EAST GERMANY: SOVIET PARTNER IN THE LDCS

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 7, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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f ff, Directorate of
East Germany:
Soviet Partner
in the LDCs
An Iateltce Assessment
GI 83-10201
September 1983
copy 3 7 7
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f`~`E Directorate of Secret
uneurgence
East Germany:
Soviet Partner
in the LDCs
This paper was prepared by
Directorate of Operations
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief. Communist Activities Branch,
OGI,
Secret
GI 83-10201
September 1983
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East Germany:
Soviet Partner
in the LDCs F-
Key Judgments East Germany is an active partner in the USSR's drive to increase
Information available Communist presence and influence in the Third World. The East German
as of 31 August /983 programs are small compared with the Soviet effort but have grown in size
was used in this report.
and scope to the point where East Germany now provides a number of com-
plementary services that serve Moscow's foreign policy interests. These
services range from traditional military and economic assistance to special-
ized activities such as developing local security and intelligence services,
establishing party and media links, and providing technical training
courses. East Germany has contributed to the establishment or consolida-
tion of a number of pro-Soviet regimes, notably in Angola, Mozambique,
Ethiopia, South Yemen, and Syria. In addition, East Germany has used
links with LDC Communist parties, media, labor unions, and front
organizations to increase Communist presence and influence in the Third
World. East German programs are most heavily concentrated in Africa
and the Middle East, but recently have become more active in Latin
America.
We believe that the East Germans in some instances act as surrogates
performing duties at Soviet request and in other cases carry out programs
in general coordination with Moscow but with the specifics left to East
Berlin. The kinds of activities that appear to be most closely coordinated
are those dealing with intelligence and security, military assistance, and
covert support to nonruling leftist and Communist parties. Other activi-
ties-such as economic assistance-are apparently conducted much more
independently, although with Moscow's knowledge and encouragement.
In addition to supporting Moscow's foreign policy goals, East German
relations with the Third World have been driven by its desire to enhance its
own international prestige, particularly vis-a-vis West Germany, and more
recently, by economic necessity, particuh need to gain access to
hard currency and export markets.
We expect that the East German interest in the Third World will continue
to increase because their activities provide benefits to the USSR and the
LDCs as well as East Germany. Of the various East German programs, in-
telligence and security assistance and political influence activities are most
likely to be expanded and pose the most direct challenge to US interests.
While Africa and the Middle East probably will continue to be prime
targets, recent East German activities in Nicaragua and Grenada indicate
an increasing interest in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Secret
GI 83-1020/
September 1983
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East German Programs in the Third World
Our knowledge about the size and scope of East
German programs comes from
LDCs, media agreements were signed with at least
six LDCs, and some 300 East German youths were
assigned to friendship brigades in nine LDCs.
Embassy reporting, and East German and
Third World press. We are confident that our data
accurately reflect the general size and pattern of East
German activities, but we are less confident about the
specific details of individual programs. Our data
show that the East Germans are active throughout
the Third World and that their programs are most
heavily concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa and the
Middle East. Programs differ from country to coun-
try, but one or more of the following elements are at
the heart of East German efforts in each target
country:
? Intelligence and Military Advisers. We estimate
that in 1982 there were 1,000 to 1,500 East German
advisers in LDCs. Most of them were involved in
assisting leftist regimes develop their intelligence
and security apparatus. Others were employed as
weapons instructors, maintenance and repair tech-
nicians, logistic specialists, and staff advisers.
? Political Influence Mechanisms. East Germany uses
a variety of mechanisms to penetrate or influence
key sectors of LDC governments and populations-
such as providing political advice and support to
Marxist parties; training journalists and supporting
leftist newspapers; and exploiting youth, labor, and
front organizations. In 1982 friendship exchanges
were conducted with fraternal parties in seven
Soviet and East German offi-
cers reviewing Angolan military
? Military Supply Program. Since the start of its
military supply program in 1964, East Germany
has signed military sales agreements worth $860
million with about 30 LDCs calling primarily for
the supply of vehicles, artillery, small arms, and
ammunition. Sales reached $320 million in 1982
alone, reflecting East German sales of vehicles to
Iran as well as equipment and ammunition to Iraq.
