RHODESIA-LOOKING AHEAD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP97S00289R000100170003-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 1, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: August 5, 1977
• Content Type: SNIE

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MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS
SPECIAL
NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
ESTI MATE
Rhodesia Looking Ahead
-Svc-r-e-T
SNIE 72-1-1-77
5 August 1977
Copy N2 421
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SNIE 72.1-1-77
RHODESIA-LOOKING AHEAD
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THIS MEMORANDUM IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD HAS NOTED
THIS MEMORANDUM, AS OF 5 AUGUST 1977.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Memorandum:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State and Defense, and the National Security Agency.
Concurring:
The Acting Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community,
Acting Vice Chairman
The Acting CIA Member representing the Central Intelligence Agency
The Director of Intelligence and Research representing the Department of State
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, National Security Agency
The Deputy Assistant Administrator for National Security, Energy Research and
Development Administration
The Special Assistant to the Secretary for National Security, Department of the Treasury
The Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Abstaining:
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
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CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY .................................................................... 1
DISCUSSION .............................................................................................................. 3
The Military Balance ............................................................................................ 3
The Guerrillas ........................................................................................................ 3
Communist Support ............................................................................................... 4
The Rhodesians ...................................................................................................... 4
South Africa's Role ............................................................................................... .5
The Economic Picture ......................................................................................... 5
Foreign Trade ........................................................................................................ 7
Outlook .................................................................................................................... 7
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ATLANTIC
OCEAN
LUANDA
7
1,300 trained guerrill#s in Zambia
Francistown
1800 refugees
Selebi-Pikwe
950 refugees
Training camp
Refugee/recruitment camp
Guerrilla base/training camp
ZANU
9,000-10,000 guerrillas
in training in Tanzania
9,000-10,000
guerrillas awaitin
ZANU
2,500-5,000 Veined
guerrillas in MAo4ambique
Mozambique
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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
A. When SNIE 72.1-1-77, Rhodesia-Looking Ahead, was issued
last January, the Intelligence Community agreed to take another
reading of the Rhodesian situation during the summer, particularly
with a view to refining, if possible, our estimates and forecasts of
guerrilla strength and of the impact of economic pressures on the Smith
regime. This paper aims to do that. Other developments in the situation,
however, notably the British cabinet's refusal to support Foreign
Secretary Owen's concepts for an interim regime in Rhodesia, Prime
Minister Smith's call for elections, and Smith's resumption of
preparations to pursue an "internal settlement," have led us to provide
an assessment that goes somewhat beyond our original charge. We have
therefore included in this paper an "outlook" section that offers our
current view of the likely course of developments during the next six to
nine months.
B. Briefly, we believe the Rhodesia situation will be essentially at
stalemate during this period. Despite increases in the size of the
guerrilla forces-some of these increases go considerably above the
numbers forecast in the SNIE-and a growing flow of Communist,
especially Soviet, support, we do not believe the black nationalist
military arms can "win" militarily within this time frame. But neither
can the white-commanded Rhodesian forces reduce the guerrilla threat,
and recognition of this by the military commanders in Salisbury is
clearly having a political effect.
C. The economic picture is similar. The Rhodesian economy is
basically depressed, and we expect it to remain so, given the inexorably
mounting budgetary and manpower costs of the antiguerrilla cam-
paigns. But economic collapse is not coming within the next six to nine
months and we see no significant change likely in the level and
character of South Africa's relationships with the Rhodesians.
D. Barring some new and dramatic intervention by outside
elements, this leaves Smith room to contrive and to maneuver, albeit in
a gradually constricting environment. We believe that the "internal
settlement" option, which we previously saw as the most likely
development, will now be pursued by the Rhodesians. Indeed, Smith's
call for elections is part of an attempt at an "internal" solution, and the
next six months are likely to be occupied mainly by Smith's effort to
attract the participation of black nationalist leadership and by the
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reactions of those black leaders who either reject Smith's approaches or
are not invited to participate. In the end, we doubt that the Rhodesians
will succeed in attracting the African and other international support
they need to make the internal option work, and the spring of 1978 will
probably find Smith or another white leader facing a larger guerrilla
threat, a still deteriorating economy, and more serious morale
problems-but still hanging on.
