ADDRESS BY THE HONORABLE R. JAMES WOOLSEY BEFORE THE WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL OF WASHINGTON, D.C. 1992 ANNUAL DINNER

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP97M00518R000600690001-9
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• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 17, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 2, 1992
• Content Type: MISC

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Address by
The Honorable
R. James Woolsey
before the World Affairs Council of
Washington, D.C.
1992 Annual Dinner
December 2, 1992
Courtesy of Northrop Corporation as Principal Corporate Benefactor
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The Honorable R. James Woolsey
The Honorable R. James Woolsey
has long been involved in national
security affairs. Most recently, he
was Ambassador and U.S. Repre-
sentative to the Negotiation on Con-
ventional Armed Forces in Europe
(CFE). Prior to that, Ambassador
Woolsey's public positions included
Delegate at Large to the U.S.-Soviet
Strategic Reduction Talks (START)
and Nuclear and Space Talks (NST)
(1983-86), Under Secretary of the
Navy (1977-79), General Counsel to
the U.S. Senate Committee on
Armed Services (1972-73), Advisor
to the U.S. Delegation to the
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
(SALT 1) and a Program Analyst in
the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(1968-70).
Ambassador Woolsey has served on
numerous commissions charged
with reviewing matters of significant
public import. In 1992, he chaired
the Global Policy Project of The
United Nations Association of the
United States of America, as well as
a special technical committee assess-
ing collection systems for the
Director of Central Intelligence.
Previously, he has been a member of
the President's Commission on
Federal Ethics Law Reform (1989);
the President's Commission on
Defense Management (1985-86); and
the President's Commission on
Strategic Forces (1983). He currently
is Vice-Chairman of the Defense
Trade Advisory Group for the
Department of State.
Ambassador Woolsey has written
frequently on defense and foreign
affairs. He is the editor of Nuclear
Arms: Ethics, Strategy, Politics (1984).
Ambassador Woolsey is also a
Regent of the Smithsonian Institu-
tion (1989-present) and Chairman of
the Executive Committee of the
Board of Regents; he is a trustee for
the Center for Strategic & Inter-
national Studies (1991-present); and
he has been a trustee of The Gold-
water Scholarship & Excellence in
Education Foundation (1988-90); The
Aerospace Corporation (1982-89);
and Stanford University (1972-74).
He is currently a partner in the law
firm of Shea & Gardner and is a
director of Martin Marietta Corp-
oration and British Aerospace, Inc.
Ambassador Woolsey is a graduate
of Stanford University (B.A. 196:3,
Phi Beta Kappa); Oxford University
(St. John's College; M.S. 1965,
Rhodes Scholarship); and Yale
University (LL.B. 1968, Managing
Editor, Yale Law Journal). Ambas-
sador Woolsey is married to
Suzanne Haley Woolsey, Executive
Director, Commission on Behavioral
& Social Sciences and Education,
National Research Council, National
Academy of Sciences. They have
three children, Robert, Daniel, and
Benjamin.
*In mid-December, Ambassador Woolsey was nominated by President-elect Clinton
to be the Director of Central Intelligence.
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I was talking the other evening
with my wife, Sue, about the possi-
bility of my making some remarks
here this evening. I said that, this
being an extraordinarily sophisti-
cated, able and challenging audi-
ence, I should perhaps talk about
some big issues, such as how we
won the cold war, what the future
might have in store, and particu-
larly how well we've been able to
predict what was going to happen.
She then, unfortunately, pulled out
the letter. I arrived in Vienna
November 7, 1989, to negotiate the
CFE treaty, four days before the
Berlin Wall went down. The morn-
ing of November 11th I wrote her
a letter which, sadly, she still has.
It goes something like this: Well,
there was something interesting on
CNN last night about the Berlin
Wall. Moving along to Christmas
vacation, really looking forward to
you and the boys coming over.
Thought we might go skiing. And
I'd like for us all to go to Prague
because, although you've been
there, none of the rest of us has,
and I want the boys to see what a
real Stalinist state looks like.
