Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
April 4, 2003
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
September 8, 1976
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP96B01172R000400030024-0.pdf1.15 MB
5X1 5X1A 5X1A 5X1A 5X1A 5X1A Tri Approved For Release 2003/06/06: CIA-RDP96B011 25X1A Subject: Selected Presentations of the 26 May Security Meeting 1. Attached for your review are three presentations delivered during the 26 May Security Meeting in Los Angeles. Included are the text of General Kulpa's opening remarks, 25X1 I Ispeech on the role of the Special security center, and a essence of I Iremarks on the NRO 25X1A and changes in the intelligence community. 2. Please take this opportunity to formally rebrief all of your personnel using the material contained in this paccageo Even hough some of the data is perishable it can serve as an outstanding "Refresher Course" for your people. The level of information is and should be tail- ored by each Il security o icer o company unique circum- stances. 3. After you have had sufficient time to review the materials, I would welcome any comments or questions you may have. Also, please (advise me when you have completed your rebriefing efforts. 3 Atch a/s NRO review(s) completed. 25X1A lop SECRET Approved For Release 2O0' 6 06 : CIA-RDP96B01172R0004 25X1A Approved For Release 2003/06/06 : CIA-RDP96B01172R000400 40 WELCOMING/KEYNOTE COMMENTS BY MAJ GEN JOHN E. KULPA As you can see I have been associated with satellite reconnaissance for a long time and, as such, have a great 25X1A feeling of identity with meeting here. I know that, in addition to the security and the group Security Officers, a key member of D ment is representing each company. I know you are all busy people. I appreciate this representation and think it is necessary to achieve the goals of this meeting. 1. The mission of the Special Projects organization is to develop and operate reconnaissance satellites, return the data to earth and deliver it to the processing center. Intelligence collection and security are intertwined. A successful intelligence collection system, in order to re- main useful, must be secure. In the case of satellites, it is a particularly hard job keeping satellite systems secure, because satellites are fragile, operate in the open environment of space and can be the target of political complaints from countries who feel their privacy rights are being invaded. Further, launches can't be hidden and satellites can be tracked and traced. For those reasons, which make security both difficult and important, we have tried to keep a close interlock between management of the. systems and security. 25X1A TOP SECRET 25X1A 25X1A Approved For Release 2003/06/06 : CIA-RDP96B01172R00040nn_nnn7a_n Approved. For Release 200 d RDP96B01172Rf1041d03002 0 Thus far, there has been reasonably good success in keep- ing the'subject of satellite reconnaissance out of inter- national and national debates. There has been no systemitized challenge, as to the legitimacy of the opera- tion. The constraining of discussion of satellites for reconnaissance is now DOD SECRET, more change may come, That is, there may be in the future, from time to time, official acknowledgements of satellite reconnaissance by Government officials. If this occurs, we-believe there will be little real effect on day-to-day security, associations, capabilities, missions, plans and operations. Protecting the details of technologies, capabilities, methods, sources, logistics, industrial potential in the operations of reconnaissance satellites will, I perceive, 25X1A remain in the 25X1A system and be our challenge to keep 2. Let me talk about a new approach that will offer in- teresting security challenges. Until now, the assets and resources of reconnaissance satellites have been devoted to fulfill the national mandate Approved For R20~dIA-RDP96B01172R00~ 25X1! 25X1A Approved For Release 2003/06/06 : CIA-RDP96B01172R000400030024-0 Approved For Release 2003/06/06 : CIA-RDP96B01172R000400030024-0 25X1A Approved For Re1 Q3/?60 -5 DP96B01172R0004000300 4-0 70 l- ? and covert relationships. However, in no case should any 25X1A individual with a clearance act against his con- science. The means, as well as the ends of our job are. and will remain absolutely legal and ethical. We can secure our systems and be honest, in fact, honesty and security go together. Let me be blunt, there is nothing wrong in keeping out I also want to again re-emphasize the need to avoid any conflict of interest situations. SAFSP personnel will not accept any gratuity and I ask your cooperation in avoiding embarrassing situations. The subject of ethics is very close to the whole phenomenon of management responsibility in the changing social environ- ment. Even before Watergate, the advent of OSHA, Freedom of Information Law and EEO had its impact on management in both Government and industry. These social changes are important and healthy for our society but they do cause additional considerations in managing security. 