POLYGRAPH EXAMINATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP96M01138R001200020020-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 54
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 19, 2008
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: December 2, 1981
• Content Type: FORM

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional
Polygraph Examinations
FROM:
Chairman, SECOM
EXTENSION
NO.
DATE
2 December 1981
25X1
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
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FORWARDED
OFFICER'S
N1TMM
DD/OS
I) DEC
L 1981
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COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
Czte:47/.0/14/41
10.
11
12.
13.
14.
You heard
refer to an AF
request for approval to
polygraph several thousand
military, civilian and
contractor personnel as a
condition of access to a
DoD Special Access program.
Attached is a copy of
the entire package.
Pls return.
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25X1
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15.
FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS
1-79 EDITIONS
25X1
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DEPARTMENT OF THE'AlR FORCE
3:
STAT
MEMORANDUM FOR
SUBJECT: Polygraph Examinations
The Air Force is the executive agent for a Special Access
A
Program which has extremely high level national interest.
Approval has been received to implement a polygraph program
which will help to ensure the security of that program.
Implementation will involve giving 1500 polygraphs the first
year, an additional 500 the following year, with another
1000 the third year. From that point on, there will be 3000
given each year. It is felt that this program will greatly
enhance security for this very important program.
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C.
25 November 1981
12124
RICHARD E. GORDON, Lt Col, USAF
Special Plans Office
Directorate of Plans, DCS/P&O
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Background
On
SPECIAL ACCESS POLYGRAPH PROGRAM
1. AFSC wants to use polygraph examinations as an access
requirement for a SPECIAL ACCESS program. These examinations
will be used to enhance the existing security procedures used
for this program access. The polygraph exams will be taken by
all personnel requiring access. This background paper outlines
the history, justification, coverage, legality, and mechanics
of such a polygraph program. Also the unanswered issues which
such a program stimulates are addressed. The background of
this program must precede any detailed outline of the AFSC
position.
2.The use of polygraph examinations as a screening device
within DOD has seen limited use. The approved uses of
polygraph as specified in DODD 5210.48, "The Conduct of
Polygraph Examinations and the Selection, Training and
Supervision of DOD Polygraph Examiners", includes:
a. serious criminal cases
b. examination of agents or operators in intelligence/
counterintelligence operations
c. certain sensitive intelligence access deter-
minations.
The last group includes designated military and civilian per-
sonnel assigned to NSA, DIA, and CIA or to certain ad hoc
groups(1). Exceptions to DODD 5210.48 must be approved by the
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD/P) (2).
Within the Air Force the Office of Special Investigations
(AFOSI) is the sole agency which is charged with the respon-
sibility of implementing DODD 5210.48 and conducting polygraph
investigations (3). Air Force Regulation 124-15 , " Conduct of
Polygraph Examinations within the Department of the Air Force
and the Selection, Training, Certification, and Supervision of
USAF Polygraph Examiners", prescribes the procedures and con-
ditions under which polygraph examinations can be used within
the Department of the Air Force. In view of the severe
restrictions placed upon the use of polygraph by DODD 5210.48
and AFR 124-15, the legality of polygraph as a screening device
needs to be addressed.
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3. There is no existing regulatory authority to use
polygraph in lieu of investigative techniques for granting
clearance requirements (4). By directive, such authority can
only be given by OUSD/P and must be specifically obtained
before polygraphs can be used as an access requirement. From a
criminal justice standpoint, the use of polygraph has seen
little use in court cases. To date, the results of a polygraph
test have never been admitted as evidence in any court-martial.
Just as interesting is the fact that there are no records
showing a single case in the federal or state courts indicating
the polygraph was an invasion of privacy or a violation of
I constitutional rights. (19). The use of the polygraph in this
(
i program is legal if properly authorized and conducted.
IJustification for securing the authority to use the polygraph
is based on national security needs.
4. The extent to which SPECIAL ACCESS activities are known
has been limited in large part due to the security measures
taken to protect them. If someone with access wants to collect
information about the test programs, facilities, capabilities,
or other intelligence data, he could do so with little threat
of disclosure. Without a doubt such information would prove to
be valuable to our enemies if passed to them. Access for
SPECIAL ACCESS program support would allow a human intelligence
collector the exposure to all activities of the program. To
prevent the unwanted disclosure of program/project information,
security procedures are used which limit the ability of foreign
governments to gather sensitive information. For access to the
SPECIAL ACCESS program, a completed TS/SBI is required along
with the "must know" criteria. The backlog in SBI completion
has necessitated the approval of waivers to the minimum
clearance level required for access (16). In 1981, some 1200
people will be granted access before the completion of the SBI.
Another major loop hole in these procedures is rff-assesgrrig- -a
foreign government's ability to recruit an individual with
information about the project who is willing to share his
knowledge. It is generally hoped the Special Background
Investigation (SBI) will identify personnel who might be
inclined to provide such information. The SBI is conducted by
the Defense Investigative Service (DIS) and includes infor-
mation which covers the last 15 years or from the subject's
eighteenth birthday-whichever is shorter. The scope of the
investigation includes:
Ii
a. A National Agency Check (NAC) which is a review of
the files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; Office of
Personnel Mangement; Defense Central Indices of Investigations;
Coast Guard Intelligence; Immigrations and Naturalization
Service, if the applicant is an alien immigrant; State
Department, to cover foreign travel and other federal agencies
as appropriate (14).
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b. Verification of birth and citizenship.
c. A check of college education and full time
employment for the past five years.
d. A check of local criminal justice records.
e. Development and interview of three character
references.
f. Verification of non-duty related travel for more
than 90 days.
g. A neighborhood check to verify residence for a
period of six months or more during the last five years. This
check includes the interview of present or former neighbors who
might be able to comment on the applicant's character.
h. A credit bureau records check or interview of cre-
dit reference if no records are available to determine indeb-
tedness or undue affluence (15).
This screening process is essentially the same for military, GS
civilians, and contractor personnel. The SBI requires a reva-
lidation or bringup every five years. At the present, DOD has
a moratorium on bringups imposed by the Deputy Secretary of
Defense (16). The reliability of the investigative process and
the SBI has been questioned. NSA, DIA, and CIA are conducting
Th-e-fr own investigations because they have found the quality of
DIS screenings to be poor. (IT)TThe need for flidForigh
security clearance procedures must be evaluated in light of the
security threat.
