ZAIRE: IS IT REFORMABLE?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP97S00289R000100190004-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 1, 2012
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: June 1, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/09 :CIA-RDP97S00289R000100190004-5
Central
[ntelligence
Zaire: Is It Reformable?
Interagency InteWgence Memorandum
~eefe~
NI I!M 80.10013
June/980
??y 2 3 9
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/09 :CIA-RDP97S00289R000100190004-5
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/09 :CIA-RDP97S00289R000100190004-5
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/09 :CIA-RDP97S00289R000100190004-5
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/09 :CIA-RDP97S00289R000100190004-5
SECRET
ZAIRE: IS IT REFORMABLE?
Information as of 11 June 1980 was
used in the preparation of this paper.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/09 :CIA-RDP97S00289R000100190004-5
 . ........ ...
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/09 :CIA-RDP97S00289R000100190004-5
PREFACE
This Interagency Intelligence Memorandum is limited in scope and
addresses f our basic questions: is Mobutu's Zaire "reformable"; why has
no revolt against the Mobutu regime taken place; what would be the
impact if the United States distanced itself from Mobutu; and what
would be the impact of Mobutu's fall from power?
Included is an annex on the importance of Zaire's cobalt to the
West.
This memorandum was prepared under the auspices of the National
Intelligence Officer for Africa with contributions from the State
Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the Central
Intelligence Agency, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. It has been
coordinated at the working level.
~~~
SECRET
~~ Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/09 :CIA-RDP97S00289R000100190004-5
 ~ _-
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/09 :CIA-RDP97S00289R000100190004-5
CONTENTS
Page
PREFACE .................................................................................................................. iii
KEY JUDGMENTS .................................................................................................. 1
DISCUSSION ............................................................................................................ 3
The Belgian Legacy: The Early Years in the Congo .......................... 3
The "Pax Mobutu" ........................................................................................ 5
The Current Mailaise and Mobutu's Response ........................................ 5
Prospects for Reform ...................................................................................... 6
The Impact of Reform on Stability .......................................................... 7
Reasons for Absence of Revolt .................................................................. 8
The US Connection ..................................................................................... 9
Impact of Mobutu's Departure .................................................................... 10
ANNEX: Zaire's Mineral Importance to the West:
The Cobalt Connection ................................................................................ 11
v
SECRET
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/09 :CIA-RDP97S00289R000100190004-5
 ---- 1 _ I
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/09 :CIA-RDP97S00289R000100190004-5
KEY JUDGMENTS
Although President Mobutu of Zaire has taken steps in the political
and economic spheres he would not have taken without external
pressure, he has done nothing he could not reverse if he became
convinced that the costs outweighed the benefits. Mobutu is likely to
continue to oppose or circumvent efforts to alter significantly his style
of rule. He has moved ahead just enough on reforms, however, to make
premature the conclusion that additional progress under his leadership
is not possible.
Far-reaching reform in the Western sense would invite upheaval by
stimulating popular expectations and undermining the system centered
on Mobutu that has provided stability so far.
There are limited economic, political, and military reforms,
however, that would not threaten his .regime, and might well strengthen
it. Even these Mobutu would not be likely to make in the absence of
foreign pressure; he realizes he must be responsive to his external
supporters.
By allowing foreign powers to assume key roles in addressing some
of Zaire's major problems, Mobutu gains room for maneuver and links
Belgium, France, and the United States to his own survival.
The impact of placing some distance between the United States and
Mobutu would be minor in the absence of concurrent action by France
and Belgium, which are likely to continue to support him regardless of
his response to pressures for change.
Pent-up pressures in Kinshasa could explode at any time and topple
Mobutu, and he could be challenged from unexpected quarters. Revolt
has been averted thus far because of disarray within the opposition,
Mobutu's skillful manipulation of potential challengers, repression by
the security forces, and apprehension among many Zairians that the
country without him would return to the chaos of the early 1960s.
Zaire's size and diversity reduce the chance that a revolt, once started,
could spread. Moreover, African social institutions provide safety valves
that relieve somewhat the intense pressures of urban poverty.
If Mobutu were to depart the scene, it is possible that he would be
quickly replaced by a military junta which could hold the country
together. It is more likely, however, that a prolonged and bloody
struggle for power would ensue. The turmoil could well spread from
SECRET
~;i Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/09 :CIA-RDP97S00289R000100190004-5
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/09 :CIA-RDP97S00289R000100190004-5
Kinshasa to other parts of the country, reviving secessionist tendencies.