? Economic Assistance. East Germany has signed
economic agreements totaling nearly $3 billion with
some 50 LDCs since the program began in 1955. A
large share of the recent agreements has been trade
credits that call for repayment in hard currency or
oil. In addition, East Germany had some 5,000
technicians in LDCs in 1982-three times the num-
ber in 1978-to help organize and develop govern-
ment administration, install and maintain East
German equipment, and work on development
projects.
? Trade. East Germany's trade with Third World
countries amounted to over $2 billion in 1981,
accounting for 5 percent of East German orei n
trade, as it has since the early 1960s.
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East Germany:
Soviet Partner
in the LDCs
East German efforts in support of Moscow's foreign
policy objectives in the Third World have led to a
substantial expansion of relations with LDCs since the
early 1970s. Starting essentially as moral support for
Third World "progressive" states and "liberation"
movements, East German activities in the LDCs are
now varied and include government-to-government
diplomatic relations, party-to-party ties, cultural and
media links, intelligence and security assistance,
training programs, military and economic agree-
ments, and trade.
Although the East German programs are small com-
pared with those of the Soviet Union, they comple-
ment Soviet programs by concentrating on selected
countries and specializing in those areas that have the
greatest potential for influence in LDCs. For example:
? By providing intelligence and security assistance to
several African countries, the East Germans have
been instrumental in helping to secure Moscow's
position in the area.
? By developing party-to-party relations, East Berlin
has been able to provide support to nonruling leftist
and Communist parties in Latin America.
? East Germany's extensive media activities help meet
Moscow's goals of broadly disseminating Commu-
nist propaganda.
? East Berlin's support of youth movements and trade
unions exemplify East German efforts to penetrate
key sectors in LDCs in order to secure current and
future political advantage for itself and Moscow.
? East Germany's military supply program, while
small, is used selectively to help support the needs of
Soviet clients and potential clients.
In addition to supporting Soviet Third World policies,
East Germany's activities in the Third World are
apparently also motivated by East Berlin's desire to:
? Enhance East German international visibility and
prestige, particularly vis-a-vis West Germany.
? Provide East Germany with needed export markets
and hard currency earnings to help finance imports
from the West as well as from the Soviet Union and
other Warsaw Pact countries.
Of the USSR's Warsaw Pact allies, East Germany
plays the most active role in support of Soviet objec-
tives in the Third World. East Berlin no doubt shares
many of Moscow's motives for penetrating Third
World countries. East German leaders have frequent-
ly stated their support for-and willingness to act as
an instrument of-Soviet policy. For example, in a
speech to the Parliament in June 1979 on the signing
of "friendship and cooperation" treaties with Angola 25X1
and Mozambique, Foreign Minister Fischer acknowl-
edged that the treaties were an expression of the
"coordinated foreign policy of the states of the social-
ist community." We believe, however, that some of
the motivation for East Germany's activities stems not
just from shared ideals but also from a desire to
enhance its position with Moscow in hopes of increas-
ing Soviet support for East German political and
economic interests.
There are numerous examples of East German activi-
ties in the Third World that directly support Soviet
objectives:
? East Germans have helped to consolidate pro-
Soviet, Marxist-oriented regimes in South Yemen,
Mozambique, Ethiopia, and Angola.
? East Berlin responded rapidly and fairly generously
to the Sandinista takeover in Nicaragua, offering
$30 million in military equipment and $110 million
in economic assistance since late 1979. This repre-
sents almost 25 percent of total Warsaw Pact aid to
Nicaragua. East Germany has also provided limited
aid and training to Guatemalan and Salvadoran
insurgents.
? East Germany has provided assistance to the Pales-
tine Liberation Organization (PLO), Syria, and Iraq
in support of Soviet Middle East policies. East
Germany's resupply of Iraq in the early days of the
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Through its involvement in Third World media, East
Germany has had some success in casting events in a
pro-East, anti-West light. Such involvement includes
training journalists, providing news services, support-
ing party newspapers, and facilitating clandestine
radiobroadcasting
Journalist Training
The Solidarity School run by East Germany's Jour-
nalist Union was established by the International
Organization of Journalists, one of the 10 major
Soviet front groups. The school has been largely used
to train journalists from African countries such as
Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Zambia
News Services
The East German news agency, ADN, is increasingly
active in the Third World.
