THE YOUTH BULGE: A LINK BETWEEN DEMOGRAPHY AND INSTABILITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 22, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
a rv
The Youth Bulge:
A Link Between Demography
and Instability
Seer-et
GI 86-10015
March 1986
cope 6 6 6
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Directorate of Secret
Intelliornec 25X1
The Youth Bulge:
A Link Between Demography
and Instability
. Lomments and queries are
welcome and may be addressed to the Chief,
Geography Division, OGI
Secret
(,I 6-lnol s
March l 9R6
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The Youth Bulge:
A Link Between Demography
and Instability
Scope Note This study is part of a continuing effort within the Directorate of
Intelligence to develop indicators of political instability and insurgency. It
provides a preliminary look at the relationships between population age
structure and political unrest, focusing on growth in the size of the young
adult population. We recognize that political instability is not caused by
any single factor, and, through a series of country profiles, we examine how
political and economic policies have either constrained or exaggerated the
role of the "youth bulge" in instability.
iii Secret
(:] 86-10015
March 1986
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Summary
b?1ormation available
ere o/Noreniher 14X5
eras used in this report.
and Instability
The Youth Bulge:
A Link Between Demography
Social scientists have long postulated a relationship between the size of a
nation's youth population and its degree of social instability. Although
hampered by the lack of high-quality data and by the difficulty of
differentiating between the effects of population and other destabilizing
factors in specific cases, political scientists, historians, and journalists have
sought to link population age with everything from street crime to
revolution. The value of such a linkage, if it could be proved, to the
Intelligence Community is that it could provide early warning of when and
where to expect political strains. Whether or not such strains erupt into
regime-threatening instability would depend on the ability of the govern-
ment to achieve constructive mobilization of its youth, as well as on other
societal factors.
On the basis of a preliminary examination of 49 countries and a more
detailed study of 12 selected from the 49, we have established a relation-
ship between the emergence of a "youth bulge" (20 percent or more of the
population in the 15 to 24 age group) and political instability in a number
of Third World countries. Political instability, ranging from riots to
insurgency, tends to break out as the youth bulge emerges and to taper off
as it subsides. This appears to be true not only of nations but of regions and
ethnic groups within nations. Although significant instability can occur
where no youth bulge is apparent, the youth bulge is almost always
accompanied by some form of instability.
We have noted a number of countries that have recently developed youth
bulges or will develop them in the next 10 years. All other things being
equal, we would expect a significant increase in political instability in these
countries:
? Indonesia, whose previous youth bulge was associated with the overthrow
of the Sukarno regime, is now developing a second bulge that will peak
around 1995.
? Mexico's youth bulge, which emerged in 1980, is projected to peak
around 1990 at a very high level.
? Nicaragua's small youth bulge is projected to expand slowly but steadily
over the next 20 years.
? Bangladesh, currently without a youth bulge, will develop one by 1990;
by 1995, it will have the world's highest proportion of young adults.
? Iraq, Egypt, Nepal, and El Salvador are also expected to develop youth
bulges by 1995.
v Secret
Gl X6-1111115
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In general, however, the 1995 picture appears brighter than that of today.
Of the 49 countries studied, the number with youth bulges will drop from
24 in 1985 to 10 in 1995. The decline will be slow in countries such as In-
dia, Brazil, Peru, Venezuela, the Philippines, and Algeria-possibly por-
tending lingering instability-but will be rapid in Sri Lanka, South Korea,
and Turkey.
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Scope Note
iii
Summary
v
Demography and Political Instability
I
Countries Selected for Analysis
1
Sri Lanka: Two Bulges, Two Insurgencies
2
Lebanon: Where Emigration Increases the Youth Bulge
2
Mexico, Peru, and Panama: The Slowly Emerging Threat
6
The Philippines: The Changing Location of the Youth Bulge
7
Iran and Nicaragua: The Never-Ending Bulges
8
Indonesia: The Generation Gap
9
Chile, Mozambique, and Nigeria: Bulgeless Instability
10
Policy Implications
12
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The analysis used in this research considers the
fourth and fifth age cohorts, as commonly used by
demographers, to constitute the young adult popula-
tion. Census data on population age structure are
most often reported in five-year age cohorts (ages 0 to
4, 5 to 9, 10 to 14, and so on). Demographers usually
consider the fourth of these age cohorts (ages 15 to
19) to be the first that is nondependent-that is, the
younger ages are not considered to be members of the
labor force and are dependent on society for their
survival. In all modern societies, some proportion of
the young postpone their entry into the labor force to
undertake secondary and postsecondaFy schooling;
they would normally enter the labor force as mem-
bers of the fifth age cohort (ages 20 to 24). By
combining the fourth and fifth age cohorts, the
analysis captures a large proportion of all those
entering the labor force for the first time, often the
first generation of those who are seeking their places
in a modern national society instead of playing
traditional roles in village society.
