SOUTH AFIRCA: THE POLITICS OF RACIAL REFORM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP97S00289R000200200004-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 8, 2011
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: January 1, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
South Africa: The Politics
of Racial Reform
Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
Copy 237
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SOUTH AFRICA: THE POLITICS
OF RACIAL REFORM
Information available as of 28 November 1980 was
used in the preparation of this Memorandum.
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CONTENTS
FOREWORD .............................................................................................................. v
SUMMARY AND KEY JUDGMENTS .................................................................... 1
DISCUSSION .............................................................................................................. 5
The Legacy of Apartheid ...................................................................................... 5
Forces for Change .................................................................................................. 6
The Debate Over Reform ..................................................................................... 7
Reform Under Botha ............................................................................................. 9
Botha's Commitment ............................................................................................. 13
Reform and the New Politics ............................................................................... 14
Nonwhite Reaction ................................................................................................. 16
Prospects for Change Through 1982 ................................................................... 19
Implications for Stability ....................................................................................... 21
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FOREWORD
This Interagency Intelligence Memorandum represents the Intel-
ligence Community's first in-depth assessment of internal South African
political dynamics as they pertain to the process of racial reform. The
ruling Afrikaner minority's thinking on the need for reform of the
apartheid system is in a state of flux. Hence, the memorandum's projec-
tions are limited to a relatively short period of time: the next two years.
Follow-on assessments by the Intelligence Community will probably be
required within this time frame.
The memorandum was prepared under the auspices of the Na-
tional Intelligence Officer for Africa. The Bureau of Intelligence and
Research of the Department of State, the Defense Intelligence Agency,
and the Central Intelligence Agency participated in its drafting. It has
been coordinated with Intelligence Community representatives at the
working level. Research was completed on 28 November 1980.
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SUMMARY AND KEY JUDGMENTS
The United States has a longstanding interest in the responsiveness
of White South Africans to Nonwhite aspirations for political, economic,
and social equality. At stake are declared American principles as well as
US objectives in preventing racial conflict in South Africa from jeop-
ardizing US economic and strategic interests there and from creating
openings for the Soviets throughout the region.
The pressures for change in South Africa's racial policies are the
product of a complex dynamic. The major external forces for reform
have been increasingly hostile international opinion and the steady ad-
vance of Black nationalism in southern Africa. However, the main ef-
fect of foreign criticism and the threat of international sanctions has
been to spur the South African regime to greater efforts toward military
and economic self-sufficiency.
Internal factors have been more telling in their impact:
- Apartheid as a doctrine has been seriously undermined by its
failure to achieve the physical separation of the races. This goal
has become increasingly unrealizable in the face of a growing
Black population and the influx of unemployed Blacks to the
urban areas.
- Blacks are increasing in economic importance as low White
birth rates and decreasing immigration make the pool of Black
labor the more necessary to maintain economic growth.
The Soweto riots of 1976 accelerated the breakdown in the White
and particularly Afrikaner consensus on apartheid. The government
saw the need for a more coherent strategy to maintain White control.
The subsequent relaxation of some of the restrictions of petty apartheid
stimulated a debate over the necessity for far-reaching changes in racial
policies.
As the debate has continued it has become clear that there is virtu-
ally no quarrel within the Afrikaner community over the long-term
objective-continued White political control and protection of
Afrikaner privilege and identity. But three main lines of argument have
emerged regarding the strategy and tactics for maintaining this
objective:
- Conservative Afrikaners, the verkramptes, oppose any sig-
nificant tinkering with a system they believe has served Whites
well.
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- Moderate Afrikaners, the verligtes, would approve a broad lift-
ing of restrictions in the economic and labor fields and a vague
promise of eventual limited Nonwhite participation in the po-
litical realm.
- The more progressive among the moderate Afrikaners advocate
reshaping the political structure into a confederal system with
decisionmaking powers granted to Nonwhites, albeit in very re-
stricted areas.
The scope and pace of change over the next two to three years will
in large part depend on the attitudes of the Afrikaner community at
large. Although Afrikaners as a group appear more receptive to change
now than at any time in the past, the conservative Afrikaner establish-
ment remains powerful enough to hinder any push for reform under-
taken by Prime Minister Botha's government.
Botha has categorically rejected a one-man, one-vote formula in a
unitary state. He and his supporters believe, however, that apartheid
must be modernized in order to assure White survival and have moved
in a variety of ways to signal the seriousness and urgency of their push
for change. It is clear that Botha is not working from a blueprint and is
moving in an ad hoc manner that gives him the flexibility to press or
back off from given policies as circumstances require.
Nonwhites have grown pessimistic about the prospects for mean-
ingful change and have, as a result, rebuffed new government initiatives
and rejected most of their leaders who have consulted with White
authorities. Urban Blacks, as well as the younger generation of Asians
and Coloreds who identify with them, have demonstrated their lack of
respect for the government's timid reforms by consumer boycotts, labor
unrest, and student demonstrations.
The pace of reform over the next two to three years will not be
sufficient to satisfy Nonwhite demands, particularly if reforms are un-
dertaken without consultation. Racial tensions will rise in urban areas as
Nonwhite expectations continue to outpace the ability of government to
deliver reforms. Indeed, reforms will likely stimulate more strident
Nonwhite demands for change. Prospects, then, are as follows:
- An overall pattern of urban unrest, interspersed with sporadic
and spontaneous violence, will mark the next few years. Vio-
lence will remain at a lower level in rural areas, but the growing
poverty of the government-established homelands may result in
increasing rural unrest. Rising urban and rural unrest can prob-
ably be contained but only at the cost of harsher repression.
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- Black insurgent groups, primarily the African National Congress
(ANC), which is backed by the Soviets, will continue to pull off
spectacular terrorist operations. The ANC may also expand its
activities in rural areas and will increase its efforts to infiltrate
Nonwhite student and labor organizations. Government security
forces, however, probably will be able to prevent ANC activities
from becoming a serious threat to stability.
- Faced with racial unrest and conservative resistance to his poli-
cies, Botha will be tempted to move away from parliamentary
institutions to concentrate power in his own hands. He will be
aided by a new elite, dominated by the military but also includ-
ing businessmen and technocrats, who see change as the only
way to maintain a strong economy and national security. Whites
would probably acquiesce, albeit reluctantly, in this shift of
power if Botha found it necessary to deal forcefully with rising
Nonwhite violence and White obstructionism.
