several years this task was to receive a great amount of attention. For DoD applications, searching has the potential for being the most valuable form of remote viewing. Table 6 (U) FY 1983 TASKS RV Enhancement Data Base Management Intelligence Assessment Operational Sites Search Methodology SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 Approved For Release (Po/Nf4 $4A-h0789R002200440001-9 - N CC OC x 00 p I-- O LL- LA W W N 0 I- O 1+7 a w w a CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 Approved For Release f O 1 DEENIT op789R002200440001-9 IMPROVE EXISTING CAPABILITY TARGETING IIFY'811 AUDIO ANALYSIS (FY'81) TRAINING (FY'81)--DIA (FY'82) FIGURE 22 (C) THE ARMY MISSION AND PROGRAM CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 Approved For Release 2000/Cf EC:RrATtDP96-00789R002200440001-9 SECTION 5. THE GRILL FLAME EVALUATION (S/NF) (S/NF) The goal of Grill Flame had been to devise a joint service program that would place an adequate amount of money into psychoenergetics research, on a timely basis, for a period of three years. Not one of these objectives was met. The program had only two participants, both of whom operated unilaterally, and there was never enough money. For the three years, funding averaged only $429,000 per year. In addition, the funds were always much delayed. The 1982 funding was not received at SRI until the fiscal year was over. The three-year contract never materialized, only three one-year contracts. (S/NF) To make conditions worse, the two participants, DIA and INSCOM, had different agendas. DIA sought to determine if any form of psychoenergetics processes could be applied to intelligence problems. This translates into, "can remote viewing be used to collect intelligence." INSCOM decided, however, that remote viewing had already achieved a level where it could be put to operational use. They then proceeded to conduct a large number of operational RV sessions for a variety of clients. Their attempt to push the RV process into operational status resulted in their pursuing goals that were scientifically inappropriate. Rather than waiting for training research to be completed, they immediately wanted "their people" trained. They selected project personnel for training long before any valid selection and screening techniques were available. Other areas that lacked operational readiness were evaluation methodology, tracking and searching techniques, RV operational protocols, data base management techniques, and research on the many variables that can affect RV performance. (S/NF) Despite all of this, the April 1980 briefing specified that at the end of three years one of the following recommendations would be made: (1) All funding should be terminated because it does not appear that psychoenergetics can be applied to the intelligence process. (2) Psychoenergetics can assist in gathering intelligence and we should either work with contractors in building an applications group or set up a DoD in-house unit. SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 Approved For Release 2000/C$gf-gk RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 (S/NF) The three-year program report recommended Alternative 2. The basis for this choice is found in the performance of the primary SRI viewer and several of the INSCOM viewers. Each did considerably better than chance over a series of operational remote viewings. This statistically significant series should not be taken to mean that an operational capability exists; it means only that there is a potential that might be developed into a useful intelligence collection tool. For instance, the configural and analytical content of RV sessions must be improved. Even today, SRI does not claim to be able to train and develop a cadre of remote viewers who can consistently produce operational-quality intelligence. Someday, hopefully soon, this will be possible. (S/NF) A complete assessment of the Grill Flame project can be found in "The Three-Year Grill Flame Program," dated 22 August 1983. The key findings are as follows: ? Remote viewing is a real phenomenon and is not degraded by distance. ? Remote viewing can be improved by appropriate training procedures. ? Remote viewing also has potential for U.S. intelligence applications and a potential threat to national security exists from foreign achievements in psychoenergetics. (S/NF) It should again be noted that there was a wide gap between Army INSCOM, and DIA's understanding as to what the current state of the art is in psychoenergetics research. To give the Three Year Program some semblance of order and direction, eight major areas of interest were identified. Each bears directly on the applications orientation of the two sponsors. SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 Approved For Release 2000/08/08 R IA RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 SECET A. (U) Training (S/NF) The effort was divided into research and development, and training personnel from client organizations. At the end