The youth bulge comes from explosive population
growth rates, which in the Third World derive from
modernization, specifically from the importation of
Western medical and public health technology lead-
ing to sharp declines in death rates. Initially, deaths
prevented are most heavily concentrated among the
newly born and young children so that demographic
stress is placed first on institutions, such as primary
schools, which provide services to the young. When
this bulge reaches young adulthood, however, stress
is exerted on the entire national social, economic, and
political systems as young adults seek employment,
educational opportunities, housing, or land.F_~
Scholars describe the activities of the young adult
cohorts as "mobilization" when they seek integration
into the national framework. Unfortunately, an ex-
cessive youth bulge thwarts mobilization by outstrip-
ping the ability of most Third World societies to
provide the desired integration. Above all else, young
adults want to participate in active roles, and casting
a ballot does not give the same feeling of participa-
tion as marching with a rifle.
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The Youth Bulge:
A Link Between Demography
and Instability F__1
We believe that there is a clear, though indirect,
relationship between the emergence of a "youth bul-
ge" (defined as when 20 percent or more of the
population occurs in the 15 to 24 age group) and
political instability. The general linkages between the
youth bulge and unrest have been established in
numerous academic studies dealing with three impor-
tant characteristics of the Third World: mobilization
of the young to encourage national integration and
identity, the revolution of rising expectations, and
explosive population growth. Rapid population growth
creates a bulge in the age structure of the population,
and, when members of the bulge reach young adult-
hood and enter the labor force, they find limited
opportunities in education, employment, and land-
ownership. Resulting frustration and discontent
25X1 among the young frequently are translated into dem-
onstrations, riots, or insurgencies.
Not all causes of instability are population related,
and some particularly strong or fortunate nations are
able to survive the youth bulge with minimal conflict.
Instability arising from external factors, such as
foreign intervention, or from military coups may be
unrelated to the youth bulge. Even when a particular-
ly large bulge is present, resulting instability may be
trivial if the means of dealing with the threat are
available. Mauritius, for example, dealt with an ex-
ceptionally large bulge of young adults in the early
1960s by encouraging emigration to Britain, Austra-
lia, and Canada. Some economic systems may absorb
additional labor even when new workers contribute
little ("hidden unemployment"), a practice similar to
featherbedding. For most Third World countries,
however, neither out-migration nor hidden unemploy-
25X1 ment are adequate safety valves, and outbreaks of
political instability are common outcomes.
Because of the relationship between population
growth and political instability, demography gives us
a method for the long-range forecasting of political
unrest. The stress exerted by the youth bulge is
predictable as to duration, intensity, and location to
the extent that demographic data are reliable, and the
instability potential of other factors, such as ethnic,
racial, or class tensions, is most likely to be realized
during such periods of demographic stress.
