APPENDIX C THE PRACTICE OF RECRUITING AMERICANS IN THE USA AND THIRD COUNTRIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP96M01138R000400030022-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 20, 2005
• Sequence Number: 22
• Content Type: REPORT

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PRACT C OF T G
A AMIERICAMIS I THE USA A
THIRD COUNTMES
A Western security service has obtained a copy of a top secret KGB training
manual entitled The Practice of Recruiting Americans in the USA and Third
Countries. The format states that the manual was "published in accordance
with the plan for editorial publishing work of [KGB Higher]School I0I, ap-
proved by the leadership of the First Chief Directorate of the KGB under the
Council of Ministers, USSR." The authors are identified as Y. M. Bruslov, N. S.
Skvortsov, L. A. Byzov, V. M. Ivanov, and N. G. Dyukov.
The manual specifies the more important KGB targets in the United States;
outlines, step by step, the methods the KGB customarily employs in recruiting
Americans; and mentions some of the oroblems the KGB encounters in attempt-
ing to suborn A.rrrericans; To illustrate recruitment methods, the authors recon-
stCucted a number of, actual KGB operations. in the-United States: :However,
they endeavored to -'disguise these somewhat by using 'p seudoi.yms 'for the
Americans involved, omitting the names of KGB personnel, and changing the
names of locales and institutions.
The strictures and themes set forth in the manual all are consistent with
what is known from other sources about KGB attitudes and practices. But any
doubt about its authenticity was removed after the FBI received a copy. Fur
the FBI eventually was able to Identify some of the people refer:..^d to in the
case examples, despite the efforts of the authors to disguise them.
'I base Who obtained the manual translated it into English for intelliccnce
rather tlW-1n literary pur;poses, 'A's a consequence, the style and expressions are
purciy Soviet and they reflect the degeneration that has occurred in the Rus-
sian language during the past fifty years. Some sections of the manual, com-
posed of standard c?:,rrmtnoist polemics of the sort one may reed in the Soviet
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i;;[CRUITiNG AMERICANS IN THE USA AND THIRD COUNTRIES 347
have been deleted as irrelevant-. Some other sections have been sum-
,
~J or omitted because they seemed tediously repetitious or trivial. Unfor-
? an important page of the tieroluted cope O_ the r~,
of i text procured by the
:lair is illegible; its absence is noted. The relatively few explanatory,
trap-f1,11, or si~minar,~ co t?n;ents deemed necessary appear in italics. Otherwise,
?tl:Jt follows is extracted and translated verbatim from, The Practice of Recruit-
-,:;; Americans in the USA and Third Countries.
The introduction of the textbook begins with the nccessarij and standard
,,w3ances to the Pantt couched in vintage Cornmunis't a
5 ja.rOtt. its essence is
,1,,t the overriding ii,ission of "Soviet intelligence" is to procure information
'iiat other nations do not wish the Soviet Union to have. Arriving at the point,
: sates:
Soviet intelligence can accomplish this task successfully with the aid of a
npetent agent network capable of obtaining the secret information in which
s=~c are interested. The acquisition of such an agent net.vork in the countries of
the principal adversa }' particularly in the U.S., is the most important opera-
task- of Soviet intelligence.
The recnsitrnent of such an age:,` network among Americans has a number
peculiar characteristics and dif culties, dependent in large part on whether
ucruitn?ent is carried out in the L .S. or in third countries.
The purpose of this text is to point out the particular characteristics of
rcirioting Americans and to disseminate certain; beneficial experiences of Soviet
Foreign Intelligence Legal Residencies in the recruitment of
the
U.S. and in third countries under present conditions, as well~~mtocshow n!low
S'iviet Foreign Intelligence is solving the task of acquiring an agent network
a Iton~ the Americans.
The text exarniies such probl:"'ii=i as the basis for recruitme=nt [verhococ12_
?:az,ta bane]. methods of spotting, and methods of assessing Americans, with the
n;n of subsequently determining the most effective means of inducing them
to collaborate '.vith Soviet Foreign Intelligence, and the accornplishment of
recruitment itself. ,
The material is presented in approximately the same sequence as that used
in development for recruitment.