US Embassy reporting shows that the East Germans
regularly supply material to Tanzania's government
press service and local Tanzanian newspapers and
that the East Germans along with the Soviets regu-
larly plant stories hostile to the West in the Zambian
media. ADN pieces are frequently printed in the
Ethiopian press. Ghana is reported to receive free
wire service from East Germany, and, according to
US Embassy reporting, a source who claims to have
good connections in Ghana claims that the East
Germans provided much of the material for an article
on "CIA in Ghana? " which appeared in the Peoples
Daily Graphic last December.
East German involvement in the media of other
countries has been less detectable, but ADN has
recently signed agreements with news services in such
countries as Burma, Cyprus, Greece, South Yemen,
and Syria. In India, East Germany continues to be
active in the media, conducting broadcasts in both
English and Hindi and maintaining a bureau in New
Delhi.
Support to Party Newspapers
East Germany also provides printing equipment and
supplies to a number offriendly Third World govern-
ments and to nonruling Communist and leftist parties
for their party newspapers:
? Grenada recently received a GDR grant for printing
equipment for its Free West Indian newspaper.
? According to press reports, East Germany covertly
provided financial assistance to the publishing
house of the pro-Soviet Greek Communist Party
through a front company in Luxembourg.
Clandestine Radiobroadcasts
East Germany has also provided broadcasting facili-
ties to a number of Western and Third World Com-
munist movements including Iran's Tudeh Party and
the Greek Communist Party. In most cases, the
listeners were led to believe that the broadcasts
originated in the target country. The only clandestine
stations still operating from Eastern Europe are two
that broadcast in Turkish from East Germany:
"Voice of the Turkish Communist Party" and "Our
Radio. " Broadcasts generally follow the Soviet line
in commenting on Turkish foreign policy and empha-
size themes designed to discredit the United States,
NATO, and the West. On many issues, moreover,
these broadcasts have been much more critical than
the more cautious official Soviet and East German
media.
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Iran-Iraq war preceded Moscow's own shift to
supporting Baghdad, while Moscow was still trying
to solidify its relations with Tehran.
? East Germany has been among the most active
Warsaw Pact countries in assisting leftist insurgent
groups. It has provided advisory support or training
(and, in some cases, weapons) to the South-West
Africa People's Organization according to State
Department reporting,
? East Germany provides printing equipment and
supplies to pro-Soviet leftist newspapers in Grenada,
Peru, Greece, and Portugal and news services
to a number of countries including Mozambique,
Ethiopia, Zambia, Tanzania, Ghana, Syria, South
Yemen, Greece, Cyprus, Burma, and India.
? East Germany is also an active participant in inter-
national Communist front organizations such as the
World Peace Council and the Afro-Asian People's
Solidarity Organization. It has representatives on
the executive committees or secretariats of nine out
of the 10 major Soviet fronts, and one of the
fronts-the Women's International Democratic
Federation-is headquartered in East Berlin. East
Germany has also established friendship societies in
countries throughout the Third World and has used
these as well as cultural and sports activities as
vehicles for promoting Soviet views.
? East Germany has several training programs for
LDC personnel that complement Soviet and War-
saw Pact training programs. We believe, based
largely on the reporting of military attaches, that
more than 1,000 trainees from LDCs-mainly from
Ethiopia, Zambia, and Mozambique-underwent
military and paramilitary instruction in East Ger-
? East Germany's Communist Party, the Socialist
Unity Party (SED), has continued to develop and
maintain direct links with leftist and Communist
parties in Africa, South Asia, and Latin America.
SED officials frequently attend party congresses
and have been involved in organizing and training
party cadre as well as providing advice and other
support. For instance, after the visit of an SED
Central Committee Politburo delegation to Congo
in 1981, an agreement was signed with the Congo-
lese Labor Party calling for closer ties with the
SED, including continued training of Congolese
party cadre, according to a State Department re-
Coordination of Activities
There appears to be coordination and some specializa-
tion of activities between the USSR and East Germa-
ny in the Third World. The degree of coordination
apparently varies depending partly on geopolitical
interests, but, in general, Soviet-East German coordi-
nation appears to be most prevalent in activities
dealing with arms sales, intelligence and military
technical assistance, party cadre development, and
support to liberation movements.
