CASTRO'S REACH INTO THE THIRD WORLD: THE CUBAN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP97R00694R000400740001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 9, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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"~ *, Directorate of 9C 1 Secret
Castro's Reach Into
the Third World:
The Cuban Economic
Assistance Program
Secret
GI 85-10134
May 1985
Copy 219
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Directorate of
Secret
25X1
Intelligence
Castro's Reach Into
the Third World:
The Cuban Economic
Assistance Program
This paper was prepared b~ Office of
Global issues. It was coordinated with the Directorate
of Operations. Comments and queries are welcome
and may be directed to the Chief, Instability and
Insurgency Center, OGI,
Secret
G185-10134
May 1985
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25X1 Secret
Summary
Information available
as of 30 March 1985
was used in this report.
Western government programs
Castro's Reach Into 25X1
the Third World:
The Cuban Economic
Assistance Program
Over the last decade Fidel Castro has made Cuba's economic assistance
program an important vehicle for exercising influence in the Third World.
Some 20,000 Cuban technicians operate within 32 non-Communist LDCs,
and Cuba hosts more than 26,000 students from about 75 Third World
countries. In terms of technicians abroad, this program is larger than most
Cuba's rapid success in building this major program is because of several
factors:
? The Castro regime has been able to respond quickly to politically
favorable developments in Third World countries. For example, within a
month of the Sandinista's victory, Cuban personnel were arriving in
Nicaragua.
? Havana gets its foot in the door by playing on its Third World credentials
and starting with minimal, low-key forms of assistance-for example,
scholarships to attend Cuban schools. Cuba has successfully exploited its
cultural heritage by placing approximately two-thirds of its overseas
civilian technicians in 10 Spanish- or Portuguese-speaking countries.
? The Cuban program is designed to meet the needs of many Third World
countries. Cuba concentrates on providing the services of personnel often
in short supply in most LDCs-teachers, doctors, and construction
workers. The Cubans generally require that recipient countries pick up
only the local costs of Cuban personnel, plus transportation expenses.
Among Communist aid donors, only the Chinese program is comparable
in terms of generosity{
Because Cuba's assistance program relies heavily on the provision of
expertise that it has in abundance and incurs almost no hard currency
expenditures, it presents only a minimal drain on the Cuban economy and
is a cost-effective vehicle for establishing a substantial Cuban presence in
Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. Important payoffs of this
presence include:
? Ideological influence in several Third World planning ministries. The
Cubans have placed 1,000 to 1,500 technicians in the ministries and
planning agencies of more than 20 Third World countries. In Angola,
Congo, Ethiopia, Guinea, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Sao Tome and
Principe, South Yemen, and Tanzania, Havana has been able to place
substantial numbers of these experts in decisionmaking positions for
extended periods of time.
iii Secret
GI 85-10134
May 1985
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? A long-term investment in Third World influence through the education
in Cuba of thousands of LDC students. Most of these individuals are
beginning to return home, many after almost a decade in Cuban schools.
As they advance in their careers, the possibilities for Cuban access and
influence will increase significantly.
? The development and consolidation of a number of leftist regimes.
Activities in Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Nicaragua account for
most Cuban assistance. In Nicaragua, Cuba's economic assistance has
made significant contributions to that country's military preparedness,
and in recent years has provided 60 percent of its rural teaching force
and 10 percent of its entire educational corps.
? Political footholds in many Third World countries-particularly in
Africa. Modest programs in such countries as Burkina, Ghana, and
Guyana probably will expand in the next few years.
? Hard currency earnings. From countries that have substantial oil reve-
nues-Angola, Algeria, Iraq, and Libya-Cuba charges for the provision
of technical personnel; such fees totaled $100 million last yea
The Cuban program is an important complement to those of the other
Communist Bloc countries. By concentrating on the provision of technical
personnel at the grassroots, Cuban aid adds an extra dimension to the
efforts of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Although the Soviet Union
does not bankroll the Cuban program and formal high-level coordination
with other assistance efforts is the exception rather than the rule, Cuba oc-
casionally supplies technicians for Bloc-sponsored projects and is involved
in the limited coordination of activities in the fiel 25X1
Despite the program's successes, translating economic assistance into
durable Cuban influence in the Third World has been difficult. Many
Cuban economic technicians-construction and medical workers-are
neither well positioned nor well prepared to act as political emissaries, and
LDC dissatisfaction with Cuban personnel surfaces frequently. Further,
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many Third World governments approach their dealings with a "buyer's
market" mentality and seek to maximize Cuban aid while resisting Cuban
political leverage
Finally, internal political developments and external factors
Chile, Grenada, Iraq, Jamaica, and Somalia
beyond Cuba's control have in recent years forced Cuban pullouts from
Nonetheless, Castro seems satisfied with the results of his economic
assistance program, and we expect that he will continue to search actively
for new opportunities to use aid for political benefit. Significant expansion
of the economic assistance program depends largely upon the prospects for
new Cuban-supported revolutions. Excluding such developments, we see
only modest opportunities for expansion of the Cuban program-with
Havana taking advantage of new opportunities-primarily in Sub-Saharan
Africa, as the future of some currently large contingents becomes more
uncertain. We anticipate that Cuban hard currency needs will make
Havana more aggressive in exploiting opportunities for providing technical
personnel on a commercial basis in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin
Americal
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Castro's Reach Into
the Third World:
The Cuban Economic
Assistance Program
The direction of Cuba's foreign policy-including the
provision of economic assistance-begins and ends
with Fidel Castro. Castro's need to sustain his self-
image as a successful revolutionary is a primary
motivator of his international activism. Up through
the 1960s, Castro focused on sponsoring armed expe-
ditions abroad to try to overthrow Latin American
regimes. More recently, he has broadened his ap-
proach to include more internationally acceptable
ways to prove the depth of his revolutionary commit-
Although Castro's commitment to Third World aid
has ideological roots, other factors are important as
well:
? Castro proudly claims Cuba is the preeminent Third
World country in education and public health, and
its economic assistance program advertises these
and other accomplishments of the revolution in a
positive manner.
