SELECTED PRESENTATIONS OF THE 26 MAY SECURITY MEETING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP96B01172R000400030024-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 4, 2003
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: September 8, 1976
• Content Type: MF

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Subject: Selected Presentations of the 26 May Security Meeting
1. Attached for your review are three presentations delivered
during the 26 May Security Meeting in Los Angeles. Included
are the text of General Kulpa's opening remarks, 25X1
I Ispeech on the role of the Special security
center, and a essence of I Iremarks on the NRO 25X1A
and changes in the intelligence community.
2. Please take this opportunity to formally rebrief all of your
personnel using the material contained in this
paccageo Even hough some of the data is perishable it can serve
as an outstanding "Refresher Course" for your people. The
level of information is and should be tail-
ored by each Il security o icer o company unique circum-
stances.
3. After you have had sufficient time to review the materials,
I would welcome any comments or questions you may have. Also,
please (advise me when you have completed your rebriefing efforts.
3 Atch
a/s
NRO review(s)
completed.
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WELCOMING/KEYNOTE COMMENTS
BY MAJ GEN JOHN E. KULPA
As you can see I have been associated with satellite
reconnaissance for a long time and, as such, have a great
25X1A feeling of identity with
meeting here. I know that, in addition to the
security and the group
Security Officers, a key member of
D
ment is representing each company. I know you are all
busy people. I appreciate this representation and think
it is necessary to achieve the goals of this meeting.
1. The mission of the Special Projects organization is
to develop and operate reconnaissance satellites, return
the data to earth and deliver it to the processing center.
Intelligence collection and security are intertwined. A
successful intelligence collection system, in order to re-
main useful, must be secure. In the case of satellites,
it is a particularly hard job keeping satellite systems
secure, because satellites are fragile, operate in the
open environment of space and can be the target of political
complaints from countries who feel their privacy rights are
being invaded. Further, launches can't be hidden and
satellites can be tracked and traced. For those reasons,
which make security both difficult and important, we have
tried to keep a close interlock between management of the.
systems and security.
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Thus far, there has been reasonably good success in keep-
ing the'subject of satellite reconnaissance out of inter-
national and national debates. There has been no
systemitized challenge, as to the legitimacy of the opera-
tion. The constraining of discussion of satellites for
reconnaissance is now DOD SECRET, more change may come,
That is, there may be in the future, from time to time,
official acknowledgements of satellite reconnaissance by
Government officials. If this occurs, we-believe there
will be little real effect on day-to-day security,
associations, capabilities, missions, plans and operations.
Protecting the details of technologies, capabilities,
methods, sources, logistics, industrial potential in the
operations of reconnaissance satellites will, I perceive,
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system and be our challenge to keep
2. Let me talk about a new approach that will offer in-
teresting
security challenges.
Until now, the assets and resources of reconnaissance
satellites have been devoted to fulfill the national mandate
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and covert relationships. However, in no case should any
25X1A individual with a clearance act against his con-
science. The means, as well as the ends of our job are.
and will remain absolutely legal and ethical. We can secure
our systems and be honest, in fact, honesty and security go
together.
Let me be blunt, there is nothing wrong in keeping out
I also want to again re-emphasize the need to avoid any
conflict of interest situations. SAFSP personnel will not
accept any gratuity and I ask your cooperation in avoiding
embarrassing situations.
The subject of ethics is very close to the whole phenomenon
of management responsibility in the changing social environ-
ment. Even before Watergate, the advent of OSHA, Freedom
of Information Law and EEO had its impact on management in
both Government and industry. These social changes are
important and healthy for our society but they do cause
additional considerations in managing
security. 25X1A
Later in the day more attention will be given to social
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3. About day to day security - You are well aware that
we have avoided a rigid compliance security program. We
do not have an SAFSP I ~ecurity representative in
your plant. We look to you to carry out the mandate of
conducting I ecurity. Generally, over the years,
you have done a good job, and I understand the often
difficult position you may be in when the goals of manage-
ment appear to be inhibited by
Constraints. My
Deputy Directors and I appreciate the outstanding accom-
plishments of ~ecurity over the years that could
not have been achieved without a lot of hard work and
sacrifice by the
security officers.
The reason for this meeting, however, is that I see
symptoms that suggest a loss of vitality. TOP SECRET
material has been lost on the streets.
is popping up in noni
even unclassified, documents.