5. The primary threat is from espionage committed by agents
from the Soviet Union. The value they place on such espionage
is clearly shown by the following quote:
"Over the years, the Russians have become so addicted
to spying that they seem to distrust information unless it
is procured by illicit means. They tradionally have
regarded technological and industrial espionage as an
indispensable component of their own scientific research
and development. Knowledge of Western plans obtained
through espionage at times has enabled them to initiate
profitable actions they might not otherwise have risked"
(20).
The Soviets have targeted a number of groups to help in their
espionage operations:
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a. employees of government institutions who are
cleared for secret political, economic, military, scientific,
technical, intelligence, and counterintelligence information.
b. employees of private firms who have access to
scientific, technical, and economic information.
c. persons who have good prospects of joining
government organizations such as students who are studying
courses in areas related to areas of interest (20).
Recruiting for these operations pose some problems for the
Soviets because most Americans do not support the Communist
ideology. Consequently, KGB operatives recruit their agents
?by prayin on American weaknesses such as the desire for fina-
npla gain, the need for revenge against some sensed
grievance in the American way of life, or fear from threat of
exposure of some compromising materials. An assessment of the
threat posed by these agents was accomplished in Oct 1979 and
updated in 1981. People aren't the only threat, but they
11 represent a threat which can be minimized. Polygraph offers a
means for reducing the risk. What is polygraph?
6. The polygraph is a portable machine which measures and
records pulse rate, relative blood pressure, rate and depth of
respiration, and galvonic skin response (GSR) (8:10). Theory
says the act of lying leads to a conflict within an individual
which will create fear or anxiety. This in turn results in
measurable physiological changes which the polygraph can
measure. A pattern of questions and yes or no responses are
used to measure these body changes to determine deception.
For this program a specific pattern of questions will be used
which relate only to the issue of espionage activity. But
just how reliable are these examinations?
7. Use of the polygraph as a screening device for the
purposes envisioned by this program is new to DOD. On the
other hand, a 1978 survey indicated that one-fifth of major US
corporations are using the polygraph in personnel-related
areas, generally to screen a sampling of applicants or
employees. (8:11) The three industries which most use the
polygraph are retailers, commercial banks, and transportation
icompanies. Industry use of the polygraph is driven by cost.
Polygraph costs approximately $50 per test while other
screening methods cost about $300 per person. "While there is
evidence from the criminal investigation context that
polygraph judgments are accurate well beyond a chance rate,
there are sufficient differences between some employment uses
of the polygraph and the criminal investigation context to
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seriously limit the generalizabili7 of accuracy figures from
one context to the other" (9:502).
Other sources show rates as high as
100% for the pre-employment screening polygraph (22).
Reliability of the tests conducted by OSI is controlled by the
polygraph operator through his questioning and by an
aggressive quality control program. Issues raised using the
polygraph in pre-employment screening generally fall in three
areas.
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will be quality controlled at two levels. The individual con-
ducting the examination must evaluate the results after the
subject has completed the questioning. The polygraph super-
visor will then review the exam. He can concur or pass the,
results back to the examiner for reevaluation. After a con-
currence on the part of the supervisor, the exam and eva-
luation are sent to HQ AFOSI for review and storage. A
nonconcurrence, at HQ requires the reviewprocess to be
Icompleted again. Exam -results are releasable-to the indiviaL
dual tested under the Privacy Act but cannot be used for any
other reason than those specified for our program. No .one out
of the normal review channel will be given access to the
results (11). The u"Se of polygraph for this type of examina-
tion has been successfully used by other DOD agencies.
9. Presently, the CIA, NSA, and DIA are authorized to
use polygraph as a screening method on certain individuals.
Use of polygraph varies from agency to agency. For. instance,
DIA doesn't use the polygraph while CIA polygraphs everyone
who comes to work for them. Additionally, the CIA conducts
proximately 3000 counterintelligence polygraph examinations
a year on contractor personnel who work on CIA contracted
efforts. CIA criteria on the use of the polygraph are expli-
cit in that without the polygraph you don't work on CIA pro-
jects. The denial of access rate for the personnel taking
these exams is less than 2%. Less than 1% refuse to take the
exam. This industrial program is highly indorsed by CIA and
they strongly advocate a similar program for USAF use for the
Special Access programs (10). NSA also strongly advocates the
use of polygraph as a screening method prior to granting
access (21). They conduct a full screening polygraph on all
civilian applicants desiring work with NSA and a full
screening polygraph on all supporting contractors. NSA deve-
lops their own background investigations but claim the
polygraph provides 95% of the unfavorable information deve-
loped on applicants (15). Use of the polygraph as a screening
method for ' access will provide an added level of
security confidence which NSA and CIA feel is justified. The
level of coverage for such a program is an important con-
sideration.
10. This program will include all personnel (military, GS
civilian, contractor) requiring access to this SPECIAL ACCESS
PROGRAM. The requirement for a polygraph examination will be
an access requirement. This means access will not be_granted
until this requirement 1167s?been met. EffirrrEEHts for work
requiring program access will be made aware of this require-
ment. .In all cases, the polygraph exam is voluntary. Those
declining to take a polygraph exam will not meet the access
criteria and will thus be prevented from access to the
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program. Waivers to this requirement will be considered by
AFSC/CC or AFSC/CV on a case-by-case basis for all military
departmental personnel(except Pentagon personnnel) and their
contractors. CSAF/CV may approve and grant waivers for all jj
other personnel. Specific polygraph policy guidelines (Atch
3) were developed by AFSC and were coordinated with HQ AF.
These guidelines outline the requirements of the polygraph
examinations; the priority for conducting the examinations;
procedures to be followed before, during, and after the
examinations; and the specific procedures to be followed on
those personnel who refuse to take the examiation or who fail
the examination. The guidelines for this program will follow
the intent and provisions outlined in DODD 5210.48 and AFR
124-15. Contractor compliance with the additional access
requirements will be handled through existing contract provi-
sions with the use of the DD Form 254: Contract Security
Classification Specification. As a Federal Government acti-
vity, this requirement will be exem ted from state provisions
whi_q_t_goyern the use of polygraph. Establishment of the
program requirei-WigIcal assets and personnel.
11. As per AFR 124-15, AFOSI is the sole agency within the
Air Force authorized to conduct polygraph examinations.
