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Approved For Release 2009118/15: CIA-RD 1792M0b1O h20005-3 human n h on p seed informa pro side to this debate suggests that errors are caused by cuts. e t y adaptive information-processing s .,++r;r,,,tional field into that of human sear ment and decision making in the d g ju era have pointed out many weaknesse ha h d paper esc- - Ps h Kahneman and A. Tversky (moo Thus i resent the more general processes t cognitive errors. certai rocessing influences. The getnerallye ti Kahneman and Tversky sugg are effecti of events may b objects or events, availability in perception, men vidual's judgment of Wends very much on th strategy which can lead to adju stment. Here, individ ing with an initial value o justed to account for new which erroneous beliefs confirming information. logical research that human judgment and of errors in conclusi settings. The rese ent theory of huma and present them logical research on parapsychologists false-negative con an sions about the operation of p- to stress that quality of data on the occurrence of psi; and (3) mistaken while there is some emphasis in parapsychology g information--this is one way ,, ? of d s- ibes three areas of ognitive social psycho- ear on the question o ference and consequen y on the examination error and indeed, may not b _P findings of relevance t This re- parapsychology ii the vui-h'. ? .. , lusions about the occurrence of psi may be istaken conelu- help in eventually identifying m hancinL the in human cognition, oul Lhu? been highlighted by D. al Review, 1973, 237-251). on-processing factors may rep- st that people habitually use 1 o lead to errors. The first of s availability, where people's t b y nenev of objects or the likelihood to the accessibility of items --;n - g The ~1naLiOn . --- sor similarity, where an indi- s ~tivene that two events are related de- bilit y a ee to which these events have features The final information-processing rrors is judgment by anchoring and r tart- o conclusions that psi has occurred, psychological researc error logically cuts both ways, and can aid in the identification of false-positive and false-negative conclusions about the occurrence of psi. ANOMALOUS HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACTION (AHCI): TOWARS (OR, AN HOW TO MAKE FRIENDS AND INFLUENCE COMPUTERS) K. Morgan (Dept. of Psychology, Univ9Jty of Edinburgh, 7 George Square, Edinburgh EH8 This paper is an attempt to clarify in what manner a genuine anomaly can be distinguished from an incident explicable by physical means. It also tries to exemplify the various methods that could be used to simulate an anomalous human-computer interaction (AHCI). This paper does not dwell in any more than a superficial obs manner upon the psychology involvedi in manipulati go bservrrs which would allow the described phy out. That would demand a paper in its own right. Part of the research being carried out at the Koestler Chair and other institutions is the investigation of anomalous human- computer interaction. As with any area of parapsychological re- search there always exists the danger of the researcher mistaking a normally explicable phenomenon as an anomaly. paper s written to help people who are confronted by an unusual happening to evaluate the situation on a computer sibility of there beng normal methods offsimulating almost any pos anom aly . The various categories into which both simulated and genuine anomalies could fall can be separated into the following: (1) Human. The majority of so-called anomalies might be found to be caused by the users' ignorance of their own computer system or aspects of it. This, coupled with the human trait of forcing unconnected events into meaningful patterns, might explain many anomalies. (2) Software Anomaly. The methods of achieving the simula- tion of a softwar dware-based) anomaly can be broken down into the following categories: (a) Replacement of the target program. The target program or process is exchanged for an amended version that contains the extra "feature" that will become the "anomaly." Approved For Release 2000/08/15: CIA-RDP96-00792R000701020005-3 Approved For Release 2000tGOP15 : CIA-RDP964070RO0O 01020005-3 (b) Adjusting or amending the target program or process. In this scenario the target process is amended at the same time or very shortly before the "anomaly." This would of course demand the knowledge of the specification of the software being used at the target site. (c) Breaches in computer /organizational security both prior to and simultaneously with anomaly. These are often a necessary prerequisite of any of the above software anomalies. The breach in security could even be from a remote site, via a computer communica- tion link that has access to the target system. The use of inter- preted languages or online debugging (disassembling) tools makes this reasonably easy. (3) Hardware Anomaly. This section covers any physical ef- fect that occurs to an item of computer machinery (but not to the logic controlling it). These "effects" could often take the form of either repairing or destroying an item of equipment. These items could be anything from a personal electronic belonging (e.g., an electronic watch) to a computer's storage device. (a) Replacement. In this scenario an exact duplicate