So, I more or less abandoned the
idea of sharing with you tonight
my own personal expertise at pre-
dicting how the future was going
to go. But I didn't give up on the
notion of talking to you seriously
about that overall question-how
we might all, together, get a better
handle on these trends. Indeed,
this is particularly important
because I was not alone in 1989.
Most of the people who were look-
ing at the Soviets did not really see
very well what was coming, even
in 1989, and certainly not before.
Seymour Martin Lipset has recent-
ly written a fascinating article on
how dimly most of us saw what
was coming. Lipset says that, basi-
cally, most liberals, particularly
among the Soviet specialists,
thought that the Soviet Union was
very strong and powerful and that,
generally, things were also very
stable. They were guided in part
by policy considerations, by not
wanting to disturb the relationship
so much as to create dangerous
conflict.
Most conservatives, on the other
hand, thought the Soviet empire
was quite evil but they also held
the view that it was very strong
and powerful and most also
thought it quite stable; they were
also in part guided by policy - by
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wanting to generate the political
will for the West to stand firm.
A very few people, including the
gentleman at our front table here
- my former boss, Paul Nitze -
had a far more nuanced and
sophisticated view of what was
going on over there. But most pro-
fessional observers, particularly
the specialists, did not see what
was coming very clearly at all.
Lipset points out that two promi-
nent American politicians, howev-
er, had been saying for 12 to 15
years that although the Soviet
Union was quite evil, it really had
feet of clay and was likely to col-
lapse. It's an interesting pair,
according to Marty Lipset-
Ronald Reagan and Daniel Patrick
Moynihan.
Now, the only thing I see that is
clearly common to those two dis-
tinguished political figures is that
both are Irish Americans. Perhaps
it's true that the Irish hear music
that the rest of us simply can't hear
- certainly it was music that I
could not hear the morning of
November 11th in Vienna in 1989.
But short of trying to obtain Irish
gene transplants for all of us, how
do we get some sort of feeling,
some sort of understanding, for
how we won the cold war and
how we might be able to deal with
what is now coming at us? How
can we climb a tree, so to speak,
and get some view of the horizon
to keep from getting lost, as almost
everyone did who in the past
focused just on policies and poli-
tics and interest groups? How can
we get a better perspective than
staying fixated on the stream bed
through which we're somewhat
blindly stumbling?
Thinking about this, and about
Lipset's article, I went back to a
favorite quote, which, although it
is a paragraph long, I want to read
to you because I think it is the
essence of wisdom on these issues.
It's the closing words of John
Maynard Keynes' general theory:
.. the ideas of economists and
political philosophers, both when
they are right and when they are
wrong, are more powerful than
is commonly understood.
Indeed, the world is ruled by lit-
tle else. Practical men, who
believe themselves to be quite
exempt from any intellectual
influences, are usually the slaves
of some defunct economist.
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Madmen in authority, who hear
voices in the air, are distilling
their frenzy from some academic
scribbler of a few years back. I
am sure that the power of vested
interests is vastly exaggerated
compared with the gradual
encroachment of ideas. Not,
indeed, immediately, but after a
certain interval, for in the field
of economic and political philos-
ophy there are not many who are
influenced by new theories after
they're twenty-five or thirty
years of age, so that the ideas
which civil servants and politi-
cians and even agitators apply to
current events are not likely to
be the newest. But, soon or late,
it is ideas, not vested interests,
which are dangerous for good or
evil."
I want to ask you this evening to
take that advice of Keynes' with
me, and for a few minutes to look
at the history of ideas as a focus for
understanding how we won the
cold war and what we need to do
now to deal with the new risks
that are in front of us.
First, what is it that we just did
over the course of the last 45
years?
A fascinating thinker, Bruce
Ackerman, Sterling professor
of law and political philosophy
at Yale, has written a new book
on constitutional revolution.
Ackerman says there that, essen-
tially, the end of the cold war
marked the end of a civil war
between two children of the
Enlightenment.