From confrontation to cooperation in the early 1970s:
? International legitimization through good will.
? Quest for broader diplomatic and trade relations.
? Minor emergency relief from natural disasters for
Honduras, Nicaragua, and Peru.
? More opportunities for small numbers of personnel
in Africa.
? Less than 1,500 Cuban civilians in 11 Third World
countries in 1975.
? Castro also hopes the assistance program will main-
tain a sense of revolutionary mission and divert
popular attention away from domestic problems.
Castro has reminded technicians going overseas that
their work is "a moral duty, a revolutionary duty, a
duty of principle, a duty of conscience, an ideologi-
cal duty."
? Castro undoubtedly expects that economic assis-
tance will encourage the development of pro-Cuban
regimes and policies.
Cuba sends its technical services personnel abroad
partly to help with Cuba's foreign debt difficulties.
? In several countries where Havana charges for its
technicians, the program helps satisfy Cuban for-
eign exchange needs. Castro openly admits that
Revolutionary struggle in the 1960s:
? The only road to socialism is insurrection.
? Create "two, three, many Vietnams" in Latin
America.
? Armed expeditions.
? A handful of medical and agricultural personnel in
a few African countries.
? International isolation.
Rapid expansion in the second half of the 1970s:
? Angola, then Mozambique, and Ethiopia in Africa.
? Jamaica, Grenada, and finally Nicaragua in Latin
America.
? Large-scale teaching and medical contingents.
? Construction for profit in Libya and Iraq.
? Wide proliferation of small-scale aid to Africa.
Setbacks and new opportunities since 1980:
? Departure from Jamaica, Grenada, Suriname.
? Rebel attacks in Nicaragua and Angola.
? War-related removal of most personnel from Iraq.
? Repayments problems with Angola and Libya.
? Minor setbacks, yet seven new recipients in Africa.
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Ten years ago Havana had less than 1,500 economic
assistance personnel in only 11 countries (figure 1). As
favorable political changes occurred in the LDCs-a
few with the aid of Cuban military assistance-Cuba
moved with impressive speed to help consolidate these
regimes through economic assistance relationships.
From 1974 through 1979 Havana sent thousands of
civilian technicians to Angola and-in rapid succes-
sion-to Mozambique, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua.
Working relationships were also forged with Libya
and Iraq. By 1981, 23,000 Cuban technicians were
operating in 28 LDCs
Since then, Havana has established a new presence in
six more LDCs, but the program has also experienced
a number of setbacks. Today, there are about 4,000
fewer Cuban civilians abroad than there were four
years ago. The newly elected Seaga government asked
all of the estimated 650 Cuban technicians to depart
Jamaica in 1981. In the Middle East, the Iran-Iraq
war caused Havana to pull from Iraq about 90
percent of its estimated 3,500 workers. The ouster of
Cuban technicians from Grenada in 1983 was accom-
panied by Suriname's rejection of what was then a
promising relationship with Havana. In Nicaragua,
the phasing out of some teachers, plus age and gender
restrictions begun in response to rebel actions, and the
threat of a US invasion caused the Cuban civilian
presence last year to drop by almost 1,000 from its
high of 6,200 three years ago
Last year the Cuban economic assistance program
placed almost 20,000 technicians in 32 non-Commu-
nist Third World countries (table 1). More than three-
fourths were African states; only Nicaragua and, to a
lesser extent, Guyana and Mexico hosted significant
numbers of Cuban technicians in the Western Hemi-
sphere. Angola topped the list with an estimated 6,000
Cuban civilians, Nicaragua had 5,300, and Libya had
about 3,500. Ethiopia and Mozambique also had
substantial, but smaller, contingents. Although
Havana charged fees for about one-half of its person-
nel, these assistance-for-hire technicians were present
in only four countries.
effort has focused on the provision of technical serv-
ices, as opposed to material or financial aid. In fact,
the Cuban program sponsors more economic techni-
cians abroad than most Western governments. We
estimate that less than 25 percent of Cuban aid has
been grants of capital goods and other materials.
Usually, recipient countries procure the materials
Cuban technicians use, often from Cuba itself. Cuba
has made substantial grants of material aid only to
Ethiopia, Grenada, and Nicaragua-the poorer coun-
tries it considers important targets. Even in these
countries, the amounts and types of such aid repre-
sent, by Western standards, only token commitments
and consist of such items as light industrial facilities,
supplies for construction projects, fishing boats,
breeding stock and equipment for animal husbandry
centers, school materials, foodstuffs, clothing, and
medical supplies. It is even more rare for the Cubans
to provide credits. We are aware of only two in-
stances-Nicaragua and Grenada-where Havana
financed projects, $50 million and $11 million, respec-
tively. Moreover, earlier this year Castro announced
Cuba would convert the Nicaraguan loan to a grant.