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I have just reviewed a report of a briefed-individual
describing a program mission to an uncleared person. These
and other examples of concern will be discussed in more
detail later in the day.
You, the people in this room, are the binding force for
our programs. I do not have as much of an opportunity as
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I would like to talk to you either individually, or in
groups, about the importance of our security program.
What we hope to achieve by our meeting today, is a better
understanding by those of you in management positions so
that you can fulfill your responsibility in assuring tire
protection of information vital to continued successful
intelligence collection by satellite.
I thank you for your assistance in the past and encourage
you to the challenges of the future.
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Special Security Center (SSC), CIA - Our job is to co-
ordinate security on the compartmented systems in general
in cooperation with the USIB committees, which are now re-
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christened, instead of USIB, NFIB. Everything is changing.
That's sort of the theme of what I'm going to talk to you
about today. The SSC, for example, is the primary source
of security policy for the NRO. In my previous position as
the NRO staff security officer, I was detailed there by the
Special Security Center. And so we do have a policy role
and some of you may wonder, well good grief, why don't they
formulate some better policy than they have in the past.
? The truth is that years ago only the NRO, the intelligence
community and the Russians knew much about our reconnaissance
efforts and security policy was relatively easy to make and
simple to follow.
But things are now much more complicated, for many reasons.
The product, as General Kulpa said, is invaluable and, as
he also indicated, it's going to a lot more places than it
used to, like the Department of Agriculture, the Department
of Interior, the Department of Commerce. In order for the
tax payer to get his buck's worth out of that reconnaissance
effort, that product has to be spread around, and it's very
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useful. People do find it extremely useful. The result
is that more people than ever are receiving satellite col-
lected intelligence.
Another factor is disclosures about these programs - first
Aviation Week and Jack Anderson, and then Seymore Hirsh,
and then Marcetti and Marks, and more recently Phil Agee,
the former CIA officer who, although not legally.labeled so,
from an ideological standpoint is in fact a defector.
Agee isn't finished yet. Last week, just before I left
to come out here, I was told that he had managed to dredge
up 200 more names of people he had been associated with
? when he was a Central Intelligence Agency.officer and dis-
closed those as well. The man has undergone a total
ideological change.
And then there were the SALT negotiations where we heard
about national technical means of verification. That's a
nice euphemism but it adds up to another admission of fact
of. There was the Rockefeller Commission, the Church
Committee, the House Committee on Intelligence. In all of
these, both through leaks and through official disclosures,
revealed a great deal about the overhead reconnaissance
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effort and intelligence in general. And there's sort of a
rising, a lack of agreement among the intelligence com-
munity regarding how much should be revealed publicly re-
garding our reconnaissance efforts, and friends, it isn't
easy to formulate security policy. It's always been heard
to maintain a secret, but it gets harder all the time. But
we, those of us in the National Reconnaissance Organization,
have kept a lot of secrets over the years. And we will
have to analyze motivation to understand why, not only why
people disclose information that damages our intelligence
effort, but why some people are willing to undergo the in-
convenience, the extra work and the anonymity that are
necessary to protect those efforts.
Those who leak secrets from the inside have their own
motives - revenge against an institution which has failed
to recognize and reward their peculiar genius; ideology, a
misguided notion that abolishing secrecy will assure world
peace and a better life for everybody; fame and notariety.
This sort of thing. And finally of course, I suspect the
most significant motive of all, financial gain.
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? But we have our own motivations, those of us in this room.
We have our own rewards, some of them in the form of what
was popularly called a few years ago "psychic income." We
have patriotism, knowing that we have contributed to the
defense posture of the United States in a unique and irre-
placeable way. We have pride in the skill and genius which-
have gone into the production of.intelligence collection
systems which, even today, makes some of Jules Vernes'
most imaginative stories seem pale by comparison.
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To be absolutely objective, of course, financial gain enters
into it for us, too. The United States aerospace industry
has grown and prospered through participation in the
National Reconnaissance Program. Not only do these facts
add up to a situation in which security policy is increasingly
difficult to formulate and virtually impossible to enforce
without the single minded cooperation and support of every
man and woman in this room. And without the absolute support
of the management of each contractor represented here. And
some of us might find it confusing, irritating, even
embarrassing, to read in the newspapers information that
relates to programs we are restrained by security from dis-
cussing. Does it irritate you? Sure it does. You wouldn't
be human if it didn't, but, let's take a look at why and
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how the NRP has managed since 1960 to maintain a record
of security which probably has not been surpassed in the
history of intelligence and secrecy.