And some few years ago, Arnold
Toynbee described Marxism as a
Christian heresy.
Now, I don't believe that either
Ackerman or Toynbee were trying
to be particularly kind to Marxism
and certainly not to Communism. I
think they were trying to point
toward an analysis that to the best
of my knowledge has been set out
most carefully by Sir Isaiah Berlin
over the years in a number of
essays. Let me see if I can state it
succinctly.
From essentially the time of Moses
through the early 19th century -
the first semester and a half of the
course we all used to take in col-
lege (and maybe somewhere they
still teach) called Western
Civilization - there was in the
West, more or less, a common set
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of assumptions about the very
important set of questions:
ple might disagree, even kill, over
what that right way was.
How should I live?
How should I be governed?
How should the state operate?
This set of assumptions about
moral and political philosophy
(one might call it the Judeo/
Christian/Greco/Roman/ Middle
Ages/ Renaissance/ Enlighten-
ment Thing) included the notions
that, first of all, moral and political
questions have an objective
answer. Second, that all humans
can know what that answer is,
whether by revelation, by the nat-
ural sciences, or by some other
method. And third, that these val-
ues all more or less form a coher-
ent whole; they don't conflict. The
idea was, in short, that there was
an ideal pattern for living and
operating a society, whoever you
were and wherever you were.
Now, one could fall away from
this pattern, and most people did,
according to this set of ideas,
through sin, through stupidity,
through weakness, through being
a prisoner of our economic class or
whatever. But there was a basic
belief that there was, generally, a
right way to live - although peo-
Heretics or rebels were thought to
be dangerous, because they might
turn people away from the truth.
Western civilization for all those
centuries was civilization in quotes
in many ways - whether it was
because Catholics and Protestants
were massacring one another in
the Thirty Years War due to the
difference between consubstantia-
tion and transubstantiation in the
Eucharist (I still can never remem-
ber which one is Catholic and
which one is Protestant), or
because Robespierre's victims
were rolling to the guillotine.
There was a lot of horror in
Western "civilization".
So this idea that there was general,
moral, and political truth, that
there was a coherent pattern of life
which one should follow, was a
very big tent, as one sometimes
says in present political parlance.
The most important point about all
this for our purposes this evening
is that Marxism was essentially a
misshapen and distorted branch of
this tradition that culminated in
the Enlightenment. It was a weird
marriage of Hegel and a mechanis-
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tic materialism, producing eventu-
ally totalitarianism and a bizarre
and profitless (in many senses)
economics. It bore the same rela-
tionship to much of the rest of
Enlightenment thought, I suppose,
that astrology bears to astronomy.
But nonetheless, at its heart there
was a sense in which Marxism was
rounded on reason, was interna-
tionalist, and had an idealistic side.
It argued for a general way to live.
When asked the question how
should one live, a Marxist would
say that - whoever or wherever
one was - one should help histo-
ry move toward a classless society,
and redistribute the abundance
which came out of the natural
workings of the dialectic in society.
Engels went to his deathbed firmly
believing that the first Communist
society would be, of course, in the
United States. Because this was the
most advanced society, economic
abundance would have been pro-
duced here first.
Marxists would at least argue.
There was something to argue
about. Reason had a role. And
even after Lenin's 1917 coup d'etat
against Kerensky, even after Stalin,
something of this notion of general
applicability and rationality, some
small part of this Enlightenment
tradition, survived. This is the rea-
son why, I think, Ackerman is
right in saying that when we won
the cold war, we won a civil war
within the Enlightenment.
But now along about the same
time that Marx was first writing,
something else was happening in
Europe. A completely different
way of thinking about one's moral
and political obligations as a
human being was arising.
At first it was a relatively gentle
and attractive philosophy. Its orig-
inators, such as Herder, were
thinkers with whom even Sir
Isaiah Berlin, himself a modern
paragon of the Enlightenment, has
expressed sympathy. He calls this
new way of thinking about morals
and politics the Counter-
Enlightenment. It arose at first
principally in Germany, out of
reactions there against the French
Enlightenment, and against French
domination - political and mili-
tary. Berlin calls it a great revolu-
tion in the human spirit.