25X1
More than three-fourths of the Cuban economic
technicians in the Third World work in three occupa-
tional categories: public health, education, and con-
struction (figure 2). Cuban expertise in each of these
sectors is rather basic. Although many LDCs appeal
for specialists, most of the doctors among the more
than 2,000 Cuban medical personnel abroad are
general practitioners. Moreover, about 10 percent are
students who are completing their internship require-
ment while serving abroad. In the education field,
most Cuban teachers teach at the primary and sec-
ondary levels or conduct adult literacy training. At
Third World universities they often teach practical
subjects such as agronomy, veterinary science, engi-
neering, and general medicine. The limited skills of
Havana's construction personnel usually restrict their
activities to manual labor on large industrial projects
and simple construction work, such as housing,
schools, roads, bridges, and small-scale irrigation
systems
Primarily Technical Services
Unlike the assistance programs of both Western
donors and other Communist nations, the Cuban
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Figure 1
Expansion of Cuban Economic Technicians Into the Third World
Cape M
VerJer
I Minici0ns ulfcrcd
+incc 1983
1980
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Table 1
Cuban Economic Technicians in the Third World, 1984
Total
19,045
Africa
12,925
North Africa
3,865
Algeria
275
Libya
3,50-0--
Mauritania
15
Western Sahara
75
Sub-Saharan Africa
9,060
Angola
6,000
Benin
30
Botswana
10
Burkina
15
Burundi
20
Cape Verde
15
Congo
140
Equatorial Guinea
15
Ethiopia
1,100
Ghana
40
Guinea
240
Guinea-Bissau
75
Estimated peak num minimum of one month,
rounded to the nearest
Madagascar
35
Mali
10
Mozambique
900
Nigeria
5
Sao Tome and Principe
225
Seychelles
20
Tanzania
150
Uganda
15
Latin America
5,420
Bolivia
5
Ecuador
5
Guyana
60
Mexico
50
Nicaragua
5,300
Middle East
600
Iraq
400
Sout
h Yemen
200
South As
ia
100
Afg
hanistan
100
The other one-fourth of the Cuban technicians per-
form a variety of advisory services; most work on
agricultural problems in remote areas. Typically, only
a few Cubans work directly for middle- and high-level
decisionmakers in Third World ministries and plan-
ning agencies; but in Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique,
and Nicaragua the number of Cuban technicians in
planning agencies is substantia
Training LDC Students in Cuba
Havana also invites large numbers of Third World
students to Cuba, usually on fully paid scholarships.
We estimate the number of students-from more
than 75 countries-at more than 26,000 (table 2). The
program is highly focused geographically: about
three-fourths of all foreign students in Cuba come
from Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Namibia, and
Nicaragua.' Five other African countries, as well as
South Yemen, currently have 500 or more students in
Cuba (figure
Like the rest of the Cuban economic assistance effort,
the student program accelerated only in the late
1970s. A large part of the growth-total Third World
enrollment has tripled in the last 10 years-is attrib-
utable to the establishment of schools on the so-called
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Figure 2
Sectoral Distribution of Cuban Economic
Technicians in LDCs, 1984
Percent
Total technicians: 19,0(R)
Isle of Youth, just south of western Cuba. Currently,
21 of the island's 60 schools are set aside for foreign-
ers; each school can accommodate about 600 students
for eight years at a time and the curriculum centers
on the blending of academic training and agricultural
labor. The first foreign students arrived there in 1977;
last year there were some 12,000 elementary and high
school students from 11 Third World countries]
Postsecondary foreign students in Cuba enroll in
Cuban universities (especially the University of Ha-
vana), technical schools operated by government min-
istries, and schools run by the party and associated
political organizations. The academic and technical
programs typically deal with such common Third
World problems as basic education, public health,
agriculture, and infrastructure development. Up to
500 students are enrolled in programs that emphasize
ideology, political organization, journalism, and
propaganda
Cuban economic assistance complements other Com-
munist Bloc activities in the LDCs. Generally,
Havana sends people, and larger Bloc programs
finance more expensive and capital-intensive projects.
Havana has specialized in educational assistance-
Third World students constitute almost 1 percent of
the total student population in Cuba. Only Havana
places large teaching contingents in individual LDCs.
Several Third World countries-Angola and Nicara-
gua are the best examples-have substantially more
Cuban than other Bloc technicians
Some coordination of Cuban activities with other Bloc
programs occurs as well. Havana has supplied labor
for Hungarian and Bulgarian projects in Nicaragua
and last year counseled Sofia on setting up an eco-
nomic cooperation commission with Managua. In
Africa, Cuban personnel in recent years have worked
jointly with the East Germans and Bulgarians.
. We believe
that Castro uses his assistance program to demon-
strate to Moscow that its support of Cuba is a
worthwhile investment
25X1
25X1
There is little evidence that the USSR bankrolls
Cuban economic assistance efforts or that Cuban
activities are planned in Moscow. Havana's program
does not need much outside help because it is a low-
cost operation. Most of Cuba's foreign projects re-
quire only the simple technologies and skills indige- 25X1
nous to Cuba. Although Cuba's substantial domestic
investment in public health and education-which
enables Castro to send thousands of teachers and
doctors abroad-would have been impossible without
funds derived from Soviet trade subsidies, we believe 25X1
t Moscow's.