25X1A Later in the day more attention will be given to social 0 25X1A Approved For Relea 2 f)/0 ~eTPMB01 0030024-0 5X1A 5X1A 5X1A 5X1A 5X1A Approved For Release 10 666/0 f -RDP96B01172R00040003 0024) - 3. About day to day security - You are well aware that we have avoided a rigid compliance security program. We do not have an SAFSP I ~ecurity representative in your plant. We look to you to carry out the mandate of conducting I ecurity. Generally, over the years, you have done a good job, and I understand the often difficult position you may be in when the goals of manage- ment appear to be inhibited by Constraints. My Deputy Directors and I appreciate the outstanding accom- plishments of ~ecurity over the years that could not have been achieved without a lot of hard work and sacrifice by the security officers. The reason for this meeting, however, is that I see symptoms that suggest a loss of vitality. TOP SECRET material has been lost on the streets. is popping up in noni even unclassified, documents. 25X1A I have just reviewed a report of a briefed-individual describing a program mission to an uncleared person. These and other examples of concern will be discussed in more detail later in the day. You, the people in this room, are the binding force for our programs. I do not have as much of an opportunity as 25X1A Approved For RelAa 903 ZQ1"k' 9*RDP96B01172R000 9 25X1 9 0 Approved For Relei5 03/~ ra DP96BO1172R000400030023-0 I would like to talk to you either individually, or in groups, about the importance of our security program. What we hope to achieve by our meeting today, is a better understanding by those of you in management positions so that you can fulfill your responsibility in assuring tire protection of information vital to continued successful intelligence collection by satellite. I thank you for your assistance in the past and encourage you to the challenges of the future. E cFCFr Approved For Release b03/b6/06 : CIA-RDP96BOl172R000 Approved For Release 03/06%06. CIA-RDP96B01172R0039030 Special Security Center (SSC), CIA - Our job is to co- ordinate security on the compartmented systems in general in cooperation with the USIB committees, which are now re- 25X1A christened, instead of USIB, NFIB. Everything is changing. That's sort of the theme of what I'm going to talk to you about today. The SSC, for example, is the primary source of security policy for the NRO. In my previous position as the NRO staff security officer, I was detailed there by the Special Security Center. And so we do have a policy role and some of you may wonder, well good grief, why don't they formulate some better policy than they have in the past. ? The truth is that years ago only the NRO, the intelligence community and the Russians knew much about our reconnaissance efforts and security policy was relatively easy to make and simple to follow. But things are now much more complicated, for many reasons. The product, as General Kulpa said, is invaluable and, as he also indicated, it's going to a lot more places than it used to, like the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Interior, the Department of Commerce. In order for the tax payer to get his buck's worth out of that reconnaissance effort, that product has to be spread around, and it's very 25X1A TOP ECRE T Approved For Release 2003/06/06: CIA-RDP96B0l172R000 Approved For Release 2003/06/06: CIA-RDP96B01172R00O0b002~-0 IECR ET useful. People do find it extremely useful. The result is that more people than ever are receiving satellite col- lected intelligence. Another factor is disclosures about these programs - first Aviation Week and Jack Anderson, and then Seymore Hirsh, and then Marcetti and Marks, and more recently Phil Agee, the former CIA officer who, although not legally.labeled so, from an ideological standpoint is in fact a defector. Agee isn't finished yet. Last week, just before I left to come out here, I was told that he had managed to dredge up 200 more names of people he had been associated with ? when he was a Central Intelligence Agency.officer and