THE SDIO: A SECURITY THREAT TO NRO TECHNOLOGY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP97M00248R000500220031-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 7, 2010
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: August 14, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
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r..LII i
NI0/FDIA
14 August 1985
The SOIO: A Security Threat to NRO Technology
I have been examining the counterintelligence and security issues
involved in the protection of sensitive NRP technology. One of the first
issues to surface with the NRO was the concern that key technologies, which
they are developing and testing now for deployment near the end of the decade,
-will be compromised in the near-term as a result of the public debate on SDI
by government officials insensitive to the protection of intelligence sources
and methods
Th
NRO'
.
e
s principal concern is that early Soviet awareness of
such plans could stimulate countermeasures development long before US
de to thereby minimizing the effectiveness of the proposed programs.
During the past 30 days I have interviewed NRO and Intelli
C
gence
ommunity
personnel involved with either technology development and/or intelligence
support who are familiar with the SDIO. Their comments lead me to the
following conclusions:
The current security apparatus within the SDIO is not adequate to
protect intelligence sources and methods. We have been told that
there is no professional security officer there, the few officers
assigned this duty have it as a secondary duty, and they are not
familiar enough with security to be effective. Storage
facilities for classified documents are inad to and document
control appears to be in disarray.
There appears to be a lack of appreciation among those involved
with SDI, and especially those within the SDIO, about the high
potential negative impact on future collection systems resulting
from their disclosure of NRP-related technologies. It is clear
that SDIO officers are trying to be responsive to the White House
desire to sell the program but they are doing so with
insufficient reaard for the needs of the Intelligence
C
i
ommun
ty.
Intelligence support to the SDIO is uneven at best, stemming from
the organizational placement of the few qualified personnel
within that office_who could assure a continuous flow of
intelligence and assist in its interpretation. Better
intelligence support could stem the volume of inadvertent
Some potential improvements:
-- Strengthen the CIA (DI and DS&T) intelligence support to SDIO.
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-- Offering a security support team to the SDIO. This team could
serve as a permanent security element similar in concept to the
one that has served so effectively for the NRO over the years.
An alternative would be to loan such a team for 2-3 years until
SDIO personnel are adequately trained and indoctrinated.
-- Offering an Office of Security inspection of the SDIO facility,
including its procedures for transport, storage and general
protection of classified Community documents. This would be a
one time effort to establish a security baseline and to identify
areas for improvement.
-- A security awareness program for SDIO, the NRO, and other
appropriate elements in order to inform them of the damage to
future collection programs resulting from the disclosure today of
NRP programs. Briefings could be provided on the record of
Soviet response to compromise and other disclosure.
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