casional friction
between the Soviets and Cubans on aid issuesF7
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Table 2
Third World Students in Cuba, 1984
Total
26,220
Latin America
6,405
Africa
18,635
Antigua and Barbuda
15
North Africa
845
Argentina
10
Algeria
5
Bahamas, The
5
Libya
100
Belize
35
Morocco
5
Bolivia
10
Tunisia
5
Brazil
S
Western Sahara
730
Chile
5
Sub-Saharan Africa
17,790
Colombia
10
Angola
5,000
Costa Rica
5
Benin
135
Dominica
35
Botswana
15
Dominican Republic
10
Burundi
15
Ecuador
5
Cameroon
5
Grenada
150
Cape Verde
50
Guatemala
5
Congo
730
Guyana
200
Equatorial Guinea
15
Haiti
S
Ethiopia
3,300
Honduras
10
Gambia, The
30
Jamaica
125
Ghana
720
Mexico
20
Guinea
300
Nicaragua
5,500
Guinea-Bissau
675
Panama
50
Lesotho
5
Peru
25
Madagascar
30
St. Lucia
25
Mali
50
St. Vincent and the Grenadines
20
Mauritius
5
Suriname
95
Mozambique
4,000
Uruguay
15
Namibia
1,290
Venezuela
10
Nigeria
125
Middle East
1,050
Rwanda
40
Bahrain
5
Sao Tome and Principe
300
Iran
5
Seychelles
20
Jordan
10
Sierra Leone
10
Lebanon
20
South Africa (ANC)
20
North Yemen
5
Sudan
5
Oman
10
Tanzania
500
PLO
400
Uganda
200
South Yemen
570
Zaire
10
Syria
25
Zambia
50
South Asia
115
Zimbabwe
140
Afghanistan
85
E
15
B
l
d
h
urope
ang
a
es
5
Malta
5
India
10
Portugal
5
Nepal
5
Spain
5
Pakistan
5
Sri Lanka
5
Excludes students attending courses of less III-
duration Numbers are rounded to the nearest
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Figure 3
Third World Countries With Students in Cuba, 1984
500 and ahovc
less than 500
reportedly led Qadhafi to give preferential
Political considerations often join with economic reali-
ties to make Cuba an attractive source of economic
assistance to Third World countries. Political sympa-
thies underlie most of Havana's success in creating
aid-based ties to the Third World. Within four
months of the leftist Rawlings coup in 1982, for
example, Ghana signed the initial aid agreement with
Cuba that Havana had pursued for several years
without success. In the absence of strong ideological
bonds, however, Third World countries often cite the
promotion of South-South solidarity or nonaligned
credentials as the driving factor. Some leaders openly
admire Cuba's capabjlity for activism in the Third
World. Such reasons,
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-s The Schemes
Cube
consideration to Cuba in the granting of commercial
construction contracts in Libya. A number of Third
World leaders have asked for Cuban technicians-
usually teachers-to help consolidate their domestic
political position through indoctrination of the masses,
Among economic factors, Cuba offers assistance well
suited to Third World economies and charges little or
nothing for it. In the field of education, Havana
specializes in delivering basic instruction, such as
literacy training, to remote areas. Most Cuban medi-
cal technicians provide routine care to rural populaces
that usually have infrequent access to medical ser-
vices. In construction work, Havana focuses on simple
housing, school, and road projects
 Cuba has used military assistance-mainly personnel
and training support-to Third World regimes in
tandem with its economic assistance program. Such
assistance helps strengthen existing Cuban relations
with recipient countries through their military estab-
lishments. In Angola, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua,
where Cuban support contributes to the survival of
Marxist regimes, the military program is more im-
portant than the economic progra~
The military effort places more than twice as many
personnel abroad as the economic program, but only
in about one-half as many countries. Last year the
Cubans had more than 43,000 soldiers and advisers
in the Third World. Angola is by far the largest
recipient, followed by Ethiopia and Nicaragua. A
better perspective on the relative dimensions of the
two programs, however, is revealed by the fact that, if
Havana's estimated 35,000-plus military personnel
were to return home from Angola, Cuban civilians in
the Third World would outnumber their military
counterparts by almost 3 to
Cuban economic and military assistance often pro-
ceed hand in hand, although many LDCs consider the
acceptance of civilian aid a less controversial, and
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These services appeal to financially strapped LDCs
est possible price on the open marke
charge. Cuba pays the salaries of its technicians in
Cuban pesos, and the host country is obligated to
provide the necessary materials and equipment, food,
housing, a personal spending allowance, and local and
international transportation. Among Communist aid
donors, only the Chinese program is comparable in
terms of generosity. In lieu of providing much materi-
al assistance or financing, Havana often helps LDCs
procure supplies for Cuban aid projects at the cheap-
thus easier, step to take. The result is that Havana's
economic program covers more countries. In the cases
of Angola and Nicaragua, however, military aid
preceded economic ties and helped bring to power
regimes favorably disposed to close Cuban ties, in-
cluding extensive economic assistance programs. The
comparatively lower profile of Cuban economic assis-
tance activities in general also makes them less
subject to disruption than the military program. In
Angola, for example, successful negotiations for the
removal of Cuban personnel would still leave some
6,000 civilian technicians in place to advance 25X 1 i
Occasionally, the distinction between Cuban military
and economic assistance activities has become
blurred. For example, some technicians in Angola
appear to have a dual affiliation with Cuban military
and civilian organizations. Similarly, in Nicaragua
civilian construction workers have helped with the
military's new Punta Huete airfield and soldiers have
helped defend Cuban economic aid projects such as
the Timal sugar refinery.
25X1
Havana also has some sociocultural advantages over a
number of other aid donors. Cuba has successfully
exploited cultural heritage by placing approximately
two-thirds of its overseas civilian technicians in 10
Portuguese- or Spanish-speaking countries. Cubans
also are more accustomed than Western or even other
Bloc technicians to the deprivations often encountered
while serving in an LDC. Several years ago, an Iraqi
official claimed Baghdad wanted Cuban doctors be-
cause they were the only ones willing to work outside
the capital (see photos at the back
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Cuban Techniques for Creating
an Aid Relationship
The Cubans use a wide range of methods in the Third
World to improve their image, expand bilateral com-
munications, and thereby pave the way for a physical
presence through aid ties. These techniques often rely
on innocuous themes and so are difficult for even
skeptical LDCs to spurn.
Havana often begins by urging better diplomatic
relations. A consular convention or other type of
foreign relations cooperation agreement may follow.
Simultaneously, Cuba usually seeks expanded trade
ties, best of all in a trade agreement. A routine civil
aviation agreement can ease bilateral travel.
The next steps forward are low-level bilateral ex-
changes in politically neutral realms. Friendship
societies, sports, performing arts, and science ex-
changes are favorites. A delegation may be invited to
visit Cuba to witness the revolution's progress, the
hoped-for result being a limited cooperation agree-
ment. Last year at least one dozen LDCs without aid
ties to Cuba signed agreements with Havana. Many
of these accords include fully paid scholarships to
Cuba for LDC trainees.