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DISCUSSION
The Military Balance
1. The conflict between Rhodesian security forces
and the principal Rhodesian nationalist guerrilla
factions, ZANU and_ZAPU, is at a stalemate; while the
government has freedom of movement and can and
does move at will inside and even outside Rhodesia,
the security forces have still not been able to block
nationalist infiltration from Mozambique and, to a
lesser extent, from Zambia, nor contain the nationalist
guerrilla presence which now has spread into much of
the country.
2. The character of the military operations has
remained essentially unchanged since our previous
Estimate and will likely continue so over the short
term despite a substantial increase in the number of
guerrilla recruits. The nationalists, primarily ZANU
forces in eastern Rhodesia, continue to focus their
efforts on small-scale, guerrilla-type operations against
targets mainly in the outlying areas. They have been
able to infiltrate into black areas to gain recruits,
attack government-run protected villages; harass white
farmers and blacks who cooperate with the govern-
ment; and disrupt communications systems by laying
land mines and ambushing convoys and civilian
traffic.
3. The government response to nationalist activities
has been aggressive, and we believe the means will be
available to continue this posture over the next six
months. The government forces have not only denied
the nationalists continuing control of any real estate in
Rhodesia, but have actively sought out and disrupted
nationalist formations within Rhodesia as well as inside
neighboring Mozambique. Such attacks have not only
kept the nationalists and their FRELIMO supporters
in Mozambique militarily off balance and on the
defensive, but have provided a "shot in the arm" for
declining Rhodesian white civilian and military
morale.
The Guerrillas
4. The major change is in the increase in the size of
the nationalist factions, particulary ZAPU. The sup-
porting data is still somewhat tenuous, but we estimate
that there may now be as many as 2,800 fighters
aligned with ZANU scattered throughout eastern
Rhodesia at any given time, and about 300-400 ZAPU
adherents inside Rhodesia in the areas bordering
Zambia. The total of some 3,200 personnel actually in
Rhodesia represents an increase of about 2,000 during
the past year. The additional personnel, however, so
far have been primarily felt in an increase in the
number and geographic spread of incidents rather
than in any change in the character of guerrilla
operations.
5. The number of recruits and trainable personnel
who have exfiltrated Rhodesia and have gone to bases
in Zambia, Mozambique, and Tanzania has expanded
at an even greater rate than the numbers of active
fighters inside Rhodesia. We believe that the ZANU
faction could have as many as 20,000 personnel,
mainly recruits, in facilities in Mozambique and
Tanzania awaiting or in the process of training. About
5,000 of these, partially trained ZANU recruits in
Tanzania, were to be transported to Mozambique in
July 1977; these forces, along with about 1,000 or so
trained ZANU personnel already in Mozambique,
would conceivably be available for subsequent oper-
ations in Rhodesia in the coming months.
6. The most significant manpower increases, how-
ever, have been with the Zambia-based ZAPU
factions, which grew from about 1,500 in late 1976 to
currently over 8,000 available personnel. While only
about 1,400 of these can be considered trained for
combat, considerable effort is being made to train and
equip the balance. ZAPU personnel are reported to
have been sent to Angola for training by Cuban
instructors and to Cuba as well as to the Soviet Union.
Those ZAPU personnel trained in the Soviet Union
have received instruction in the operation of heavy
weapons (e.g., antitank missiles and 122-mm rockets)
as well as in administrative procedures (e.g., immigra-
tion and police work).
7. Despite the rapid increases in available insurgent
manpower, the overall level of insurgent combat
effectiveness remains low, and is further inhibited by
factional and political rivalries within the movements.