First, it is because of the motivational factors I mentipned
earlier. Second, we have always maintained a totally un-
flapable attitude in the face of-these disclosures and in-
quiries. We have never rushed to let the cat out of the
bag just because he managed to get a whisker out of the
opening. We have let the disclosures wear themselves out
in the press. We have avoided adding to the information
that was already compromised. Like any champion team, we
? have never abandoned our game plan. We have stuck together.
We have avoided adding to the problem, and it is important
that we continue to do so. When we start letting our
adversaries call the shots, when we start playing their
game, we are going to be in very serious trouble.
.Now, should the government do something about disclosures?
Should we have laws to limit the news media? Well, such
laws are impossible because they are unconstitutional, and
secondly, I for one wouldn't like to see them passed be-
cause they would deprive us as Americans of one of our most
precious possessions, a free press.
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Security has to come from within, and recent efforts to
plug security leaks have concentrated on seeking legisla-
tion to penalize those who disclose secrets which were
officially entrusted to them. This is logically and
legally the only way we can go among the informed and ?
well intentioned government officials.
There is a lack of agreement on certain basics. For
example, there are those who feel strongly that the fact
that the United States engages in satellite reconnaissance
for intelligence purposes, what we popularly call fact of,
should be unclassified. And certainly the disclosures by
the news media, government officials, and others lend an
unassailable logic to the proposition that when everyone
knows a secret it isn't asecret any more. But other
officials, equally well motivated, contend that we must
maintain fact of as a secret, at least officially, because
of possible diplomatic and political repercussions of
officially acknowledging that we are capable of gathering
intelligence from any corner of the earth without the con-
sent of the countries which are being so surveilled. This
is a very serious problem and a difficult one, and I don't
know how long it's going to take to. reach a final decision
on it, but it probably will come fairly soon.
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One thing for certain, if we are going. to maintain our
capabilities, facts about overhead reconnaissance have to
be very closely held. Every increment of information
about how our systems operate, every item of data on how
effective they are, all contribute to the ability of our
adversaries to mount effective countermeasures. Unfor-
tunately, there is a link between fact of and facts about.
Even people in the intelligence community sometimes ask
why all the secrecy. The Russians know we have
satellite reconnaissance systems, why can't we save our-
selves a lot of money and do away with all these security
programs. The naivete' of such a'view is reall
lli
y appa
ng.
? The Soviet intelligence services are spending a small
fortune trying to learn all about our capabilities. If
they can learn with precision what our systems can do, how
well they do it, they can concentrate their efforts on
only those countermeasures which will be really effective
against us.
The new social laws such as the Privacy Act and Freedom
of Information can provide opportunities for people whose
real purpose is to reveal intelligence sources and efforts.
Now, I might add parenthetically that the people in the
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Central Intelligence Agency, for example, who are tasked
with responding to these Freedom of Information Act in-
quiries find that not only are there very frequently
nebulous reasons for requesting the information - but they
find the same phraseology, the same format coming at tFiem
from all parts of the country, and this of course adds up
to a concerted effort to disrupt and harass the intel-
ligence community.
This kind of legislation, as the least, makes it very
difficult to formulate policies which are as simple and
effective'as the ones in the 60's were. It will become
? increasingly important to understand why our policies are
changing. At the same time, it will be more difficult in
a rapidly evolving situation to keep track of the changes
which will certainly occur. We are going to have to com-
municate more closely. You will have to try to foresee
complications which will arise from your implementation of*
those changes in policy.
At this time there area number of studies of compartmenta-
tion going on in the intelligence community. The views
expressed in these studies range from favoring complete
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? abolition of compartmentation through the realignment of
the various categories and criteria for compartmentation,
to finally a retention of the status quo. I think of
those three the last is the least likely to occur over the
long haul.
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In addition, the techniques of compartmentation, as they
are practiced in the national programs and have been for
years, are being copied by departmental programs, and more
code words and more slugs and more special channels are
being created, which promises additional confusion,
criticism of compartmentation today.
The picture I have painted may seem like a bleak one, but
I believe we are near the end of a difficult time, one in
which security was subordinated to a desire to probably
reveal all the ills and bad features of our intelligence
effort.