If an LDC is judged to have immediate or special
needs, Havana will focus its initial aid overtures on
those areas. In the wake of natural disasters, Cuba
has delivered small amounts of emergency relief aid
We estimate that the cumulative value of Cuban
economic aid to the Third World to date amounts to
more than $400 million, averaging about $75 million
annually in recent years (figure 4). This includes the
value of service personnel sent overseas (based on
domestic Cuban wage scales), donated goods and
materials, and aid credits. These costs entail almost
no hard currency expenditures, however, because
Havana normally loses only the peso wages of its
overseas personnel, plus whatever benefit their ser-
vices would have produced at home. Moreover, Cuban
to a number of countries-including Bolivia, Ecua-
dor, Peru, and even Nicaragua prior to the fall of
Somoza. Cuba has also provided personal security
assistance to Third World leaders. We believe Cuba
has supplied personnel to or provided training for the
bodyguard or intelligence units of at least 12 Third
World countries to date. Most recently, this type of
assistance has helped stabilize pro-Cuban regimes in
Burkina and Ghana. Last September Cuba may have
made such an offer to Zimbabwe, a country with
which it currently has only limited ties. Havana also
seeks to advance its cause by offering another type of
assistance to Third World leaders: it has provided
personal medical services to leading individuals from
at least six Third World countries.
Establishment of a Joint Commission for Economic
and Scientific- Technical Cooperation cements
Cuban-LDC aid relationships and is the primary
mechanism for decisions on the provision of Cuban
personnel and other aid. The commission is a perma-
nent body that schedules annual meetings. The entire
range of activities is discussed, and a formal protocol
specifying the upcoming year's program is signed.
Cuba currently has joint commissions with 29 LDCs
(table 3
hard currency contracts with a few LDCs more than
offset the costs of its aid to the rest of the Third
World. The large number of personnel trained as a
result of the postrevolutionary concentration on the
education, agriculture, and public health sectors pro-
vides Castro with a ready supply of technicians. In
addition to the cost of technical services, Cuba also
contributes limited amounts of material aid to LDCs.
Usually this consists either of products Cuba has an
adequate supply of (cement or sugar, for example) or
small amounts of goods such as medicine, food, or
clothinj
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Table 3
Cuban-LDC Joint Commissions
for Economic Cooperation
Date
Estab-
lished
Date
Estab-
lished
Algeria
1979
Libya
1977
Angola
1976
Madagascar
1979
Argentina
Burkina
Cape Verde
Chile
Congo
Ethiopia
Ghana
1982
Seychelles
1980
Grenada
1979 a
South Yemen
1977
Guinea
Guinea
1979
Spain
1983
Guinea-Bissau
1978
Suriname
982 a
1982-
Guyana
1975
India
1979
Uganda
1980
Iraq
1978
Western Sahara
1984
Jamaica
1975-
Cuban economic assistance to Nicaragua, because of
the substantial amount of material aid and large
numbers of technicians, currently accounts for three-
fourths of Havana's total aid to the Third World.
Deliveries to Nicaragua to date include a 13,000-ton
merchant ship; heavy machinery and other construc-
tion materials; fishing boats; prefabricated housing
plants; and agricultural, railroad, light industrial, and
communications equipment. Cuban assistance to Ma-
nagua is also costlier because Havana pays the inter-
national transportation expenses, something it rarely
does for other recipients. Two years ago during the
annual rotation of its 2,000 teachers, Havana report-
edly spent more than $20,000 to refuel its aircraft in
Managua
Cuba pays more than
one-half of the personal spending money for its people
in Nicaragua. We estimate this expense alone may
amount to more than the equivalent of $1 million a
year in Nicaraguan currend
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Figure 4
Cuban Economic Programs in the
Third World, 1975-84
Hard currency
charges to
Algeria, Angola,
Iraq, and Libya
Cuba trys to limit the cost of educating foreign
students by training them in Cuba. We estimate Cuba
currently budgets the peso equivalent of about $10
million annually for this part of the program. Most
students receive full scholarships that include tuition,
educational materials, room and board, clothing, and
medical care, but their home country must pay the
hard currency expense of international transportation.
accommoda-
tions, food, and other provisions o their scholarships
are rudimentary at best. Some scholarships also are
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The Isle of Youth students-accounting for nearly 50
percent of the Third World students in Cuba-are
less of a burden for Havana than those enrolled in
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universities and technical schools, and may even be
profitable. As much as one-third of the faculty at the
Isle of Youth schools is provided by the participating
Third World countries. The students are responsible
for the basic maintenance of their facilities and are
required to donate 18 hours of agricultural work every
week in surrounding citrus groves, according to open
sources. Cuban Education Minister Fernandez him-
self has openly estimated that, after the initial three
years of operation, the agricultural output from Isle of
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The assistance program has been instrumental in
providing Castro with an impressive reach into the
Third World-32 countries at present and 40 over the
years. Cuban ties to many of these countries would
exist even in the absence of economic assistance; the
aid provides Cuba with a broader range of fronts on
which to make an impact. Through the physical
presence of technicians, Havana transmits its views on
domestic and international issues to host-country na-
tionals. Joint economic cooperation commissions bring
together a wide range of middle- and high-level
representatives from both sides. For Third World
leaders, economic assistance is a tangible demonstra-
tion of support that lends credibility to C125X1 rofes-
Teachers potentially are Havana's best instruments
for influencing the popular masses in the Third
World. Castro has openly stated that Cuban educa-
tional assistance is intended to exert long-term influ-
ence in the Third World. In Angola last year, accord-
ing to the Cuban press, Cuban teachers were active in
16 of the country's 18 provinces, teaching an estimat-
ed 100,000 students. The Cubans incorporate leftist
viewpoints in their lessons; the books they use reflect
Cuban ideology and are often translations of Cuban
texts. Open sources indicate Cuban educational ex-
perts used the Cuban model to help shape the organi-
zation of school systems in Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau,
Nicaragua, South Yemen, and Tanzania
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In addition to the estimated $400 million worth of
aid that Cuba has provided to the Third World, it
has also provided assistance for a fee.