of the target is prepared and exchanged for the target item when the op- portunity arises. The duplicate has some extra "feature" which will be used by the false anomalist to simulate the required anomaly. (b) Adjustment/destruction--"live." To adjust or amend an item of equipment is not as difficult as it might appear. Much com- puting equipment is sensitive to one or many of the following en- vironmental influences : weak magnetic fields, physical force (e.g., bending), exposure for long periods to strong sunlight, contact with sharp objects, extreme humidity, temperatures outside the tolerated range, contact with static electricity, and any substances or object making contact with a recording or electrically conductive surface. (c) Breaches in computer /organizational security before or simultaneously with anomaly. In contrast to the previous scenarios, simulating hardware anomalies requires the physical presence of the false anomalist or environmental influence in order to achieve the anomaly. (4) External to Computer System. Such things as electrical mains fluctuations are a possible example of natural "disasters," and if the fluctuation coincided with some other meaningful event the users might decide that an anomaly had occurred which had a correlation with that meaningful event, thus starting local lore about this false correlation. Methods of Avoiding Computer-Based Fraudulent Anomalies Examples of new technology that might help alleviate the above- mentioned problems are (1) WORMS (write once read many times) optical disks. These (at present) are noneditable and are immune to "grubby thumbs," magnetic fields, and static. They are therefore much better potential psi-corruption targets than the currently favorite floppy disk, especially if the target data on the disk are well en- crypted and the disk uniquely identified. (2) Optical fiber cables. This makes data transmission line monitoring or adjustment much more complex. (3) Automated technical advisers for computer-based security. These can rapidly and thoroughly analyze a large and highly com- plex system specification for security weaknesses. They are only as good as the level of detail or accuracy in the specification and the expertise of their user. (4) Gypsy verification environments & (5) Program analysis tools. Both of these methods could be useful in the analysis of a piece of code that has been in an "anomaly." Again, they are sub- ject to the same weaknesses discussed under the previous heading. (6) Cryptographic methods. These can be highly effective in preventing access to information, provided a sufficiently good encryption method is selected. (7) Shielding. Simple shielding of vdu screen emission can eliminate the chance of a computer screen being reconstituted out- side the system confines. This paper has tried to portray the various scenarios that could be misinterpreted as an "anomalous" human-computer inter- action (AHCI). It also tried to show that there are conceptual pat- terns that allow AHCI anomalies to be categorized, along with their possible fraudulent explanations. It is hoped that armed with such a method of categorization experimenters may be able better to re- cord and evaluate the intriguing field of AHCI. In such evaluations it may be more cost effective to create a means of detecting a fraud- ulent anomaly rather than to proof a system against every possible threat. A highly motivated false anomalist with large financial and time resources might be able to create fraudulent anomalies, regard- less of the tightest precautions. Experimenters might therefore find it helpful to adopt an experimental condition where no one Approved For Release 2000/08/15: CIA-RDP96-00792R000701020005-3 Approved For Release 2000/08/15: CIA-RDP96-00792R000701020005-3 Papers star "makes or breaks" the results. By using large "anonymous" source groups the incentive for any one individual to create false anomalies might be greatly reduced. WHEN WILL WE BEGIN TO REDUCE ALPHA AND BETA ERRORS IN STATISTICAL PSI EXPERIMENTS? Ulrich Timm (Institut fur Grenzgebiete der Psychologie and Psychohygiene, Eichhalde 12, 7800 Freiburg i.Br., West Germany) In many psi experi made, after whose correct appears. These are Type That does not necessarily real psi effects do not exis correctly, are often so inef instability, and inconsistenc seldom lead to statistical sign cal methods creates Type II er tical selection errors are 'statistical significance dis- er, that in these experiments e usual methods, if utilized ith regard to the rareness, e. This inefficiency of statisti- or beta errors. Therefore, gnificances but also the reduction ase of real significance. First I give an overview of tho e alpha errors that I call statistical selection errors. T ese sho , simply stated, the follow- ing three qualities (Timm, 4, 1983, 19k-229): (1) From a set of st istical result a single result is se- lected and eval ted by some si ficance test. (2) The selection not performed radomly but according to a criterion hat is related to th level of the single result in that it directly or indirectly favors positive (3) Despite this success-dependent selection, the significance test is carri~d out and interpreted in the usual manner without any correction. Approved For Release 2000/08/15: CIA-RDP96-00792R000701020005-3