- Botha is not likely to find himself under pressure to this degree
before the end of 1982, but he appears to be positioning himself
to rule South Africa as a strongman at some point in the future.
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DISCUSSION
1. The United States has a longstanding interest in
the responsiveness of White South Africans to Non-
white aspirations for political, economic, and social
equality. At stake are declared American principles as
well as US objectives in preventing racial instability in
South Africa from jeopardizing US economic and
strategic interests there and from creating openings for
the Soviets throughout the region. US relations else-
where in Africa are also involved.
2. This memorandum will address the question of
whether Prime Minister P. W. Botha's administration
and the ruling Afrikaner-dominated National Party
are willing and able to push reforms far enough and
fast enough to keep racial violence from escalating.
The Colored riots in mid-1980 near Cape Town,
mounting Black labor and student unrest throughout
South Africa, and Botha's recent unwillingness to buck
the right wing of his party have all given special point
to this question.'
3. The memorandum will review Botha's reform
policies as they have unfolded since he took office two
years ago, discuss his style and strategy, analyze the
reaction of Nonwhites and Whites to the program, and
draw conclusions about the prospects for change over
the next two to three years. Special emphasis will be
given to the implications for internal stability. This
paper focuses on the domestic South African political
scene. It is in many respects a follow-on to IIM 79-
10025, December 1979, which discussed South Africa's
overall strategy for survival in an increasingly hostile
world. The memorandum's projections are based on
assumptions that external pressures for reform will not
' This paper uses conventional terminology in referring to South
Africa's racial groups. Specifically, it uses the term "Blacks" when
referring to South Africans of tribal lineage and the term "Non-
whites" as a collective label for Blacks, Asians (mostly Indians), and
Coloreds (persons of mixed race). Usage of these terms among
observers of South Africa is changing. The term "Africans" is being
applied increasingly to South Africans of tribal lineage, and the term
"Blacks" is used as a collective label for all the Nonwhite ethnic
groups-including Coloreds and Asians. Such broad usage of the
term "Blacks," however, could be confusing to an American au-
dience. Similarly, although the label "Nonwhite" is being increas-
ingly avoided because of its possible pejorative connotations, it is
arguably the least confusing term to use when referring collectively
to Blacks, Asians, and Coloreds.
increase dramatically over current levels and that Pre-
toria will continue to believe in the efficacy of the
economic, military, and foreign policy aspects of this
overall strategy.
The Legacy of Apartheid
4. The National Party rose to power in South Africa
in 1948 on a pledge to extend patterns of White
supremacy and racial segregation-both statutory and
customary-that had developed over the previous two
centuries. The party, in fact, coined the word "apart-
heid," meaning "apartness" or "separation," to encap-
sulate its pledge and to serve as its campaign slogan.
The appeal of that pledge and slogan reflected the rise
of Afrikaner identity and the depth even then of
White concerns over the impetus that post-World
War II forces of industrialization, urbanization, and
nationalism gave to pressure from other racial groups
for wider political, economic, and social rights.
5. During the 1950s, successive National Party gov-
ernments enacted laws that more strictly codified ra-
cial separation in the social, economic, and residential
spheres. Under Prime Minister Verwoerd, the party
embraced as doctrine the concept of "grand apart-
heid." Verwoerd's theory centered on the notion that
the tribal reservations that had already been set aside
for exclusive use of the main African tribes could be-
come nominally independent states where Blacks
could fulfill their political aspirations. In essence, the
theory proposed that Blacks provide labor for the
White areas of South Africa but return to their re-
serves or "homelands" upon completion of their con-
tract. No plan was offered for even theoretical auton-
omy for Coloreds or for Asians, who had no
historically or geographically defined territorial bases.
6. Working from Verwoerd's blueprint, successive
Nationalist governments by the early 1970s had de-
vised the complex and interwoven policies of eco-
nomic, political, and social discrimination and control
known as "separate development." The main features
of apartheid are by now well known:
- As the result of the process of enforced territorial
segregation, most Blacks have been made legal
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residents of 10 rural and economically deprived
tribal homelands. These homelands make up
about 13 percent of South Africa's territory.
- Blacks are permitted to exercise basic political
rights only within the homelands in which they
hold citizenship. The government operates sepa-
rate and inferior health facilities and educational
systems, for Nonwhites, and public transportation
is generally segregated. Interracial marriages are
prohibited, and mixed social activities are
discouraged. "Petty apartheid" regulations nor-
mally bar Nonwhites from restaurants, hotels,
theaters, and other public facilities.
- Within "White areas," Coloreds and Asians must
live in specially zoned residential areas; with a
few exceptions, Blacks qualifying for residency
outside the homelands must live in designated
Black townships.
- "Influx control" laws stipulate that Nonwhites
can be in White areas only by permission; the
burden of proof that they are authorized to be in
the areas rests upon them.
- Two separate labor markets exist: one for Whites
made up largely of skilled and management posi-
tions, in which there are personnel shortages; and
one for Blacks consisting of unskilled and
semiskilled jobs, in which there are massive
personnel surpluses. Pay scales for Nonwhites
tend to be lower than for Whites, even for com-
parable work.
The police and a large bureaucracy enforce the repres-
sive laws, including sweeping powers of arrest and
detention, which shore up the system. Under influx
control alone, for example, Nonwhites are subject to
more than 2,000 laws and regulations; the government
acknowledges having arrested more than 5 million
Blacks over the past decade for violating the pass laws.
Forces for Change
7. Political Pressures. The pressures for racial re-
form that South Africans are feeling today are the
product of a complex dynamic. External pressures in
the form of increasingly hostile international opinion
and the steady advance of Black nationalism in south-
ern Africa have helped bring about a reappraisal of
racial policy, but they have not by themselves been
sufficient to bring about significant change. In fact,
one major effect of criticism from abroad and the
threat or actual imposition of sanctions has been to
spur Pretoria to embark on a program to make South
Africa militarily and economically independent-and
thus less susceptible to outside leverage.'
8. External pressures have been accompanied by in-
ternal unrest. Indeed, as Blacks have become urban-
ized and consequently less divided along tribal lines,
they have also become more aware of the world be-
yond South Africa's borders. The decolonization proc-
ess in Africa in the late 1950s and early 1960s encour-
aged many Nonwhites in South Africa to believe that
historical trends improved the prospects for the even-
tual destruction of the apartheid system. During this
period the African National Congress (ANC) and the
Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) organized large-scale
antiapartheid demonstrations which culminated in the
Sharpeville massacre of 1960. Subsequently both or-
ganizations were banned, and Black political activity
in general was suppressed. A long period of quiescence
ended with the Soweto riots of 1976, which were par-
tially linked to the coming to power of Black majority
governments in Angola and Mozambique.