AFOSI/CVPG will be responsible for conducting the polygraph
examinations as part of this screening program. Support for
the program polygraph requirements will be provided by imple-
menting a three phased program (Atch 4). Phase A will provide
the ability to conduct approximately 1500 polygraph exams a
year by four examiners. (See Table 1 and Atch 2). Special
attention will be given to the problems of implementation,
scheduling, transportation, and conduct of the program. The
initial cost of implementing this phase is $297,727. Phase B
will involve the expansion of the program to another location.
The cost of implementing Phase B will be $150,104.
PHASE A PHASE B PHASE C
First Yr Cost $297,727 $150,104 $336,208
#Polygraphs 1500 500 1000
Stations 4 2 4
Personnel 7 (SEE NOTE) 4 8
Start Date ASAP 1 Yr after 1 yr after
Phase A Phase B
Lead Time 6-24 Mos 6-24 mos 6-24 Mos
To Full ops
NOTE: One of the personnel slots will be for a Quality Control
Polygraph Specialist at HQ AFOSI.'
TABLE I. Polygraph Program Implementation Schedule and Costs.
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Lessons learned during Phase A will be applied to Phase B.
Phase C will establish an additional capability for polygraph
examinations in the vicinity of prime contractor facilities.
Cost to implement this Phase will be $336,208. Once the total
program is in operation the costs for continued operation will
be approximately $553,000/yr. Lead times for setting up this
program vary from 6-24 months depending on the availability of
1 l' equipment, polygraphers, and floor space and priorities. The
physical establishment of this program is possible but many
eriTeitional_is_sues_ must_still-156-adressed.
12. Emotions run strong when discussing this issue.
"Polygraph them all...I don't know anything about polygraphs
and I don't know how accurate they are but I know they'll
scare the hell out of people." This statement made by an
ex-President of the United States sums up most attitudes about
polygraph. If this program had been planned as a harassment
method for scaring the hell out of people, no doubt it would
achieve its intended goal. But this is not the purpose of
this program. Instead, it is a screening program which will
prevent the loss of valuable National Security information.
As with all sensitive and emotional programs, this one will be
administered with great care. The individuals to be covered
by it have shown a great degree of patriotism, motivation, and
devotion to duty. If these same individuals sense that this
polygraph program is anything other than an attempt to prevent
espionage, then the program will be counter-productive, and
may in fact, breed what we are trying to prevent.
Consideration for the PEOPLE will be paramount when this
program is instituted. The rights of the individual will
never be waived, compromised, or treated lightly. The fact
thaty the program is voluntary will in no way detract from its
main goal to,..pent_aounterintellAg_ence. Persons who decline
the polygraph will be treated like alf-Others; but their
access will be limited until other investigative methods can
be used to verify their allegiance. Because of the emotion
that polygraph stirs up in individuals, a public relations and
education process (Atch 5) will be started for those persons
who are currently working on the program to attack these fears
head on. The program will involve briefings and demonstra-
tions for all personnel who will be polygraphed. Everyone
will be given the opportunity to discuss the questions to be
asked, to discuss the overall intent of the program, and to
discuss the consequences of participating in the program.
Management will stress the positive of this program and freely
admit to the negative. Concern at all levels will be the only
way for implementing a worthwhile program which satisfies the
national security needs and at the same time guarantees the
success of the program.
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5 Atch
1. Polygraph Questions
2. Polygraph Implementation Costs
3. Polygraph Program Policy and
Guidelines
4. Polygraph Program Implementation
Plan
5. Polygraph Education Plan
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REFERENCES
1. Memo from DAF/General Counsel, Subject: Polygraph (U)
2. US Department of Defense. DOD Directive 5210.48: "The
Conduct of Polygraph Examination and the Selection, Training,
and Supervision of DOD Polygraph Examiners (U)"
October 6, 1975.
3. US Air Force. Air Force Regulation 124-15: "Conduct of
Polygraph Examinations Within the Department of the Air Force
and the Selection, Training, Certification, and Supervision of
USAF Polygraph Examiners (U) " Washington, June 18, 1976.
4. Memo from AFSC/JA, Subject: Polygraph Memo (U), 14 Jul 1981
5. Deleted.
6. Deleted.
7. Deleted.
8. Matueswitch, Eric P., "Fear of Lying: Polygraphs in
Employment (U) ", Technology Review, January 1981, p 10-11.
9. Sackett, Paul R., et al., "Detection of Deception in the
Employment Context: A Review and Critical Analysis (U) ".
Personnel Psychology, 1979, pp 487-505.
10. Chief of Security at the Central Intelligence
Agency, Interview, 11 Aug 81.
11. Suter, Jim. Chief Polygrapher AFOSI, Interview, 11 Aug 81.
12. Suter, Jim. Chief Polygrapher AFOSI, Interview, 16 Jul
81.
13. Harrison, Kelly. OSI Polygrapher, Norton AFB CA
Interview, 6 Aug 81.
14. US Department of Defense. DOD Directive 5220.22:
"Department of Defense Industrial Security Program (FOUO)",
Washington, July 30, 1975.
15. US Congress. House Committee on Intelligence. Security
Clearances Procedures in the Intelligence Agencies (U). Staff
Report, Washington: GPO, 1979.
16. Memo from Deputy Secretary of Defense, Subject:
"Degradation of Operational Readiness/Mission Accomplishment
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Due to Personnel Security Investigative Shortfalls (U)" , 8 Jun
1981.
17. US Congress. House Select Committee on Intelligence.
Pre-employment Security Procedures of the Intelligence
Agencies(U). Hearings. Washington: GPO, 1979.
18. Deleted.
19. Ansley, Norman, Quick Reference Guide to Polygraph
Admissibility (U). Linthicum Heights, Maryland: American
Polygraph Association, 1980.
20. Barron, John. KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Agents (U). New
York: Reader's Digest Press, 1974.
STAT 21. Assistant Director for Security Policy,
National Security Agency, Interview, 20 Aug 81.
22. Adams, Henry E. and Correa, Eileen I. "The Validity of
the Pre-employment Polygraph Examination and the Effects of
Motivation (U)". In Press, University of Georgia: Athens,
Georgia, 1979.
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. eb
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Polygraph Implementation Costs (
Phase A 1500 Polygraphs Per Yr at XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
1. Personnel (4 Examiners/ 1 Supervisor/ 1 Admin Specialist/
1 Quality Control Specialist)
GS-12 x 5 $ 134,755.00
GS-14 x 1 38,000.00
GS-06 x 1 13,672.00
TOTAL
2. Equipment
5 Instruments @ 4200 ea
2 Module Sets
Misc Module Expense
Instrument Spare Parts
$ 186,427.00
21,000.00
50,000.00
4,000.00
2,500.00
3.