Turbulence or disintegration in Zaire could hardly fail to have an
impact on Zaire's neighbors in a variety of ways, not the least of which
is the possibility that Zaire would again become a theater for rivalries
among external powers.
A major impact of Mobutu's replacement by an anti-Western
regime would be on the African, European, and Arab perceptions of the
United States. Conservative African leaders might see it as a further
shift in the balance of forces against them; Europeans and Arabs would
see it as f urther evidence of the United States' inability or unwillingness
to protect its friends.
2
SECRET
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/09 :CIA-RDP97S00289R000100190004-5 ---
 _ _ _ _ - - - _ ~----- ----1 -
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/09 :CIA-RDP97S00289R000100190004-5
DISCUSSION
1. Zaire's problems loom larger to the United States
and other Western countries than those of most other
African nations, even though similar difficulties can
also be found elsewhere on the continent. First, Zaire's
size, economic potential, and mineral resources make
its international alignment important to the West.
Second, its regime is closely associated by much of the
world with the West in general and with the United
States in particular. Third, the plight of its people, in
the face of inefficient government and economic
regression, and the association of President Mobutu's
government with corruption and arbitrary treatment
of his people have led many in the West to question
the morality of Western support for his regime.
2. The military incursion into the mineral-rich
Shaba region in March 1977 by Zairian exiles based in
Angola revealed the extent to which the Mobutu
regime had been weakened by a combination of world
market factors and poor management since its zenith
in 1972-73. In response to growing domestic and
international pressures, the latter principally from the
United States, Mobutu announced in July 1977 that
major political, military, and economic reforms would
be implemented. The most significant political re-
forms proved to be the holding of competitive elec-
tions to fill seats in the legislature, the members of
which had previously been appointed, and the cre-
ation of the office of prime minister. Responsibility for
upgrading Zaire's armed forces was placed primarily
on the Belgian and French military missions. The
resultant Belgian-trained 21st Infantry Brigade and
the French-trained 31st Paratroop Brigade represent a
significant strengthening of Zaire's military capability.
The central elements of economic reform in Zaire
have been adherence to an International Monetary
Fund standby agreement and reliance on expatriates
to staff key positions at the Bank of Zaire, the Ministry
of Finance, and Customs.
3. In general, there now are two contending schools
of thought concerning reform. Some believe that the
present regime can be brought to a point of significant
reform, that some of the changes that Mobutu has
already made are irreversible and will alter the nature
of the regime. Others contend that no real change has
occurred and that Mobutu must go if the current "mal
Zairois" is to be cured.
The Belgian Legacy: The Early Years in the
Congo
4. Although the difficulties that President Mobutu
and his predecessors have faced in trying to establish
Zaire as a viable and cohesive state are hardly unique
in Africa, the legacy of Belgium's colonial paternalism
and its hasty retreat from its principal African terri-
tory virtually assured an inauspicious beginning. In
contrast to the relatively orderly preparations for
independence that were instituted by the French and
British-in which political parties took root and aspir-
ing politicians were gradually brought into the admin-
istrative and political systems-the Congolese were
grossly ill prepared to take over the administration of
the new state.
5. By the time Mobutu seized power in 1965, Zaire
had experienced practically everything that could go
wrong in a newly independent African country. Inde-
pendence was followed by an Army mutiny, debilitat-
ing political infighting, fragmentation of the country
along ethnic lines, three regional secessions, and a
series of peasant uprisings. Many of these develop-
ments were exacerbated by outside interests, including
those of some West European and Communist nations.
Five years of independence had left the political,
economic, and social life of the country in ruins.
6. The pre-Mobutu regimes depended heavily on
external economic and technical assistance, including
the continued service of large numbers of foreign
civilian and military specialists. Indeed, the foreign
rescue operations that were mobilized to maintain the
country's viability during the tumultuous early
1960s-ranging from economic inputs from aid contri-
butors and private investors to UN peacekeeping
forces-have remained permanent features of Zaire's
history. They were manifested more recently by the
French, Belgian, and Moroccan involvement in the
Shaba crises of 1977 and 1978 and by international
efforts to maintain the government's solvency. Unlike
many other African countries where foreign involve-
3
SECRET
I~ Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/09 :CIA-RDP97S00289R000100190004-5
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/09 :CIA-RDP97S00289R000100190004-5
Tanzania
Lake
Tanganyika
At/antic
ocean
4
SECRET
a Kolwezi Likasi /
CBZI
~` ,~ Lubumbashi
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/09 :CIA-RDP97S00289R000100190004-5 _--^
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/09 :CIA-RDP97S00289R000100190004-5
ment is rebuffed as neocolonialism, or at least is less
visible to the outside world, Zaire under Mobutu
welcomes it-albeit selectively. Foreign involvement
has become an essential part of the way Mobutu
manipulates the country's political dynamics.