A serious round of clashes that occurred in late June
inside Rhodesia between ZANU and ZAPU is but
another sign of the nationalists' inability to cooperate.
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Suspicion and lack of trust-at all levels-between
these organizations will continue to inhibit joint or
coordinated military operations, and this condition
argues against any meaningful integration of these
forces under the aegis of the Patriotic Front in the
future.
8. Indeed, leaders of the ZANU military faction are
coming to believe that ZAPU may be their real enemy,
and that ZAPU's long-standing ties with the Soviet
Union could leave ZANU at a real disadvantage in any
real struggle for power after independence. They are
particularly concerned about the recent buildup of
ZAPU's forces and the preponderance of new and
superior Soviet weapons the ZAPU faction is receiving.
Communist Support
9. Communist military assistance to the insurgents
and to Mozambique, the insurgents' principal military
supporter, has increased substantially since late last
year. A further escalation of Soviet and Cuban
military aid is anticipated during the balance of the
year to accommodate the growing size and proficiency
of the guerrilla forces. New arrangements for addi-
tional aid were agreed on between ZAPU leader
Nkomo and Presidents Castro and Podgorny during
the latter's swing through Africa in March.
10. The sharp step-up in Communist arms ship-
ments and advisory support to the Zimbabwe national-
ists, primarily from the USSR and Cuba, was triggered
in part by the intensification of Rhodesian cross-
border operations last fall against guerrilla camps and
government military facilities in Mozambique. Urgent
appeals for help by rebel leaders and President Machel
of Mozambique late last year set in motion a series of
emergency shipments of arms and advisory personnel
to shore up Mozambican defenses and to correct
serious guerrilla and regular troop deficiencies ex-
posed by the Rhodesian raids. Initially, large amounts
of weapons and equipment were transferred from
Tanzania to depots in Mozambique, and by early 1977
substantial tonnages of arms and equipment, including
APCs, antiaircraft guns, and artillery, had arrived
from the USSR, the PRC, Yugoslavia, East Germany,
and Bulgaria. Several hundred Cuban military instruc-
tors and arms were secretly airlifted from Angola to
Mozambique.
11. In the period since this program to meet the
immediate situation in Mozambique (and deliveries of
Soviet equipment to regular forces in Mozambique
have continued), the USSR's support effort for the
guerrillas has focused on the ZAPU contingents, which
are located mainly in Zambia. Cuban equipment
reportedly has been trucked from Angola to north-
eastern Zambia, and Soviet weapons have been
shipped overland from Dar es Salaam. ZAPU cadre
are being trained in the use of 122-mm rockets, and
some 1,000 ZAPU personnel reportedly have left for
training-including instruction on heavy weapons-in
the USSR.
12. We do not expect to see this Soviet support
translated into new kinds of effective guerrilla activity
in Rhodesia during the period of this estimate,
however. We think that new equipment and training
will be employed first to improve the defensive
capabilities of the guerrilla bases in both Zambia and
Mozambique, and this alone will be no easy task.
Ultimately, of course, an improved defensive posture
should be reflected in improved guerrilla morale and
effectiveness generally, other factors being equal.
13. The state of current Chinese support of the
Rhodesian rebels is unclear. Robert Mugabe's visit to
Peking last month to seek additional military support
may have met with some success, but the results are
not yet known.
The Rhodesians
14. The Rhodesians have been able to capitalize on
nationalist disunity and combat deficiencies, but they
have not been able to stem exfiltration of recruits and
the infiltration of guerrillas, eradicate the insurgent
presence inside Rhodesia, or restore a sense of security
to its black and white citizens. While the government
forces are currently unbeatable, they are also not
winning, and the assessments of the Rhodesian
intelligence and military organizations continue to
stress that the longer term prospects are bleak.