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More coordination and specialization-particularly
between the USSR, East Germany, and, in some
instances, Cuba-is evident in Sub-Saharan Africa
and Latin America than in other regions. In Ethiopia
and Angola, for example, Moscow has provided the
bulk of the Bloc military and economic aid, Cuba has
supplied combat troops, while the East Germans have
concentrated on strengthening and reorganizing local
intelligence and security services. The apparent coor-
dination of East German, Cuban, and Soviet activi-
ties, as well as East Germany's increased role in
Africa, may have been the result of an understanding
reached by the three countries in 1977 when Cuban
President Fidel Castro and later Soviet Defense Min- 25X1
ister Ustinov visited East Berlin. 25X1
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Ethiopian journalists being
tau ht by East German instruc-
tors
In Latin America-particularly in Nicaragua-a
stronger East German effort in the area seems to have
followed party leader Honecker's visit to Cuba in
early 1980. The visit culminated in the signing of a
25-year friendship and cooperation treaty, the first of
its kind signed by Cuba with a Warsaw Pact state.
According to US Embassy reporting, East Germany
now has a 110-man contingent of military and eco-
nomic technicians in Nicaragua, complementing an
estimated Soviet presence of 260. The East Germans
have concentrated on assisting the Nicaraguans to
develop their security and party apparatus. They have
also supplied over 800 trucks to Nicaragua through
Arms Sales. According to State Department and
military attache reporting, Warsaw Pact arms sales
are coordinated with and, in some instances, orches-
trated by Moscow-the amount of Soviet control
varying with the size of the order, the type of
equipment involved, and the political importance
Moscow attaches to the client/supplier relationship.
East Germany's military equipment sales account for
less than 3 percent of total Warsaw Pact sales to the
Third World. As is the case with other Warsaw Pact
suppliers, sales are concentrated in a few Soviet-
supported states in:
? The Middle East-Iraq, Iran, Syria, North Yemen,
and Libya.
? Sub-Saharan Africa-Angola, Mozambique, Ethio-
pia, and Zambia.
? Latin America-primarily Nicaragua (figure 1 and
table 1).
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Figure 1
East Germany: Military Sales With LDCs
Percent
1964-77
Total: $147 million
1978-82
Total: $713 million
Middle East
4.2
Sub-Saharan Africa
15.1 78.2
North Africa 2.5
? A Syrian journalist based in East Berlin recently
told the US Embassy there that East Germany-
with Soviet backing-will play a role in training the
Syrian military. Moreover, he expected the Soviets
to funnel some military equipment shipments to
Syria through East Germany.
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Table I
East Germany: Military Relations
With Non-Communist LDCs, 1964-82
Total
Sub-Saharan Africa
Angola
Agreements Deliveries
860 588
211 209
Benin NA
Cameroon NEGL NEGL
Senegal NA
NA
Tanzania 5
5
Zaire NEGL
NEGL
Middle East 600
348
Egypt 8
8
Iran 208
17
Iraq 292
231
Lebanon NEGL
NEGL
North Yemen 19
19
South Yemen 2
2
Syria 65
65
Afghanistan NA NA
Bangladesh NEGL NEGL
NEGL NEGL
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Table 2
East Germany: Intelligence and
Military Advisers in LDCs, 1982 a
Angola
200-250
Congo
20
Ethiopia
250-300
Guinea-Bissau
15-30
Zambia
40
Other
115-250
Middle East
300-550
200-300
75-150
Other
25-100
Latin America
60
60
Support of Liberation Movements. East Germany's
support of liberation and revolutionary movements
has also closely paralleled that of the Soviet Union.
For example, the East Germans joined the Soviets in
backing Mozambique's FRELIMO and Angola's
MPLA long before these regimes came to power. On
some occasions, the East Germans appear to have
been used to establish contact with a movement when
it was politically inopportune for Moscow to do so.