7. Even Mobutu's harshest critics grudgingly ac-
knowledge his success in maintaining a reasonable
degree of domestic peace and order in Zaire. Except
for opponents within the Zairian elite, many observers
until recently found few faults with Mobutu's efforts
at maintaining stability. They viewed the political
system he began to construct after he came to power
as being not markedly unlike regimes that were
emerging in other parts of the continent as African
leaders replaced the political frameworks left behind
by the former metropoles. Such moves as the establish-
ment of the MPR (Popular Revolutionary Movement)
as the sole political party and the gradual extension of
Mobutu's control over the armed forces were seen as
logical steps to strengthen the central government and
prevent a return to chaos.
8. Neighboring states were relieved that "the Congo
problem" no longer threatened their own stability and
shared the general African satisfaction that a blemish
had been removed from Africa's record. During the
"Pax Mobutu" period that lasted through the early
1970s and was marked by relatively substantial rev-
enues from copper and other mineral resources, few
private investors or others in the international commu-
nity seemed to worry about how Zaire was governed,
but instead were more concerned with the investment
climate.
9. Although the innermost workings of Mobutu's
circle of cronies and advisers remain obscure, the basic
details of how his system works are generally known
and have not changed significantly since he took
power. He rules more as a paramount tribal chief than
as a head of state in the Western sense. He is secretive,
ruthless (although less so in recent years), and political-
ly astute, and has a talent for catching potential
challengers and foreign leaders off balance and for
exploiting tribal jealousies. He adroitly handles the
military, judiciously dispenses largesse and punish-
ment, funds pet projects, and indulges in luxuries
without being directly accountable to any authority.
He also rules by employing a crisis management
approach to problems, marshaling seemingly nonexist-
ent domestic and external resources to resolve or defer
what appear to others as insoluble economic and
political problems.
10. Mobutu distrusts Western-style democratic in-
stitutions because he believes they would give free
reign to the divided loyalties and opportunism that
have disrupted Zaire in the past. In the early 1970s,
when Zaire had emerged from a decade of internal
rebellions, Mobutu embarked on a series of political
changes that were intended to create the framework of
a one-party state, to introduce into Zaire something of
the aura of an African "radical" state, and to give
himself the legitimacy that came from identification
with the African political mainstream. Perhaps the
best known of these enterprises was his unsuccessful
attempt to carry out his campaign for "authentic-
ity"- akind of cultural revolution which had prece-
dents in other African countries and which empha-
sized political solidarity by stressing the introduction
of "authentic" indigenous practices to replace "colo-
nial" ways (for example, changes in personal names
from Europeanized to vernacular forms). This was also
an attempt to create a sense of national unity, no
doubt inspired by Mobutu's confidence that he was in
full control and by the vague philosophies of other
African leaders who have sought to construct a frame-
work for their own particular style of rule. In the
event, neither authenticity in its various ramifications
nor any of the other innovations that Mobutu at-
tempted to introduce in the early 1970s took deep root
and Zaire's political system has remained a highly
personalized one.
The Current Malaise and Mobutu's Response
11. After 15 years, "Pax Mobutu" is still little more
than a truce enforced through Mobutu's domination of
the instruments of power. Tribal and regional tensions
persist, and social and economic problems-including
inflation, unemployment, labor and student unrest,
periodic shortages of necessities, and deteriorating
infrastructure-are now acute.
12. Many factors contribute to Zaire's current diffi-
culties-including a severe deterioration of the terms
of trade, the invasions of Shaba, costly economic
blunders, the burgeoning foreign debt, and the pilfer-
ing of scarce foreign exchange. The resulting deterio-
ration of the economy and public services has stimu-
lated public discontent, while international concern
over human rights has rallied some of Mobutu's
detractors around the central theme of reform. Mobu-
tu's domestic problems have been compounded by his
5
SECRET
-;, Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/09 :CIA-RDP97S00289R000100190004-5
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/09 :CIA-RDP97S00289R000100190004-5
tendency-for a variety of reasons, including mainte-
nance of his regime-to deal with their symptoms
rather than their causes.