he Soviets-wanting Cuba
to become more economically self-sufficient-have
urged the Cubans to concentrate more on the parts of
the program that generate revenues. Havana's activi-
ties in Algeria, Angola, Iraq, and Libya-where the
Cubans charge a hard currency fee-represent an
economic plus. Payments from these oil producing
countries-ranging from $4,800 to $18,000 a year per
technician-go directly to Havana and more than
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Havana's actual annual receipts from these activities
are difficult to quantify because of reported repay-
ments problems. Both Angola and Libya have been
reported to be substantially in arrears in recent years;
a January announcement by President dos Santos
indicates that Cuba probably has deferred Angolan
payments for economic assistance. In any case,
Havana is aggressively pursuing assistance-for-hire
arrangements with at least four new clients, and we
believe its hard currency earnings from such activities
will increase. (~
Trade expansion and the reduction of domestic un-
employment are additional benefits of Cuban pro-
grams, whether performed without charge or for
payment. Many Third World recipients of Cuban
technicians buy the necessary materials and equip-
ment from Havana, and Cuban officials incorporate
the export of associated goods into their aid propos-
als. Last year,
E::~lgeria agreed to use a line of credit rom
Japan to acquire construction machinery for Cubans
to use in their Algerian activities as well as for
projects in other countries, including Cuba. The
dispatch of personnel overseas also slightly reduces
domestic unemployment, a side benefit for a country
whose rapidly growing work force is already under-
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Another important vehicle for influence is the esti-
mated 1,000 to 1,500 Cuban technicians placed in the
ministries and planning agencies of more than 20
Third World countries. Working with the recipient
country's middle- and high-level professionals on a
daily basis, they assist in economic planning, trade
development, agricultural reorganization, mass com-
munications, labor relations, and sociocultural affairs.
In several countries-for example, Angola, Congo,
Ethiopia, Guinea, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Sao
Tome and Principe, South Yemen, and Tanzania-
Havana has been able to place substantial numbers of
these experts in decisionmakin nositions for extended
periods of tim
Cuba has used several facets of its educational assis-
tance program to try to convert routine ac2
technical trainin into influence.
Third World stu-
dents enrolled in Cuban programs receive political
training. Moreover, at least some are reerniterl by
Cubans also reportedly prefer individuals who hold
progressive views without outwardly seeming political.
On the Isle of Youth, Havana attempts to indoctri-
nate thousands of younger, more impressionable stu-
dents through a work-study regimen-unique among
educational assistance programs-that can last for up
to eight years for each student.
The full impact of the Third World student program
will not register for another five to 10 years. Most of
the initial group of Isle of Youth students have been
back in their home countries less than two years, and
students with academic promise (those most likely to
find influential jobs) have continued on into the
Cuban university system. We already are aware of a
limited number of Cuban successes. For example,
Guyana's Agriculture and Health Ministers are both
alumni of the Cuban educational system; Health
Minister Van West-Charles, President Burnham's
son-in-law, heads up the economic cooperation com-
mission between the two countries. The son of former
Jamaican Prime Minister Manley and a daughter of
that country's former Minister of National Security
attended the University of Havana. In Ghana, a key
adviser to the ruling Provisional National Defense
Council is a Cuban alumnu
A variety of factors-ranging from inefficiencies in
the aid effort to internal political factors-combine to
set limits on translating Cuban economic assistance
into durable influence in the Third World. For exam-
ple, even in two of Havana's largest recipients, Angola
and Mozambique, Castro has not been permitted as
We estimate that less than one-half of the Cuban
civilians in the Third World are good candidates to
function as effective purveyors of pro-Cuban views.
More than 40 percent of the Cuban overseas work
force is made up of construction workers and, al-
though their activities contribute to a favorable image
of Cuba, they are only marginal instruments of
influence:
? They often operate in sparsely populated areas and
their daily routines leave little time for political
activities.
? The workers live in self-contained camps close to
their job sites, and ost are
primarily motivated by materia rewards o "inter
nationalist" tours of duty, such as overseas bonuses
and greater access to consumer goods.
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Nicaragua: A Cuban Success Story
Cuban assistance to Nicaragua-totaling nearly
$300 million to date-has contributed significantly
to the consolidation of the Sandinista regime over the
last five years. Havana's economic support has in-
creased Managua's military strength. New or im-
proved roads built by Cubans facilitate arms trans-
fers and the deployment of troops to fight rebel
forces. Similar benefits derive from Cuban improve-
ments to the national railroad system. Cuban person-
nel are helping with construction work on at least five
airfields, including Punta Huete (soon to be the
largest of such facilities in Central America), and
construction reportedly will soon begin on a 600-bed
military hospital in Managua. The Nicaraguans have
used the merchant ship Monimbo-a gift from
Cuba-to itnpnrt nrtillnrv WWII nntrnl hnntc frnr>
Korea.
avana last year converted nearly the entire
corps of Cuban civilians in Nicaragua into a younger,
mostly male, force with up-to-date military training
and regular combat preparedness drills.
The Cubans have also had a particularly strong
impact on the Nicaraguan educational system. The
large contingent of primary and secondary school
teachers-which at one time constituted 60 percent of
the rural teaching force and 10 percent of the coun-
try's entire educational corps-has used texts with
pro-Cuban Marxist content. Havana also has hosted
well over 5,000 Nicaraguan students in extended
academic programs, most of which include political
subjects. Of this number, more than 1,000 are teen-
agers on the Isle of Youth where, as one Nicaraguan
? Most of the construction workers are-as debrief-
ings of Cubans at the Grenada airport under-
scored-politically unsophisticated compared with
other Cuban civilians abroad.