East Ber- 25X1
lin established close relations with the PLO when
Moscow officially treated it with caution; the PLO
opened an office in East Berlin in 1973, three years
before opening one in Moscow. Similarly, the Zimba-
bwe African People's Union (ZAPU) opened an office
in East Berlin in 1978, the first of its kind in the
Soviet Bloc25X1
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Honecker receiving Zambian
General Svrrvtarv Humnhrrv
Mulemba
Other Motives
In addition to backing Moscow, East German activi-
ties in the Third World also support two of East
Berlin's most important foreign policy objectives:
? The East German desire for international recogni-
tion and prestige comparable to West Germany.
? More recently, the need for increased earnings of
hard currency or opportunities to barter with LDC
raw materials for East German goods or services.
The International Prestige Factor
The desire to attain recognition as a legitimate sover-
eign state is not the driving force it once was, as most
states now recognize East Germany. Nevertheless, we
believe that the rivalry with West Germany for
prestige and influence in the Third World remains
strong. With this in mind, the East Germans have
paid special attention to liberation movements and
new regimes in Africa and the Middle East. In
agreements signed with Third World countries, the
East Germans try to insert references to the inviola-
bility of the inter-German frontier and to seek ac-
knowledgment that West Berlin is not part of West
Secret
Germany. In May 1978 the East German Ambassa-
dor persuaded Guinea-Bissau to shelve an $8 million
aid agreement with Bonn because it contained a
clause that endorsed the special ties between West
Germany and West Berlin.
East Berlin uses the image of increased prestige it has
gained in the Third World to bolster the legitimacy
of the East German Government with its own people.
Support of foreign revolutionary causes is justified to
the East German populace as a necessary contribution
of the "ultimate victory" of Communism over
imperialism. East German Communist Party leader
Honecker and other high-level East German officials
have made frequent visits to Africa, the Middle East,
and other Third World regions. These visits as well as
those of Third World governments and party leaders
to East Germany are well publicized in the East
German and Bloc media.
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Honecker meeting with YAR
Vice Presiden
Abdul Ghani
East Germany's investment has paid off well in gains
in international recognition and prestige. At the be-
ginning of 1970, East Germany was recognized by
only seven non-Communist countries. Today it has
formal relations with over 130 and assistance agree-
ments with 50. It has gained influence and respect,
particularly in Africa and the Middle East where it
has established close relations with a number of
countries as well as with many of the leading African
revolutionary movements and the PLO. It has signed
treaties of friendship and cooperation with Angola,
Mozambique, Ethiopia, South Yemen, and Afghani-
stan and a joint declaration of friendship and coopera-
tion with Syria. Its influence also appears to be
increasing in other countries such as Zambia and
Nicaragua.
The East Germans, nevertheless, have also suffered
some setbacks. According to Embassy reporting, East
German police advisers in Somalia were sent home in
1981 when Mogadishu refused to renew their con-
tracts, presumably a reflection of Somalia's distanc-
The East Germans also experienced a setback in
Zimbabwe that they now appear to be reversing. East
Germany, along with Czechoslovakia and the USSR,
backed the ZAPU which lost out to Mueabe's Zimba-
bwe African National Union (ZANU).
Economic Considerations
Although East Germany's economic and military
programs in the Third World were at first motivated
more by political and ideological considerations, East
Germany began to increase its emphasis on economic
considerations in the mid-1970s (figure 2 and table 3).
At that time, economic constraints began impinging
on East Berlin's willingness to provide financial aid to
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Figure 2
East Germany: Economic Agreements With LDCs
Percent
1955-77
1978-82
Total: $1,295 million
Total: $1,681 million
North Africa Sub-Saharan Africa
300511 9-83
East German supplies being un-
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Table 3
East Germany: Economic Aid to
Non-Communist LDCs, 1955-82
Total a
2,976
959
North Africa
402
135
Algeria
377
127
Tunisia
25
8
Burundi
NEGL
NEGL
Cape Verde
7
4
Congo
27
23
Ethiopia
235
32
Ghana
64
15
Nicaragua
Guinea
24
24
Panama
Guinea-Bissau
5
5
Uruguay
Madagascar
9
1
Middle East
Mali
NEGL
NEGL
Egypt
Iran
Sao Tome and Principe
5
Iraq
Somalia
I
1
North Yemen
Sudan
46
18
South Yemen
Tanzania
19
5
Syria
Uganda
24
1
Turkey
Zambia
96
2
South Asia
Zimbabwe
16
2
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Burma
India
Indonesia
Pakistan
Kampuchea
Sri Lanka
New measures during the past five years to increase
economic returns from LDC relationships have
included:
? Opening new markets for East German equipment
by expanding the size and scope of credits provided
under trade agreements. Of the $1.7 billion in
economic agreements signed in 1978-82, $1.3 billion
112
45
4
3
6
6
1,001
390
264
170
100
84
55
10
10
42
32
451
122
50
166
81
42
15
25
12
2
2
35
10
62
42
were trade credits, usually carrying 10-year repay-
ment terms at 4.5- to 9-percent interest. According
to an East German official, only countries with good
credit records are being allowed deferred payment
terms.