13. In gauging his response to the pressures on his
regime, Mobutu has accurately perceived that there
are divergent views among those who advocate
change. Longtime Zairian opponents both inside and
outside the country seem to believe that any change
must be accompanied by Mobutu's departure. The
United States and, to a lesser extent, France and
Belgium recognize the need for stringent fiscal and
monetary measures to halt the economic decline, but
only the United States also places emphasis on the
necessity of internal political changes. For the Belgians
and French, economic recovery programs that result
in nondisruptive political changes are acceptable, and
Paris and Brussels seem content to let the United States
take the lead and act as the lightning rod for any
adverse reactions from Mobutu.
14. Mobutu believes he has the support of the
Europeans regardless of his response to reform pres-
sures. He also probably reasons that his critics are
limited in dealing with him by the fear of severe
unrest and an even less palatable outcome if he should
leave the scene. Mobutu has responded skillfully to
these various pressures, dragging out his .response
while he seeks to play off the outside players against
each other, and at the same time weighing the impact
of his actions on his control of the internal situation.
15. Mobutu has apparently concluded that the
United States and his domestic opponents have similar
notions about the changes that should be imple-
mented. Although he realizes that no reforms will
satisfy the Zairian intellectual elite, both this group
and the United States. tend to advocate structural
changes in the government that accord with Western
conceptions of how reform is induced. Consequently,
Mobutu has only tinkered with the country's thinly
rooted institutions. Among other things, he has ap-
pointed aPrime Minister and given him some respon-
sibilities in the day-to-day operations of the govern-
ment. The legislature has been allowed to voice some
criticism of the regime. A number of corrupt officials
have been replaced by competent technocrats, and a
cabinet shakeup earlier this year appears to have
improved the overall competence of the government's
ministers. Against this backdrop, some judicial reforms
have been enacted and amnesties for criminals and
political dissidents have been announced in order to
placate those who point out the repressive nature of his
rule. Nevertheless, each move has usually been fol-
lowed at some point by other actions that are intended
to signal to domestic critics that Mobutu is not pre-
pared to go too far. In essence, he continues to rely
primarily on his keen understanding of the system he
has created to maintain himself in power.
16. Mobutu has shrewdly delegated major responsi-
bility for solving the economic crisis to Western
advisers and governments that are deeply involved in
Zaire. By depending on them to come up with stopgap
financial aid, to reassure and work with overseas
financial institutions and investors, and to oversee
Zaire's banking and customs operations, he has linked
the United States, France, and Belgium to his own
survival-a move which enables him in part to deflect
domestic criticism of the economic situation to
outsiders.
17. Mobutu has pursued a similar strategy in the
military sphere. Because the armed forces are both the
base of Mobutu's support and a potential threat to his
rule, he probably has ruled out extensive changes in
the military that would threaten his control of the
officer corps. Economic constraints weigh against any
substantial arms expenditures, and a need for continu-
ous security has ruled out replacement of existing
forces by totally new ones. Instead, prompted partly
by Western pressure and partly by his own recognition
of the need for improvement, Mobutu has put in train
a series of important, though less sweeping, meas-
ures-reduction in the number of troops, creation of
three new brigades, improvements in messing and pay,
streamlining the chain of command, retraining a
poorly disciplined infantry division, and establishment
of a logistics corps. With the exception of the last two
of these, measurable albeit halting progress has been
made, although this has depended on about 200
Belgian and French advisers, some of whom accom-
pany and command the units they have trained.
Mobutu and key armed forces officers hope the
reforms already made will become sufficiently institu-
tionalized to last beyond the tenure of these advisers.
One of the most significant of the reforms-the
infusion of discipline in the armed forces-has proved
less effective. Thus far, with the exception of the
Belgian- and French-advised units, there does not
seem to have been a significant crackdown designed to
impress on the troops the importance of discipline.
Prospects for Reform
18. In allowing certain foreign powers to assume
key roles in trying to solve Zaire's current problems,
Mobutu has provided room for maneuver to continue
6
SECRET
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/09 :CIA-RDP97S00289R000100190004-5
 i
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/09 :CIA-RDP97S00289R000100190004-5
his balancing act of maintaining himself in power
while others tackle the intricacies of economic recov-
ery and keep the regime afloat with financial aid and
economic assistance. While this allows the United
States, and to a lesser extent France and Belgium, to
maintain some pressure on Mobutu to reduce the
flagrantly corrupt practices that are part of his regime,
Mobutu's response thus far strongly suggests that fun-
damental political reform-in Western terms-is nei-
ther his intention nor in his perception a possibility.