Although the Castro regime screens other economic
technicians-teachers, medical personnel, and techni-
cal advisers-in terms of political qualifications,
many of these technicians arc
exert influence. For example,
medical personnel typically confine them-
selves to the provision of medical services. Although
this can promote a positive impression of Cuba,
student has openly explained, the work-study regi-
men is "the implementation of the Leninist concept to
form the new Soviet man. " In addition, Cuba has
trained large numbers of Nicaraguans in shorter,
vocational courses that have increased the country's
pool of technical skills. Havana also has supplied
higher level advisers to the Ministry of Education,
who have probably helped reshape the overall organi-
zation and direction of the national educational
system
Hundreds of Cuban personnel have been placed at the
central decisionmaking level in nearly every other
sector of Nicaraguan society. Through economic
planning agreements, Cuban advisers probably have
encouraged the gradual growth of state control of the
economy. he Cubans have
taught courses in Marxism to staff members of the
Nicaraguan Public Administration Institute.
articularly extensive Cuban involve-
ment in the Nicaraguan communications system.
These activities range from the installation of micro-
wave and other kinds of equipment to the provision of
critiques and recommendations on the national com-
munications network. Close ties exist between the
Cuban Communist Party and the Sandinista Nation-
al Liberation Front, and we believe Cubans have
advised on the development of Nicaraguan mass
organizations.
ndigenous populations
sometimes resent e u Dan presence because they
provide the technicians with food and lodging, and the
Cuban medical skills often are severely limited. More-
indicates that about three-fourths
o the Cuban technicians who are not involved in
public health, education, or construction work at the
grassroots in a strictly technical capacity
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The quality of its personnel and the terms under
which Cuba provides aid frequently reduce the politi-
cal mileage Havana is able to extract. In Ethiopia, the
completion of one of Cuba's largest aid projects was
held up for six months because Addis Ababa could
not supply the necessary materials. Complaints about
Cuban technicians are not uncommon. Although it is
unusual for client dissatisfaction to lead to the remov-
al of Cuban personnel, complaints can hamper the full
development of the relations. A t ical example is in
Burundi whey some
Cuban medical technicians speak no French and the
specialties of the doctors and nurses are incompatible.
Over the years, a number of Third World recipients
have characterized Cuban teachers as incompetent
and too political. The Cuban requirement that LDCs
bear the hard currency transportation expenses has
caused at least one country-Tanzania-to refuse
more than one-half of the scholarships and techni-
cians called for in its annual coon ration agreement
with Havana
"buyer's market" mentality on the part of a number
of recipient countries, works against the program's
success. For example, we believe relations between
Cuba and Mali suffered recently when Havana pres-
sured Bamako to accept Cuban medical technicians.
Despite years of assistance from Cuba, some Third
World countries try to use the importance Havana
attaches to its aid program as leverage to
more favorable terms for Cuban assistance
Burundi, Uganda, and Ghana
are recent examples. Cuba occasionally finds itself in
adversarial bargaining sessions, even with regimes in
which it has invested a ant amount of time and
resources
Finally, developments beyond Havana's research can
quickly erode gains from the resources expended in an
aid program. Internal political dynamics or external
factors over the years have forced Cuban pullouts
from Chile, Grenada, Iraq, Jamaica, Somalia, and
Suriname. More recently, domestic insurrections in
Nicaragua and Angola have disrupted the implemen-
tation of Cuban assistance
LDC Students Sometimes Alienated
The student program also has problems that may
substantially reduce the amount of influence Havana
expects to develop over time. Although Third World
students often go to Cuba with preexisting leftist
leanings, many others are alienated by the political
indoctrination in their Cuban educations
The physical labor requirements
and lack of personal amenities reportedly also leave
some students disenchanted with the Castro regime.
Serious student problems-including riots-have
plagued the Isle nf Yoll"17 rogram almost from its
inceptio
We believe Castro's personal motivations are as
strong as ever and will continue to keep the program
alive as long as he is in power. His strong desire to be
a major actor on the world stage means that he is
committed to the aid program, regardless of economic
or other costs. We believe reverses in recent years may
cause him to value even more the successful Third
World relationships he retains and to strengthen his
resolve to exploit opportunities for new ones
The future of some of the existing large-scale Cuban
civilian contingents abroad has grown more uncertain
in recent years. Regional talks in southern Africa
have not improved the prospects for the Cuban civil-
ians there. Castro reportedly was outraged with the
signing of the Nkomati accord in March 1984 be-
tween Mozambique and South Africa. Similarly, al-
leged Angolan failure to keep Havana abreast of
negotiations with Pretoria has put more distance
between Castro and President dos Santos. In addition,
the rebel bombing of a Cuban barracks last April may
have made it more difficult to recruit personnel to
work in that country. Although neither situation has
led to cuts in the number of Cuban civilians in those
countries, any turn away from the Communist Bloc
and toward the West that grows out of regional
accommodation would work against their extended
stay. In Nicaragua, it appears likely that Cuban-
trained Nicaraguans this year will replace Cuban
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Soldiers or Civilians:
Cuban Economic Technicians Abroad
Although Cuban economic technicians in the Third
World truly are civilians, Havana makes no secret of
the fact that it expects its personnel abroad to be able
to use small arms to defend themselves. Most Cuban
technicians-male and female-have undergone at
least basic small-arms familiarization training.
ing Cuba civilians assigned abroad often receive an
intensive military training course lasting four to six
weeks.
Nicaragua.
chief of the Cuban medical detachment reportedly
was forced to depart on his 40th birthday. Havana
also made certificates of recent military training
mandatory for personnel assigned to Nicaragua, and
we believe the new requirement is being strictly
enforced. Defensive preparations were evident across
the board; even Cuban Communications Ministry
workers have held combat preparedness meetings.
Defensive fortifications have been constructed at the
Timal sugar refinery-Cuba's largest aid project in
access to weapons and extensive drills make
Over the past 18 months, growingfears of direct US
involvement in Nicaragua and rebel activities in that
country as well as in Angola have led Havana to
place considerably greater emphasis on the military
side of its civilian aid program. In Nicaragua, Ha-
vana dramatically transformed the composition of its
civilian aid personnel in the country during 1984.