dis- closed those as well. The man has undergone a total ideological change. And then there were the SALT negotiations where we heard about national technical means of verification. That's a nice euphemism but it adds up to another admission of fact of. There was the Rockefeller Commission, the Church Committee, the House Committee on Intelligence. In all of these, both through leaks and through official disclosures, revealed a great deal about the overhead reconnaissance Approved For Release QR6/0SEo; DT96B01172R0004b0030024-0 ? Approved For Release 2Obl06/0d~ Q0961301 172ROa4' 002 effort and intelligence in general. And there's sort of a rising, a lack of agreement among the intelligence com- munity regarding how much should be revealed publicly re- garding our reconnaissance efforts, and friends, it isn't easy to formulate security policy. It's always been heard to maintain a secret, but it gets harder all the time. But we, those of us in the National Reconnaissance Organization, have kept a lot of secrets over the years. And we will have to analyze motivation to understand why, not only why people disclose information that damages our intelligence effort, but why some people are willing to undergo the in- convenience, the extra work and the anonymity that are necessary to protect those efforts. Those who leak secrets from the inside have their own motives - revenge against an institution which has failed to recognize and reward their peculiar genius; ideology, a misguided notion that abolishing secrecy will assure world peace and a better life for everybody; fame and notariety. This sort of thing. And finally of course, I suspect the most significant motive of all, financial gain. 25X1A Approved For Release 20I 6106'~Ic !6B01172R00040 Approved For Release 20 106' PfT 25X1 A 6B01 I 72R0 04 003 ? But we have our own motivations, those of us in this room. We have our own rewards, some of them in the form of what was popularly called a few years ago "psychic income." We have patriotism, knowing that we have contributed to the defense posture of the United States in a unique and irre- placeable way. We have pride in the skill and genius which- have gone into the production of.intelligence collection systems which, even today, makes some of Jules Vernes' most imaginative stories seem pale by comparison. 9 0 To be absolutely objective, of course, financial gain enters into it for us, too. The United States aerospace industry has grown and prospered through participation in the National Reconnaissance Program. Not only do these facts add up to a situation in which security policy is increasingly difficult to formulate and virtually impossible to enforce without the single minded cooperation and support of every man and woman in this room. And without the absolute support of the management of each contractor represented here. And some of us might find it confusing, irritating, even embarrassing, to read in the newspapers information that relates to programs we are restrained by security from dis- cussing. Does it irritate you? Sure it does. You wouldn't be human if it didn't, but, let's take a look at why and Approved For Release 2003/06P CO-DR91172R00~ 25X1A Approved For Releash PA 3/O t DP961301 I72R0004000300 T_ 2R 25X1A how the NRP has managed since 1960 to maintain a record of security which probably has not been surpassed in the history of intelligence and secrecy. First, it is because of the motivational factors I mentipned earlier. Second, we have always maintained a totally un- flapable attitude in the face of-these disclosures and in- quiries. We have never rushed to let the cat out of the bag just because he managed to get a whisker out of the opening. We have let the disclosures wear themselves out in the press. We have avoided adding to the information that was already compromised. Like any champion team, we ? have never abandoned our game plan. We have stuck together. We have avoided adding to the problem, and it is important that we continue to do so. When we start letting our adversaries call the shots, when we start playing their game, we are going to be in very serious trouble. .Now, should the government do something about disclosures? Should we have laws to limit the news media? Well, such laws are impossible because they are unconstitutional, and secondly, I for one wouldn't like to see them passed be- cause they would deprive us as Americans of one of our most precious possessions, a free press. Approved For Release 2?4386/0$ -1 96B01172R0004 25X1A Approved For ReI s Oc / , 