Most of the basic decisions affecting the country's
economic life will continue to be made in his office.
Mobutu doubtless would allow further limited changes
in the government and bureaucracy in order to appear
responsive, calculating that the high officials and civil
servants who are affected by such changes will be
content to seek ways around them to survive
'economically.
19. Mobutu is no doubt aware of the pressure on his
principal foreign supporters to distance themselves
from his regime, although he probably has fewer
doubts about France's resolve than he does about that
of the United States or Belgium. He may reason,
however, that his critics in the international com-
munity have been unable to offer a candidate for
succession and that active opponents of serious stature
either in Zaire or among the Zairian exiles abroad do
not exist. He also perceives that most of the interna-
tional community attaches as much-if not more-
importance to access to Zaire's mineral resources and
to the country's potential for affecting regional stabi-
lity as to internal reform. Even those nearby African
leaders who dislike Mobutu and are highly sensitive to
foreign military rescue operations in support. of Afri-
can regimes would probably argue against disengage-
ment on the grounds that Africa's and the West's
interests would not be served if Mobutu's departure
brought a return to the situation that existed in Zaire
before he came to power. Mobutu views his trip to
Europe and the United States late last year, his private
contacts with French President Giscard, and French
willingness to conclude occasional bilateral economic
deals that circumvent the IMF program as commit-
ments to his survival.
20. While Mobutu may perceive that the down-
ward trend of US economic and military assistance
represents a gradual disengagement, he could con-
clude that his ties to the French and the Belgians, and
to conservative Arab governments that provide finan-
cial handouts, are sufficiently firm to enable him to
lash out at the United States, as he has done in the past
when tensions have arisen in US-Zairian relations. If
he judges that US pressures for reform are excessive,
he might calculate that the US commitment to Zaire is
so deep that a US response to any action he might take
would be limited and would not endanger US-Zairian
relations. Mobutu might gauge the success of any anti-
US move on the lack of a negative US response to his
stage-managed ouster of the US Ambassador in mid-
1975.
21. On the other hand, Mobutu has seen his margin
of maneuver reduced by Zaire's growing dependence
on external financial assistance. Moreover, his exagger-
ated perception. of US influence on the IMF (and the
World Bank) has contributed to his acceptance, how-
ever reluctant, of far more US infringement on what
he considers Zairian sovereignty than would have been
conceivable in 1975.
The Impact of Reform on Stability
22. Fundamental political changes designed to lib-
eralize the regime would substantially increase
chances for instability by stimulating expectations and
undermining the system Mobutu has assembled for
maintaining control. If implemented now, these meas-
ures-such as creation of impersonal institutions and
independent sources of power, introduction of a multi-
party system, or devolution of significant lawmaking
authority to parliament or regional bodies-would
likely unleash the divisive tendencies in Zaire that
Mobutu so far has managed to contain and use to his
own advantage.
23. More limited changes, however, unless adopted
simultaneously, would probably not threaten Mobutu's
regime and might well strengthen it by allowing
dissidents to vent their dissatisfaction in a controlled
environment. Permitting the legislature to elect its
officers without presidential interference would be
one such measure, as would making regional assem-
blies centers of discussion about local problems. He
could also grant his appointed prime minister author-
ity to select and dismiss cabinet members.
24. The security forces likely offer somewhat more
room for nonthreatening improvement than does the
strictly political sphere. Further efforts to bolster the
morale and effectiveness of troops-better training,
more efficient pay and quartermaster systems, some
new barracks and medical facilities, tighter disci-
pline-would probably improve Mobutu's position by
raising security force capabilities marginally. But dra-
matic improvement of military effectiveness would
7
SECRET
~~ Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/09 :CIA-RDP97S00289R000100190004-5
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/09 :CIA-RDP97S00289R000100190004-5
require stressing competence over ethnic background
and personal loyalty to Mobutu within the officer
corps. The President would have to relinquish control
over officer assignments and perquisites-which
would greatly improve chances of an eventual move
by a military unit against him.
25. There is also a margin for additional reform in
the economic arena. Although Mobutu will continue to
need both ample` funds for direct payoffs to key
supporters and opportunities for them to exploit public
positions for private gain, there appears to be consider-
able room for retrenchment in these areas. Progress on
managing Zaire's foreign exchange earnings and re-
ducing payroll skimming, for example, might cramp
Mobutu's style somewhat but at no real political cost.