We based our analysis of the youth bulge and instabil-
ity on a preliminary study of 43 non-Communist
developing countries with projected populations of 10
million or more by 1995. To this list were added
Guatemala, Lebanon, Nicaragua, Panama, El Salva-
dor, and Ethiopia because of special US policy inter-
ests. Twenty-four of the 49 countries analyzed had
youth bulges in 1985 (figure 1). Twenty-two of these
24 countries showed significant symptoms of instabil-
ity, either current or recent, while those countries with
low proportions of young adults (below 18.5 percent)
were among the most stable in their regions of the
world (Ivory Coast, Saudi Arabia, and Burma). As we
expected, since not all instability stems from demo-
graphic factors, those countries with proportions of
young adults between 18.5 and 20.0 percent offered a
mixed pattern. Some (for example, Nigeria, Mozam-
bique, and El Salvador) show clear evidence of insta-
bility, while others (for example, Nepal, Bangladesh,
and Ecuador) are relatively stable. Mexico, one of the
two cases of a youth bulge without associated instabil-
ity, although currently exhibiting only sporadic and
vague signs of unrest, has been targeted by previous
instability reporting as an area of major concern
during the 1983-93 period. Indonesia, the other excep-
tion, has just acquired a youth bulge, and it is too
early to assess the relationship there between the
current bulge and instability. Indonesia, however,
experienced an earlier youth bulge related to a major
episode of instability. 25X1
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Twelve countries, nine of which have current youth
bulges, were selected for detailed analysis according
to several criteria:
have traditionally depended on the civil service and
the professions for upward mobility, found themselves
in the less favored position.
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? The presence of clear evidence of political
instability.
? Regional variation, so that the major areas of the
Third World are represented in the analysis.
? Patterns of youth bulge development that are rea-
sonably representative of youth bulges throughout
the Third World.
Sri Lanka: Two Bulges, Two Insurgencies
Sri Lanka's two major ethnic groups, dominant in
separate areas of the country, experienced youth
bulges at different times, and these bulges are associ-
ated with separate Sinhalese and Tamil insurgencies.
The Sinhalese, concentrated in the southwest, pro-
duced a youth bulge that peaked about 1970; the
bulge of the Tamils, dominant in the northeast,
emerged in the late 1970s and will reach its highest
point in 1990 (figure 2). The Sinhalese insurgency
occurred in the southwest and peaked in 1971; the
current Tamil insurgency is concentrated in the
northeast. An academic study showed that Sinhalese
insurgents consisted entirely of youths between the
Government policy that favored one ethnic group over
another amplified the effect of the youth bulges. The
initial Sinhalese bulge, occurring at a time when relict
British influences seemed to favor Tamils, created a
situation where- unprecedented large numbers of Sin-
halese young adults felt discriminated against. Lack-
ing access to the best English-language secondary
schools, they found higher educational opportunities
elusive, and thus were denied access to the professions
and middle-range civil service positions. The insur-
gency led to policies-such as preferences for Sinha-
lese for university admission and public employment
and the establishment of Sinhala as the official
language-that accelerated movement toward a Sin-
halese-dominated society. By the time the second
bulge, concentrated among the Tamils in the north-
east, developed, laws and public policies favoring the
Sinhalese were in place. This time, the Tamils, who
to defuse the conflict.
The Tamil youth bulge will fade after 1990 and will
disappear by about 1995, although the communal
hostility that has been aroused may fade more slowly.
Recent violence, including Tamil terrorist acts against
Sinhalese and the massacre of Tamil civilians by
Sinhalese soldiers, has created a situation where the
easing of demographic pressure may not be sufficient
national population.
Lebanon: Where Emigration
Increases the Youth Bulge
Lebanon's youth bulge, which developed between
1975 and 1980, will increase until 1990, at which time
more than 22 percent of the population may be in the
15 to 24 age group (figure 3). Although there is no
recent official demographic data for Lebanon, we
believe that our estimates-based on contract
studies-are conservative. The out-migration of many
Christians implies that, if only Muslims in the Leba-
nese population are considered, the bulge would be
even greater-perhaps as much as a third of the
Lebanese Islamic population by 1990, a figure more
than 50 percent greater than that for any other
Lebanon's total popula-
tion declined between 1975 and 1985, while the
number of youths in the population increased, produc-
ing a substantial rise in the proportion they constitute
of the total population. Population decline occurred
because emigration, since 1975 averaging about
50,000 per year (about 80 percent of whom are
Christians), exceeded additions to the population aris-
ing from high birthrates among the Islamic elements.
The number of both men and women between 40 and
49 and of children under 15 declined markedly in the
Lebanese population between 1975 and 1985, a pat-
tern that suggests the emigrants were predominantly
older adults accompanied by their young children
(figure 4). Their departure from the country rein-
forced the tendency toward a young adult bulge
already present. F_~
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Figure 2
Sri Lanka: Youth Bulge
Percentage of total population, age 15-24
Sinhalese insurgency
I - _ t 1
55 60 65
" I he critical level is the point at which youths make up 20 percent
or more of the population.