9A-RDP96B01172R0004000300 11 .1 0 Security has to come from within, and recent efforts to plug security leaks have concentrated on seeking legisla- tion to penalize those who disclose secrets which were officially entrusted to them. This is logically and legally the only way we can go among the informed and ? well intentioned government officials. There is a lack of agreement on certain basics. For example, there are those who feel strongly that the fact that the United States engages in satellite reconnaissance for intelligence purposes, what we popularly call fact of, should be unclassified. And certainly the disclosures by the news media, government officials, and others lend an unassailable logic to the proposition that when everyone knows a secret it isn't asecret any more. But other officials, equally well motivated, contend that we must maintain fact of as a secret, at least officially, because of possible diplomatic and political repercussions of officially acknowledging that we are capable of gathering intelligence from any corner of the earth without the con- sent of the countries which are being so surveilled. This is a very serious problem and a difficult one, and I don't know how long it's going to take to. reach a final decision on it, but it probably will come fairly soon. 25X1A 0 6 25X1A Approved For Release 20j?1 /06SE 6BO1172R00040 Approved For Release 2003/06/06 : CIA-RDP96B01172R00040003002 TOP SECRET One thing for certain, if we are going. to maintain our capabilities, facts about overhead reconnaissance have to be very closely held. Every increment of information about how our systems operate, every item of data on how effective they are, all contribute to the ability of our adversaries to mount effective countermeasures. Unfor- tunately, there is a link between fact of and facts about. Even people in the intelligence community sometimes ask why all the secrecy. The Russians know we have satellite reconnaissance systems, why can't we save our- selves a lot of money and do away with all these security programs. The naivete' of such a'view is reall lli y appa ng. ? The Soviet intelligence services are spending a small fortune trying to learn all about our capabilities. If they can learn with precision what our systems can do, how well they do it, they can concentrate their efforts on only those countermeasures which will be really effective against us. The new social laws such as the Privacy Act and Freedom of Information can provide opportunities for people whose real purpose is to reveal intelligence sources and efforts. Now, I might add parenthetically that the people in the 0 TOP srr:r 11~-~~~~]]''' Approved For Release 200 /6`'ePA-RDP96B01172R0 25X1A 25X1A Approved For 1 20Q3106L0. A-RDP96B0i 172R00040003002 Central Intelligence Agency, for example, who are tasked with responding to these Freedom of Information Act in- quiries find that not only are there very frequently nebulous reasons for requesting the information - but they find the same phraseology, the same format coming at tFiem from all parts of the country, and this of course adds up to a concerted effort to disrupt and harass the intel- ligence community. This kind of legislation, as the least, makes it very difficult to formulate policies which are as simple and effective'as the ones in the 60's were. It will become ? increasingly important to understand why our policies are changing. At the same time, it will be more difficult in a rapidly evolving situation to keep track of the changes which will certainly occur. We are going to have to com- municate more closely. You will have to try to foresee complications which will arise from your implementation of* those changes in policy. At this time there area number of studies of compartmenta- tion going on in the intelligence community. The views expressed in these studies range from favoring complete 0 Approved For R I 20 ~OIA-RDP96B01172R00 Approved For Release 2U03/06;W P96B01I72R0004000300 4-0 ? abolition of compartmentation through the realignment of the various categories and criteria for compartmentation, to finally a retention of the status quo. I think of those three the last is the least likely to occur over the long haul. ? In addition, the techniques of compartmentation, as they are practiced in the national programs and have been for years, are being copied by departmental programs, and more code words and more slugs and more special channels are being created, which promises additional confusion, criticism of compartmentation today. The picture I have painted may seem