Reasons for Absence of Revolt
26. Many observers wonder why major disturbances
have not already occurred in view of the deteriorating
quality of life in Zaire. They have argued that the
chief danger to the Mobutu government would come
in the form of spontaneous uprisings in such locales as
Kinshasa and other urban centers. Aside from the
Mobutu system that has been described, there are
other factors that we believe have contributed to
stability. Some are specific to Mobutu's Zaire: his
manipulation of potential rivals, the relative efficacy
of his security forces, the Zairian population's belief
that the United States, France, and Belgium would
intervene to prop him up, and the widespread desire
to avoid a repetition of the violence of the early 1960s.
Others, including ethnicity and income redistribution
within the extended family, are features general to
Africa.
27. During his 15-year tenure, Mobutu has been
extraordinarily successful in controlling military plot-
ting and political intrigue. Through a variety of
methods-arrests, intimidation, bribery, rewards, and
the shuffling of portfolios-he has been able to keep
potential rivals off balance. His practice of filling
government positions with individuals from minor
ethnic groups means that there are few persons in
positions of power who could command broad sup-
port. In the military@ he has encouraged factionalism
and promoted ethnic and regional tensions. He has
periodically manipulated the chain of command to
help keep the Army from becoming a unified, cohe-
sive force. He has, moreover, staffed key military
positions with presumably trusted officers from his
own tribe or region.
28. Nevertheless, the military has the potential for a
successful move against Mobutu, so he pays careful
attention to it. No senior officers known to us present
immediate threats to Mobutu's control. Any officer,
regardless of his competence, who appears to be
attracting a following of his own is shifted promptly to
another job. Senior officers still need Mobutu-as do
most members of his entourage-more than he needs
them. This situation is likely to persist at least as long
as the effective leaders of elite troops are the foreign
training officers, now Belgian and French.
29. There is no obvious leader to galvanize discon-
tent and exploit the regime's shortcomings. With the
exception of a vague feeling of "anti-Mobutuism,"
there is no one ideology that appeals to a maiority of
Zairians. Most of Mobutu's opposition is based outside
the country, either in Europe or in neighboring coun-
tries. With the exception of the Front for the National
Liberation of the Congo (FLNC: ex-Katangan gen-
darmes), which has some contacts inside the Shaba
region, external opponents have few links within Zaire.
They are unable to organize effectively, and none has
an effective propaganda machine. Although France
and Belgium host numerous anti-Mobutu groups and
individuals, these governments have not and probably
would not allow such groups to engage in serious
action to destabilize the regime even if they possessed
the potential to do so.
30. Another factor is the effectiveness of the se-
curity services-the Army and security police. Al-
though ragtag and unprofessional by Western stan-
dards, they can contain limited local uprisings and are
able to monitor antigovernment activities both at
home and abroad. Moreover, their reputation for
brutality also acts as a deterrent.
31. The implications of perceived US support for
Zaire are more valuable to Mobutu than the actual
assistance he receives. Although many educated Zair-
ians believe that the French and the Belgians also
would be likely to intervene on Mobutu's behalf, they
have the notion that Paris and Brussels-despite sig-
nificantly larger interests to protect in Zaire-take
their cue from Washington. Mobutu's detractors be-
lieve that this foreign support bolsters the incumbent
and preserves the status quo, and this belief, which
Mobutu reinforces, is also a major inhibitor of mean-
ingful opposition.
32. An additional important factor that probably
limits the potential for revolt is the population's fear of
a repetition of the internal violence that characterized
8
SECRET
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/09 :CIA-RDP97S00289R000100190004-5
 . _ _ .. I
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/09 :CIA-RDP97S00289R000100190004-5
Zaire in the early 1960s. Mobutu's demise could touch
off domestic instability that no single Zairian figure
would be able to calm. Although disgruntled, many
Zairians simply are apolitical; others believe that
things could get worse without Mobutu.
33. While a less tangible explanation for the ab-
sence of revolt, it appears that most Zairians do not
expect much from the regime. This probably works in
the President's favor by lessening demands that might
otherwise be placed on the government. The inclina-
tion of Zairians to accept situations they perceive as
being beyond their control also works to Mobutu's
advantage.
34. The country's size, diversity, and lack of social
cohesion helps prevent the coalescence of a viable
opposition. The central government's presence in
Zaire's diverse regions, tenuous at best since independ-
ence, has deteriorated still further in recent years.
Several of Zaire's regions are so physically and psycho-
logically separated from Kinshasa that they are part of
the country in name only. Deteriorating roads, short-
ages of fuel, and limited contact between the capital
and the outlying regions contribute to their relative
isolation and lessen the likelihood that a revolt would
spread.
