DRAFT OF PROPOSED NSDD ON CRISIS INFORMATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP97M00248R000500060008-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 2, 2010
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: May 25, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT -
ROUTING SLIP
SUSPENSE
Remarks
To #17 & 18: Please coordinate Agency response
for transmittal by ES.
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S E C i t T NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL System I I
w/ TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506 9 0 4 6 9
Attachment
May 25, 1988
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SUBJECT: Draft of Proposed NSDD on Crisis Information
The draft of a proposed National Security Decision Directive
(NSDD) on the National Security Information and Situation
Management System (NSI&SMS) has been sent to the addressees at
Tab A and is attached at Tab B for your review. This proposed
directive is the product of interagency discussions within the
Crisis Management Working Group (current membip at Tab C).
The proposed NSDD would supersede NSDD 95.
We would appreciate your comments on the draft by June 6, 1988.
4,6 L-P /*A 9A~
Paul Schott Stevens
Executive Secretary
Tab A List of Addressees
Tab B Draft NSI&SMS NSDD
Tab C Current CMWG Membership
s1eTCT
T rte.
w/ TOP SUCRET.
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SYSTEM II
90469
THE NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION AND SITUATION MANAGEMENT
SYSTEM (U)
This directive updates policy and gi,idelines for sustaining and
improving the nation's crisis management capability in support
of the President, the National Security Council (NSC), and the
interagency community. It builds on the technical progress
achieved since signature of NSDD 95 in May 1983, and codifies
the oversight, coordination, and procedural dimensions of a
National Security Information and Situation Management System
(NSI&SMS), consistent with the NSC structure and process
approved in NSDD 266 and NSDD 276. This directive supersedes
NSDD 95. (S)
Background
NSDD 95 established PROJECT MEDUSA, a framework for
national-level crisis management and for making critical
technical and procedural enhancements to associated department
and agency operations centers. PROJECT MEDUSA created a Crisis
Information and Management System (CIMS) to sustain effective
and uninterrupted crisis management by providing a means of
recording and disseminating adequate and timely intelligence,
information, analyses, and policy options in form usable by
top-level decision makers. This system was to include rigorous
mechanisms for accessing, preserving and archiving historical
data and associated decisions. (S)
Implementation of PROJECT MEDUSA, in conjunction with
associated department and agency technical upgrades,
significantly improved the nation's ability to respond to
crises. PROJECT MEDUSA created a secure, multi-media
telecommunications system for exchanging information, now
referred to as the Secure Video Teleconferencing System (SVTS).
The technical capabilities established under NSDD 95 present
new opportunities for interagency coordination. These
opportum ti.es apply not only to crisis operations -- the urgent
focus of_PROJECT MEDUSA -- but also to the spectrum of
government-activities, from daily operations during peacetime
through reconstitution after nuclear attack. (S)
The recent introduction of new technology and facilities for
crisis management has created the technical capability to
support a broader National Security Information and Situation
Management System. The principles and longer-term objectives
of the NSI&SMS are outlined below, together with necessary next
steps following PROJECT MEDUSA. This directive codifies a
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process incorporating improvements made to date and will more
fully address the requirements for effective interagency
coordination in the future. (S)
Policy Principles
The NSI&SMS is an interagency network of people, facilities,
equipment, information resources, plans, policies and
procedures designed to provide for: (1) support to national-
level decision makers in monitoring national security
situations and in considering, implementing, or reporting on
any U.S. response, and (2) a rapid and continuous flow of
information regarding national security situations across a
spectrum from peacetime activity through reconstitution
following nuclear attack. (S)
The purpose of the NSI&SMS is to support the national
leadership so that the policy and decision making process will
not be impaired by a lack of information, procedures for
coordination, or secure communications and data transmission
capabilities. To the maximum possible extent, interagency
coordination during periods of international tension or crisis,
or domestic emergencies, shall be conducted by people concerned
with the issues on a day-to-day basis using reliable equipment
according to the same familiar, approved procedures with which
we operate on a daily basis. (C)
The NSI&SMS shall be operationally integrated with Continuity
of Government (COG) programs, the White House Emergency Plan,
the Nuclear Command and Control System, and the National System
for Emergency Coordination (NSEC). (TS)