Figure 3
Lebanon: Youth Bulge
Percentage of total population, age 15-24
t
75 80
Major anti-Tamil rioting in Colombo
F_ Peak of Tamil insurgency, September 85
11
85
Israel invades -
Civil war begins
Tamil
I ---- -- I - -- 1
90 95 2000 05
Assassination of President-elect Gemayel
- 241 US marines killed in their barracks
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Figure 4
Lebanon: Change in Age Groups,
1975-85
may be, the presence of an estimated 400,000 Pales-
tinian refugees in Lebanon-not included in the cal-
culation of Lebanon's youth bulge-directly promotes
political instability. The presence of a foreign group,
equal to nearly 20 percent of Lebanon's population,
creates yet another obstacle to national integration.
0-4
5-9
10-14
15-19
20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44
45-49
50-54
55-59
60-64
65-69
70-74
National policy has contributed to the frustration felt
by the Islamic youth bulge by institutionalizing cen-
sus procedures that produce an apparent Christian
majority and justify a proportionate participation in
government far outweighing the Christian share of
the actual in-country population (now estimated at
about 25 percent).
Mexico, Peru, and Panama:
The Slowly Emerging Threat
Several Latin American countries exhibit a similar
pattern of emerging youth bulges: a slowly expanding
young adult population beginning in the early 1960s,
reaching the 20-percent level during the 1980s, and
disappearing by the late 1990s. There are early
indications that instability may be growing in all these
countries.
The composition of Lebanon's youth bulge portends
continued grim prospects for political stability be-
cause it appears to have been largely the product of a
single ethnic group, the Shia Muslims. The Shia
young adults, who are at the bottom of the economic'
ladder-less well educated, housed, and clothed than
their Christian, Druze, or Sunni countrymen-offer a
huge unskilled labor supply to an economy that
cannot absorb it. The presence of a labor surplus,
moreover, will tend to depress the wages of those
fortunate enough to find employment. The alienation
of Shia youth, along with their growing numerical
dominance of Lebanon, contributes to a situation ripe
for continued outbreaks of unrest.
Scattered data from Palestinian refugee areas suggest
the possibility that Palestinians have developed a
separate youth bulge that peaked around the 22-
percent level between 1980 and 1985. However that
The languid pace with which the youth bulge has
emerged in Mexico probably promotes less destabili-
zation than would a smaller bulge that emerged more
rapidly (figure 5). Mexico's political system-essen-
tially a single party encompassing a broad political
spectrum-is remarkably resilient and, given the am-
ple response time provided by the gradual expansion
of the youth bulge, is in a favorable position to
respond. The most salient feature of the response is
the continuing migration of a portion of the youth
bulge to the United States, which provides Mexico
with a demographic "safety valve." In this case,
mobilization of the youth bulge so as to minimize
instability has been accomplished not so much by
policy as by the absence of policy; the de la Madrid
government, and its predecessors, have treated sub-
stantial northward emigration with benign neglect.
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Figure 5
Mexico: Youth Bulge
Percentage of total population, age 15-24
Period of high potential
for instability' 1
Figure 6
Peru: Youth Bulge
17 1950 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 2000 05
Scc Nmiom I Intelligence Bsumnte 81-84 (Secret NF N( OC),
25 A1-1 19K4. Outlook / r 51 ieo
Panama's youth bulge, which peaked at about 21
percent in 1985, appears to coincide with a degree of
political instability (figure 7). Press and US Embassy
reporting since 1980, corresponding to the emergence
of the youth bulge, shows a gradual escalation in
demonstrations, political killings, and other indica-
tions of instability. The September 1985 ouster of
President Barletta, though coinciding with the youth
Joining.