of the program, the assumption was that improved remote viewing can be achieved through training. While almost all of the effort during the Three-Year Program was placed on only one methodology, research was begun on another training program when the Three-Year Program was concluded. Additional training methodologies that should yield more and better training programs are continually reviewed at SRI. B. (U) RV Enhancement (C) To this point, most of the targeting has been using coordinates. Other targeting strategies were investigated and they show promise. In addition an attempt to identify and separate good from bad data during sessions was made. Calibration trials and audio linguistic analysis were both looked at but did not hold enough promise to warrant their continuance. C. (U) Search (C) Search is looking for an object or person that is lost. Some progress was made, however, this problem still baffles the researchers. D. (U) Evaluation (C) A number of evaluation methods have been developed over the years, yet no standard procedure exists. Very little was accomplished on this subject during the Three Year Program, but the research on this important area continues. E. (U) Data Base Management (C) During the program a system was developed to store and sort both RV data and intelligence information, F. (U) Countermeasures (C) Research on this area still largely resides on gaining an improved understanding of the RV phenomena. Direct searches for countermeasure techniques cannot take place without having some basic understanding of the phenomena. Approved For Release 2000/08/ $ . CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 Approved For Release 2000/0%C RE4{tDP96-00789R002200440001-9 SG1A (U) Evaluation Recommendations (C) The final section of the Three-Year Grill Flame Program Report made two recommendations. It is interesting both The recommendations were: have been followed. ? Applied should funding intelligence-oriented research in remote be continued. (It has, although through source.) viewing another ? Basic research on RV and PK should be initiated. also through another source.) (It has, SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 Approved For Release 2000/0$t( c t DP96-00789R002200440001-9 SECTION 6. THE FOLLOW-ON PROGRAM (U) (S/NF) In FY 1984, the U.S. Congress imposed a prohibition on spending NFIB money for psychoenergetics research. At this point, the Three-Year Grill Flame Program had ended and an assessment of the research was made. The recommendation was that the work showed very promising potential, especially the use of RV to gather intelligence. Fortunately both Army and DIA were able to secure R&D funds to continue financing the research at SRI. (S/NF) In FY 1984, as before, the Army portion of the program was dedicated to topics that would assist INSCOM in improving the performance of their in-house RV group. The DIA funds were used to continue lines of research that began in the Grill Flame era. A complete list of areas investigated and the FY 1984 budget are shown in Table 8. Prior to FY 1984, only one training methodology had been investigated and it was used to train a number of individuals to do RV, During FY 1984, research on an alternative program was begun and good initial results were obtained using that technique. (S/NF) Also in FY 1984, a major emphasis was placed on methods to evaluate data derived from RV. Until then, RV research had concentrated on training people to do RV, improving the quality of RV data, and looking at variables that affect RV. A very vital area, evaluation, had received some attention but no concentrated effort. Evaluation is, of course, critical to any research effort and evaluating RV data has been an especially difficult task and one that is surrounded by much controversy. Complete and detailed reports are available on each of the tasks investigated in FY 1984. SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 Approved For Release 2000/S6E RDP96-OO789ROO22OO44OOO1-9 Table 8 (S/NF) FY 1984 TASKS AND SPENDING $ 85K RV Enhancement $ 85K Alternative Training $ 25K Targeting $150K psychokinesis Data Base Management $ 25K $ 50K RV Evaluation Methodology $ 10K Operational RV $126K Training (Advanced) $115K Selection and Screening $ 65K ELF $165K Search RV B. (U) FY 1985 (S/NF) During FY 1985, research on tasks initiated in FY 1984 was continued and many of the final FY 1984 reports were completed. The major item for FY 1985 was to develop a contract and statement of work for a major and well-financed five-year program to begin in FY 1986. The funding is from the R&D community and, therefore not restricted by the U.S. Congress prohibition on NFIB funds. The level of funding and the multi-year commitment has the potential to accomplish what previous under funded one-year efforts could not. One important facet of the program begun in FY 1985 was that some of the fundamental aspects of the RV and PK phenomena could be investigated without regard to a specific application. However, the