35. Ethnic and regional cleavages that migrants
bring with them to the cities remain deeply rooted.
This insularity helps to prevent the coalescence of a
broadly based dissidence in Kinshasa or in other urban
areas.
36. "Safety valves" to ameliorate economic hard-
ships in the urban areas to some degree belie the
statistical indicators pointing to ever declining living
standards. Principal among these safety valves is the
village origin of many urban dwellers. In times of
shortages or hardship, family members go to their
home villages to be fed and cared for; when they
return they bring food mostly for family consumption
but for sale as well. Some observers point out that 80
percent of all urban women are engaged in some sort
of market activity; this contributes in small degree to
alleviating the distress of urban workers.
37. Because of the responsibilities inherent in the
extended family system, those members with jobs or
other resources must help less fortunate relatives. This
is in effect an informal but effective income redis-
tribution and welfare system that relieves an otherwise
bleak economic situation.
38. These arguments for the absence of revolt do
not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Mobutu will
be in power indefinitely. They do suggest, however,
that the individual or group working to replace him
will not be visible until very shortly before the action,
if then, and may come from unexpected quarters. For
example, noncommissioned and junior officers, who
were clearly a major factor in Ethiopia, Ghana, and
Liberia, could strike similarly in Zaire.
39. The threat to sever or reduce the close US
relationship to the regime is Washington's main source
of influencing Mobutu to adopt reform measures he
would otherwise shun. This is not, however, a very
powerful source of leverage, and is diminishing as
other supporters have adopted comparatively stronger
roles in the wake of the two Shaba invasions. Mobutu's
prospects for political survival would not be seriously
diminished by a withdrawal of US support, although it
would likely encourage some opponents of the regime.
A clear signal that the United States would not
intervene to rescue Mobutu from a Shaba III or an
uprising in Kinshasa would not have a significant
impact on the stability of the regime in the absence of
concurrent action by France and Belgium. A drastic
reduction of US aid would probably not trigger similar
reactions by France and Belgium, and might even
stimulate greater support by them. The impact on
regional stability of a unilateral US withdrawal would
likely be minimal, but would be of concern to other
African nations and might tempt the Soviet Union to
exploit Zairian weaknesses.
40. If, on the other hand, France and Belgium were
to follow the US lead and withdraw their military
personnel and their general support for Mobutu, the
threat to his survival would increase markedly. The
effectiveness and political reliability of key military
units would rapidly decline. Mobutu's opponents, both
internal and external, would have far more opportuni-
ties to hasten his downfall than is currently the case
and consequently Mobutu's style of rule would prob-
ably become progressively more harsh and repressive.
Mobutu would likely be desperate for foreign support
and would accept it from any quarter, including the
USSR.
41. But Paris and Brussels seem firmly committed
to Mobutu regardless of his response to pressure for
political reform. Neither appears to have any illusions
about Mobutu's ability or willingness to alter the way
9
SECRET
~ Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/09 :CIA-RDP97S00289R000100190004-5
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/09 :CIA-RDP97S00289R000100190004-5
he rules Zaire. As long as they can continue to get what
they want from Zaire with Mobutu's cooperation they
will continue to do what they can to maintain him in
power.
Impact of Mobutu's Departure
42. There is no question that Zaire's size, its location
in Africa, and its mineral wealth make it an important
country. The impact on US interests of Mobutu's
disappearance or overthrow would depend on the
ability of a successor regime to maintain order. While
there is a possibility that a military junta could manage
this, we think it more likely that a prolonged and
bloody struggle for power would ensue. The turmoil
could well spread from Kinshasa to other parts of the
country, reviving secessionist tendencies. Turbulence
or disintegration in Zaire could hardly fail to impact
on Zaire's neighbors in a variety of ways, not the least
of which is the possibility that Zaire would again
become a theater for rivalries among external powers.
43. In these circumstances Moscow would be
tempted to intervene. Already present in considerable
numbers in some neighboring countries, the Soviets
and their Cuban allies might be convinced that they
eventually could win out in Zaire. Although most of
Mobutu's known opponents are not favorably disposed
to the Soviets, backing from Moscow or Havana could
be the crucial difference enabling new leaders to seize
and maintain power. The degree to which the Soviets
and Cubans would seek to become actively involved in
shaping a post-Mobutu Zaire would depend on a
multitude of factors, including Soviet commitments
and activities elsewhere.
