USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP96R01136R002605290040-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 20, 2010
• Sequence Number: 40
• Publication Date: July 10, 1980
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/20: CIA-RDP96RO1136R002605290040-2
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/20: CIA-RDP96R01136R002605290040-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/20: CIA-RDP96R01136R002605290040-2
A Soviet Decision To "Muddle Through"?
Moscow's recent troop withdrawal from Afghanistan
does not represent a significant overall reduction in
Soviet combat capability or overall military posture,
and sheds little light on long-term Soviet military in-
tentions. The TASS announcement of the withdrawal did
not address the possibility of further withdrawals and
did not rule out the possibility of future increases in
the number of Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Neverthe-
less, the use of the announcement as a broad political
gesture does make it somewhat less likely that the
Soviets will decide in favor of a substantial augmenta-
tion of their presence in Afghanistan in the near term.
President Brezhnev's optimistic justification for
the withdrawal, which was expressed at the Central Com-
mittee's first foreign policy plenum in five years, also
suggests that the Soviets are not planning an imminent
buildup in their military presence in Afghanistan.
Brezhnev contended on 23 June that "life is gradually
returning to normal" in Afghanistan and gave the impres-
sion that Soviet forces had control over the situation.
Barring a major reversal or humiliation in Afghanistan,
any sudden augmentation of Soviet forces would undermine
the party leader's credibility.
The withdrawal was designed in part to deflect West-
ern efforts to arrange a more substantial Soviet pullout
from Afghanistan and to contribute to perceived differ-
ences within the Western alliance on the appropriate
strategy for handling the Afghan crisis. In view of the
political timetable between East and West for the rest
of the year, the Soviets may find it awkward to engage
in any significant increase in their military presence
before next year.
-- Moscow presumably would not endorse a major
military increase before the end of the
Olympics in early August.
10 July 1980
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-- The start of the CSCE review conference in
September, which culminates in the Madrid
meeting in November, might also inhibit a
Soviet reinforcement decision before the
onset of winter in Afghanistan.
Just as the Soviet party tried to put the best face pos-
sible on events in Afghanistan before the plenum meeting
in June, it may similarly want to avoid any difficult
decision on augmentation of forces before the next party
congress in February.
It is no more certain the Soviets would decide to
augment their presence in Afghanistan during the winter
months in order to prepare for a spring offensive in
1981. There is no clear evidence, for example, that
either Soviet field commanders in Afghanistan or polit-
ical-military leaders in Moscow favor a drastic escala-
tion of their militar resence.
Moscow underesti-
mated the Western an Islamic response to the invasion,
which would inhibit a future decision in favor of serious
augmentation. Such Politburo members as Brezhnev,
Kosygin, and Chernenko might argue that the Soviets have
had some limited success in stabilizing the military
situation in several key provinces and in improving the
security conditions along key roads to Kabul and that
current force levels and tactics should continue to be
tested. The current tug of war over the next five-year
plan, which would be affected by any additional economic
sanctions against the USSR, might also inhibit discus-
sion of a decision in favor of significant military re-
inforcement.
Indeed, it is also possible that certain Soviet
leaders would argue that the Soviets have faced the worst
of both international reaction and insurgent resistance
and that current force levels in Afghanistan are suffi-
cient. Their position would be that the USSR had already
had a certain amount of success in Afghanistan in terms
of obtaining Moscow's basic goal--to wit, preventing the
collapse of the political and military institutions that
the Soviets had helped to mold. Such a collapse would
have made an Amin regime or its successor susceptible to
transformation into another militantly Islamic state or
vulnerable to Chinese or Western influence. These
10 July 1980
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SECRET
geopolitical and strategic calculations were uppermost
in Moscow's mind in deciding to intervene and, on that
basis, any consideration of a massive reinforcement of
Soviet forces would be premature.
Such a Soviet faction would argue that the cost of
the military intervention in Afghanistan. at current
force levels is acceptable and the absence of leadership
for the popular opposition to the Babrak government
obviates the need for additional Soviet forces. Con-
versely, it would be difficult to obtain a new consensus
in favor of augmentation in view of possible Soviet op-
position to taking on even greater responsibilities in
Afghanistan for internal security, operations against
the insurgency, and increased administrative duties.
Therefore, the Soviet leadership could very well decide
to muddle through in the foreseeable future with current
force levels or modest reinforcements rather than create
the impression both at home and abroad that a significant
increase in the Soviet presence in Afghanistan meant
that the situation was getting out of hand.
10 July 1980
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/20: CIA-RDP96RO1136R002605290040-2