TOTAL
Floor Space (2000 Sq Ft)
$ 77,500.00
TOTAL
18,000.00
4.
Supplies
6 desks @ $380.00 ea
2,280.00
5 credenzas @ $380.00 ea
2,280.00
2 typewriters @ $950.00 ea
1,900.00
1 typing chair @ $120.00 ea
120.00
4 Examiner Chairs @ $270.00
ea
1,080.00
1 Executive Chair @ $340.00
ea
340.00
4 Polygraph Chairs @ $200.00
ea
800.00
4 Blinds for 2-way mirrors
1,000.00
@ $250.00 ea
Carpet for 4 rooms and area
6,000.00
(400 yds)
TOTAL
$ 15,800.00
OVERALL TOTAL PHASE A
$ 297,727.00
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Phase B 500 Polygraphs Per Yr at XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
1. Personnel (2 Examines/ 1 Supervisor/ 1 Admin Specialist)
GS-12 x 2
GS-14 x 1
GS-06 x 1
2. Equipment
$ 53,902.00
38,000.00
13,672.00
TOTAL $ 105,574.00
2 Instruments @ $4200.00 ea
1 Module Set
Misc Module Expense
Instrument Spare Parts
3. Supplies
$ 8,400.00
25,000.00
2,000.00
1,000.00
TOTAL $ 36,400.00
3 Desks @ $380.00 ea $ 1,140.00
3 Credenzas @ $380.00 ea 1,140.00
1 Typewriter @ $950.00 ea 950.00
1 Typing Chair @ $120.00 ea 120.00
2 Examiner Chairs @ $270.00 ea 540.00
1 Executive Chair @ $340.00 ea 340.00
2 Polygraph Chairs @ $200.00 ea 400.00
2 Blinds for 2-way Mirrors @
$250.00 ea 500.00
Carpet for 2 rooms and area (200 yds) 3,000.00
TOTAL $ 8,130.00
OVERALL TOTAL PHASE B $ 150,104.00
Phase C 500 Polygraphs Per Yr Per Location in XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX.
1. Personnel (Same as Phase B x 2) $ 211,148.00
2. Equipment (Same as Phase B x 2) 72,800.00
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3. Floor Space (Same as Phase A x 2) 36,000.00
I. Supplies (Same as Phase B x 2) 16,260.00
OVERALL TOTAL PHASE C $ 336,208.00
Yearly Cost of Continued Operation of the Entire Program
1.
Personnel
$476,198.00
2.
Equipment
10,000.00
3.
Supplies
3,000.00
4.
Floor Space
54,000.00
5.
Travel
10,000.00
$553,198.00
Attachment 2
3
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? 04,1-c-3
Polygraph Policy and Guidelines
GENERAL
) The following policies will be used with the XXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXcounterintelligence polygraph program. These policies
will serve as the basic guide to decision making with respect
to this program. Exceptions to these policies can only be -
approved by AF/CV.
II PROGRAM COVERAGE ( )
) All personnel who need access to XXXXXXXXXXX will be
required to take a counterintelligence polygraph examination.
The examination will be administered by the AF Office of
Special Investigations. Polygraph will not be required for
access to XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX at theXXXXXXXXXXX.
Personnel who already have access toXXXXXXXXXXXXXwill be asked
to complete the polygraph .
III WAIVERS ( )
) The requirement of this program applies to all per-
sonnel requiring access toXXXXXXXXXXX - distinguished
visitors, military, civilian, and contractor. Exceptions to
this program will be for emergency situations only. Each
request to waive the polygraph requirement will be reviewed
and approved by AFSC/CC or AFSC/CV on a case-by-case basis for
all military departmental personnel (except Pentagon
personnel) and their contractors. CSAF/CV will approve and
grant waivers for all other personnel.
09d4 ,
ovv----114"
IV OTHER CLEARANCE REQUIREMENTS ( )
) The polygraph will be used to supplement other
clearance requirements for XXXXXXXXXX . Access toXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
will require a TOP SECRET clearance based on a Special
Background Investigation (SBI) as outlined in the "XXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Security Policy Guidance" of Feb 1979. Security clearance
procedures will continue as outlined in that document. Any
future changes to these requirements will be handled through
changes to the "XXXXXXXXXXXXSecurity Policy Guide".
V POLYGRAPH PROGRAM OUTLINE ( )
) The polygraph examinations will be conducted by AFOSI
in accordance with the procedures outlined in DOD Directive
5210.48 "The Conduct of Polygraph Examinations and the
Selection, Training and Supervision of DOD Polygraph
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Examiners" and AFR 124-15, "Conduct of Polygraph Examinations
Within The Department of The Air Force and the Selection,
Training,Certification, and Supervision of USAF Polygraph
Examiners". Each examination will be preceded by an interview
by the examiner. The examinee will be briefed on his rights,
the voluntary nature of the program, the purpose of the exam,
the polygraph equipment, the questions to be asked, and the
importance of this program. The examinee will be asked to
sign a statement volunteering for the polygraph. He will also
sign a statement saying he understands his rights. Only those
questions specifically discussed in the pre-exam briefing will
be asked. However, there may be times when it is necessary to
expand on one of the basic questions during the examination to
clear up issues which might otherwise be cause for suspicion
of espionage. The examinee will be told of the possibility of
such questioning and will be advised of his right to terminate
the exam at anytime during the examination, should he feel it
necessary. A debriefing will be held after the examination.
At this time any issues with respect to the completed
polygraph will be resolved. AFOSI will provide the results of
the examination to XXXXXXXX. XXXX will then determine whether
or not to grant access to XXXXXXXXXX .XXXXX will provide pro-
tection of the results of the examination until such timethe
results are destroyed. At no time will the results of a
polygraph examination be provided to anyone other than person-
nel assigned toXXXX. Protection by AFOSI of the examination
related material will be handled in the same manner. An indi-
vidual can obtain the results of his polygraph as per the
Privacy Act.
VI PROGRAM PRIORITIES ( )
) Since it will be impossible to polygraph all people
requiring access at once, the following priorities will be
used to determine the order in which these examinations will
be completed:
(1) a11XXXXXXXXXXXXX atXXXXXXXXXXXX
(2) new access requests
(3) XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
(4) persons with access on security clearance waiver .