44. Assuming that Zaire's cobalt production facili-
ties are not destroyed, we are not greatly alarmed by
the potential for denial of Zaire's mineral resources to
the West. Zaire's own need for foreign exchange
would make it very difficult for any government in
Kinshasa to use its strength in cobalt supplies to exert
leverage on Western countries. An unexpected and
protracted cutoff of Zaire's cobalt, however, would
seriously affect Western industry. (See the annex.)
45. This probably understates the noise in the world
that would arise from Mobutu's overthrow and re-
placement by an anti-Western regime. A major impact
might well be in the perceptions of African, West
European, and Arab political strategists. Few now find
Mobutu attractive as a national leader, but he contin-
ues, because of his past history of association with the
United States and the West, to represent what was, at
least at one time, a significant Western victory over
hostile tendencies. Conservative African leaders might
see Mobutu's departure as a further shift from a
balance of forces with which they were comfortable.
West Europeans would tend to blame the United
States for another blunder unless Mobutu's successor
were clearly in the pro-Western camp. The Arab
nations might, again depending on circumstances, read
Mobutu's fall as evidence of another failure of Ameri-
can nerve.
10
SECRET
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/09 :CIA-RDP97S00289R000100190004-5 ---
 - ---- -- .. ~_-_ _ - - I
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/09 :CIA-RDP97S00289R000100190004-5
ZAIRE'S MINERAL IMPORTANCE TO THE WEST:
THE COBALT CONNECTION
1. US strategic interests in Zaire, along with those of
most other industrial powers outside the Communist
world, are influenced by their almost total reliance on
imported cobalt and by Zaire's prominent role in
supply of this critical metal. Prized for its unique
qualities, cobalt is regarded as essential and virtually
irreplaceable in some 60 percent of its uses by volume
in the United States. These include, for example: high
temperature, stress-resistant superalloys for iet engines;
abrasive-resistant surfaces for tools, dies, and drill bits;
and catalysts for petroleum hydrogenation.
2. In terms of non-Communist world needs for
cobalt, Zaire has been and will remain crucially
important. Specifically, it accounts for well over half
of the new cobalt entering the market each year. Last
year, Zaire's output of 14,000 metric tons represented
57 percent of the non-Communist world's cobalt pro-
duction, overshadowing that by any other producer.
We do not believe that recent output gains and plans
of other cobalt producers portend any significant
diminution of Zaire's share in world cobalt production
over the near future. In terms of land-based reserves,
no other country has Zaire's capability for expanding
output.
3. This heavy reliance on Zaire takes on special
significance because of existing and potential threats to
output. Zaire's cobalt industry has been increasingly
strained by shortages of spare parts, inadequate main-
tenance, need for new equipment, and more recently
by shortages of badly needed foreign technical and
supervisory personnel. A major breakdown or accident
that would defy on-site capabilities for repair could
result in a major loss of output for a considerable time.
Along with the possibilities of accidental damage,
Zaire's cobalt industry, with its weak plant security, is
highly vulnerable to sabotage. Action by lust a few
individuals against key units,
experts, shut down
period.
could, in the view of
4. Stoppage in the supply of Zairian cobalt for a few
months or so probably would not cause serious hard-
ship to any consuming country, particularly in the
light of current market conditions. If the cutoff were
protracted, we think that within a year, serious strains
and dislocations would be felt by cobalt-consuming
industries in a number of countries-particularly those
with heavy traditional ties to Zairian supplies. Includ-
ed in this list are the United States, West Germany, the
United Kingdom, and Italy. If the US situation should
warrant Presidential declaration of a "national emer-
gency," strategic reserves could be allocated to keep
defense and other essential producers operating for
some time; the other countries would face serious
operating problems.
5. The United Kingdom and West Germany would
feel the impact sooner and to a greater extent than the
United States, since neither country has meaningful
national stockpiles of cobalt or much flexibility to
employ substitutes in cobalt consuming industries.
France, on the other hand, could stave off serious
hardships for a considerably longer period, because it
not only receives the bulk of its cobalt from Morocco
but has some national stockpiles to fall back on. Japan
probably also would feel the impact later than most,
since it processes most of its cobalt from non-Zairian
materials and can employ substitutes to a greater
extent than most industrial users. Although the effects
might be deferred longer in some countries than
others, it seems clear that loss of some half of non-
communist world cobalt supply would take its toll
directly or indirectly on all consumers.
11
SECRET
~~ Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/09 :CIA-RDP97S00289R000100190004-5
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/09 :CIA-RDP97S00289R000100190004-5
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/09 :CIA-RDP97S00289R000100190004-5