Peru's small youth bulge emerged in 1980, at the
same time as the emergence of the Sendero Luminoso
(SL), Peru's principal insurgent group, and will disap-
pear after 1990 (figure 6). SL activity shows a steady
increase from 1980 through 1984, corresponding to
the expansion of the youth bulge. Embassy reporting
indicates that the SL is an almost ideal example of an
insurgent group spawned by the youth bulge. Its
members are 15 to 25, often with above-average
education. Captured members cite frustration with
their inability to obtain employment commensurate
with their educational levels as a principal reason for
Emergence of Sendero
Luminoso
60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 2000 05
bulge peak, appears to have been largely unrelated to
demographic pressure, while street demonstrations in
the wake of the ouster bear the mark of the youth
bulge in action.F--] 25X1
The youth bulge in Panama will begin to diminish by
1990, and by 2005 the young adult population will
reach the norm for developed countries. Such a steep
decline, shared only by Indonesia among the countries
analyzed for this study, will sharply reduce demo-
graphic pressure generating instability.
The Philippines: The Changing
Location of the Youth Bulge
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The increase in the proportion of the Filipino young
adult population has been dramatically sudden, and
the speed with which it made its appearance has left
the government and the economy unable to cope
effectively with it (figure 8). As recently as 1965, the
proportion of youths in the Philippine population was
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Figure 7
Panama: Youth Bulge
21.5
21.0
20.5
Critical level
20.0
19.5
19.0
18.5
18.0
Figure 8
Philippines: Youth Bulge
art
a
aw
ec
are
NPA formed
Student unrest peaks;
visit of Pinochet
F
22
21
Critical level
20
19
18
308173 2.86
only slightly larger than the norm for a developed
country. By 1970, however, more than 20 percent of
the population was made up of young adults, and their
impact had become apparent. Today's insurgent lead-
ers are predominantly former students from the early
1970s, recruited to membership in the Communist
Party of the Philippines (CPP) or in the New Peoples'
Army (NPA) from a societal context in which unem-
ployment rates grew increasingly great and the oppor-
tunities for social mobility ever more elusive. The
emergence of the youth bulge coincided with the
declaration of martial law by the Marcos regime, and
the bulge reached its maximum around 1980, corre-
sponding to increasing Communist domination of the
countryside and student unrest.
The youth bulge will start to dissipate by 1990, but
the threat to stability will probably continue beyond
that date. Unlike the age structure patterns of Latin
American countries, where the typical bulge quickly
evaporates, the bulge in the Philippines has been more
protracted (20 years, versus 10 to 15 years in most of
Latin America). This sustained demographic pressure
has been one factor, along with government policy
restricting political opposition to the Marcos regime,
308174 2.86
in creating a favorable environment for insurgent
groups to organize, recruit, and gain control over a
substantial portion of the country.
The youth bulge, which was predominantly urban
based before 1984, is now becoming increasingly
rural, a transformation that may reduce the quality of
the leadership within insurgent groups (figure 9).
Although insurgent operational bases are located in
rural areas, a substantial proportion of leaders, and
perhaps a significant number of trained personnel
generally, are educated urbanites who have "taken to
the hills" in opposition to the government. The poten-
tial pool of support among young urbanites in the
Philippines is now drying up and will be substantially
reduced in 20 years.
Iran and Nicaragua: The Never-Ending Bulges
Iran and Nicaragua are unusual cases because their
youth bulges have emerged since 1975 and will
continue to grow slowly through the entire period
projected by current population studies (figures 10
and 11). Only catastrophic events, such as the decima-
tion of young males in combat, could reduce the youth
bulge below the 20-percent level before 2010.
M
i
l l
d
l
d
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Figure 9 Figure 10
Philippines: Rural and Urban Iran: Youth Bulge
Youth Bulges
Youths age 10-25 as a percentage of total population Percentage of total population, age 15-24
37 Ch1h nverthrnwn Ir,n_Irsn, -- k..0,n,
Urban
20.0
19.5
19.0
18.5
18.0
17.5
17.0
_. _.___ 1 1 __1.._. 1 1_-_.. I I I _1_.. I_-I
16.5 1950 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 2000 05
It appears that both countries have turned the youth Figure 11
bulge to the task of eliminating perceived "enemies of Nicaragua: Youth Bulge
the state" in conflicts that seem interminable. While
it is clear that neither the Iran-Iraq war nor the
Sandinista-Contra conflict was initiated with the idea Percentage of total population, age 15-24
of absorbing the youth bulge, both accomplish that
Overthrow of Somoza
end. The wholesale conscription of young adults in
Iran and Nicaragua accomplishes the absorption of 21.0
youth into the national fabric. While new regimes
always target the young for indoctrination, in both 20.5
Iran and Nicaragua more than education or mere
symbolic involvement is involved. Mobilization of the 200
youth bulge was central to the uprisings that brought 19.5
both Khomeini and the Sandinistas to power, and
both regimes probably fear that at least a portion of 19.0
their volatile youth could turn against them.
