RHODESIA - CURRENT VIEWS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP97S00289R000100180007-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 12, 2012
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: May 2, 1979
• Content Type: MISC

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2 May 1979
RHODESIA - Current Views
1. Although an Interagency Intelligence Memorandum on the Zimbabwe
Rhodesia problem is scheduled for publication about mid-June, Intelligence
Community representatives have concluded that an earlier report of current
analytical views, presented in the form of a set of judgments without
extensive supporting argument, would be useful. This paper is that report.
It has been coordinated at the working level to ensure that it does reflect
analysts' views, but has not been subjected to the scrutiny normally given
an IIM.
2. The recent elections in Rhodesia have produced the basis for a
black parliamentary majority under the constitution approved by the white
electorate last winter. These elections do not resolve questions pertaining
to the ability of the new government (which we expect to have been established
by early June) over the next several months to:
-- consolidate its position internally;
-- gain international support and recognition;
-- make progress in winding down the war against the guerrillas;
-- restore the deteriorating economy.
In tackling these questions, we also have addressed the role of the guerrillas,
actions of the major external actors, and the likely consequences of the
Western maintenance or dropping of sanctions.
3. For the next few months the attitudes of whites toward the new
regime in Salisbury will be a more critical factor than those of blacks.
We believe that the whites will at least tend to suspend judgment during
the next few months, will not exit en masse, and that they will continue
to fight for the government as long as they perceive it to serve their basic
interests. The essential character of the Zimbabwe Rhodesian government as
an administration will not change much in the next few months; it will
continue to be run day-to-day by whites.
* This paper raas prepared under the aegis of the National InteZZigence
Officer for Africa. Contributions were provided bz~ State/INR, DIA and
NF,2C, with assistance from NSA. Questions or comments may be addressed
,, . ,..r..,...
NI 79-10002
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4. The initial posture of the new black leaders toward the whites
will be more one of accommodation than confrontation, although ultimately,
unless Muzorewa turns out to be a total puppet, there will likely be
serious friction between him and his party and the white leaders. The
black leadership's attitude toward rival internal black leaders is likely
to be cavalier; this could be modified in action by white advice.
5. The immediate priorities of the new regime will be on interna-
tional recognition, internal security -- including measures to bring the
black auxiliaries under tighter direction -- and on efforts by a variety
of means to begin to end the war. These emphases imply postponement of
serious efforts to meet other expectations of the black cornAwnity. The
very existence of a black-led government will give rise to expectations
of more civil service and white collar jobs for educated blacks; skilled
blacks will expect to enter trades; many will assume that more and better
land will be made available to them; others will anticipate broadening
educational opportunities. For the time being, whites will seek to
channel pressure to enlarge black roles in ways that do not further
threaten basic white privileges.
6. A black-led government will make a major effort to entice defectors
from the guerrilla movements, and independent developments within the
guerrilla movements themselves -- e.g., graver splits in ZAPU and ZANU --
could play a significant role. We do not believe, however, that defections
will be on a scale to turn the tide of military action.
7. With regard to external relations, the formation of a black-led
government places Rhodesia's critics and opponents on the defensive. This
is not likely to translate into immediate gains for Zimbabwe Rhodesia
either through widespread recognition or formal lifting of sanctions, but
more of the burden of "why not?" will be placed on Salisbury's opponents
in the West and on those African states, like Nigeria, which have backed the
Frontline and the Patriotic Front on black nationalist grounds. Such
African governments, and of course the Marxist-minded regimes like Ethiopia's,
will continue to support the guerrillas. A Tory government in the UK almost
certainly would prepare the way for not renewing sanctions in November,
but we do not now expect it to act before then.
8. The South Africans, now as previously the key element in the Zim-
babwe Rhodesian equation, will provide economic and military support to keep
the black-led regime going for this period. Given this support and inter-
national trends they perceive as favorable, we see virtually no prospect
that the Salisbury leaders within the next few months will entertain seriously
proposals that seem to undermine white interests or Muzorewa's hold on the
leadership, including a re-run of elections under UN supervision.
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9. Most analysts believe that available evidence does not suggest
a significant shift in Soviet or Cuban policy during this period. In the
view of others, the Soviets and Cubans appear to be reassessing their
policies towards Rhodesia in the face of the new developments in Salisbury.
All agree, however, that Frontline resistance to outside initiatives which
could result in great power confrontation in-the region will remain a
critical obstacle to a greater Soviet-Cuban role. If, during this period,
Rhodesian air attacks against targets in Zambia and Mozambique continue
to intensify, there is a fair chance that these governments would request
air defense or other specialists to help defend the installations. Moscow
and/or Havana would probably respond positively.
10. The military situation nonetheless will continue to develop in
a way that increases the opportunities and pressures for outside inter-
vention, particularly on the guerrilla side. While the new Zimbabwe
Rhodesia government is likely to pursue "carrot-and'stick" tactics against
both the guerrillas and the Frontline States and is unlikely to cut off
Zambia entirely from the southern supply routes, it very likely will inten-
sify military operations across the board and expand the range of geographic
targets in Zambia and Mozambique as well as in Angola and possibly even
Tanzania. We think the Rhodesians will still avoid foreign national
military or economic targets when they can and will be influenced to some
degree by the desire to encourage international diplomatic support.
11. The new government's internal military operations will probably
feature increased use of auxiliaries in rural areas, and a more systematic
effort to deny food to guerrilla bands during the impending maize shortage.
These tactics are not likely in the next few months to restore any signifi-
cant measure of government control in rural areas where it has crumbled,
but they should serve to maintain the present level of control for at
least the next several months, and this should in turn permit the government
to put a reasonably good face on its security situation generally. The
critical short-term factor in the military field, as in others, is white
morale; we do not expect a collapse during this period.
12. On the guerrilla side, both ZAPU and ZANU are developing their
capabilities only slowly, despite numerous training programs and a steady
flow of materiel from external sources. A credible air defense still seems
beyond the Frontline's or guerrillas' reach in this period without direct
outside support; when they make significant progress in this field, they
will have added a significant new element to the military balance. The
guerrillas inside Rhodesia may be able to increase their numbers to some
extent in this period as more trained manpower becomes available. While
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this obviously will add to the strain on Salisbury's defensive capabilities,
it is not likely to shift the military balance.
13. Economic factors are not likely to have a critical, or even a
major, effect on either the political or military situations during the
next few months, given the South African policy of support for the new
regime. Although we are unable to quantify them, the ecoramic benefits --
not to mention the psychological boost -- from lifting sanctions would
probably be substantial, although some would take time to take hold. The
Rhodesians would be able to take better advantage of the current pick-up
in world demand for base metals, and would save the substantial sanction-
busting fees Rhodesians have been paying to middlemen.
14. But even without sanctions lifted, and in the face of a depressed
economic situation, Salisbury's ability to carry on the war and provide
essential services is not likely to be seriously impeded during the next
few months. At worst, a continuation of the present situation would
require some belt tightening, and ultimately white emigration could increase
substantially with the depressing economic effects accentuated. Longer
term, this could be a serious problem, but the time for these factors to
play a really direct role is not yet.
15. tJe conclude, therefore, that
-- the new government will hold its own internally in the
next few nbnths;
-- it will not gain widespread international support or
recognition during this period;
-- it will make little progress in winding down the war
from its own initiatives, but may well be assisted
by splits and confusions in the guerrilla movement;
-- it would benefit psychologically from a lifting of
sanctions, but the economic benefits, although sub-
stantial in a longer run, would not immediately restore
the economy. Continuation of sanctions would not be
crippling, however.
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