sponsor also assured the intelligence community that those aspects of the phenomena that are important to the intelligence applications would continue, as would elements begun earlier but not completed. So, for the first time since 1972 it appeared that a program had been developed that was secure and would produce major advances in psychoenergetics research. SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789ROO2200440001-9 Approved For Release 2000/ R k DP96-00789R002200440001-9 SECTION 7. THE FIVE YEAR PROGRAM (U) (S/NF) In FY 1986, a five-year psychoenergetics research program was launched at SRI using Army Medical Department R&D funds. Although the Army currently provides all the funds, the effort, from the outset, included the needs of the intelligence community. In addition, research and development on medical and biological aspects of psychoenergetics was initiated. The Five-Year Program has three major objectives: Document that psychoenergetic phenomena are real and reproducible. ? Determine the mechanism underlying psychoenergetic phenomena. ? Bring psychoenergetics into the mainstream of human performance research. (U) The categories of research interest form a hierarchy ranging from basic research on fundamental mechanisms to methodologies for applications. These include: ? Identify explanatory mechanisms (e.g., electromagnetic effects, neurophysiological mechanisms). ? Specify phenomenological properties (e.g., effects of distance and shielding). ? Determining physical, physiological and psychological correlates (e.g., geophysical environment, EEG and GSE measures). ? Develop optimal strategies for use in applications (e.g., statistical averaging). A. (U) The First Year--FY 1986 (S/NF) Technical reports for each of the research areas investigated are available. Advances in several technical areas were made during this fiscal year. Much of the work was follow-on efforts to research begun in past fiscal years. In addition some new topics were also investigated. SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 Approved For Release 2000/cEC:RETRDP96-00789R002200440001-9 1. (U) Remote Viewing Enhancement - Advanced Training (S/NF) Two of the most experienced remote viewers who have been responsible for helping to formulate advanced training directions were formally calibrated during FY 1986. Both demonstrated strong statistically significant evidence of functioning. They also brought their attention to developing an advanced training manual. One of the experienced viewers also continued to train some of the advanced students and some progress was noted. Both demonstrated strong statistically significant evidence of functioning. They also brought their attention to developing an advanced training manual. One of the experienced viewers also continued to train some of the advanced students and some progress was noted. 2. (U) Novice Training (C) Nine students were chosen on the basis of personality screening criteria to participate in a novice RV training program. Four of the nine showed promise. 3. (U) Remote Viewing Evaluation (S/NF) The primary evaluation procedure, figure of merit analysis, was brought to the point where it was well understood and stable. In addition to its capacity to provide an assessment of RV- derived data, it is also useful in assessing the ability of RV evaluators (i.e., analysts). Other technologies to evaluate RV data have been identified for preliminary research. They will be discussed in future studies. 4. (U) Screening And Selection (C) The greatest amount of research on selecting potentially good remote viewers was on examining the Personality Assessment System. During 1986 that system accurately predicted the best and worst remote viewers among ten novice trainees. SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 Approved For ReleasCONF14O EINII1JAJ.00789R002200440001-9 5. (U) Search (C) Thirty-six participants were tested on both a spatial search and a temporal search problem. Two participants contributed significant results in spatial search and six were significant in temporal search. Subjects tended to do much better on one or the other, but not on both of these search tasks. 6. (U) Photon Production Experiment (C) This experiment attempted to replicate a Chinese experiment where signals from a photomultiplier tube were noted when "exceptional" remote viewings occurred. No statistically significant correlations were observed in the SRI experiments, despite the fact that the quality of the remote viewing was excellent. 7. (U) Piezoelectric Strain Gauge Experiment (U) In these experiments the object was to determine if RA could be used to induce effects on a piezoelectric strain gauge. Only one of the five subjects was able to consistently produce above-threshold effects. He produced at least two statistically significant events at SRI which led to a follow-on effort in FY 1987. B. (U) The Second Year--FY 1987 (U) Technical reports for each of the research areas investigated are available. The categories of research interest range from basic research on fundamental mechanisms to methodologies for applications. (U) Selected tasks are summarized below. A more complete description of the work and a complete task list may be found in the Enhanced Human Performance (December 1987). 