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? Focusing on agreements with countries that can pay
in hard currency or in needed raw materials such as
oil. This pattern has become more pronounced in
both military and economic agreements over the
past five years. Three-fourths of the $1.7 billion in
economic agreements is repayable in hard currency,
oil, or other raw materials. Seventy percent of the
$710 million in East German military agreements
with non-Communist LDCs over the past five years
have been with Middle Eastern oil producers, pay-
able in oil or hard currency.
? Raising charges for technical services and requiring
payment in hard currency. Because of the heavy
concentration of personnel in countries that had
been targeted for ideological purposes, East Germa-
ny had not enjoyed the same hard currency returns
that other East European countries had been earn-
ing on their technical services programs.
Thus far the East German economic initiatives in
Third World countries have had limited results (table
4). Total exports to LDCs amounted to only $1 billion
in 1981-down slightly from 1980-with the LDC
share of East German trade steady at 5 percent since
the early 1960s. Nevertheless, military deliveries in
1981 accounted for about 10 percent of exports,
generating at least $100 million in hard currency.
Further hard currency earnings came from Iran, Iraq,
and Libya, which together accounted for more than
one-third of East Germany's Third World exports.
We expect income from military sales to increase as
LDCs take delivery of equipment from a record x32(1
million in contracts signed in 1982.
We believe that most East German programs will
continue to grow over the next several years. In our
view, economic aid and trade agreements will grow
only slightly-the emphasis being on hard currency
Table 4
East Germany: Trade With
Major LDC Partners
Total
947
2,295
27041
North Africa
43
352
243
Algeria
21
163
76
Libya
4
152
150
4
15
14
83
112
Sudan
10
8
2
Tanzania
2
15
1
East Asia
13
48
43
139
389
412
_
8
66
72
75
182
200
11
67
43
10
64
80
35
10
17
526
927
711
Egypt
183
93
89
Iran
17
33
38
Syria
60
118
130
Turkey
South Asia
113
145
189
India
100
134
180
Pakistan
5
6
4
Portugal
11
8
9
Spain
31
51
86
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Secret
rving Nicaraguan wounded to
East Berlin for treatment
earnings-and will have little direct impact on the
United States. In contrast, East Germany probably
will make increased use of its intelligence and security
training programs and its political influence mecha-
nisms, activities that affect US interests more direct-
ly. In addition, East Berlin's military supply program,
while small in comparison to Moscow's, can be used
selectively in those areas where Moscow is reluctant
to show its hand directly.
We believe that these trends are already evident in
recent East German moves:
? During 1982 East Berlin signed agreements to 25X1
provide news services to the local press in Greece,
Cyprus, and Syria and provided a grant for newspa-
per Printing equipment to the government of Grena-
da. 25X1
We expect that countries in Africa and the Middle 25X1
East will remain prime targets for East Germany, but
the opportunities for increased East German involve-
ment in Latin America may be of most concern to the
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Maurice Bishop visitinu
United States. East Germany's recent efforts in Cen-
tral America and the Caribbean, its ties to leftist and
Communist groups, and its effort to develop economic
relations in the region indicate a growing interest in
Latin America. How much further East Berlin will go
is not yet clear. In considering this question, East
Berlin will have to balance its desire for ties and
influence with revolutionary regimes and nonruling
leftist parties with its efforts to develop relations with
countries like Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico, where
East Germany has a growing economic stake.