The Counter-Enlightenment reject-
ed the idea that moral and political
questions have one answer, that
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that answer can be known, and
that true values don't conflict with
one another. It contended right
from the beginning that values are
relative from civilization to civi-
lization, from culture to culture,
from tribe to tribe. They are not
universal. Even at its somewhat
benign beginning there was pre-
sent in the Counter-Enlightenment
the notion that it is one's own
country's or one's own civiliza-
tion's culture that matters, not
those of - as it was once said -
lesser breeds without the law.
There was no concept in the
Counter-Enlightenment of single
coherent truth. Answering the
question, "how should I live?",
political and moral decisions were
principally thought to be acts of
will, not matters of understanding.
The proper analogy for moral and
political decision-making was not
the way one reasoned about theol-
ogy or physics. It was, rather, biol-
ogy, the survival of the fittest, or
even artistic creativity.
A leader was neither a philosopher
king nor an elected official; he was
a romantic hero. Carlyle wrote
about this concept a great deal, as
did Nietzsche. The idea was that a
leader molded people creatively,
as Beethoven molded notes. And
most importantly, for our current
purposes in understanding the
implications of this Counter-
Enlightenment line of thinking, the
idea was present from the begin-
ning that conflict between soci-
eties, between civilizations,
between cultures, was inevitable.
They would inevitably clash. The
strongest would inevitably win.
And war itself was an essential
part of the picture.
There was an early, peaceful live-
and-let-live version of this roman-
tic, Counter-Enlightenment vision,
identified with Herder and others.
But before long, it took a more
brutal turning. Through Nietzsche
and others, it evolved toward
notions of passionate nationalism
and then into fascism, not only in
Germany but in many other coun-
tries as well. It became, philosophi-
cally, and in many other ways, the
Triumph of the Will.
Now although Communism - the
central Communist state, the
Soviet empire - was to some
extent infected by this nationalist
spirit, especially under Stalin dur-
ing World War II (indeed Stalin
created the Oriental despotism
that Marx had warned against),
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still, all along, there was in
Marxism this small, slightly glow-
ing coal of the Enlightenment idea
of universal, general, coherent val-
ues. Enough of a coal, I think, to
make Bruce Ackerman right.
Often the coal seemed to have
gone out, but from time to time it
would surprise you. And in pon-
dering the old issue, "how should
one live?" even some Communist
leaders would ask themselves uni-
versal and general questions, and
they would get surprising
answers. The two most important
times this happened, for our cur-
rent purposes, were when these
questions were asked by
Khrushchev and Gorbachev.
When Khrushchev made his 20th
Party Congress speech attacking
Stalin's crimes, it was the begin-
ning of the end of the Soviet
empire. His speech was the inspi-
ration for generations of Russians
and others who began to under-
stand the fundamental contradic-
tions, indeed the idiocy, of their
own system. Of course we all owe
a great deal to the dissidents, the
renegades, the rebels, within the
Soviet system. But it is also vitally
important that Gorbachev, for all
the difficulties he came to,
nonetheless - in his effort to be, in
a sense, an honest Communist, to
try to make the system live up to
some sort of universalist ideas -
he hesitated, and finally he made a
firm decision not to send in the
tanks. Gorbachev's sense of uni-
versal values, his capacity to be
ashamed of his system's contradic-
tions, made it possible for the
Soviet system to deteriorate, and it
deteriorated in part because of that
small glowing coal of the
Enlightenment at Marxism's core.
Put another way, because they
were not children of the Counter-
Enlightenment the Soviets never
believed that war was inevitable.
They wanted to win without war.
And that's why, ultimately, we
won. Since they didn't regard war
as inevitable or desirable, unlike
Fascists, our containment policy
had time to work. And in fact it
did work, almost exactly as
George Kerman said it would in
1946. We held until they disinte-
grated. But it took nearly half a
century instead of a few years.