(5) XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX personnel with access over 5 years
(6) XXXXXXX personnel with access over 5 years
(7) others with access who have not taken a polygraph
(8) persons terminating access
(9) others.
Polygraph exams will be completed at least every five years on
personnel requiring access for that long.
VII REFUSALS ( )
2
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) This program is voluntary. Consequently, indivi-
duals may elect not to take the polygraph. Access of those
persons who do not volunteer for the polygraph will be
reviewed and each person in this category will be interviewed
by the AFOSI Field Agent assigned to XXXXX. This interview
will follow the standard SCI Screening Procedures and Personal
Interview Guidelines as contained in AFR 205-32,"USAF
Personnel Security Program (PA)", Attachment 13. No adverse
action will be taken against those persons who do not
volunteer to take the polygraph examination.
VIII FAILURES ( )
) Those personnel who fail the polygraph examination
will be denied access to XXXXXXXXXX . The conduct of each of
these cases will be turned over to the AFOSI for military and
GS civilians and the FBI for contractor persons. Personnel
who are cleared of all suspicion after subsequent investiga-
tion will be given XXXXXXXXXXX access to the same level they
previously held.
IX PROGRAM QUESTIONS ( )
( ) Relevant questions which can be asked during the
polygraph exam or pre-exam and post-exam briefing will be
related directly to counterintelligence issues. Irrelevant,
symptomatic, and control type questions used in accordance
with DOD acceptable polygraph techniques will not be reported
in the polygraph results but will be listed in the Polygraph
Examiner's Report retained by AFOSI. ALL questions will be
discussed ?with the examinee prior to the polygraph examina-
tion. Should the examinee reveal self incriminating infor-
mation relative to a serious prosecutable criminal issue, he
will be advised of his rights against self-incrimination and
right to counsel immediately. Such information will be
reported to the proper authorities in accordance with
Executive Order 12036. No life-style or related issues will be
discussed at anytime during this examination.
X PROGRAM REVIEW/CONTROL ( )
( ) A permanent general officer oversight committee will be
established to provide overall control of this polygraph
program. This committee will provide the final review
authority for all aspects of the program including the
polygraph questions and completed polygraph results. This
committee will report directly to AF/IG.
( ) Quality control of this program will be the respon-
sibility of AFOSI. Supervisors at all levels must insure
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strict adherence to the policy and guidelines approved for the
program. An annual review of the program is required.
XXXXXXXX will conduct this review and report to AFSC/CV on the
status of the program.
( ) Statistical information as per AFR 124-15 and DOD
Directive 5210.48 will be recorded and reported by AFOSI/CVPG.
XXXXXXXX will also keep records of all refusals, failures, and
related information and report these statistics to AFSC/CV.
XI PROGRAM OPR ( )
( ) This program will be directed and managed by XXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXX. AFOSI will OPR for all polygraph operations. CPR's
will be AFOSI/CVPG,XXXXXXXXX, AF/XOXP, and XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
within their respective organizations.
XII CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE ( )
) This program is UNCLASSIFIED. Tying the polygraph
program to XXXXXXXXXXX, any other SPECIAL ACCESS programs, or
XXXXXXXXXXX is classified SECRET- Special Access Required.
All polygraph program related statistics are classified
CONFIDENTIAL- Special Access Required.
XIII RESPONSIBILITIES ( )
xxxxxxx/xx
1. ( ) Management of the Polygraph Program.
HQ AFSC
1. ( ) Implementation of the Polygraph Program.
2. ( ) Granting of the XXXXXXXXXXXXaccess clearances.
3. ( ) Preparation of program related reports to AF/CV and AFSC/CV.
AFOSI
1. ( ) Administration of the Polygraph Program.
2. ( ) Conduct of the polygraph examinations.
3. ( ) Reporting information required in AFR 124-15 and DODD 5210.48.
4
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Polygraph Program Implementation Plan ( )
I. General ( )
(U) This document outlines the policies to be followed
in the implementation of the counterintelligence polygraph
screening program for XXXXXXXXXXX. Final program implemen-
tation plans will require the approval of the General Officer
Polygraph Oversight Committee prior to the conduct of the ini-
tial polygraph examination.
II. Program Outline ( )
) This program provides ?for use of polygraph as a
counterintelligence screening method for access to XXXXXXXXX
XXXXX. Program implementation is contingent on the approval
of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy as required by
DODD 5210.48. This program will be administered by the Air
Force Office of Special Investigations. Policy and procedures
will be outlined and coordinated by XXXXXXXXXXX.
) The physical establishment of the program will
be handled in three phases (Atch 1). Program milestones are
shown Attachment 2. The first phase will provide the capabi-
lity to conduct 1500 polygraphs in XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX, the
second phase 500 polygraphs at XXXXXXXXXXX, and the third
phase 500 polygraphs in XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX and 500 polygraphs in
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX. The go-ahead for each phase will be
provided by AFSC/CV. Program termination can be initiated by
AFSC/CV with the concurrence of AF/CV during any phase of
implementation.
III. Program Start-Up ( )
) XXXXXXXXXXX will notify all agencies requiring
access of the start date for the first polygraph. From this
date forward, all individuals requiring access to XXXXXXXXXXX
must have a polygraph exam to meet the access requirements.
The priority for polygraph exams is established in the
XXXXXXXXXX XXXXX Polygraph Policy and Guidelines. Individuals
who already possess a XXXXXXXXXXX access clearance will not be
denied access during program implementation. All new access
requests must meet this new access requirement. Agencies
requiring access will notify XXXXXXXX of the name, social
security number, and availability of those who require access.
XXXXXXXX will coordinate with XXXXXXXX for the date, place,
and time an individual is to report for the polygraph exam.
1
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IP
IV. Program Funding ( )
) Funding for this program will be provided by XXXXXX
XXXXXXX. Some of the expense for the program will be passed
to the projects testing at XXXXXXXXXXX as an reimbursable
cost. AFOSI will purchase all equipment required for the
program and charge XXXXXXfor all such expenses.
V. Scheduling ( )
( ) Individuals will be scheduled to take their
polygraph following the priorities established in "XXXXXXXXXXXXX
Polygraph Policy and Guidelines". Scheduling for class atten-
dance and the polygraph for the XXXXX personnel and the XXXXXXXXX
XXXXX project personnel will be-handled by XXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXX
will request polygraph exams for all personnel other than
those XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX access who XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX basis.