9. Apartheid has also been undermined by its fail-
ure to meet its own goals, particularly the physical
separation of the races. An annual growth rate of al-
most 3 percent in the Black population and the meager
job opportunities in the homelands have resulted in
increased migration of Blacks to urban areas-a rever-
sal of the flow Verwoerd envisioned. Blacks out-
number Whites in almost all urban centers, and the
relative numerical position of Whites continues to de-
cline. (See population estimates in figure 1.)
10. Economic Pressures. When the National Party
came to power in 1948, agriculture and mining
contributed more to the economy than did manufac-
turing and commercial interests. In 1979, the situation
had reversed: industry and commerce were respon-
sible for more than half of the national product. This
has created a demand for Black skilled labor that can-
not be filled within the constraints of apartheid. Low
White birth rates and a decline in White immigration
have significantly slowed the expansion of the White
labor pool. In 1975, 41,000 new White jobseekers en-
tered the labor market; in 1979, there were only
26,000 new White workers. The increasingly acute
shortage of skilled labor has resulted in the elimination
of job reservations in all but two sectors of the econo-
2 See IIM 79-10025 for a detailed discussion of South Africa's ef-
forts to make itself more immune to foreign economic pressures and
to enable it to act with greater independence in the political and
military fields.
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Figure 1
SOUTH AFRICA:
Population Estimates by Percent, 1 July 1980
Xhosas(Ciskei) 4.1
my and has led businessmen to work around many of
the codified apartheid restrictions on Black labor.
11. The growing economic importance of Blacks-
who now comprise 80 percent of the new entrants into
the labor market and 64 percent of the labor force in
the industrial heartland around Johannesburg-is
beginning to give some skilled Black workers leverage.
Since 1973, when traditionally docile Black labor
shocked the White community by engaging in more
than 200 strikes nationwide, urban Blacks have been
making use of this leverage to demand better working
conditions, higher pay, union recognition, and, in-
creasingly, a general easing of apartheid restrictions.
12. Moreover, one of the major lessons the govern-
ment drew from the riots in 1976 was that high levels
of unemployment pose a serious danger to internal
stability. Pretoria currently estimates that the econo-
my needs to maintain an annual growth rate of 5.5
percent' just to hold unemployment at the current
level. Thus, continued economic expansion, once
deemed important largely because of the material
benefits derived by the White community, has now
become vital in helping to keep Nonwhite frustrations
in check.
The figure for the total population is derived from a projection by the US Department of
Commerce Foreign Demographic Analysis Division. Figures for the individual ethnic
groups were calculated from official South African percentages for each group. The
figures for the Afrikaans-speaking and English-speaking communities were calculated
from the generally used ratio of 3:2 for Afrikaans speakers to English speakers.
Differing natural growth rates among South Africa's racial communities, accompanied by
likely changes in emigration and immigration patterns, will produce a change in racial
composition of the country's population in the decades ahead. The South African
Department of Statistics projects an overall population of about 47,000,000 by the year
2000, of which 14 percent would be Whites, 73.4 percent Blacks, 9.9 percent Coloreds,
and 2.7 percent Asians.
The South African Blacks are currently about evenly divided between those living in the
homelands and those in the White areas (not counting about 1,500,000 migrant workers
who take temporary employment in the White areas). Of those living in the White sector,
55 percent are in the towns and cities, 45 percent in rural areas.
13. When the National Party first came to power,
these economic problems would have been mainly the
concern of English speakers, who then owned most
industries. By 1975, Afrikaner private business owner-
ship, excluding agriculture, had grown from less than
10 percent in 1946 to almost 30 percent. Furthermore,
the National Party, to counter English domination of
the economy, has created or expanded 22 public cor-
porations that control, among other sectors, the iron,
steel, and coal industries, electrical production, and
the manufacture of armaments and synthetic fuels.
Afrikaner commercial and industrial leaders, who rep-
resent an increasingly significant segment of the
Afrikaner elite, now comprehend that the continued
adherence to separate development hampers economic
growth.
14. Despite the steady erosion of apartheid's
foundations, the broad Afrikaner consensus against
any significant modification of the system did not start
to break down until after the Soweto riots of 1976. The
upheaval in this large Black township outside Johan-
nesburg contributed to the undercurrent of unease set
in motion by the emergence of hostile Black regimes
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in Angola and Mozambique with close ties to the
USSR, the onset of the worst recession since the 1930s,
and increased Western activism against apartheid.
15. Viewing itself threatened by a "total onslaught"
of hostile external and internal forces, Prime Minister
Vorster's government sought to rationalize and or-
chestrate domestic and foreign policies in order to de-
vise a more coherent strategy for maintaining White
control. As part of this effort, the government allowed
a relaxation of apartheid restrictions in such areas as
sports, urban home leaseholds by Blacks, penalties for
passbook violations, job discrimination, and segrega-
tion of public facilities. These measures were a prag-
matic response to the rising external and internal pres-
sures and to the prospect of increasing isolation from
the West. The main impact, however, was to stimulate
a debate, conducted until then largely within intellec-
tual circles, over the necessity of more far-reaching
changes in racial policies.
16. As the debate has intensified and spread within
Afrikaner elites during the past few years, it has be-
come clear that the quarrel is not over long-term
objectives; Afrikaners remain collectively committed
to maintaining White political dominance and protect-
ing their privileges and identity. Progressive and con-
servative Afrikaners alike rule out any one-man, one-
vote formula in a unitary state, believing that Whites
would quickly lose control regardless of any guar-
antees. Three main lines of argument have developed,
however, over issues of strategy and tactics.
- Conservative Afrikaners, popularly labeled ver-
kramptes (literally, cramped ones) oppose any
significant tinkering with apartheid. Ver-
kramptes contend that even minor modifications
in the principles of separate development will
eventually undermine the entire system. Even
among the verkramptes there are gradations.
Some of them believe that certain aspects of
petty apartheid can and should be eased to pla-
cate international critics. Others would improve
the livelihood and general well-being of Non-
whites but strictly within the dogma of separate
development. If the Verwoerdian model proves
unattainable, there are verkramptes who believe
that Afrikaners should retreat to a White home-
land rather than experiment with modifications
of the present system.