Thirdly, we won because of
nationalism itself. Moderate
nationalism is the attractive side of
the Counter-Enlightenment. And
because the Soviet system was, in
part, of course a Russian empire,
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the dissident and separate parts of
that empire, including in some
cases the Russians themselves, saw
that their own nation's cultures
and spirits were being stifled by
the Soviet system.
The civil war within the
Enlightenment is over. It's proba-
bly over for a long time. The way
Frank Fukuyama says this is that it
is the End of History, with a capi-
tal "H." What he principally
means by that, I think, is that it is
the end of civil wars within the tra-
dition of the Enlightenment. But
history with a small "h" is certain-
ly not over; indeed, it is getting
more and more exciting all the
time. I want to conclude with some
thoughts about that.
One of the reasons history is get-
ting to be so exciting is technology.
For example, the technology of
inertial, even terminal, guidance of
ballistic missiles, is now out and
about in the world. Beyond single-
stage SCUDs we will come to see
longer-range two-stage ballistic
missiles in the hands of more
countries. The technology of chem-
ical and bacteriological weapons is
also out and about in the world.
And, proliferation of nuclear
weapons is only being checked
with great effort by the difficulty
of acquiring fissionable material.
In the aftermath of the breakdown
of the Soviet Union, I'm afraid that
even that difficulty may not prove
to be a great one for a number of
countries.
Second, the end of the cold war
has freed nationalism. Some
nationalisms now thrive in very
virulent forms, particularly in the
southern part of what used to be
called the world island: from
somewhere south of Moscow over
through the Balkans, down into
North Africa, east to south-central
Asia and back up to the area south
of Moscow. In this area there are a
number of countries in which
nationalism today is extremely
strong - often augmented by
strong cultural feelings or funda-
mental religious beliefs. There is
also oil money, substantial oil
money, in that part of the world.
And there is not a strong tradition
of democracy.
Certainly it is not only from that
part of the world that international
difficulties will come - sub-
Saharan Africa, the Western
Hemisphere, North Korea, and
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elsewhere will present major prob-
lems too. But even if one concen-
trates only on this central area, I
think one could say that, although
we have slain the single dragon of
Soviet imperialism, there are still
lots of very large poisonous
snakes. And, as they say in
Hollywood, it's a jungle out there.
Further, some of these snakes will
soon be able to strike from a dis-
tance.
The world, although less danger-
ous with respect to a single cata-
clysmic exchange between the
United States and the Soviet
Union, has traded that danger for
a number of very, very difficult
international problems. Can we
deal with those the way we won
the cold war? By containment? By
seeing Enlightenment notions of
self-doubt come about in leaders
of countries that have untoward
ambitions? Will nationalism help
us?
I think the answer to all of these
questions is, unfortunately, no.
Containment will not help us. In
dealing with the intellectual proge-
ny of the Counter-Enlightenment,
with virulent nationalism, it is cru-
cial to understand their concept of
war being inevitable. This concept
certainly seems to be out and
about in Serbia and Iraq. It may
soon be out and about in other
parts of that area of the world.
In these countries can we count on
the followers of current leaders, -
e.g., Saddam's successors - some-
day to be seized by the same
degree of Enlightenment spawned
self-doubt that led Khrushchev to
make the 20th Party Congress
speech, that led Gorbachev to balk
at sending in the tanks? I think the
chances of that are very, very lim-
ited. Close to non-existent.
And nationalism is now far from
helping us in the way that it
helped us undermine the Soviet
empire. Indeed, these new virulent
nationalisms now feed on one
another, together they metastasize.
Serbian nationalism helps boost
Croatian nationalism, and vice
versa. These nationalisms are not
like Polish nationalism in the
1980's. They are not our friends.
