ZAIRE'S NATIONAL ROUTE: A NORTHERN OPTION?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP97R00694R000700270001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 19, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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ff n ~l Intelligence 25X1
Zaire's National Route:
A Northern Option?
Secret
GI 87-10029
April 1987
Copy 217
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Directorate of
Intelligence
A Northern Option?
Zaire's National Route:
OGI,
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Geographic Issues Division,
Secret
GI 87-10029
April 1987
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Summary
Information available
as of 27 February 1987
was used in this report.
A Northern Option?
Zairian traffic that now moves through South Africa.
Zaire's primary river and rail system, the Voie Nationale (VN), barely
meets the country's transport needs, and investments of roughly $100
million are required to maintain the system's capacity at current levels over
the next five years. If South Africa were to disrupt transport patterns by
imposing countersanctions on neighboring Frontline States, the VN would
require even greater investments in infrastructure and equipment-as well
as marked improvements in management capabilities-to handle the
solution for Zaire to this possible transport dilemma.
Zaire depends on the South African transportation network to export 40
percent of its mineral resources and to import supplies for its key mineral
industries in the Shaba Region. A cutoff of the southern route would result
in an annual loss of $200-250 million in copper export revenues alone and
further set back efforts to revive Zaire's economy. Alternate routes through
adjacent states do not provide realistic options in the short term for Zaire
because of security threats, inefficiencies, and Zaire's often strained
relations with its neighbors. Thus, investment in the maintenance and
expansion of the VN, despite its current limitations, provides an attractive
system's capacity.
Continued donor financing will be necessary to maintain the existing
capacity of the VN. The VN suffers from management problems, outdated
and poorly maintained equipment and infrastructure, and a shortage of
skilled and disciplined manpower. Zaire has made some progress in
improving portions of the system over the past five years, but rehabilitation
of the rail lines, continued expansion at the ports of Ilebo and Kinshasa,
and management improvements are critical to any future increase in the
Even with major investments, it is unlikely, in our judgment, that the VN
would be able, in the short term, to serve the needs of the landlocked
Frontline States if countersanctions were imposed by South Africa.
Expansion of VN capacity would, however, relieve pressures on the
southern transport system and ensure the continued transit of the majority
of Zaire's mineral exports. Improvements to the VN would benefit the
region if the Benguela Railroad were rehabilitated; the Benguela's only
link to the South African transport network is via Zaire's southern rail line.
Secret
GI 87-10029
April 1987
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The Transportation Challenge
Voie Nationale
The System
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5
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11
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Figure 1
Zaire's Rail Links With Its Neighbors
Libyaa'1,,
Zaire's Export
Economy and
Regional Divisions
KINSHASA BANDUND,U
KINSNASA
BAS-ZAIRE
atadi
-TA.a
Copper-cobalt-zinc
mineral zone
Metal refining
A Oilfield
Oil refinery
Region boundary
KASAI-'-
ORIENTAL
SHABA
150 300 Miles
150 300 K ilom,t r. rs
- Voie Nationale system
Alternate regional routes
- South African routes
I Frontline State
cheid c5ud'an
Zaire
Gayon
Gon9o;, -~
KlasheSS
Somalia
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A Northern Option?
Zaire depends on the railway network of neighboring
countries to export a significant portion of its mineral
resources and to import much of mineral-rich Shaba
Region's industrial and consumer needs. Much of this
flow moves through South Africa. In the event that
South African countersanctions or associated develop-
ments were to disrupt existing transport patterns,
Zairian exports would have to compete with those of
other southern African states for use of the region's
limited transport facilities or be channeled entirely
onto the Voie Nationale (VN), Zaire's only major
transport artery. In 1982 and 1983 about 45 percent
of the country's mineral exports moved along the VN
to Zaire's main seaport at Matadi, an equal amount
traveled the Shaba portion of the system to link to the
"southern route" for export through South Africa,'
and the remainder exited through the Tanzanian port
of Dar es Salaam (figure 2). However,
he Matadi
route now carries more than 50 percent of the mineral
traffic, while the flow through South Africa has been
reduced to about 40 percent. The VN does not have
the capacity to absorb more than a small percentage
of the potential additional traffic.
Zaire's recent efforts to join the Frontline States
(FLS) 2 and the Southern African Development Co-
ordination Conference (SADCC) ' reflect, in part, its
concern over how possible South African countersanc-
minerals have been exported via the VN. These percentages were
apparently computed using only data submitted by Gecamines, the
giant Shaba-based mining parastatal. Our calculations also include
tonnage figures submitted by the firm SODIMIZA, which exports
all of its copper through South Africa.
nia, Zimbabwe, and Zambia.