- The more politically moderate members of the
Afrikaner elite, called verligtes (enlightened
ones), recognize that the Verwoerdian model is
seriously flawed and that domestic and interna-
tional pressures for change will continue to build.
They are prepared to throw up various facades of
reform and of consultation and collaboration
with Nonwhite elites but refuse any compromise
on the fundamental principle of maintaining the
White political monopoly. Their program in-
cludes not only a rollback of much of petty
apartheid and a broad lifting of restrictions in the
economic and labor fields, but also vague prom-
ises of eventual political concessions in return for
the cooperation and collaboration of Nonwhite
leaders. Reforms, the mainstream verligte ar-
gument goes, should be dispensed on a tactical
basis to maximize their political impact interna-
tionally and within the Nonwhite communities
while minimizing the practical effect on White
power and on National Party unity.
- Progressives in the verligte camp-who can be
termed the verligte vanguard and who are
mainly journalists and academics-are prepared
to experiment cautiously in the political realm.
They would reshape the South African political
structure by involving Coloreds and Asians in a
limited form of decisionmaking and would in-
clude urban and homeland Blacks in a broader
political confederation with consensus decision-
making powers over certain matters. Whites
would maintain authority over the great bulk of
national resources and a veto over any policy that
might adversely affect White interests.
17. The verligtes seek to co-opt Coloreds, Asians,
and limited numbers of urban Blacks into a new Non-
white middle class that would act as a buffer against a
Black revolution. Verligte arguments, or at least the
mainstream strategies, have found sympathetic au-
diences within important sectors of the Afrikaner
community. Businessmen want freedom from govern-
ment regulations that hamper industrial efficiency,
including apartheid restrictions on the mobility, train-
ing, and employment of Black labor.
18. The largely Afrikaner officer corps in the De-
fense Force also has embraced verligte views. The
Soweto riots, coupled with the disappearance of
friendly White buffer states, have created the specter
of what South African defense planners fear most-a
combination of internal revolt and external attack.
Having embarked on a program of force expansion
that involves increasing recruitment of Nonwhites and
progressive elimination of petty apartheid within the
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services, the military has made plain its concern that
civilians are lagging behind in making changes to
dampen domestic and international discontent.
19. Verligte views have also found a sympathetic
audience in the increasing numbers of urbanized and
educated Afrikaners. This growing upper middle class
has drifted away from traditional culture and values
into an increasingly affluent and more relaxed
lifestyle. These Afrikaners are willing-even anx-
ious-to have the government devise more flexible
and pragmatic approaches to race relations. Verligte
views are also making inroads among some younger
clergymen in the Dutch Reformed Church, hitherto a
bastion of verkrampte doctrine, as well as on campuses
of the traditionally conservative Afrikaner universities.
20. The verkrampte argument appeals to a power-
ful quarter in the Afrikaner community: lower-level
civil servants, including the police; blue-collar work-
ers, primarily in the mining sector; and farmers. These
groups, which feel most intensely the need for either
job protection or the supply of cheap Black labor that
apartheid has assured, once formed the dominant
strand of the National Party, although their influence
is declining. Led by Transvaal party chief Andries
Treurnicht (see figure 2), the verkrampte faction in
the party-estimated to command the loyalty of up to
40 of the 135 Nationalist members of Parliament-has
been able to block some verligte initiatives by cap-
italizing on Afrikaner traditions of consensus de-
cisionmaking and the party's historic fear of a split. In
addition, the Treurnicht faction could probably count
on the support of as many as 40 other members of the
party caucus on some issues.
21. When he took office two years ago, P. W. Botha
(see figure 3) had been in the public eye for more than
12 years as Defense Minister and head of the National
Party's Cape Province branch. Cape politicians have a
relatively moderate tradition within the National Par-
ty, and during the years Botha held the defense portfo-
lio the military had begun to drop racial barriers in the
defense forces. But Botha was generally regarded as a
hardliner because of his role as architect of South Af-
rica's intervention in Angola in 1975 and because of
his clashes with government leaders over this and
other issues, and most observers placed him on the ver-
krampte side of the debate over racial reform.
22. His previous reputation notwithstanding, Botha
has led the way in changing the style and tone of gov-
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ernment dealings with the Nonwhite community,
adopting the rhetoric of change, and becoming the
first South African prime minister to visit a Black
township-Soweto-and a homeland. He has con-
sulted with some Blacks-homeland leaders and mod-
erate urban spokesmen-and has introduced a series of
reform proposals with considerable fanfare.
23. New Constitutional Structures. Efforts at
constitutional reform began in 1976 under Prime Min-
ister Vorster when Botha, then Minister of Defense,
chaired a Cabinet committee that drew tip a plan to
create separate Colored and Asian parliaments at the
national level that would have limited autonomy in
local affairs. This plan was endorsed by the National
Party but rejected by Coloreds and Indians on the
grounds that it ignored the political aspirations of
Blacks.
24. After moving tip to the prime ministership in
1978, Botha scrapped this plan and set up a commis-
sion under then Interior Minister Schlebusch to find
alternative solutions. Botha's new plan for constitu-
tional reform was revealed early in 1980 in an interim
report by the Schlebusch commission and given legal
life in a constitutional amendment passed by Par-
liament last May. The principal institutional innova-
tion was the President's Council, a deliberative body
of 60 Whites, Coloreds, and Asians tinder the chair-
manship of State Vice President Schlebusch, whose
new post was created by the amendment.
25. The Council, whose members are appointed for
five-year terms, was officially installed on 6 October
1980, with 44 Whites, 10 Coloreds, five Asians, and
one Chinese South African agreeing to serve on it;
most of the Nonwhite members are not recognized
leaders of their communities. Botha appears intent on
making the Council an important component of the
government. To enhance their prestige, Council mem-
bers will receive the same salaries as members of Par-
liament and will be housed in new, impressive offices
in Cape Town, the country's legislative capital. The
Council has five subcommittees-constitutional, sci-
entific, economic, planning, and community re-
lations-in which specific problems between the races
are to be discussed.
26. The Schlebusch proposal also envisioned a Black
advisory council of urban representatives and home-
land leaders, on which the President's Council could
call at its discretion for advice and consultation. Botha
dropped the concept altogether after major Black
leaders objected to the secondary status it conferred on
Blacks. Blacks still have no representation on the na-
tional level.