like a bleak one, but I believe we are near the end of a difficult time, one in which security was subordinated to a desire to probably reveal all the ills and bad features of our intelligence effort. I feel that, in perspective, most Americans are convinced that mistakes have been made, but they were not massive as was charged, and they were not motivated by anything other than a desire to serve the best interests of the United States. TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2003/06/06: CIA-RDP96B0l172R000 - 25X1A 25X1A TOP SEC, - T ? Approved For Release 2003/06/ : CF DP96B01172R00040003002 .25X1A The former Director of Central Intelligence, William Colby, was a man of patriotism, wisdom and foresight.. He realized that the day of simply stamping documents with a secret stamp without any really serious consideration of why are over, and he spoke repeatedly in public speaking engage- ments of the need to keep good secrets while not trying to keep bad secrets. Most of. his major addresses heavily stressed the importance to our nation of a strong, well founded security program, and the lessons he taught are vitally important. He pointed out the folly of trying to protect too much, of trying to conceal the unconcealable, if we try to hide things which shouldn't be hidden, which can't be hidden, we damage security by providing ammunition to our critics. We can then say look at what all the bureaucrats with their little rubber stamps have done now. The worst part about that is when we have done something that can truthfully be pointed to in fashion, we have given them ammunition. We have provided credence and it does seriously undermine our efforts to keep the good secrets. The present Director of Central Intelligence, George Bush, has already demonstrated a very keen interest in security. He is a tireless worker, he shows every promise of giving strong security leadership in the community. I think that we can be assured that he's not going to do anything to TOD crrR7 - 25X1A Approved For Release 2003/06/06: CIA-RDP96B01172R - Approved For Rele FT~00~(6(q6): -RDP96BO1172R00040003p0240 a ~x %JL ltiL-s 25X1A weaken his ability to safeguard intelligence sources and methods which is what he's charged to do by statute. The CIA, I believe, is not about to adopt an extremist position that says we have no secrets worth keeping. Close and continuous communication between those who make and administer policy and those who carry it out is indispensible. Those of us in Washington need to know when policies are being overtaken by events, or when circumstances dictate the need for new policies to cover new situations. All too often in history battles have been'lost because the people at headquarters didn't know what was going on in the trenches. So we have got to have that very, very close ? communication, and it's got to be timely. We can't let the situation sit around and get worse and worse until there isn't any solution possible before we try to do something about it. I believe in the near term we are going to be able to stablize our security programs, formulate policies that are appropriate to today's situation and get on with the business of producing the world's best intelligence collection systems. In the long term I believe that if we maintain a rigorous, viable security program, the disclosures which have been made will fade into insignificance, as new secrets arise to ? 11 Approved For Release 2003/06/06 : CIA-RDP96B01172R00040 - I -, lop HC HI ? ? ? Approved For Releasi Q0310S 6 . I1 c- DP96BO1172R000400030 replace the old ones, just as the U-2 reconnaissance air- craft of the 1950's have long been public knowledge. The facts about our satellite systems which have been disclosed will fade into history. It is vitally necessary, however, that we renew our resolve at this.moment to make the extra effort that spells the difference between a truly effective security program and simply making a minimal effort to give the-appearance of compliance with security policies. Based on the past record, I think I know which one you are going to chose, and I believe the people of the United States owe each of you a debt of gratitude for your dedication over the past two decades. Thank you. Approved For ReleaseW068 0 P96B01172R~ 25X1A 25X1A Approved For Release 2003/06/06 : CIA-RDP96B01172R00040003002 TOP 25X1A ~iOSECRET P5X1 A ~5X1A 25X1A ? Presentation by of the NRO Staff to the 26 May Security Meeting- 25X1A in Los An n a changing Environ- ment" is ubject, and he addresses the impa ive Order 11905, The NRO Charter, National Policy for Satellite Reconnaissance, and NRO Support to Military Forces. Iremarks have been transcribed and edited for presentation in this report of proceedings. 