VI. Manpower ( )
( ) AFOSI will require additional personnel slots to
satisfy the requirements of this program. Atch 1 shows the
positions required. All polygraph examiners used in this
program must meet the requirements outlined in AFR 124-15,
"Conduct of Polygraph Examinations with the Department of the
Air Force and the Selection, Training, Certification, and
Supervision of USAF Polygraph Examiners".
VII. Program Reporting ( )
( ) AFOSI will provide XXXXXXXX with the written results
from each of the polygraph examinations. Each report of exa-
mination will specify whether or not the individual tested
used desception in the replying to the counterintelligence
questions used during the exam. If desception was noted, an
assessment of whether or not other investigative methods are
warranted will be made. If the examiner noted any other
counterintelligence related information this will also be
noted. XXXXXXXX will grant the access to XXXXXXXXXXX based on
the results of the polygraph and other security clearance
information. XXXXXXwill be notified of those individuals
cleared for XXXXXXXXXXX access.
VIII. CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE ( )
) This program is UNCLASSIFIED. Tying the
polygraph program to XXXXXXXXXXX,any other SPECIAL ACCESS
programs, or XXXXXXXXXXXXis classified SECRET- Special Access
Required. All polygraph related statistics are classified
CONFIDENTIAL- Special Access Required.
2
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IX. Responsibilities (U)
AFOSI
1. (U) Make provisions for required personnel
2. (U) Establish required polygraph facilities
3. (U) Report on examinations completed
XXXXXXXX
1. (U) Request polygraph exam slots as required
2. (U) Grant access to XXXXXXXXXXX
3. (U) Notify XXXXX of those cleared forXXXXaccess
XXXXXXXXXX
1. (U) Schedule polygraph examinations in coordination
with the location polygraph supervisor.
2. (U) Conduct required education classes.
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Polygraph Implementation Costs (
Phase A 1500 Polygraphs Per Yr
at
Specialist)
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXkXXXXXXXXX
1 Admin Specialist/
$ 134,755.00
38,000.00
13,672.00
1.
Personnel (4 Examiners/ 1 Supervisor/
1 Quality Control
GS-12 x 5
GS-14 x 1
GS-06 x 1
TOTAL
$ 186,427.00
2.
Equipment
5 Instruments @ 4200 ea
21,000.00
2 Module Sets
50,000.00
Misc Module Expense
4,000.00
Instrument Spare Parts
$ 2,500.00
TOTAL
$ 77,500.00
3.
Floor Space (2000 Sq Ft)
TOTAL
$ 18,000.00
4.
Supplies
6 desks @ $380.00 ea
$ 2,280.00
5 credenzas @ $380.00 ea
2,280.00
2 typewriters @ $950.00 ea
1,900.00
1 typing chair @ $120.00 ea
120.00
4 Examiner Chairs @ $270.00
ea
1,080.00
1 Executive Chair @ $340.00
ea
340.00
4 Polygraph Chairs @ $200.00
ea
800.00
4 Blinds for 2-way mirrors
1,000.00
@ $250.00 ea
Carpet for 4 rooms and area
6,000.00
(400 yds)
TOTAL
$ 15,800.00
OVERALL TOTAL PHASE A
$ 297,727.00
1
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?tr.,
Phase B 500 Polygraphs Per Yr
at
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
1 Admin Specialist)
$ 53,902.00
38,000.00
13,672.00
?
1.
Personnel (2 Examines/ 1 Supervisor/
GS-12 x 2
GS-14 x 1
GS-06 x 1
TOTAL
$ 105,574.00
2.
Equipment
2 Instruments @ $4200.00 ea
$ 8,400.00
1 Module Set
25,000.00
Misc Module Expense
2,000.00
Instrument Spare Parts
1,000.00
TOTAL
$ 36,400.00
3.
Supplies
3 Desks @ $380.00 ea
$ 1,140.00
3 Credenzas @ $380.00 ea
1,140.00
1 Typewriter @ $950.00 ea
950.00
1 Typing Chair @ $120.00 ea
120.00
2 Examiner Chairs @ $270.00
ea
540.00
1 Executive Chair @ $340.00
ea
340.00
2 Polygraph Chairs @ $200.00 ea
400.00
2 Blinds for 2-way Mirrors
@
$250.00 ea
500.00
Carpet for 2 rooms and area
(200
yds) 3,000.00
TOTAL
OVERALL TOTAL PHASE B
$ 8,130.00
$ 150,104.00
Phase C 500 Polygraphs Per Yr Per Location in XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX.
1.
Personnel
(Same as Phase B x
2)
$ 211,148.00
2.
Equipment
(Same as Phase B x
2)
72,800.00
2
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?
3.
Floor Space (Same as Phase A x
2)
36,000.00
4.
Supplies (Same as Phase B x 2)
16,260.00
OVERALL TOTAL PHASE C
$ 336,208.00
Yearly Cost of Continued Operation of the Entire Program
1.
Personnel
$476,198.00
2.
Equipment
10,000.00
3.
Supplies
3,000.00
4.
Floor Space
54,000.00
5.
Travel
10,000.00
$553,198.00
Attachment
1
3
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Program Go-Ahead
Equipment -
Manpower
Floorspace
Final Progam Guidelines
First Polygraph
Phase A
Phase B
Phase C
1Q
1st FY
2Q 3
4
1
2
2nd FY
3rd FY
4th FY
.6
-a
A
A?A
A
A
?
FIGURE 1. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Polygraph Program Implementation.
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VI/II
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IIP
(
Polygraph Education Plan ( )
GENERAL( )
( ) This document outlines the plan for establishing an
education program for the XXXXXXXXXXX"counterintelligence-
polygraph screening program. This education program is '
established specifically to reduce the reaction anticipated
with the establishment of this screening program.
Additionally it will serve to educate all those covered by the
program on the security requirements for this special access
program. Security will be stressed during all phases of the
programs with special emphasis added to help in the iden-
tification of possible internal security threats to XXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXX.
II PROGRAM COVERAGE( )
) All personnel cleared for XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
access will be required to participate in this program.
Supervisors will assure the attendance of all unpolygraphed
personnel.