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27. Homelands Policy. Under Botha, the govern-
ment has continued to push the homelands (see figure
4) toward political "independence." Botha recently
admitted that the homelands are not economically vi-
able, thereby tacitly acknowledging that for all prac-
tical purposes the classic homelands policy of apart-
heid has failed. The homelands, however, are central
to Botha's revamped "constellation of states" plan-a
concept devised originally to strengthen and reinforce
existing economic links and to create a system of alli-
ances and informal arrangements for military
cooperation between South Africa and its relatively
dependent neighbors in southern and eastern Africa.
Following Robert Mugabe's victory in Zimbabwe, Pre-
toria scaled down the plan's geographical limits to the
Republic and its homelands.
28. In 1979 Venda became the third nominally in-
dependent homeland. Ciskei will probably soon be-
come the fourth. The government has failed, however,
to persuade the vast majority of Blacks that there are
political and economic benefits to be derived from res-
idence in the homelands.
29. Politically, one major sticking point has been
the question of citizenship. As Transkei, Bophu-
thatswana, and Venda have become independent,
their residents along with tribally related urban Blacks
have lost South African citizenship and attendant
rights. This has aroused bitter opposition among
Blacks, who contend that the government is trying to
make them aliens within their own country.
30. The issues of land consolidation and economic
aid have been equally contentious. The consolidation
of the geographically disparate homelands-the non-
independent homeland of KwaZulu alone is made up
of at least 30 fragments of land-would require the
acquisition of large amounts of White-owned prop-
erty. Aside from commissioning new studies of the
problem, the Botha administration is unwilling to ac-
cept the considerable economic and political costs that
a serious consolidation program would incur.
31. 13otha's economic aid program for the home-
lands has not differed significantly from Vorster's.
Pretoria continues to provide operating expenses-and
seconded White bureaucrats-for the homelands
administrations, but development aid remains scanty.
Botha's efforts to persuade the South African private
sector to assume some of the burden for improving
economic conditions in the impoverished homelands
have been unproductive so far.
32. Limited Autonomy for Urban Black Commu-
nities. Despite his unwillingness to countenance a di-
rect consultative role for Blacks in the new constitu-
tional machinery, Botha has continued Vorster's
cautious program for extending limited autonomy to
some Black townships. In October 1980 the govern-
ment published legislation it intends to submit to Par-
liament which would establish municipal authorities
that would replace the 312 existing community coun-
cils. These new local Black authorities would have le-
gal status equivalent to that of local White govern-
ments. The decisions of the Black municipalities
would, however, be subject to the veto of the Depart-
ment of Cooperation and Development. Unless the
government wins the approval of key Black leaders, its
new legislation will suffer the fate of past solutions
proposed from above: it will be made meaningless and
unworkable by the suspicions and passive resistance of
the township residents.
33. Family Housing. An acute shortage of Non-
white housing throughout South Africa has led the
government to relax enforcement of the Group Areas
Act for Coloreds and Asians. The Act requires segrega-
tion of residential areas and is one of the most impor-
tant pillars of apartheid. Estimates of the shortfall in
housing are now around 4,300 units for Asians, 10,000
for Coloreds, and perhaps as many as 400,000 for
Blacks. In the Black township of Soweto alone, there is
a shortage of at least 32,000 units.
34. The 1980 budget, which reflected the dramatic
increase in gold prices, provided for a 20-percent cap-
ital increase for the national housing fund, but this
does not begin to meet the pressing needs of Nonwhite
communities. While admitting the need for the diver-
sion of greater resources to housing, government of-
ficials have expressed hope that much of the slack will
be taken up by the private sector-for example, by
employers underwriting the mortgages of their work-
ers. Botha's administration has tried to ease Black
frustrations by following through on Vorster's promise
to extend 99-year leaseholds to those few Blacks who
qualify for "permanent residence" in the townships. If
legislation proposed for the 1981 parliamentary session
passes, more Blacks would qualify for leaseholds. In
addition some inheritance rights for qualified depend-
ents could be strengthened, making home ownership
more attractive.
35. Education. In 1980, the government has in-
creased spending on Black education and training pro-
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NAMIBIA
BOTSWANA
`~a~ j debele Kan ne
Mmabatho (~
a Pretoria ran aal Louievil
fl ... tom/ t f'/r a~ Johannesburg
Mbabar
) SwAZtLA
Orange QwaQwi
Phuthaaditiha c
? Kimberley Free State
/ Bloemfontein?
=~. Maseru r
Bophuthatswana LESOTHO }
(not recognized by the US)
o Homeland seat of government
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grams by 32 percent' and has given even higher prior-
ity to improvements in Colored schooling. The gap to
be made tip is enormous, however. Pretoria spends 10
times as much money per student on White education
as it does on Black education.
36. The government recently announced that
compulsory education for Blacks up to the age of 16
will be gradually phased in grade by grade in selective
urban Black townships beginning in January 1981.
Government officials have admitted, however, that
the program will probably not be implemented on a
countrywide basis for another 10 years.
37. Labor Reforms. In response both to growing
pressure from the business sector for relief from apart-
heid bottlenecks that prevent more rational use of
Black labor and to White concerns over the growing
potential for labor unrest, the Vorster government in
1977 established two commissions to study the system
of labor law and administration. The two com-
missions-named after their chairmen, Professors
Wiehahn and Riekert-last year submitted reports
containing what in the South African context were far-
reaching recommendations. As a result of a ver-
krampte backlash some of the more progressive
proposals were dropped and the intent of others was
blunted or neutralized through legislative sleight of
hand.
38. Under laws that ostensibly implement Wiehahn
Commission recommendations, Black unions, which
previously had no official status, now are offered the
opportunity to register and bargain collectively in
industrial councils that decide wage demands. Once a
union accepts registration, however, it must submit to
government oversight and refrain from political activ-
ity. The government has also formed two new bodies
to encourage more efficient use of manpower: the Na-
tional Manpower Commission and a new one-man
Industrial Court.
39. The government has amended regulations that
formerly prohibited Black entry into several skilled oc-
cupations and has eased travel and other restrictions
on urban Black jobholders. At the same time, however,
other new regulations make it more difficult for home-
land Blacks to live and seek work in urban areas by
imposing steep fines on employers who hire Blacks
illegally.
40. Reform in the Military. In 1978, when Botha
still held the defense portfolio, a study by the Defense
This figure, along with the previous one for the housing budget,
does not take into account South Africa's 15-percent annual inflation
rate.