25X1A Approved For Release 2003/06/06: CIA-RDP96B0117~ Approved or MEMO TOP S ECP FT THE NRO IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT EXECUTIVE ORDER 11905 NRO CHARTER NATIONAL POLICY AND SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE Approved For Release 2001U6, 1 A01172R000400030024-0 25X1A Approved For Release 2003P ft IB01172 R000400030024-0 (Refer to Chart #1) There have probably been more changes that affect the intelligence community in the last two years than there were in the past decade. EO 11905, which caused the reorganization of the foreign intelligence collection activities of the US Government, is perhaps the top driving document to all the changes but it's by no means the only driving force that's going on in the community. The NRO Charter, the document which tells how we operate and makes the NRO a formal instrument for collecting intelligence, is perhaps of more concern to those people in the government than in the contractor plants. Based on experience, it is good background for understanding the total picture. I will also elaborate on satellite reconnaissance policy. IS 25X1A 25X1A -OP SECRET I Approved For Release 2003/06/06 : CIA-RDP96B0l172R000400030024-0 Approved For Release 2003/06/06 : CIA-RDP96B01172R000400030024-0 TOP c FCP -T 25X1A EXECUTIVE ORDER 11905 .DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE CONCERNS CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT HEARINGS EXECUTIVE ORDER ABOLISHED USIB IRAC NSCIC NRP EXCOM . 40 COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS ADVISORY GROUP THE NRO IS A SPECIALIZED RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE .op SECRET Approved For Release 2003/06/06 : CIA-RDP96B01172R000400030024-0 25X1A Approved For Release 2003/06/06 : CIA-RDP96B01172R000400030024-0 TCo SECRET (Refer to Chart #2) EO 11905 was published on the 18th of February 1976. It was driven by a need to improve the efficiency of the intelligence community and government control over domestic surveillance activities to assure no violation of individual rights. We are caught up in the over-all changes that are taking place in the legislative structure. ? 25X1A We work with the House and the Senate Appropriations Committees, the House and Senate Armed Services Committees. Generally the comments have been the program is well run and vital. One of the specific features of the EO that affected the NRP was the abolishment of the USIB. The USIB had been the organization that provided our requirements, both long range and mission by mission, for collecting intelligence. USIB is being reconstituted as the National Foreign Intelligence Board without any great changes from the former USIB structure. The Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee was also abolished by this order as was the National Security Council Intelligence Committee. The NRP Executive Committee, which has been our Board of Governors over the years, was also abolished. It has been replaced by-the Committee on Foreign Intelligence. The EO did not call us the "NRO". That would have acknowledged the existence of the office and been one step further to divulging as an official policy of the government that we conduct satellite reconnaissance. At the last moment the White House struck the words. They covered the NRO by saying that there should be specialized reconnaissance offices for the collection of specialized intelligence. % 25X1A Approved For Release 2003/06/0!`'i~=F~ AULR000400030024-0 Approved For Release 2003/06/06 : CIA-RDP96B01172R000400030024-0 Approved For Release 2003/06/06 : CIA-RDP96B01172R000400030024-0 Approved For Release 2003/06/06 : CIA-RDP96B01172R000400030024-0 top *ET (REFER TO CHART #3) Let's start with the DNRO. He is appointed as the DNRO by the Secretary of Defense. The.Secretary of Defense is the executive agent for the NRP. The Committee on Foreign Intelligence consists of three people: the DCI is the Chairman and the other two members are the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. We look to this. Committee on Foreign Intelligence to approve our programs and our budgets. We look to the DCI to establish our requirements and priorities as the Chairman of the NFIB. The DCI is also responsible, based upon the National Security Act of 1947, for establishing the security policy that pertains to our