15. To keep pace with the expanding scope of the
nationalist presence in Rhodesia and in the Zambia
and Mozambique border areas, the Rhodesians have
had to maintain about 20,000 army, air force, and
police personnel on active duty at any given time; this
has resulted in a greater reliance on the manpower
pool of white reservists. A new call-up policy
announced in June requires that men under age 38
will serve up to 190 days per year on active duty,
while those between 39 and 49 will serve a maximum
of 70 days. An appeal went out to those men between
50 and 60 to volunteer for active duty as "specials."
The government is also keeping closer tabs on young,
potential draftees between 16 and 18 to ensure that
they remain available for military service. The
government's increasing dependence on reservists and
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draftees is not being well received by many white
civilians, although we have no evidence to show that
the white exodus-which averaged about 1,000 per
month for the first five months of 1977-is to a large
extent related to the call-ups.
16. The morale of the security forces, particularly
the activated reservists, has probably suffered to some
degree from the spiraling manpower requirements
and the continuing spread of the insurgent presence
throughout the country. Moreover, there is evidence
that the military commanders are preparing psycho-
logically for a political accommodation with the black
nationalists. But at the same time, they also are
unwilling to accept a "sell-out" to the Patriotic Front
which would have the net effect of dismantling the
current force and replacing it with a ZANU or ZAPU
force. The military will likely support the Smith
government or any successor in reaching a solution
which would preserve their organizational integrity
and provide a political and economic role and place
for whites in Rhodesia following independence.
17. In the absence of such assurances, the military-
and particularly the regular forces-can be expected
to continue to pursue actively the insurgents inside
Rhodesia, as well as without. The defensive weak-
nesses of neighboring Mozambique and even Zambia
will, without external assistance, inhibit them from
effectively defending against Rhodesian cross-border
raids over the next six months.
18. Over the same period, however, the steady
increase in nationalist recruits in both ZANU and
ZAPU will allow these factions-still operating inde-
pendently-to place even greater pressure on Rhode-
sia's limited military resources. Under these circum-
stances we would expect the security forces to look to
South Africa for continued and even increased
logistical support, and even some more sophisticated
military equipment. The security forces are also likely
to press their own government toward more imagina-
tive initiatives as long as these are not seen to be
politically damaging to the more moderate elements
among the black nationalists. Further strikes into
Mozambique and, possibly even against ZAPU targets
in Zambia, cannot be ruled out under these conditions.
settlement which Smith regards as unreasonable unless
convinced that Smith himself is being unreasonable.
20. Pretoria is urging Smith and his advisers to be
moderate in their military efforts and in their dealings
with supporters of the nationalists who are operating
inside Rhodesia. Vorster recently told Smith that he
was strongly opposed to a major military operation in
Zambia and to arrests of officials of nationalist groups
in Rhodesia. Smith himself is against such actions and
reportedly used Vorster's position to back up his case
against hard-liners in his cabinet who were pushing for
such policies.
21. Rhodesian and South African security and
military officials continue to maintain close contact.
South African military observers reportedly are
stationed with Rhodesian units and a small number of
Rhodesian personnel-primarily from the Rhodesian
Air Force-still receive flight and technical training in
South Africa.
22. The single most important aspect of South
Africa's support remains that of providing transport
for Rhodesia's overseas trade. Almost all of that trade
has gone through South Africa since Mozambique-
which shipped almost 70 percent of it-closed its
border with Rhodesia in early 1976.
23. Although South African military support to
Rhodesia has never been extensive-and we cannot
determine that it has increased substantially-it is an
important source of certain critical supplies such as
petroleum and aviation fuel. South Africa also acts as
transshipper for military equipment purchased abroad
by Rhodesia. The Rhodesians have contacts with arms
,suppliers in Switzerland, France, and Brazil which
they use occasionally for the purchase of vehicles,
communications equipment, and spare parts.
24. A collapse of settlement discussions or a full-
speed-ahead effort on Smith's part to implement an
independent settlement would prompt Vorster to
review the affordable political and economic costs of
further support. While Vorster recognizes the difficul-
ties of an "internal" settlement, we believe he would
support it, particularly if other efforts failed and if
Smith were making an honest attempt.