1. (U) Fuzzy Set Applications in Remote Viewing Analysis (U) In FY 1987, fuzzy set mathematics was applied to the problem of RV analysis. Two analytical methods were developed; the first was designed to analyze the verbal content of the RV response, and the second to analyze the visual and spatial arrangements of response elements. CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 Approved For Release tI41 :Sii -00789R002200440001-9 2. (U) An Expert System Approach to Remote Viewing Analysis (U) The effort here was to make RV judging techniques more transferable, if not uniform. The result was an expert system to assist the analyst. Unfortunately, the series of RVs to test the system did not show a significant RV effect. 3. (U) Gross Physiological Correlates to RV (U) A persistent problem in using RV in an operational environment is the lack of a method for assessing the quality of a particular RV session. SRI attempted to determine whether external physiological cues could be used to discriminate accurate from inaccurate sessions. Unfortunately, no RV functioning was apparent; thus, no conclusions could be drawn. 4. (U) PAS Review (U) The PAS was reviewed to gauge its continued usefulness as a screening and selection technique. SRI concluded that it is not useful. 5. (U) Video Disk Training (U) The FY 1987 effort was aimed at developing a technology for enhancing the acquisition of RV skills. The conclusions were that persons trained using video disc format developed significantly improved RV skills. 6. (U) RV Stimulus-Response Times (U) The hypotheses tested were (1) shorter response latencies produce relatively better RV responses and (2) better responses are produced when less time is spent processing them. Both were confirmed. 7. (U) Hypnosis as an RV Debriefing Tool (U) In this experiment, hypnosis was used in an attempt to enhance an RV session. The results confirmed previous findings that hypnosis can facilitate the acquisition of information not available to other sensory processes. 8. (U) Neuropsychological Assessment (U) This was an exploratory attempt to determine if there are neuropsychological correlates of psychoenergetic functioning. Analysis of the results did show that productive ideation was partially related to measures of psychoenergetic functioning. UNCLASSIFIED Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 Approved For Release 2000/ RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 C. (U) The Third Year--FY 1988 (S/NF) For FY 1988 the Army funding was reduced from the expected $2.3 million to $1.15 million, and the Army Medical R&D Command expressed its intent of providing no additional funds for psychoenergetics research. The DIA, however, is holding $1 million to continue the research in FY 1989. The following tasks were completed in FY 1988: a. Identify New and Excellent Remote Viewers. To accomplish this task 196 individuals were screened using the video disk technology and protocol that were developed during FY 1987. Of the 196, 16 were selected for second-stage screening and two produced excellent results and have been invited to join the research effort as part-time viewers. b. Determine Physiological Indicators of RV: SG1A a second experiment, the attempt was to determine ii Lnere was significant alpha blocking as a result of a remote visual stimulus. The three participants all demonstrated significant changes in Alpha power across the remote stimulus boundary, of the six participants in the first experiment some did exhibit a response to a remote stimulus. c. Effects of Robust Feedback on RV Quality Of the targets looked at, the ones from the natural category elicited better remote viewing d. Effects of Hypnosis on RV Quality To test this, the remote viewing sessions were conducted while the viewers were in a hypnotic trance. The results were not statistically significant. e. Mental Noise in Binary Psychoenergetic Task The statistical data suggest that some sources of mental noise was detected by the experiment. f. Fuzzy Set RV Analysis This methodology shows much promise for judging the amount of correct information in a remote viewing session. SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9 Approved For Release 2000/0'8kc:'CTATRDP96-00789R002200440001-9 SECTION 8. THE DIA PROGRAM--FY 1989 (U) (S/NF) DIA will investigate the following topics in FY 1989. ? Meta-analysis of all experimental results since 1973 ? Magnetic visual evoked potentials correlation with a remote stimulus ? Evaluation of operational RV results ? Conduct operational RV sessions ? Selection and screening for remote viewers ? Further research on using hypnosis in the RV process SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9