program. The Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) is to work with each of the agencies of the intelligence community and look at matters of propriety and legality in their operations. There will be periodic reports, at least quarterly, made to this board. Matters involving legality of intelligence operations will be reported by the IOB to the Attorney General for presentation to the President. Matters of propriety rather than legality will be reported directly to the President by the IOB. The board is a three member board and is shown overlapping with the President's FIAB. (The FIAB is responsible for many of the management procedures that we operate under now.) The EO also calls out that each intelligence agency will have an Inspector General (IG). The OSD has never had an IG. We will have to report problems of law and propriety thru this IG who will answer to the Deputy Secretary of Defense directly. 25X1A ?. 25X1A Approved For Release 2003/06/ 69T1 - gc6B0 172R000400030024-0 Approved For Release 2003/06/06 : CIA-RDP96B01172R000400030024-0 I - P SECRET 25X1A DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE PROHIBITED WITHOUT ATTORNEY GENERAL APPROVAL NRP CONDUCTS DOMESTIC R&D AND SYSTEM ENGINEERING TESTS SIGINT PHOTO DOD GENERAL COUNSEL ASKED FOR APPROVAL 1 JUNE 76 COMPLIANCE ANTICIPATED OUTCOME DNRO` GRANTED.AUTHORITY AUTHORITY REQUIRED FOR EACH CATEGORY OF TEST DESTRUCTION PROCEDURES REQUIRED REPORTS REQUIRED FOR INFRACTIONS EXTREME DISCRETION ESSENTIAL 25X1A TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2003/06/06 : CIA-RDP96B01172R000400030024-0 Approved For Release 2003/06/06 : CIA-RDP96B01172R000400030024-0 ? TOP. (IC T (Refer to Chart #4) Domestic surveillance. E.O. 11905 contains restrictions on Domestic Surveil- ance. The Attorney General must approve domestic surveillance activities, actual or apparent. In the development of systems we actually do R&D tests and we do systems engineering tests, such as calibrations. We also do work with photo satellites for system performance evaluation which is used in things like validation of contract performance. These activities certainly could give the appearance of domestic surveillance. We have developed some. procedures by which we will be able to get approval to continue necessary R&D activities. We are interested only in those things under our direct control. The date in the E.O. calls for 1 June 1976 compliance. We have completed interim planning documents. There will be modifications to them but we are working under them on an interim basis. We anticipate that the DNRO will be granted the final authority for determination of what activities can and cannot be permitted without going forward for specific AG comment or approval. For each category of test we will require a specific approval. Reports are required for infractions. There's a lot of self-policing required. That's why we have an IG established. I think really the primary point here is that extreme discretion is essential in this whole area. TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2003/06/06 : CIA-RDP96B01172R000400030024-0 25X1A ~pprovec{"For'Re1ease 2003T0~T06' :"CIA-RDP96BOtr72RO O 'OII030'024=O-"-' ` I" - TOP Q NRO CHARTER :.'1965 AGREEMENT CHANGING ENVIRONMENT EXECUTIVE ORDER 11905 25X STRENGTHENS NRO . CFI DIRECTIVE NO. 3 REAFFIRMS' HIGHEST NATIONAL PRIORITY TASKED BY NFI B (SEC DEF IN, WAR) STAFFS NRP FOR CFI (INTERFACES WITH IC STAFF) SOLE AGENCY RESPONSIBLE FOR SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE DOD INSPECTOR GENERAL & GENERAL COUNSEL NRO REMAINS-COVERT Approved For Release 204 801172 R000400030024-0 .25X1 A,: Approved For Release 2003/06/06 : CIA-RDP96B01172R0.00400030024-0 ~C?l~ HOET (Refer to Chact #5) The NRO Charter - Our 1965 agreement is signed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. and the Director of Central Intelligence. It is called an agreement for the reorganization of the NRO/NRP. We arel in the Intelligence Community and one of the least formally chartered. The E.O. does put things in perspective, and we have gone one step further and put to- gether a revised charter - Committee on Foreign Intelligence Directive #3. We have general agreement on the. provisions of this charter and we do consider that E.O. 11905 serves to'strengthen the NRO. New feature - historically we have never had any provision for transitioning control or tasking in time of war and that feature will now be included in our charter. It will say, in time of crises, war, or when directed by the President, the control for the tasking of reconnaissance satellites will revert to the Secretary of Defense. An important point - we are still the sole agency of the US Government responsible for. satellite intelligence collection activities. The NRO is still the sole agency responsible for studies, development and operation of reconnaissance satellites. And finally, the NRO remains by charter a covert organization. There is a line in the charter which has not changed in any of the staffing saying that only with the approval or recommendation of the DCI to the President will there by any change in the covert nature of the organization. "Fact of" satellite reconnaissance has still not been acknowledged. 