South Africa's Role
19. Regarding South African attitudes toward
Rhodesia, the basic judgments expressed in SNIE 72.1-
1-77 remain valid. Prime Minister Vorster will
continue to support efforts toward a settlement, but he
will do nothing to pressure Smith into accepting a
The Economic Picture
25. Low business confidence in Rhodesia's future
and military drains on the economy are producing
another year of economic contraction in 1977-the
third in a row. The economic situation undoubtedly is
an important spur to Smith's politically risky efforts to
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get agreement on a formula and timetable for
eventual power sharing with blacks.
26. Manufacturing output, responsible for about
one-fifth of GNP, is at its lowest point in four years;
construction has fallen to a fraction of past levels,
particularly in the private residential and commercial
sectors; and growth in agriculture has been mediocre.
Mining has been the only bright spot, up by one-third
in 1976 over 1975 because of increased world demand
and the opening of new nickel and gold mines.
27. Military requirements brought on by the
guerrilla threat have deepened the recession. Bud-
geted expenditures for the military and police have
more than tripled since fiscal year 1973 to $250
million this year; they now account for one-fourth of
Salisbury's total spending. Foreign exchange alloca-
tions for nonmilitary needs-fuel, raw materials for
manufacturing, and both consumer and capital
goods-have been cut sharply to make funds available
for arms purchases. Salisbury, moreover, has been
forced to raise taxes and freeze government wages to
hold down budget deficits.
28. Rhodesia has no alternative but to curb
nonmilitary imports to meet its growing military
expenses. Although the level of foreign exchange
reserves is unknown, Salisbury's tightfistedness in
managing its balance of payments indicates a thin
margin of safety. Despite the rise in foreign military
purchases in 1976, for example, the government
clamped down on nonmilitary purchases enough to
reduce the overall volume of imports by 27 percent,
forcing a turnaround in the current account from a
$180 million deficit in 1975 to a $27 million surplus in
1976. The improvement was necessary to offset a steep
drop in net capital inflows (from about $155 million to
$40 million), which demonstrated the growing caution
of foreign investors in the face of both the recession
and the country's shaky political future.
29. So far, the recession has not seriously disrupted
the lifestyle of the 270,000 whites in Rhodesia.
Supplies of essentials-food, shelter, medical sup-
plies-have been unaffected. Declines in retail sales of
other commodities probably reflect consumer caution
more than shortages. Restricted auto travel because of
gasoline rationing is the main economic incon-
venience.
30. Most troubling to the whites has been their
heavy military obligation. Business not only loses key
employees to the draft but also is required to make up
the difference between low military pay and normal
salaries.
31. Although white emigration has been up sharply
since early last year, the overwhelming majority of
whites are still sticking it out (see table). Both deep
roots in the country and stringent limits on capital
outflows (reportedly $1,600 per family plus personal
property) constrain departures. While the net outflow
in 1976 represented as much a slowdown in immigra-
tion as a pickup in departures of Rhodesian citizens,
the outflow is slowly accelerating and net emigration
probably will exceed 10,000 this year.
32. Press reports indicate that a majority of the
emigrants are young-ages 20 to 40-and that a
significant minority-possibly 5 percent-are edu-
cated professionals. No official data are available on
the ages and occupations of emigrants to confirm or
refute these reports. It appears reasonable, neverthe-
less, that these groups would be the most likely to go;
they presumably would have a smaller economic stake
in Rhodesia than older people and would have the
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
Jan-May
1977
' As of 31 December.
Estimated.
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12.2
5.9
6.3
2.5
243
14.7
5.3
9.4
2.6
255
13.9
5.1
8.8
3.2
267
9.5
7.8
1.7
2.3
271
9.7
9.1
0.6
2.4
274
12.4
10.5
1.9
2.1
278
7.8
14.9
-7.1
2.0E
273
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greatest chance of starting over successfully in a new tially cooperative-if not compliant-nationalists
homeland. ' inside Rhodesia and the chief-led party, ZUPO.