The continuous, effective operation of the NSI&SMS is crucial
and requires each agency's understanding of its individual role
in the interagency process. The Executive departments and
agencies involved in the NSI&SMS will budget for, procure,
install, operate, and maintain compatible equipment and
capabilities, and share appropriately the cost of system
improvements that may be required. (S)
Implementation
Oversight of the NSI&SMS will be provided by the NSC through
the Crisis Management Working Group (CMWG), chaired by the
NSC's Deputy Executive Secretary for Situation Support. The
CMWG will report to the Policy Review Group (PRG). (U)
The CMWG shall further develop the NSI&SMS and strengthen
interagency capabilities and procedures for the collection,
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coordination, transmission, and dissemination of information in
support of the President and the NSC. The CMWG shall meet
regularly. In order to support the activities of the policy
decision makers, appropriate CMWG members also may convene by
means of SVTS or other secure communications at the outset of,
or during, a situation to ensure effective information
management and coordination among operations and intelligence
centers. (S)
The CMWG shall be the principal interagency working group for
coordination and consideration of policies and issues
concerning the integration and interoperability of Continuity
of Government (COG) programs. (TS)
Oversee formulation of policy relating to the NSI&SMS
to ensure a system responsive to national needs; (S)
Review and define interagency NSI&SMS operating
procedures and responsibilities; (C)
Ensure technical and operational capabilities are
maintained and developed consistent with NSI&SMS
objectives; (C)
Ensure effective use of resources expended in
establishing, operating, and modernizing the NSI&SMS;
promoting interagency equipment compatibility; and
recommending to the PRG priorities for those
improvements that will affect interagency information
flow; (U)
Ensure integration of the NSI&SMS with COG, NSEC, and
other coordinating activities related to national
security; (TS)
Ensure that the NSI&SMS supports the Director of
Central Intelligence in monitoring and transmitting
fn-formation on the world situation in the context of
operational requirements for early warning; (TS)
Ensure the capability to control and coordinate the
flow of critical information from the White House and
other Washington-area operations centers to all COG
elements, and to direct changes in their operational
posture; (TS)
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Ensure that interoperable equipment and compatible
procedures are established among relevant departments
and agencies, and COG elements; and (TS)
Provide for regular exercising and testing of the
NSI&SMS. (C)
CMWG membership shall include representatives from Executive
departments and agencies with responsibility relating to the
national response to international incidents or domestic
emergencies potentially affecting the national security of the
United States. The CMWG chair shall establish a Steering Group
to develop and monitor its agenda, and may establish other
subgroups as required. To the extent possible, the CMWG shall
use already existing interagency committees to facilitate
coordination and resolution of issues. (S)
Situation management at the national level requires close
coordination and cooperation among Executive departments and
agencies. As the supporting system, the NSI&SMS can only
remain responsive to national situation management needs if the
community actively participates and interacts in the evolution
of this critical situation management system. Accordingly,
each participating Executive department and agency shall:
Designate a member to serve on the CMWG;
- Participate in exercises to improve and maintain the
proficiency of situation management personnel and
evaluate the responsiveness of the NSI&SMS; and
- Budget for, procure, manage, operate, and maintain
equipment in its facilities in a manner consistent
with NSI&SMS objectives and procedures. (C)
The Department of Defense, because of its close and continuing
involvement with PROJECT MEDUSA and the NSI&SMS, shall continue
to act as the Executive Agent for the NSI&SMS. The Department
of Defense shall:
Pro-vide NSI&SMS architecture and systems engineering
support in response to requirements identified and
approved through the CMWG;
Ensure an NSI&SMS Master Plan is developed to maintain
an affordable and modern NSI&SMS focused on fully
exploiting the capabilities of current equipment, and
ensuring compatibility and interoperability among all
NSI&SMS nodes and COG systems;
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Continue to provide the SVTS Program Manager and
Configuration manager assistance to complete the
installation and testing of the SVTS; assist in
developing SVTS user procedures for CMWG review; and
examine and recommend cost-effective modifications to
the current SVTS in response to requirements
identified by the CMWG; and
- Ensure that NSI&SMS activities and security procedures
are consistent with NSI&SMS security requirements.
(S)
The Department of Defense shall continue to provide resources
and technical support to NSI&SMS in the White House complex.
(S)
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