25X1 NRO 25X1A ? 25X1A Approved For Release 2108'6/1961301172R000400030024-d LET'S TALK ABOUT SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE 0 DCI POSITIONS . PAST V PRESENT ? "EVERYBODY KNOWS" ? EFFECTS OFT I ME ? NUMBERS OF PEOPLE ? IRREVERSIBILITY OF KNOWLEDGE 0 DR. PROCTOR'S COMMITTEE Q SELF HEALING PHILOSOPHY 0 DOD PREPARED TO SAY -- 0 THE NORMALIZATION PROCESS '0 TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE THE PRESS PHOTINT VS SIGINT O S PACE POLICY COMMITTEE Approved For Release 2003 6 W1301 172R000400030024-0 25X1A Approved For Release 2003/06JQ6 PIdkJ1172R000400030024-0 S ? (REFER TO CHART #6) ? 25X1A Satellite reconnaissance is one of the best protected programs in the intelliJ business. Mr. Bush has informally reaffirmed that he does not want "fact of" acknowledged; however, that position is not final. Regarding information in the media, we have always had a self-healing philosophy that you neither confirm nor deny what has been divulged, accurate or not. If a decision is made to acknowledge, for example, at the confidential level, you don't make any further acknowledgments. That message may get lost by the time it gets to the field. People don't have an in-depth knowledge of what national policy is in this area or of what's really in- tended by such an acknowledgment. Having seen some official proclamation that we do satellite reconnaissance, people, without the specific policy background, may then feel free to go ahead and say even more. That concerns us very much. I have to point out that if the DOD is asked if there is an NRO, they are prepared to say: "Yes, there is an NRO; any further details are classified." That announcement can only come from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. Don't react to questions or announcements in this area until you hear from us. Without reconnaissance satellites we'd be totally blinded as to the military strength of the Soviet Union and China. Because of this, more and more people have known about it. The process is an irreversible one. Numbers of people who use both the product and have access to the programmatic aspects of the system have grown 25X1A significantly. These people don't forget what they have learned. They quite often see better or additional applications that can be made, still within security bounds and the national interest. It is a much wider body of knowledge now than it used to be. If the "fact of" satellite reconnaissance is acknowledged, that means photographic reconnaissance. That would soon erode and people would start talking about the sigint missions. Finally, a bright note on the "fact of" issue - the Space Policy Committee. Recently the principals of this committee met and the major conclusion was that the US government should not acknowledge the fact that we conduct satellite reconnaissance operations. This position was conveyed to the DCI. ' TOP SECRET 25X1A Approved For Release 2003/06/06 : CIA-RDP96B01172R000400030024-0 Approved For Release 2003/06/06 : CIA-RDP96B01172R000400030024-0 TOP.. SECRET IN CONCLUSION THE NRO IS VIABLE SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE IS A SECRET THERE WILL BE GREATER INTERFACE WITH MILITARY USERS 25X1A 25X1A .TOf y SECRET ILLEGIB Approved For Release 2003/06/06 : CIA-RDP96B01172R000400030024-0 Approved For Release 2003/06/06 : CIA-RDP96B01172R000400030024-0 (REFER TO CHART #7) TOPOECRET In conclusion, the NRO controls reconnaissance satellites. It is still the policy of the US government that satellite reconnaissance is a secret. It is not in the best national interest to divulge "fact of"; that could cause adverse political reaction which we would not want to suffer at this time. Finally, the thrust of the future is that there will be better use, greater use, wider use of the product of our satellites. TO,P SELi 'E I ? 25X1A 25X1A Approved For Release 2003/06/06 : CIA-RDP96B01172R000400030024-0