' SADCC is an alliance of nine black states established in 1980 to
maximize regional cooperation and to reduce these countries'
dependence on South Africa. The member states are Angola,
Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania,
Figure 2
Zaire Mineral Exports by Route,
1976-84
600
400
300
200
100
ar CS Salaam
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tions might affect its ability to export minerals and
import goods necessary to maintain its domestic min-
eral industry. Minerals now provide an estimated 65
percent of Zaire's foreign exchange earnings. Zaire's
attempts to revive its economy would be badly hurt by
the closure of the southern route. The imposition of 25X1
countersanctions would not immediately affect the
supply of Zairian cobalt to the United States and its
allies; stockpiles exist in European warehouses and the
mineral can be flown to Matadi for export. A more
permanent disruption, however, could stimulate the
development of cobalt production in other countries
and result in the loss of Zaire's cobalt market in the
West. Although cobalt could be air freighted, Zaire
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Figure 3
Zaire's Voie Nationale
Voie Nationale system
R R Voie Nationale potential
bottleneck
Electrified railroad (Zaire)
Diesel railroad (Zaire)
Oil pipeline
Copper cobalt -zinc
mirneeral zone
a
11~HZ,
llebo -
Kamina '
)Shab
Regio
~uku4~
aloe e
Bujumbura
BURUNDI
Lake
7anganyrka
Lubumv shi
Lake
Sang-lu
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would be hard pressed to find alternative routes that
could absorb the other mineral exports that now move
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through South Africa.
For the foreseeable future, Zaire's prospects for using
alternative routes through adjacent states are poor.
Large-scale investments and improvements in effi-
ciency would be required to expand the capacity of
the regional transport net to absorb the traffic that
now exits through South Africa. If this flow of goods
could not move through the South African-controlled
southern route, it would need to be apportioned
among the region's six alternate transport corridors
with access to the sea (figure 12, end of report).
Insurgencies have closed two major routes to regional
use-the Benguela Railroad to Lobito, Angola, and
the Limpopo Railroad to Maputo, Mozambique. Two
additional Mozambican rail routes, the Beira and the
Nacala, are subject to sabotage and insurgent attacks.
The two Tanzanian railroads, the Tanzania Railway
Corporation and the Tazara, are ultimately con-
strained by the heavily congested port of Dar es
Salaam.
Thus, improving the VN is an attractive option for
Zaire. This extensive system, with its multiple rail and
river interchanges, management problems, and main-
tenance difficulties, can now handle only about 60 to
70 percent of Zaire's import and export traffic. Costs
are high, transit times are slow, and delays are
frequent. Substantial international assistance has
helped Zaire make some progress in improving por-
tions of the system over the past five years, but the
government still lacks the funding to significantly
increase the route's capacity.
The country's 145,000-kilometer road network is not
a viable alternative to the VN; it is in poor condition
and consists mainly of narrow, unengineered roads
with poor drainage and deteriorated surfaces-less
than 4 percent of the network is paved or graveled.
Although parastatal agencies (state-owned companies)
still dominate the transport sector, the number of
private operators in road, river, and air transport is
increasing. Road transport, which has traditionally
been handled by the private sector, is very competitive
around Kinshasa and vies with rail traffic along the
account for 33 percent of all river traffic.
The System
The Voie Nationale is a 2,665-kilometer rail and river
network that serves as Zaire's main transport corridor
linking the country's Shaba Region to its main sea-
port at Matadi (figure 3). About 240,000 tons of
mineral traffic move annually by rail from Shaba to
the river port of Ilebo, by barge from Ilebo to
Kinshasa, and by rail from Kinshasa to Matadi. In
addition, the route annually handles about 75,000 to
100,000 tons of general cargo and about 120,000 to
140,000 tons of petroleum as imports, together with
unspecified amounts of raw materials and agricultural
products as exports. The VN is also an important
artery for internal commerce. It serves as a funnel
into which feeder routes throughout the country are
channeled, and as a less expensive alternative to the
country's poor road system. Large quantities of maize
move from northern Shaba and Kasai Regions to
southern Shaba, and such goods as palm oil, forestry
products, manioc, and rice move downstream on the
VN system. Zaire's rural economy and nonmineral
exports depend on the maintenance and improvement
of the VN.
Two major parastatals manage and maintain the
system: the Office National des Transports
(ONATRA) and the Societe Nationale des Chemins
de Fer Zairois (SNCZ). ONATRA manages transport
services on the Congo and its tributaries, the railway
between Matadi and Kinshasa, and most inland ports.
The SNCZ operates the rail services in the southern
and eastern portions of the country and manages
several ports, including Kalemie and Ilebo. Two agen-
cies that operate navigational aids on the country's
waterways, Regie des Voies Fluviales (RVF) and
Regie des Voies Maritimes (RVM), also have key
roles in the VN.
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Figure 4. Derailment south of
llebo, Zaire (note steep drop-