Force recommended recruitment of 10,000 to 13,000
Nonwhites into the services as part of a general force
expansion. In part, this goal reflected shrinkage of the
available pool of White manpower as the booming
South African economy absorbed more and more
skilled manpower. The Defense Force has increased its
Nonwhite volunteer component from approximately
1,500 men in 1977 to between 5,000 and 6,000 men in
1980. Coloreds make up the largest Nonwhite group in
the services, followed by Blacks and Asians.
41. The military recently has accelerated its
recruitment of Blacks, and Botha has announced the
formation of four Black battalions. Although there are
still slight differences in pay scales and separate rec-
reational and housing facilities for Nonwhites, the eco-
nomic benefits and the gradual elimination of petty
apartheid within the services have made military duty
attractive to them. The military also appears serious
about accepting more Nonwhites for training in highly
skilled technical specialities.
42. Nonwhite soldiers serve tours of duty in the
operational area in Namibia where they share com-
mon facilities with,White troops. Botha has held up
the example of racial cooperation in the military as a
model for the nation.
Botha's Commitment
43. Despite Botha's actions over the past two years,
major questions remain over the nature of his commit-
ment to racial reform and the specifics of his strategy
for change. Reflecting his Cape background, Botha ap-
pears to have greater sympathy for Colored aspirations
and to be less impressed by the fears of the "black
peril" felt by Afrikaners in areas of the coun-
try-especially the Transvaal-where the Black popu-
lation is greater. Like Whites across the South African
political spectrum, however, he has ruled out the pos-
sibility of one-man, one-vote in a unitary state. The
label that fits Botha best is that of a political prag-
matist; in describing his approach to race relations,
Botha himself has recently been claiming to be prac-
ticing "the art of the possible."
44. Botha, perceiving that the momentum of Black
nationalism is growing, appears to attach some ur-
gency to the need for change. Indeed, he appears to
believe that White survival may depend on the success
or failure of his administration's efforts to adapt tra-
ditional apartheid to current realities. Botha has not,
however, spelled out any specific blueprint or time-
table for change. Instead, his approach to race rela-
tions over the past two years has been ad hoc. Some of
his proposals appear to have been aimed at attracting
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Nonwhite support. Others were trial balloons floated
to test the limits of White toleration for change. What-
ever the case, Botha has remained flexible, pressing or
backing off from a given policy as circumstances have
required.
45. Botha's goal-and that of the verligtes collec-
tively-is to build a new middle class of Coloreds,
Asians, and urban Blacks with enough stake in the sys-
tem to want to defend it, alongside Whites, against
outsiders and, if necessary, against less privileged
South African Blacks. His vision is that of a large
multiracial bloc, dominated by Whites, in which there
are so many layers of partial privilege for Nonwhites
that the lines of racial confrontation which exist today
will become blurred.
46. Botha has been reluctant to push for goals too
vigorously in the face of concerted verkrampte
resistance. During the initial phase of his prime min-
istership, he acted as though the right wing of the par-
ty were irrelevant, admonishing the verkramptes to
"adapt or die" and giving the impression he preferred
them to leave the party rather than have them act as a
drag on racial reform. At this time, however, Botha is
not prepared to push change to an extent that might
cause a split in the party-and the Afrikaner commu-
nity. Such a split occurred in 1969 when extreme
rightists broke away to form the Herstigte
(Reconstituted) National Party, which has thus far not
won a seat in Parliament. In several recent confronta-
tions over reform-related issues, Botha avoided a
showdown with verkrampte leader Treurnicht.'
' The verkramptes picked up three additional parliamentary seats
recently when the ultraconservative English-speaking South African
Party disbanded and joined the National Party. The historic enmity
between Afrikaners and the English-speaking community has
blurred somewhat in recent years and many conservative English
speakers have little quarrel with apartheid policies. When the Na-
tional Party based its 1977 general election campaign on a call for
White unity, it received 80 percent of the popular vote. The two
remaining English-speaking opposition parties, the Progressive Fed-
eral Party and the New Republic Party, have a combined total of 27
of the 165 elected parliamentary seats and offer no real political
challenge to National Party rule. They have gone on record as favor-
ing the removal of obvious racial discrimination and the establish-
ment of some form of federalism. There seems to be no hope for a
merger between the English speakers, however. The New Republic
Party, whose eight parliamentary seats are mainly in Natal, is philo-
sophically closer to the National Party on matters such as the pres-
ervation of segregated residential areas. In two recent parliamentary
byelections there appeared to be collusion between the New Repub-
lic Party and the National Party against the Progressives. This could
portend a closer New Republic Party-National Party parliamentary
coalition.
Reform and the New Politics
47. Botha, while reluctant to confront the ver-
kramptes head on, has shown no such hesitancy about
trying to cut down to size another major impediment
to reform-the swollen South African bureaucracy,
which employs up to half the Afrikaner work force.
Most civil servants are National Party members and
are in the verkrampte camp. The vast majority of
them are lower level bureaucrats who possess only
modest qualifications. As administrators of apartheid
regulations, they are intent on enforcing the existing
laws; indeed they are dependent on them for their
livelihood. Moreover, the mass of legislation that forms
the apartheid system delegates to these bureau-
crats-especially those in the Department of
Cooperation and Development-the effective power
to pick and choose how and when to implement
change.
48. Botha has sought to overcome this built-in iner-
tia within the government in two ways. First, he has
cut the number of government departments by more
than half and is leaving 12,000 jobs vacant. He has also
created a new tier of department heads and has begun
to fill this management level with people who have
been successful in administration and management
outside the civil service. Second, in a process that has
been dubbed "government by permit and exemption,"
he has permitted owners and operators of restaurants,
hotels, sports arenas, and similar facilities to apply for
special permits exempting them from apartheid
restrictions. Likewise, he has encouraged reform-
minded industrialists to proceed with progressive mea-
sures such as the desegregation of facilities at their
plants without waiting for the necessary legislation or
administrative notices to complete their slow journey
through the bureaucracy.
49. Botha has also moved to strengthen his ability to
induce change through executive fiat. The Senate,
which historically had a delay and review function,
was abolished this summer as part of the constitutional
renovation entailed in the establishment of the Presi-
dent's Council. Botha has also greatly expanded his
own Prime Minister's Office and formalized the role
of the State Security Council, a Cabinet-level com-
mittee patterned on the US National Security Council.
In short, he has created within the executive branch a
virtual minigovernment with increasing ability to plan
and coordinate policy on its own, bypassing ver-
krampte obstructionists in the National Party's par-
liamentary caucus.