This world that we are beginning
to see - with the addition of
nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles,
chemicals, bacteriologicals and the
rest - begins to look more and
more like a more lethal version of
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the old world that existed before
1914, when a range of nationalist
sentiments produced the holocaust
of World War I.
I have to share with you one of my
favorite anecdotes, from that time,
about the power of nationalism. It
is Frederic Morton's description of
the actions of four individuals in
August, 1914. All were outsiders,
all intellectuals, all Viennese. I
think its underlying point about
nationalism's power is as true
today in many parts of the world
as it was in 1914 in Vienna.
As the guns of August started fir-
ing, the philosopher, Ludwig
Wittgenstein, a deviant from soci-
ety in just about every way one
can think of, a recluse recovering
from an operation, enlisted in the
Austro-Hungarian Army.
The composer Arnold Schoenberg,
father of atonal music, at odds with
the entire musical establishment of
Vienna, had left Vienna in personal
and artistic rebellion. But he
returned in August of 1914, enlist-
ed in the Deutschmeister Regiment
and began composing convention-
al, certainly not atonal, patriotic
military marches for its marching
bands.
The painter Oskar Kokoschka,
who talked about the personal
misery of living in Vienna, sold his
most cherished possession, a love-
ly painting of himself with his mis-
tress (and practically everybody
else's mistress at that time) Alma
Mahler, bought himself a horse, a
cavalry uniform, a brass helmet,
and joined the 15th Imperial
Dragoons.
And the psychiatrist Sigmund
Freud, outcast from his city's med-
ical establishment for his radical
ideas, returned to Vienna, set up
his practice again, refused to give
male patients of conscription age
certificates of nervous disability,
and declared, and I quote, "all my
libido goes to Austria-Hungary."
What we saw among these brilliant,
unconventional, rebellious intellec-
tuals - in many ways the forefa-
thers of much of twentieth-century
culture - in Vienna in August of
1914 is not far afield from what we
may well see in other societies in
other parts of the world as the spir-
it of nationalism grows. Such a
world is extremely unpredictable.
The risk of crossborder spillovers of
nationalist conflict, indeed the risk
of genocide, is substantial. And
increasingly, as it mixes with
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weapons of mass destruction and
new delivery methods for them,
nationalism creates a high degree,
to put it mildly, of international
uncertainty.
The U.S. and some other countries,
acting together on an ad hoc basis,
can, I suppose, from time to time
check some of these expressions of
nationalism when they evolve into
genocide or dangerous cross-bor-
der threats. But this is a much
messier, incoherent, and less intel-
lectually manageable problem
than the one we have just solved,
as we did in the cold war - by
organizing a worldwide crusade
against a single warped product of
the Enlightenment. In time, I'm
fearful that for us and for other
countries who might be willing to
help, without some transformation
of the way international order and
decency are maintained, the coun-
tries that need to check this new
nationalism will tire. At some
point the burden will become too
great.
A new approach toward collective
security seems to me to be badly
needed, and I will'close by saying
that I think that, at this time, the
only institution that is likely to be
able to provide the mechanism for
that is the old and somewhat
creaky United Nations. The mech-
anisms that were produced in 1945
and 1946 for enforcing peace via
the United Nations are still there.
Such efforts will have to be under-
taken in a very different manner
than people thought in 1945 and
1946, and the difficulties of how to
structure relations between nation-
al military forces and the UN
Security Council still need to be
worked out. But, as far as I know,
in one particular case they're being
worked out even this evening,
with respect to Somalia.
One thing seems clear to me. If we
look at the ideas that underlie the
cold war and at those that underlie
the new international disorder,
spawned by children of the
Counter-Enlightenment, that is
coming into existence, it suggests
to me that we have a huge chal-
lenge ahead of us. And it is a chal-
lenge different in nature, different
in strategy, different in technology,
and, above all, different in ideas
than what we have dealt with
before. We may well find - and I
am sorry to close on a somber note
- that the last 45 years have been
easy.
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12
1992 Annual Dinner
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TRW, Inc.
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The World Affairs Council of Washington, D.C.
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