New age and gender restrictions were put in place,
and by the end of the year most women and older
technicians had been pulled out, some replaced by
younger men. The seriousness with which Cuba pur-
sued these changes is underscored by thefact that the
primary and secondary school teachers, thereby per-
manently reducing Havana's presence by 1,600. Fi-
nally, the nature of the Cuban involvement in Grena-
da revealed by the intervention has probably made
potential recipients much more reluctant to accept
highly visible large contingents. Former Jamaican
Prime Minister Manley, for example, reportedly has
told Castro he would not now consent to large Cuban
work teams like those in Jamaica a few years ago.F-
Havana will follow through on opportunities for
small-scale assistance, but probably will experience
additional setbacks in some existing minor programs.
Other than Angola and Nicaragua, we have little
evidence that these above changes are being imple-
mented elsewhere.
Low-profiled assistance programs are less controver-
sial from both Cuban and Third World perspectives,
and new chances for such activities will continue to
arise, mostly in Africa. We believe a current list of
likely candidates for positive Cuban aid developments
includes Burkina, Ghana, Guyana, Mauritania, Zaire,
and Zambia (table 4). A Cuba-Zambia Joint Commis-
sion for Economic Cooperation may have been orga-
nized just late last year, and one with Zaire is being
discussed. We foresee only small-scale or slowly grow-
ing aid to these countries, however, primarily because
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Table 4
Pending Offers of Cuban Assistance Since 1983
Belize
Benin
Bolivia,
Burkina
Ecuador
Ghana
Guyana
Kuwait
Mauritania
Mexico
Nigeria
Sierra Leone
Trinidad and Tobago
Vanuatu
Zaire ,
Zimbabwe
Housing.
Roads, housing.
Teachers, agricultural and medical technicians.
Railroad and airport rehabilitation, sugar industry development, economic planning.
Hospital, pharmaceutical plant, teachers.
Fisheries and sugar industry development.
Housing, cement silos, medical school, additional doctors and teachers, agricultural development.
Miscellaneous construction projects.
Joint fisheries venture, sugar mill rehabilitation.
Housing, hospital, schools.
Hospital, schools, hotel, joint fisheries venture, agricultural technicians.
Sugar mill.
Public works project.
Medical assistance.
Sports complex, roads, sugar refinery, agricultural development, teachers, medical technicians.
Vocational school, sports complex, medical technicians.
Countries that currently have either negligible or no assistance-
based ties to Cuba.
of their reported reluctance to accept large numbers
of Cubans. Havana also has standing offers of assis-
tance to a number of other, less receptive, Third
World countries; the ones we are aware of are Belize,
Bolivia, Ecuador, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Zimba-
bwe. Nonetheless, dissatisfaction with Cuban assis-
tance, never an uncommon phenomenon, probably
will lead a numbe r of Third World clients to curtail
Havana's activiti
Burun t, Sao ome an Principe, and
Seychelles a ready iously consid-
ering such cutback
Cuban leaders have placed stronger emphasis on the
provision of economic technicians to Third World
countries as a way of increasing hard currency remit-
tances and making marginal reductions in domestic
unemployment. Havana appears to have focused on
the lucrative Middle Eastern market apparently be-
lieving that declining oil revenues will not damage the
opportunities for its projects, which tend to be small
ccnle and inPxnrnciv
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nearly one-fifth of all Cuban overseas personnel are
located, is likely to continue despite Tripoli's foreign
debt repayment problems. Cuban technicians repre-
sent only about 0.5 percent of the foreign workers in
the countr
Cuba also has been trying to break into the Latin
American construction market and has made offers to
international firms to supply laborers and skilled
technicians for projects in Mexico and other Latin
American states, Because it
charges less for its personnel than Western suppliers,
Havana reportedly is optimistic about concludin
and we believe at least some positions probably will be
open to foreigners. As in the past, many Third World
regimes will continue to view small numbers of Cuban
scholarships as a harmless way to add to their limited
technical expertise. For its part, Cuba will find it
easier to accommodate foreign students in the future,
as demographic changes cause domestic enrollments
to drop
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Cuban economic assistance will continue to consist
overwhelmingly of basic technical services, rather
than turnkey projects with financial assistance. The
Cuban economy will not support significant increases
in aid financing in the near term. The only large
turnkey projects we are aware of Havana discussing
are sugar refinery construction or rehabilitations,
such as that in Nicaragua, but without Cuban financ-
ing. Cuba will continue to provide smaller light
industry facilities. Because of the scarcity of highly
trained technical experts in Cuba, Havana will limit
itself to the provision of laborers and midlevel
technicians
We believe the Third World student program will
grow despite its various problems. The rate of accep-
tance of scholarship offers has not diminished, and
offers to additional countries and those that now have
only limited numbers of students continue to grow. In
addition, as some Isle of Youth students have moved
on to Cuban universities or technical institutes, a new
generation has begun to take their places. This year
Havana plans to open four new Isle of Youth schools,
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 Typical Elements of the Cuban Program
.Shaping popular opirunn: it .1'ICU/aLuan-C11han
/dirt crlu.
Lien in toll sit tit Ito it It ok the nres, a"c i, nor /o I, a
Iaillt Ctlhan-Janlai[a/I Cii,, s trim Olt TCanl.
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An entphusis on IcIoIll tinnarr esprit de carps:
the `Chi Guevara Cit it ngent"o/(uhait
learlice s arrives in 4ngoItI.
Cone errtralei) e an simple pIoic,Is: hridges in
\ I(arupna.
for the do/ease vi lriendli renirees: students at the
Cuhan-hnilt rnilitare school in Iluamho. Angola.
Iladirlg an irrrpresstoll nn Ill, roue;: a Cnhan
reach// ie o muAcs/I i/II (/1/5 10, )Ill. ,u,al AiiU/agna.
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