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50. In staffing the top posts of his administration,
Botha has gone outside traditional National Party cir-
cles and brought in a variety of experts. Academics,
think-tank professionals, businessmen, and financiers
have all found their roles shifting from the periphery
to the center of government strategy planning. Botha
has also packed the Cabinet with a coterie of verligte
politicians, including Gerrit Viljoen, a leading verligte
theorist.
51. Even more influential are the senior military
officers Botha brought with him when he moved up
from the Defense Ministry. Not only does General
Magnus Malan (see figure 5) now sit in the Cabinet as
Minister of Defense, but military officers are now so
strategically placed on every important executive
committee and working group of both the Cabinet and
Prime Minister's Office that they have the opportunity
to influence and monitor policy decisions in a way no
parliamentary member and few Cabinet ministers
can. Malan, at least, is counted among the verligte
vanguard, having formulated the "80-20" theory
which holds that only 20 percent of the threat to the
country's stability is external, while 80 percent is in-
ternal and the result of Nonwhite grievances. Botha
probably believes that giving more political influence
to military leaders will be palatable to the Afrikaner
community because of its respect for military
institutions.
52. Another hallmark of the new politics under
Botha has been the proliferation of government-spon-
sored consultative and investigative commissions.
Finding parliament inadequate as a source of new
ideas, the government has used these commissions to
gather facts and make recommendations on issues of
major concern. More important, South Africans of all
races whose views would otherwise have never been
heard by policymakers have been able to testify on
such topics as Black labor and influx control, Black
education, consolidation of the homelands, the future
of the constitution, and the causes of Nonwhite riots.
Commission reports receive widespread publicity and
serve both to educate Whites on pressing problems and
to condition them to the need for change. In the case
of the Rickert, Wiehahn, and Schlebusch commissions
and a few others, Botha has used their findings and
recommendations to pressure parliament to pass legis-
lation it would not have otherwise.
53. The most pronounced feature of the new pol-
itics Botha practices-and the one which seems to
have the greatest implications for racial policy-is the
entente that has developed between the government
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and the private sector of the economy. Pretoria's new-
found affinity for the business community reflects
shifts in thinking that began during the latter years of
the Vorster regime. In the wake of the Soweto riots the
Vorster administration decided that high unemploy-
ment posed a serious threat to internal stability. Hav-
ing concluded that optimum economic growth could
be achieved only by providing the private sector with
the scope and incentives for rapid expansion, Vorster's
administration began gradually to curb growth in the
public sector and in bureaucratic controls over private
business.
54. Botha has taken Vorster's approach to the pri-
vate sector and pushed it further and faster, seeking
openly to enlist the aid of business in bringing about
changes he is unable or unwilling to effect in other
ways. The most notable single event in this courtship
occurred in late 1979 when Botha met in Johannes-
burg with 300 business leaders to persuade them that
they shared common concerns with the government.
Promising a reduction in state controls, Botha asked
for private industry's help in continuing to expand the
economy and thereby create more jobs for Nonwhites.
He also asked for greater private sector investment in
such areas as industrial job training programs and
development projects for the homelands. To prove his
good faith, Botha's next budget included, among a
number of other stimulative measures, even more
extensive tax concessions for business.
55. Businessmen have welcomed Botha's call for
greater cooperation but have made plain their feeling
that the government must do more. In complaining
about the growing shortage of skilled labor, busi-
nessmen have pointed out that the policy of separate
and inferior education for Nonwhites is sabotaging
their industrial training programs, noting that very
few Blacks reach an educational level high enough to
qualify for apprentice training. Recently, two major
English-speaking business groups appealed to the gov-
ernment to relax influx controls further and to provide
more and better housing for Blacks. Both groups also
expressed concern over the long-term contradictions
inherent in the government's effort to create an inte-
grated economy while maintaining a segregated po-
litical structure.
Nonwhite Reaction
56. Nonwhite attitudes toward Botha's approach to
race relations have evolved in the last two years from
an initial wait-and-see stance to a growing pessimism
over the prospects for meaningful change. Many mod-
erate Nonwhites who have participated in the discus-
sions with the government have become discredited or
discouraged. Despite strong-arm tactics by govern-
ment security forces, urban Blacks, Asians, and
Coloreds have become increasingly bold in rejecting
government initiatives. Student demonstrations, con-
sumer boycotts, and labor unrest-frequently accom-
panied by violence-have become commonplace.
57. Homeland Blacks. The leaders of the nonin-
dependent homelands have proclaimed several prin-
ciples on which future negotiations on independence
should be based, including the retention of South Af-
rican nationality for homeland citizens. The homeland
leaders have been critical of most of the government's
proposals for change. During a meeting in August 1980
with Botha, homeland leaders refused membership in
the proposed Black Advisory Council, demanding that
Blacks be included in the President's Council along
with Coloreds, Asians, and Whites.
58. Homeland leaders have agreed, however, to
continue meeting with government officials to discuss
reform proposals. Black critics argue that these meet-
ings represent a de facto Black advisory council. In-
deed, homeland leaders are the most likely Black can-
didates for participation in any multiracial political
institutions at the national level, largely because of the
leverage the government has over them. Many home-
land leaders, while having tribal chieftain status,
would not occupy positions of political leadership
without government backing; the constituency they
eventually must answer to is not Black but the White
bureaucracy in Pretoria.
59. Buthelezi. Gatsha Buthelezi, chief minister of
KwaZulu, is the one homeland leader who does not fit
the mold (see figure 6). He has built his Zulu-based
political organization Inkatha into a grass-roots orga-
nization claiming 300,000 members, with a growing
following in Soweto and other Black urban commu-
nities. The Zulus are the largest and most aggressive of
South Africa's Black tribes. Buthelezi has advocated
peaceful change. He indicated to the Schlebusch
Commission in 1979 that he would support an interim
program of piecemeal but concrete reforms such as the
abolition of influx controls and the Group Areas Act.
Botha's failure to initiate such reforms and the govern-
ment's proposal of a Black advisory body with only
consultative powers disillusioned Buthelezi.
60. Recently, Buthelezi has refused to participate
personally in any future meetings between homeland
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leaders and government officials, insisting instead on
bilateral meetings with Pretoria's representatives.