I feel that, in perspective, most Americans are convinced
that mistakes have been made, but they were not massive as
was charged, and they were not motivated by anything other
than a desire to serve the best interests of the United
States.
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The former Director of Central Intelligence, William Colby,
was a man of patriotism, wisdom and foresight.. He realized
that the day of simply stamping documents with a secret
stamp without any really serious consideration of why are
over, and he spoke repeatedly in public speaking engage-
ments of the need to keep good secrets while not trying to
keep bad secrets. Most of. his major addresses heavily
stressed the importance to our nation of a strong, well
founded security program, and the lessons he taught are
vitally important. He pointed out the folly of trying to
protect too much, of trying to conceal the unconcealable,
if we try to hide things which shouldn't be hidden, which
can't be hidden, we damage security by providing ammunition
to our critics. We can then say look at what all the
bureaucrats with their little rubber stamps have done now.
The worst part about that is when we have done something
that can truthfully be pointed to in fashion, we have given
them ammunition. We have provided credence and it does
seriously undermine our efforts to keep the good secrets.
The present Director of Central Intelligence, George Bush,
has already demonstrated a very keen interest in security.
He is a tireless worker, he shows every promise of giving
strong security leadership in the community. I think that
we can be assured that he's not going to do anything to
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weaken his ability to safeguard intelligence sources and
methods which is what he's charged to do by statute. The
CIA, I believe, is not about to adopt an extremist position
that says we have no secrets worth keeping.
Close and continuous communication between those who make
and administer policy and those who carry it out is
indispensible. Those of us in Washington need to know when
policies are being overtaken by events, or when circumstances
dictate the need for new policies to cover new situations.
All too often in history battles have been'lost because the
people at headquarters didn't know what was going on in the
trenches. So we have got to have that very, very close
? communication, and it's got to be timely. We can't let the
situation sit around and get worse and worse until there
isn't any solution possible before we try to do something
about it. I believe in the near term we are going to be
able to stablize our security programs, formulate policies
that are appropriate to today's situation and get on with
the business of producing the world's best intelligence
collection systems.
In the long term I believe that if we maintain a rigorous,
viable security program, the disclosures which have been
made will fade into insignificance, as new secrets arise to
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replace the old ones, just as the U-2 reconnaissance air-
craft of the 1950's have long been public knowledge. The
facts about our satellite systems which have been disclosed
will fade into history.
It is vitally necessary, however, that we renew our resolve
at this.moment to make the extra effort that spells the
difference between a truly effective security program and
simply making a minimal effort to give the-appearance of
compliance with security policies. Based on the past record,
I think I know which one you are going to chose, and I
believe the people of the United States owe each of you a
debt of gratitude for your dedication over the past two
decades. Thank you.
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Presentation by of the NRO
Staff to the 26 May Security Meeting- 25X1A
in Los An n a changing Environ-
ment" is ubject, and he addresses
the impa ive Order 11905, The NRO
Charter, National Policy for Satellite Reconnaissance,
and NRO Support to Military Forces.
Iremarks have been transcribed and
edited for presentation in this report of proceedings.
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THE NRO IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11905
NRO CHARTER
NATIONAL POLICY AND SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE
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(Refer to Chart #1)
There have probably been more changes that affect the intelligence community
in the last two years than there were in the past decade. EO 11905, which
caused the reorganization of the foreign intelligence collection activities
of the US Government, is perhaps the top driving document to all the changes
but it's by no means the only driving force that's going on in the community.
The NRO Charter, the document which tells how we operate and makes the NRO
a formal instrument for collecting intelligence, is perhaps of more concern
to those people in the government than in the contractor plants. Based
on experience, it is good background for understanding the total picture. I
will also elaborate on satellite reconnaissance policy.
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EXECUTIVE ORDER 11905
.DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE CONCERNS
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT HEARINGS
EXECUTIVE ORDER
ABOLISHED USIB IRAC NSCIC NRP EXCOM
. 40 COMMITTEE
ESTABLISHED INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
OPERATIONS ADVISORY GROUP
THE NRO IS A SPECIALIZED RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE
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(Refer to Chart #2)
EO 11905 was published on the 18th of February 1976. It was driven by a need
to improve the efficiency of the intelligence community and government control
over domestic surveillance activities to assure no violation of individual
rights. We are caught up in the over-all changes that are taking place in
the legislative structure.