The impetus for continued expansion of East German
activities in the Third World comes from the potential
benefits to all parties-the East Germans, the USSR,
and the LDCs themselves. In addition to helping
secure its international position, East Germany's ac-
tive role in the Third World reinforces its special
relationship with Moscow. It also provides some op-
portunities-albeit as yet small-for economic gain.
For the USSR, the presence of its Warsaw Pact ally
in the Third World takes some of the burden off
Moscow and helps diffuse some of the Western and
Third World criticism of superpower interference.
The Soviets can be expected to again look to the East
Germans to test the waters in a target LDC when it is
politically inopportune for them to do so. The LDCs
benefit from East German programs because of the
specialized technical expertise the East Germans have
developed.
25X1
25X1
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Appendix
Supplemental Data on
East German Military and
Economic Assistance Programs
Table A-1
East Germany: Military Agreements With LDCs, 1964-82
Libya 18 18
Sub-Saharan Africa 5 18 80 39 5 63 1 NA 211
Angola 14 50 10 5 79
Congo 2 NEGL 2
Ethiopia .. 16 24 NEGL 2 42
Ghana 2 2
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Madagascar
Mozambique 4 14
Senegal .. ..
Tanzania 3 .. 2
Zaire
Zambia
East Asia
Burma
Indonesia
Latin America
Guyana
Nicaragua
Middle East
Egypt
Iran
Iraq
Lebanon
North Yemen
South Yemen
.. .. .. 5 .. 2 23
39 3 1 61 NEGL 159 60 277
8
NEGL
30
NEGI.
30
600
4 204 208
16 3 1 8 153 50 61 292
53 NEGL
United Arab Emirates
Afghanistan
Bangladesh NEGL
India NEGL ..
NEGI.
19
2
65
6
NA NA
NA NA
NEGI.
NEGI.
23
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Table A-2
East Germany: Type of Military
Equipment Provided
to Non-Communist LDCs
Angola Small arms, ammunition, trucks, trailers,
other vehicles, spare parts
Congo Small arms, ammunition, other ground
force materiel
Ethiopia Antiaircraft guns, small arms, ammuni-
tion, medical supplies
Mozambique Fighter aircraft, tanks, assault guns, anti-
aircraft guns, armored personnel carriers,
training
Tanzania Patrol craft, small arms, ammunition,
trucks
Zambia Artillery weapons and ammunitions,
vehicles
Egypt Transport aircraft, vehicles, communica-
tions equipment
Iraq Artillery, small arms, vehicles,
ammunition
Syria Jet fighter aircraft, electronic equipment,
small arms, ammunition
South Yemen Artillery, armored cars, small arms
East Asia
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Table A-3
East Germany: Economic Credits and Grants Extended to LDCs
Total-
796
222
277
965
91
113
404
North Africa
131
21
250
Algeria
127
250
Congo
5
22
Ethiopia
1
23
207
1
2
Ghana
22
42
Guinea
4
NEGL
Guinea-Bissau
5
Mali
NEGL
Mozambique
5
1
9
2
2
75
Sudan
46
NEGL
Tanzania
7
12
Uganda
22
1
Zimbabwe
14
East Asia
90
75
30
Burma
8
Indonesia
69
75
Bolivia
5
10
Brazil
19
200
Chile
20
Colombia
5
55
Grenada
Guyana
10
20
6
Mexico
..
20
..
..
Nicaragua
..
..
..
..
20
4
62
108 2,976
402
377
NEGL
10 104
46
19
23
2 16
195
8
144
15
219
20
60
16 16
.. 36
.. 20
26 112
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necre[
Table A-3
East Germany: Economic Credits and Grants Extended to LDCs (continued)
33 264
100
10
25 25
2 2
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Table A-4
East Germany: Economic Technicians in
Non-Communist LDCs, 1982
Total
4,835
North Africa
700
Algeria
250
Libya
400
Tunisia
50
Sub-Saharan Africa
2,510
Angola
750
Ethiopia
500
Guinea
200
Mozambique
800
Zambia
100
Other
160
Other
South Yemen
Syria
Other
South Asia
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Secret
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