III PROGRAM OBJECTIVES( )
) The objective of this program is get everyone with
access involved in security. This will require
the development of an education process which stimulates, cap-
tivates, and motivates those participating. Generation of the
proper attitude will in many ways lessen the chance of a major
rebellion when the polygraph screening program is started.
Every level of management must understand the role they play
in the program. Their support is essential to the success of
the security XXXXXXXXXXXXXX.
IV PROGRAM OUTLINE( )
( ) A specific training guide for this program is provided in
Attachment 1. This program was developed with the thought in
mind that if the threat and the concern about this threat is
understood--then polygraph becomes a needed method for
reducing the threat. Arriving at this logical conclusion is
the desired outcome of the learning process.
V COURSE SCHEDULING( )
( ) This course will be taught once a week to 18-20 students
per week. The course will fill the AFR 205-57, "Reporting and
1
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?
Investigating Espionage,Sabotage, Terrorism, and Subversion
(FOUO)", annual requirement for military and civilian person-
nel. Each member of the class will be briefed on Monday and
then complete his polygraph sometime during the same week.
Class sizes can be varied to meet this goal.
VI CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE ( )
) This program is UNCLASSIFIED. Tying the polygraph
program to XXXXXXXXXXX, any SPECIAL ACCESS programs,
XXXXXXis classified SECRET- Special Access Required.
polygraph related statistics are classified
CONFIDENTIAL-Special Access Required.
VII TRAINING OUTLINE(U)
or XXXXXXXXX
All
TIME
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX's Introduction
0+05
Espionage Film (OSI)
0+20
Threat Briefing (OSI) (w/specific examples)
0+20
Break
0+15
Polygraph Intro (OSI)
0+30
Discussion
0+15
1+45
Desired Learning Objectives
XXXXXXXX's Introduction
Welcome
Purpose of Course
Overview
Importance of Polygraph Program
Voluntary Nature of Program
Espionage Film
Threat
What to do if approached
Importance of Security
Threat Briefing
Threat
Examples
Identification
Polygraph Intro
Voluntary Program
Background of Polygraph
Test Results/Failures
Refusals
Questions
Special Exam Info
2
0+05
0+20
0+20
0+30
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Discussion 0+15
Issues Class Wants to Discuss
VIII RESPONSIBILITIES (U)
XXXXXXX
1. Implement this plan.
2. Monitor this program to insure the attainment of
program objectives.
AFOSI
1. Conduct the training as indicated.
3
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VI/II
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UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
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UNCLASSIFIED
OVER VIE
o PROGRAM
? BACKGROUND
? COVERAGE
? APPROVAL
e PROGRAM POLICY
? EXAMINATION QUESTIONS
? FAILURES
? REFUSALS
? REVIEW/CONTROL
? PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION
? PHASING
? COST
? EDUCATION
o SUMMARY
UNCLASSIFIED
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- ,
PH PROGRAM
o CONCERN ABOUT THREAT TO PROGRAMS
o HQ AFSC/JA. LTR ON POLYGRAPH (14 JUL 81)
o OTHER FEDERAL USERS
? DIA
? NSA
e CIA
UNCLASSIFIED
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UNCLASSIFIED
OLYGRAPH PROGR Fin
POLYGRAPH
? ? DEVELOPED IN 1920s TO AID IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS
e MONITORS CHANGES IN BREATHING, BLOOD PRESSURE, PULSE RATE,
? PERSPIRATION, AND ELECTRICAL CONDUCTIVITY OF SKIN
e EXAMINATION PROCESS
e QUESTIONS BY POLYGRAPH OPERATOR
? DETERMINES DECEPTION
e PROVIDES DETERRENCE ?
? UNCLASSIFIED
?
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UNCLASSIFIED
POLY R PH P OGRAM
COVERAGE
ALL PERSONNEL REQUIRING ACCESS
O MILITARY
O GS CIVILIAN
O CONTRACTORS
? WAIVERS
COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE SCREENING
UNCLASSIFIED
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UNCLASSIFIED
POLYGRAPH PROGRAM
o APPROVAL
9 AFSC/CC
? CSAF/CC
? ? SAF
? OUSD/P
? OSD
o AFOSI ACTION
? SET UP PROGRAM
? IMPLEMENTATION POLICY
? PROVIDE RESULTS
? AFSC/TEX GRANTING OF ACCESS
UNCLASSIFIED
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UNCLASSIFIED
PROGRAM POLICY
EXAMINATION QUESTIONS
o COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE ONLY
? NO LIFE-STYLE ISSUES
o DISCUSSED IN DETAIL WITH EXAMINEE
UNCLASSIFIED
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UNCLASSIFIED
-
PROGRAM POLICY
REFUSALS
e ACCESS LIMITED
OSI WILL CONDUCT INTERVIEW AS PER AFR 205-32, ATCH 13
POSSIBILITY EXISTS OF MANY IN THIS CATEGORY
REDUCE WITH GOOD EDUCATION /PR PROGRAM
UNCLASSIFIED
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UNCLASSIFIED
PROGR AIM POLICY
FAILURES
e DENIED ACCESS
e WILL REQUIRE FURTHER INVESTIGATION
e DON'T EXPECT MANY (ANY)
UNCLASSIFIED
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UNCLASSIFIED
PROGRAM POLICY
REVIEW/CONTROL
e POLICY CAN ONLY BE CHANGED BY CSAF /CV
co ANNUAL PROGRAM REVIEW REQUIRED
e GENERAL OFFICER POLYGRAPH OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE
UNCLASSIFIED
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UNCLASSIFIED
OGR M I PLE7 ENTAT1ON
PHASING AND COST
PHASE A
ilialliti=111022611111
PHASE B PHASE C
COST (FIRST YEAR) $297,727 $150,104 $336,208
NO OF POLYGRAPHS .1500 500 1000 (500 EA)
NO OF STATIONS 4 2 4 (2 EA)
PERSONNEL (OP/ADMIN/SPT) 4/1/1 2/1/1 4/2/2 (2/1/1 EA)
START DATE ASAP 12 MOs AFTER A 12 MOs AFTER B
LEAD TIME TO FULL OPS 6-24 MO 6-24 MO 6-24, MO
UNCLASSIFIED
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_
UNCLASSIFIED
R GRA LEMENTATION
EDUCATION
? SELLING PROGRAM TO THOSE PREVIOUSLY CLEARED
? NEEDED TO REDUCE ANXIETY OF PROGRAM
? WILL INCLUDE OTHER SECURITY ITEMS
to CONDUCTED BY COMMANDER
? DEVELOPED WITH HELP OF OSI STAFF PSYCHOLOGIST
UNCLASSIFIED ?