Indonesia: The Generation Gap 18.0
Indonesia's youth bulge first developed in 1950,
emerged in 1985, and will reach a new-and consider-
ably higher--peak around 1990 (figure 12). The origi-
nal appearance of the youth bulge in the early
independence period created a problem for the Sukar-
Note The 1975 bulge is associated with the ouster of Somora in 1979.
but was immediately followed by the outmigration of youth as reflected
in the trough of 1980
no regime, which was unable to provide employment 308177 286
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Figure 12
Indonesia: Youth Bulge
Percentage of total population, age 15-24
Abortive coup, followed by
antileftist, anti-Chinese rioting
308178 2.86
and education for hundreds of thousands of youths.
Sukarno attempted to mobilize this group with the
idea that their role was to protect the country from
foreign and domestic enemies. It is doubly ironic that
it was members of the youth bulge, both students and
military, who overthrew Sukarno and were themselves
decimated by the purges that followed. By 1970
young adults were sparse in the Indonesian popula-
tion, in part because of nearly 600,000 deaths in the
anti-Chinese, antileftist riots occurring in the wake of
Sukarno's ouster.
The potential impact of Indonesia's second youth
bulge, now entering the scene, is both aggravated and
lessened by certain government policies and cultural
traditions. Since independence, Indonesia has made
education the linchpin of its policy for economic
development. An important aspect of educational
policy has been the introduction of Bahasa Indonesia,
a language bearing little similarity to the many
regional tongues of the country, as the medium of
instruction. The traditional languages of Indonesia
are spoken with different inflections, according to the
social status or authority of the person being ad-
dressed. Bahasa Indonesia ignores these distinctions,
thereby helping to create an especially broad genera-
tional gap between members of the youth bulge, who
use the new language, and older Indonesians, who use
the traditional languages. Partially offsetting these
tendencies is the existence of a centralist government
in Indonesia that has developed as a result of previous
popular rejections of threats from both the left and
the right. Government political ideology, probably the
most common target of youth protest worldwide, is
not a major issue.
The reemergence of the Indonesian youth bulge in
1985 bodes ill for the country over the next decade.
Since the Sukarno years, per capita income in Indone-
sia has more than doubled and the country has made
major advances in creating a coherent state from
disparate islands and cultures. Despite the gains,
however, Indonesia remains a poor country, and its
ability to absorb the new youth bulge without the
outbreak of unrest is doubtful.
Chile, Mozambique, and Nigeria: Bulgeless Instability
The youth bulge appears always to result in at least
some instability, but not all instability results from
the youth bulge as demonstrated by the cases of Chile,
Mozambique, and Nigeria. Chile maintained a long
tradition of political stability-until the coup in 1973
that overthrew the Marxist regime of Salvador
Allende-without a youth bulge present (figure 13).
Opposition to the Allende regime came from the
upper and middle class, as well as from the military,
without any obvious participation by young adults.
Classic military coups, such as Chile's, can occur
without the support of youth; organized youth groups
were evident in Chile during the 1960s and early
1970s, but in support of Allende or of causes
embraced by the Allende regime. Chile experienced a
small and short-lived youth bulge that seems to
correspond with increasing pressure on the Pinochet
regime.