Foreign Trade
33. After initial teething problems, Rhodesia has
adjusted satisfactorily to the closure of the Mozam-
bique border in March 1976. The closure forced
Rhodesia to reroute its foreign trade over longer routes
through South Africa. The move freed Rhodesia,
however, of costly shipping demurrages that it had
been paying at Mozambique's ports; the savings have
roughly offset the increase in rail fees.
34. There is no evidence so far that the repeal of the
Byrd Amendment by the US has had any impact on
Rhodesian trade. As in the past, exports apparently are
flowing smoothly to South Africa and overseas
customers, probably in Europe and Japan. Imports
come mainly from South Africa. And South Africa,
with the help of Swiss middlemen, is continuing its
role of obscuring the destination and origin of
Rhodesian trade, making it difficult for overseas
countries to be certain that they are not trading with
Rhodesia.
35. The uncertainty of the whites over their future
in Rhodesia probably now is as harmful for the
economy as shortages of manpower and foreign
exchange. Both investors and consumers will continue
to hold back, awaiting some clear sign as to their
future in Rhodesia. But the economy is still far from
collapse. Substantial resiliency and diversification have
been built up over the 11 years of sanctions, providing
the depth for continued viability, though with limited
prospects for growth until the political problems are
settled. Emigration, while psychologically disturbing
to the country, is not yet making a major impact, and
the Rhodesians can keep going economically for the
next six to nine months without significant additional
economic strain.
Outlook
36. Given the military and economic situation in
Rhodesia sketched above, British cabinet withdrawal
of support for key aspects of Foreign Secretary Owen's
negotiating efforts leaves the principals in the
Rhodesian crisis little recourse but to pursue strategies
they had been developing in any case:
- The Smith regime had been preparing the
ground for an internal settlement with poten-
' Military obligations apparently are not a factor because
Rhodesian law requires all 20- to 40-year-old male emigrants to
have completed their four-year service obligations before leaving.
- The Patriotic Front has been arming and
training its guerrilla cadres in order to wear
down the Smith regime and vindicate the Front's
claim to political power.
37. No less than the Patriotic Front's need to press
the guerrilla war the harder if only to keep Rhodesia
on the defensive and the internal option unviable,
Smith must seek a political solution; otherwise the war
eventually will wear down the whites' resolve to resist
in spite of evidence that Rhodesia could hold out for at
least another year under present guerrilla, economic,
and international pressures. The cumulative effects of
increasing emigration, white manpower shortages,
economic uncertainty, and psychological distress in
the white and moderate black communitihs have
already produced the first serious domestic political
crisis since the unilateral declaration of independence
in 1965:
Twelve MPs from the right wing of the ruling
Rhodesian Front party have broken from Smith's
leadership and formed their own party; the
former RF chairman may join them.
Remaining right-wing cabinet ministers have
been pressing Smith to take a harder line against
the nationalists inside Rhodesia and to avoid
making deals with any but the most pliant of
them.
Top military and security officials have been
pursuing an almost independent political line,
tending to support moves toward, or political
leaders who favor, an early political settlement
with both moderate nationalist and conservative
black Rhodesians.
The thus far ineffectual "liberal" white commu-
nity has been pressing for greater accommoda-
tion with the nationalists, relaxation of racially
discriminatory laws, and even for Smith's
replacement.
38. We do not believe that Rhodesia will crumble
militarily or economically during the period of this
estimate. But for Smith, the urgency of movement
toward some sort of resolution has never been greater.
Smith must soon launch a settlement that is acceptable
to his constituency if he wishes to avoid further right-
wing defections, keep the loyalty of the security
forces, and demonstrate to South Africa that it is not
locked into endless and open-ended support of an
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intransigent Salisbury regime or headed for some
greater, perhaps military involvement.