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We work with the House and the Senate Appropriations Committees, the House
and Senate Armed Services Committees. Generally the comments have been the
program is well run and vital.
One of the specific features of the EO that affected the NRP was the abolishment
of the USIB. The USIB had been the organization that provided our requirements,
both long range and mission by mission, for collecting intelligence.
USIB is being reconstituted as the National Foreign Intelligence Board without
any great changes from the former USIB structure.
The Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee was also abolished by this order
as was the National Security Council Intelligence Committee.
The NRP Executive Committee, which has been our Board of Governors over the
years, was also abolished. It has been replaced by-the Committee on Foreign
Intelligence.
The EO did not call us the "NRO". That would have acknowledged the existence
of the office and been one step further to divulging as an official policy
of the government that we conduct satellite reconnaissance. At the last moment
the White House struck the words. They covered the NRO by saying that there
should be specialized reconnaissance offices for the collection of specialized
intelligence. %
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(REFER TO CHART #3)
Let's start with the DNRO. He is appointed as the DNRO by the Secretary of
Defense. The.Secretary of Defense is the executive agent for the NRP. The
Committee on Foreign Intelligence consists of three people: the DCI is the
Chairman and the other two members are the Deputy Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence and the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs. We look to this. Committee on Foreign Intelligence to approve our
programs and our budgets. We look to the DCI to establish our requirements
and priorities as the Chairman of the NFIB. The DCI is also responsible,
based upon the National Security Act of 1947, for establishing the security
policy that pertains to our program.
The Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) is to work with each of the agencies
of the intelligence community and look at matters of propriety and legality
in their operations. There will be periodic reports, at least quarterly,
made to this board.
Matters involving legality of intelligence operations will be reported by
the IOB to the Attorney General for presentation to the President. Matters
of propriety rather than legality will be reported directly to the President
by the IOB. The board is a three member board and is shown overlapping with
the President's FIAB. (The FIAB is responsible for many of the management
procedures that we operate under now.)
The EO also calls out that each intelligence agency will have an Inspector
General (IG). The OSD has never had an IG. We will have to report problems
of law and propriety thru this IG who will answer to the Deputy Secretary
of Defense directly.
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DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE
PROHIBITED WITHOUT ATTORNEY GENERAL APPROVAL
NRP CONDUCTS DOMESTIC R&D AND SYSTEM ENGINEERING TESTS
SIGINT
PHOTO
DOD GENERAL COUNSEL ASKED FOR APPROVAL
1 JUNE 76 COMPLIANCE
ANTICIPATED OUTCOME
DNRO` GRANTED.AUTHORITY
AUTHORITY REQUIRED FOR EACH CATEGORY OF TEST
DESTRUCTION PROCEDURES REQUIRED
REPORTS REQUIRED FOR INFRACTIONS
EXTREME DISCRETION ESSENTIAL
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(Refer to Chart #4)
Domestic surveillance. E.O. 11905 contains restrictions on Domestic Surveil-
ance. The Attorney General must approve domestic surveillance activities,
actual or apparent. In the development of systems we actually do R&D tests
and we do systems engineering tests, such as calibrations. We also do work
with photo satellites for system performance evaluation which is used in things
like validation of contract performance. These activities certainly could
give the appearance of domestic surveillance.
We have developed some. procedures by which we will be able to get approval to
continue necessary R&D activities. We are interested only in those things under
our direct control. The date in the E.O. calls for 1 June 1976 compliance. We
have completed interim planning documents. There will be modifications to them
but we are working under them on an interim basis. We anticipate that the DNRO
will be granted the final authority for determination of what activities can and
cannot be permitted without going forward for specific AG comment or approval.
For each category of test we will require a specific approval. Reports are
required for infractions. There's a lot of self-policing required. That's
why we have an IG established. I think really the primary point here is that
extreme discretion is essential in this whole area.
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NRO CHARTER
:.'1965 AGREEMENT
CHANGING ENVIRONMENT
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11905
25X
STRENGTHENS NRO .