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Chile: Youth Bulge
Figure 13 Figure 14
Percentage of total population, age 15-24
Allende regime falls to coup
Mozambique: Youth Bulge
Percentage of total population, age 15-24
20.0
Mozambique and Nigeria, both currently experienc- Figure 15
ing high levels of political instability, have not devel- Nigeria: Youth Bulge
oped youth bulges, nor are bulges projected for the
future (figures 14 and 15). The percentage of young
adults in the populations of both countries has re- Percentage of total population, age 15-24
variety of influencing factors.
mained consistently high since 1950, but below the 19.6
20-percent level. Given the heavy involvement
throughout Sub-Saharan Africa in traditional agri- 19.4
culture and the corresponding lack of modernization,
it is likely that the economic infrastructure through- 19.2
out the region is so fragile that demographic pressure
arising from the youth bulge may be applied well 19.0
below the 20-percent level. Age structure data derived
from most African censuses, moreover, are highly 18.8
unreliable because traditional groups tend to measure
the passage of time in ways unrelated to the Western 18.6
calendar. Respondents to census forms often do not
know their ages, and their answers may reflect a 18.4
While this analysis does not reveal the presence of a
youth bulge in Nigeria, the government in 1983 took
action that substantially reduced the size of the
resident young adult population. The Shagari admin-
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istration ordered the expulsion of all illegal immi-
grants, most of whom were young adults from other
West African countries, principally from Ghana. This
action removed some 2 million people from Nigeria,
one of the largest short-term migrations in modern
history. Nigeria's reasons for the expulsion seem
mainly to have involved concerns over the shortage of
jobs for young Nigerians in Lagos and other urban
areas, a common manifestation of a youth bulge. The
extreme action taken by the Nigerian Government
could not fail to alleviate demographic pressure from
a youth bulge, if one existed, or to prevent its
emergence.
There are no easy or universal solutions, but, if the
explosive potential of the youth bulge is to be con-
tained, new policies must address the successful mobi-
lization of youth so that their integration into the
national fabric can be achieved. Since World War II,
attention of policymakers in the United States and
more recently in LDCs has focused mainly on rapid
population growth, and the policy outcome has been
the creation of national and international programs
aimed at reducing birthrates. Although family plan-
ning programs will avert longer range problems, they
have no effect on existing Third World youth bulges;
young adults making up the bulges have already been
born. In Iran, Bangladesh, and Nicaragua, where the
youth bulges are projected to continue indefinitely,
the creation or expansion of family planning programs
could have an effect on political stability arising from
demographic factors, but this effect would not be felt
before the year 2000.
The existence of the youth bulge carries with it, at
least in part, the seeds of its own correction. Nations
are unlikely to respond to problems until they have an
impact at the national level. An increase in the
number of infants and young children hits principally
at the family level, and the increase may provoke only
a limited policy response, or no response at all. When
the increased number of "infants and children" grow
older, producing the youth bulge, the burden of rapid
population growth threatens the stability of national
institutions and demands policy response. Effective
national family planning programs are likely to be a
response to the youth bulge, and they have probably
been a major factor in the reduction of the number of
countries with youth bulges from 24 in 1985 to only
10 in 1995 (figure 16). The response, however, comes
too late to avoid much of the demographic pressure
associated with political unrest.
Since 1980 Third World nations have increasingly
developed population policies that deal with the relo-
cation of people, rather than with birthrates, to the
point where there are now more countries with explic-
it relocation policies than with family planning pro-
grams. This policy has potential for dealing with the
youth bulge, but it also has limitations. In Indonesia,
for example, policy favors the settlement of islands
other than Java, and the policy can be seen as a means
of mobilizing the youth bulge to the frontier, much
like the notion of "Go West, young man, and grow up
with the country." The Indonesian scheme, and simi-
lar ideas in other countries, has achieved mixed
success at best. Young people seek a role in the future
of the country, and the sparsely occupied regions seem
to offer little future.
Emigration by young adults can help to reduce the
pressure exerted by the youth bulge, but it is doubtful
that legal migration to foreign areas can play a
significant role in most countries. Receiving countries
favor the immigration of the older adults, particularly
the more affluent and the better educated, and their
young dependents, rather than those in the young
adult ages. Immigration policies of this sort actually
accentuate the effects of the youth bulge, as was the
case in Lebanon. On the other hand, illegal immigra-
tion, such as the movement of Mexicans and Central
Americans to the United States, directly reduces the
pressure of the youth bulge in the source countries,
but presents a dilemma to the receiving countries:
does the benefit derived from the probable reduction
of instability within the sending country outweigh the
cost of absorbing these migrants within the receiving
country?
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Secret
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