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UNCLASSIFIED
I:SLJES
EMOTIONAL SUBJECT
?112210111129111111
'1 ?
"POLYGRAPH THEM ALL ... I DON'T KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT
POLYGRAPHS AND I DON'T KNOW HOW ACCURATE THEY ARE,
BUT I KNOW THEY'LL SCARE HELL OUT OF PEOPLE."
Richard M. Nixon,
July 24, 1971
UNCLASSIFIED
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UNCLASSIFIED
SUMMARY
e POLYGRAPH PROGRAM NEEDED
O KEY IS OUSD /F.' APPROVAL
O PROGRAM POLICIES HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED
? PHASED PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION
e PEOPLE WILL BE PRIMARY PROGRAM CONSIDERATION
UNCLASSIFIED
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1. Concern: The method for handling a lawsuit related to this
polygraph program.
Response: There appears to be no cause of action under the
Constitution, legislation, or case law that could arise from
this program; however, there will be no way to prevent anyone
from filing suit against the US Government because,of it. Our
concern will be to limit potential damage by precluding the
exposure of classified information during court proceedings.
In the last year Department of Justice has been successful in
applying the provisions of the Classified Information
Procedures Act of 1980 (Pub. L. No. 94-456, 94 Stat.2025)
which specifically applies to criminal cases, to safeguard
classified material in civil cases. That act employs such
devices as in camera inspections, protective orders, and sani-
tized summaries of documents sought in discovery to protect
classified information. Because it is a crime to knowingly
release classified information to unauthorized personnel (8
USC, Section 793), the information disclosed during the filing
of a suit is generally unclassified. The suit itself would be
handled by the Justice Department using the standard proce-
dures that they normally apply in such cases.
2. Concern: The impact of the polygraph screening program on
union/management relationships for those contractors sup-
porting our programs/projects.
Response: The security manager at the SPO assessed the impact
of polygraph testing on union/management relations when this
program was first considered. He found that the full impact
of the program seems to be a function of the company and its
present union/management relations. One contractor already is
having problems in this area. In this company, if a union
member is denied access because he is unable to obtain the
necessary security clearances, then the union provides the
member with pre-printed forms for filing a Congressional
grievance. In this case, we run the risk of union problems if
a member of the union is denied site access because of the
polygraph exam. The union/management relationships of the
various other contractors are not so strained and the impact
of the polygraph program is not likely to be so immediate, but
the real impact is unknown until the program starts. We
believe the polygraph education program will serve to reduce
adverse impact on union/management relations. Moreover, the
experiences of NSA and CIA in their polygraph programs will be
applied to this program to help prevent similar problems.
This issue has been of paramount concern since this polygraph
program was first suggested. It is still of concern and
remains the area of the program which may cause the most
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problems during program implementation. Every effort will -be
made to reduce the impact through the program education pro-
cess.
3. Concern: The actions to be taken against the
government/contractor employees who refuse to take the
polygraph?
Response: This concern really breaks down into two
situations; The first case involves the employee who already
has access but does not volunteer for the polygraph examina-
tion. This program does not require an exception to that pro-
vision of DOD Directive 5210.48 which prohibits adverse
actions against individuals refusing to be polygraphed. The
only action to be taken in this program will be to limit such
an individual's access to his immediate work area and thus
deny him access to other programs/projects under testing. The
OSI will be asked to conduct a SCI Screening Interview IAW AFR
205-32, Atch 13, with the individual. No record of the inter-
view itself will be kept unless the interviewer feels he has
reason to suspect the employee of involvement in espionage. If
further investigation is warranted, the case will be handled
by the FBI for contractor personnel and the OSI for government
personnel. Every effort will be made to prevent any stigma
being attached to the fact that access has been restricted.
The second situation involves the employee who desires access
for the first time but is unwilling to take the polygraph.
These individuals will not be granted access. The contractor
can continue to use this individual on a related
program/project but will be unable to get access to the Air
Force part of the special program.
4. Concern: How will the polygraph requirement be incor-
porated into existing and future contracts?
Respnse: The best method for making these changes on existing
? contracts is by Supplemental Agreement. This will require
? negotiations to reach agreement on all aspects of ?the
polygraph requirement. In addition, existing labor agreements
between affected contractors and labor unions may require
modification. New contracts will have the DD Form 254:
Contract Security Classification Specification written to show
the polygraph as a requirement for access. This will allow
the contractor to advertise for employment with the stipula-
tion that the government requires a polygraph for access to a
particular project. The polygraph examination will thus not
be a condition of employment but a requirement for access to
this project.
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5. Concern: The relevant and control questions to be asked
--during the polygraph examination are not specifically known.
The following is a list of control questions which could be
used for this type of examination. It should be pointed out
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1110 ?
that these are-only some possibilities among many. Control
questions must be selected during the pre-test interview and
depend upon the examiner's assessment of their meaning and
importance to the examinee. They are used to capture the
psychological set of the examinee who is truthful to the reve-
lant questions. The examiner uses them to normalize his eva-
luation of the polygraph charts. These are the questions
which enable the examiner to recognize an examinee who is
truthful to the relevant issues. Control questions and their
answers are not reported in the polygraph results. They are
in the Polygraph-Examiner .eport, as are all proceedings, and
?are retained at HQ A?OSI. They are protected by the Privacy
Act. They may be requested under the Freedom of Information
Act by the examinee. Subject material used in control
questions is not included in an advisement of rights unless
the examinee should begin to confess to a.serious specific
criminal act. The control question technique is used by DOD
agencies in almost all specific criminal offenses, counterin-
telligence and counterespionage matters, and security offen-
ses. Application of the technique in this security screening
polygraph should be equally effective. A bank of approved
control questions will be used for this program. Some control
questions are:
These questions by their very nature are broad in scope
and are intended to create a physiological response from the
examinee. No matter what the verbal response to the question,
no attempt will be made to explore the question further. In
some cases an individual may be asked more than one control
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question. The value of any one control question is assessed
during the pre-test interview and depends on any observed
reactions of the examinee. The control questions will vary
from examinee to examinee. Generally the same question can
not be used for any two individuals.
5
25X1
(b)(2)
25X1
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