CFI DIRECTIVE NO. 3
REAFFIRMS' HIGHEST NATIONAL PRIORITY
TASKED BY NFI B (SEC DEF IN, WAR)
STAFFS NRP FOR CFI (INTERFACES WITH IC STAFF)
SOLE AGENCY RESPONSIBLE FOR SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE
DOD INSPECTOR GENERAL & GENERAL COUNSEL
NRO REMAINS-COVERT
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(Refer to Chact #5)
The NRO Charter - Our 1965 agreement is signed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense.
and the Director of Central Intelligence. It is called an agreement for the
reorganization of the NRO/NRP. We arel in
the Intelligence Community and one of the least formally chartered. The E.O.
does put things in perspective, and we have gone one step further and put to-
gether a revised charter - Committee on Foreign Intelligence Directive #3.
We have general agreement on the. provisions of this charter and we do consider
that E.O. 11905 serves to'strengthen the NRO.
New feature - historically we have never had any provision for transitioning
control or tasking in time of war and that feature will now be included in
our charter. It will say, in time of crises, war, or when directed by the President,
the control for the tasking of reconnaissance satellites will revert to the
Secretary of Defense.
An important point - we are still the sole agency of the US Government responsible
for. satellite intelligence collection activities. The NRO is still the sole
agency responsible for studies, development and operation of reconnaissance
satellites.
And finally, the NRO remains by charter a covert organization. There is a
line in the charter which has not changed in any of the staffing saying that
only with the approval or recommendation of the DCI to the President will there
by any change in the covert nature of the organization. "Fact of" satellite
reconnaissance has still not been acknowledged.
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 LET'S TALK ABOUT SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE
0 DCI POSITIONS . PAST V PRESENT
? "EVERYBODY KNOWS"
? EFFECTS OFT I ME
? NUMBERS OF PEOPLE
? IRREVERSIBILITY OF KNOWLEDGE
0 DR. PROCTOR'S COMMITTEE
Q SELF HEALING PHILOSOPHY
0 DOD PREPARED TO SAY --
0 THE NORMALIZATION PROCESS
'0 TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE
THE PRESS
PHOTINT VS SIGINT
O S PACE POLICY COMMITTEE
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(REFER TO CHART #6)
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Satellite reconnaissance is one of the best protected programs in the intelliJ
business. Mr. Bush has informally reaffirmed that he does not want "fact of"
acknowledged; however, that position is not final. Regarding information in the
media, we have always had a self-healing philosophy that you neither confirm nor
deny what has been divulged, accurate or not. If a decision is made to acknowledge,
for example, at the confidential level, you don't make any further acknowledgments.
That message may get lost by the time it gets to the field. People don't have an
in-depth knowledge of what national policy is in this area or of what's really in-
tended by such an acknowledgment. Having seen some official proclamation that we
do satellite reconnaissance, people, without the specific policy background, may
then feel free to go ahead and say even more. That concerns us very much.
I have to point out that if the DOD is asked if there is an NRO, they
are prepared to say: "Yes, there is an NRO; any further details are classified."
That announcement can only come from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public
Affairs. Don't react to questions or announcements in this area until you hear from us.
Without reconnaissance satellites we'd be totally blinded as to the military strength
of the Soviet Union and China. Because of this, more and more people have known
about it. The process is an irreversible one. Numbers of people who use both the
product and have access to the programmatic aspects of the system have grown 25X1A
significantly. These people don't forget what they have learned. They quite often
see better or additional applications that can be made, still within security bounds
and the national interest. It is a much wider body of knowledge now than it used
to be.
If the "fact of" satellite reconnaissance is acknowledged, that means photographic
reconnaissance. That would soon erode and people would start talking about the
sigint missions.
Finally, a bright note on the "fact of" issue - the Space Policy Committee.
Recently the principals of this committee met and the major conclusion was that
the US government should not acknowledge the fact that we conduct satellite
reconnaissance operations. This position was conveyed to the DCI. '
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IN CONCLUSION
THE NRO IS VIABLE
SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE IS A SECRET
THERE WILL BE GREATER INTERFACE
WITH MILITARY USERS
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(REFER TO CHART #7)
TOPOECRET
In conclusion, the NRO controls reconnaissance satellites. It is still the policy
of the US government that satellite reconnaissance is a secret. It is not in the
best national interest to divulge "fact of"; that could cause adverse political
reaction which we would not want to suffer at this time. Finally, the thrust of
the future is that there will be better use, greater use, wider use of the product
of our satellites.
TO,P SELi 'E I
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