39. Smith probably still sees a settlement in terms of
the "internal option." He may now hope that
nationalist divisions and Patriotic Front intransigence
will wear down UK-US patience, and that the West
would prefer the internal option-if it guaranteed the
irrevocable devolution of power to demonstrably
popular, albeit "safe" and moderate African lead-
ers-to continued war.
40. For these reasons, and because the costs of war
and international pariahdom are ultimately intoler-
able, we believe that Smith will launch an internal
settlement over the next few months. Indeed, by
permitting Ndabaningi Sithole to return to Rhodesia
in early July and calling for parliamentary elections,
he already has begun the process. His next steps will
probably be to:
-seek in the elections to be held on 31 August
white Rhodesian approval of negotiations with
"responsible" Rhodesian blacks that will lead to
majority rule,
- invite all nationalists and black Rhodesians to
contest an election aimed at choosing their
spokesmen for negotiations leading to majority
rule, and
- ask for international, preferably US-UK, supervi-
sion of elections, and even participation in talks
with the Africans.
41. At the same time, Smith may be expected to step
up preemptive and hot-pursuit attacks against ZIPA,
forces in Mozambique and may possibly authorize a
few carefully controlled and small-scale incursions into
Zambia to thwart ZAPU buildups. He may hope
thereby to "prove" to both the Africans and internal
dissidents that the regime will not permit itself to be
intimidated or defeated militarily.
42. Smith probably also hopes that with black
participation in government, significant numbers of
ZAPU and ZANU guerrillas would defect to the new
black leaders inside Rhodesia, or at least throw down
their arms. At the same time, he might hope that
Zambia and Mozambique would find it difficult to
continue to support the guerrillas against such a
government.
43. Unless the processes established to bring
majority rule win broad international acceptance
(which is unlikely), efforts to implement the internal
option will not seriously blunt front-line or other
African implacability. The war is likely to go on, and
by the end of the year the guerrillas will have
enhanced their ability to make small, terrorist style
strikes almost at will over large areas of Rhodesia, and
even at black "collaborators" in urban areas. Yet, we
do not believe that they will be able to overcome the
Rhodesian regime over the next six to nine months.
44. There are two possible ways in which this
stalement might be avoided or broken:
- While the front-line states and the nationalists
are confident that their cause will ultimately
prevail, they recognize that the military route
will be long and arduous and that the deep and
serious internal divisions among the nationalists
weaken them both on the battlefield and at the
negotiating table. Mozambique, and now Zam-
bia, are suffering internal strains as a result of
their virtual states of war with Rhodesia. They, as
well as a number of African supporters farther
removed from the front line (for example,
Nigeria and Ghana), might well prefer an early
settlement to a costly prolongation of the struggle
that may have less to do with liberation than
with internecine nationalist competition. Hence,
the front-line states and influential members of
the OAU might press the Patriotic Front to take
SNIE Estimate
28 January 77
SNIE Estimate (Revised)'
July 1977
ZANU
6,000
14,000
9,000
15,000-18,000
ZAPU
1,000
3,000-4,000
1,400
6,000-7,000
' Includes personnel in Rhodesia, Zambia, and Mozambique.
This estimate will depend on the nationalists' continuing ability to recruit, the intensity of their training
effort, and the amount of arms available to them.
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part in elections that had acceptable interna-
tional supervision.
Should South Africa at any time determine that
it would be in its own interests to jettison
Rhodesia, neither Smith nor any possible black
collaborator could long survive. They would soon
be required to sue for peace on the nationalists'
terms.
We doubt that either of these "circuit-breakers" is
likely to occur during the period of this estimate unless
there is some now unforeseeable external stimulus
upon the black African states most deeply involved or
upon the Republic of South Africa. The outlook thus is
for stalemate until such a stimulus does occur or until
the white Rhodesian position has eroded to the point
that the balance of forces shifts decisively toward the
black nationalists.
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