The authors hope that this text v..- ill be of definite assistance to intelligence
"`facers, particularly to the inexperienced, in organizing and carrying out
-=?telligence operations against ithe U.S.
1. THE BASIS FOB RECRUITMENT IN THE U.S.
:1t the present time KGB Residencies in the U.S. are faced with an
ex- important task: the development of a izent nets.arks capable of obtain
-
Secret information on the militarv and political plans of the U.S. govern-
''''%'t; on new discoveries and inventions in science and technology; on the
"% rf
:Lmsri-aaii intelle. C. ;?C'e and countorintf'lli eci, '8 organs; and on the
a=tivities of international organizations-the U.N. and others-which are located
ma the United States.
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The basic targets of our agent penetration (operations) are as follows:
-The President's Cabinet and the National Security Council;
-The State Department, including its representatives in New York, the
U.S. delegation to the U.N., the Passport Office of the State Department, etc.;
-The U.S. Department of Defense (Pentagon), the military intelligence
organs of this department, and the Permanent Military Group of the NATO
Staff in the U.S.;
-The Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation;
-The National Association of Manufacturers, and the most important
monopolies and banking houses, which have a direct influence on the U.S.
government;
-The most important scientific centers and laboratories; .. .
(Here a page of the copy available to the author is illegible.)
-The governing organs of the leading political parties in the U.S. and
other influential public and political organizations-trade unions, youth ]or-
ganizations], journalistic [organizations], etc.;
-The diplomatic and commercial representations of foreign countries in
the U.S., and also the Secretariat of the U.N. and foreign representations in
the U.N.
In carrying out these tasks, our Residencies must, first of all, thoroughly
study the basis for recruitment.
Purposefulness in the recruitment operations of our Residencies is achieved
through the identification of Americans who have intelligence potential and
sufficiently strong motives that could lead them to collaborate with Soviet
Foreign Intelligence. The following categories of individuals are of opera-
tional interest to Soviet Foreign Intelligence Residencies in this connection:
-Employees of government institutions who are cleared for secret political,
economic, military, scientific and technical, and intelligence and counter-
intelligence information;
-Employees of nongovernmental institutions and organizations who, be-
cause of their activities or interests, have access to the state secrets of the
country against which intelligence operations are being carried out-cor-
respondents, employees of technical bureaus and firms, representatives of emi-
grant groups and foreign intelligence agents;
-Employees of private firms who have access to secret scientific and
technical and economic information;
-Persons who have good prospects of joining government organizations.
This relates primarily to students in educational institutions which supply the
personnel for organizations having an interest in intelligence. In addition, our
Residencies are also interested in other persons who hold. certain jobs and have
personal q 'alities which make their recruitment possible.
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 pECt WTING AMERICANS IN THE USA AND THIRD COUNTRIES
correct determination of tl-,e basis for recruitment, that is, of the motives
?,ie h lead us to conclude that a person of interest can he induced to col-
!?orate, ,.: of great importance to successfully organizing his development for
rot ancr,t. Thus, for example, the following factors can serve as a basis for
n-cruitirrg employees of government institutions:
-Sympathies toward the U.S.S.R., as a consistent striver for peace;
-Dissatisfaction with the rigid policy of the U.S. government toward
civil servants-infringement on the rights of the individual;
-Surveillance of government employees; study of their way of life, con-
4tets, etc.;
-Dissatisfaction with the domination by large monopolies which use the
U.S. government apparatus for purposes of repression (such dissatisfaction
with the uncontrolled activities of the large monopolies is most frequently
found in government functionaries, persons from laboring families, and in em-
ployees lacking sufficient financial security);
-Availability of confirmed information on the financial difficulties of a
government employee or of serious compromising information which could cost
him his job.
The following are exploited when establishing relationships with scien-
ti~ts and important specialists:
-The desire of specialists to sell us the technical secrets of their firms;
-The desire of scientists to establish scientific contacts with representatives
of the U.S.S.R. (particularly noticeable in persons who have left Russia).
When determining the basis for establishing intelligence relationships
with representatives of business circles. account is taken of the fact that busi-