Buthelezi's move appears aimed in part at dissociating
him from other homeland leaders who might com-
promise with the government. Buthelezi has also estab-
lished a commission of his own to study prospects for
racial reform in Natal Province, in part at least to bol-
ster his claim to special status among Black leaders. He
has staked his political future on the government's
eventual willingness to offer Blacks some meaningful
share of political power, and, by solidifying his po-
sition as the one national Black leader with whom Pre-
toria must deal, he hopes to gain real concessions.
6.1. Pretoria has so far apparently refrained from
using the same arm-twisting tactics on Buthelezi it has
employed on other homeland leaders. While Buthelezi
has been a voice of moderation during recent protests,
he also has often warned that his ban against violence
is not an absolute one. The specter of an alliance be-
tween Inkatha-with Buthelezi's organizational abili-
ties-and antigovernment militants clearly tempers
Pretoria's? thinking about its options for dealing with
him.
62. Time, however, is working against Buthelezi's
aspirations for national Black leadership. The longer it
takes for the government to propose acceptable re-
forms, the more skeptical Blacks will become about
the wisdom of Buthelezi's pragmatic policy of nonvio-
lence. Many Blacks already believe that Buthelezi is
only seeking power for the Zulus. Many urban Blacks
who have refused to negotiate with the government
unless it abandons the policy of separate development
argue that Buthelezi, because of his position as a
homeland leader and his willingness to negotiate with
the government, does more harm than good to the
Black cause.
63. Urban Black Leadership. Most urban Black
leaders have also rejected the government's proposals
for change. Prominent Black spokesmen, such as Dr.
Nthato Motlana (see figure 7) of the Soweto Com-
mittee of Ten, oppose any cooperation with the gov-
ernment until it agrees to negotiate on the question of
power sharing. Motlana refused to participate in elec-
tions in 1978 for a Soweto Community Council, and
his boycott, coupled with the nonparticipation of
Inkatha, resulted in a voter turnout of under 6 percent.
64. For the most part urban Black leaders have
been unable to translate their demands into effective
action. Recent attempts by the Committee of Ten to
initiate a rent strike, for example, have been un-
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25
successful. Once they emerge into the public eye, these
urban Black leaders are particularly vulnerable to ar-
rest and banning.,, When persons such as Fanyana
Mazibuko, leader of the Soweto Teachers' Action
Committee, Curtis Nkondo, suspended president of
the Azanian People's Organization, and Thozamile
Botha, former head of the Port Elizabeth Black
Community Organization, were banned, a public out-
cry ensued but no effective pressure was brought to
bear against Pretoria. The vulnerability of urban Black
leaders to government reprisals in large part accounts
for their inability to organize an effective con-
stituency.
65. Bishop Desmond Tutu, secretary general of the
South African Council of Churches, is one of the few
urban Black spokesmen who can claim a constituency,
both within South Africa and abroad. Tutu recently
led a delegation of church officials to meet with Botha
to discuss race relations. Although the meeting was
criticized by some Black militants, who warned Tutu
' Banning is a form of house arrest that limits, for a specified
period of time-usually three to five years-the social and political
activities of an individual. A typical banning order might restrict a
person to a particular town, limit his social contacts to members of
his immediate family, and prohibit him from appearing at public
gatherings. A banning order cannot be appealed..
against becoming a "South African Muzorewa," Tutu
has been a harsh critic of Botha's policies. Last fall,
while traveling abroad, he called for international dis-
investment from South Africa and subsequently had
his passport lifted. Tutu also advocates civil disobedi-
ence and was arrested for participating in a protest
march against the government.
66. Black Consciousness. The recent wave of stu-
dent demonstrations, job actions, and consumer boy-
cotts reflects the general discontent of Blacks,
Coloreds, and Asians with the pace of reform under
Botha. The unrest has been largely unorganized and
spontaneous, as the government has discovered
through the failure of its traditional tactics of arresting
or banning activist leaders. Much of the increasingly
open dissent appears to be an outgrowth of the Black
consciousness movement, a philosophical and cultural
rejection of White attitudes and lifestyles that encour-
ages Black pride and self-help-
67. During the mid-1970s Pretoria outlawed the or-
ganizations that formed under the banner of Black
consciousness. New groups, most notably the Azanian
People's Organization and several student bodies, have
emerged, although they are kept under tight govern-
ment control and surveillance. As a vaguely defined
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social and cultural movement, however, Black con-
sciousness continues to spread, particularly among
Nonwhite urban youth. This new generation has little
respect for Nonwhite leaders, particularly those will-
ing to work for change within the existing system. It
resents Botha and the verligtes collectively for trying
to buy off Nonwhites with economic and social
palliatives.
68. Coloreds and Asians. Although Botha has per-
suaded a handful of Coloreds and Asians to serve on
the President's Council, he has not won the
cooperation of these communities. Both groups have
long enjoyed a standard of living considerably higher
than that of urban Blacks, and, even before their
inclusion on the President's Council, they had advisory
bodies similar to the one recently proposed for Blacks.
Coloreds, who once were able to vote for Whites to
represent them in Parliament, still bitterly resent the
National Party's moves to disenfranchise them. Asians,
a small minority, are subject to prejudices from both
Whites and Blacks, with the result that their leaders
have a tradition of fence sitting on issues affecting race
relations.
69. The most credible Colored and Asian leaders
have rejected Botha's overtures. They have made it
plain that their demand for full citizenship and full
participation in the political process must extend to the
Black population as well. The Coloreds are particu-
larly cynical about Botha's pleas for patience, knowing
the Afrikaners' historical concern about a political alli-
ance between Coloreds and English-speaking Whites
that would send the National Party down to electoral
defeat.
70. Reflecting a growing community of interests
and grievances, the younger generation of Asians and
Coloreds, moreover, is beginning to identify closely
with urban Blacks. Colored and Asian students and
workers, some of them Black consciousness adherents,
have participated in and or initiated a number of re-
cent antigovernment demonstrations. Organizations
with policies of noncollaboration with the Whites,
most notably the Unity Movement among the
Coloreds and the Natal Indian Congress, have devel-
oped significant constituencies among politically
sophisticated Coloreds and Asians.
71. The Insurgent Groups. Although the Pan-
Africanist Congress is still attempting to recover from
the setbacks it suffered in the early 1960s and the fac-
tionalism that has plagued it since, the African Na-
tional Congress is showing signs of resurgence. During
its years in exile, the ANC was sustained by its
longstanding ties to the South African Communist Par-
ty and the USSR, although it was unable to develop
contacts with newly emerging Black activists inside
South Africa. The ANC, however, has benefited
significantly from the racial unrest since Soweto and
from the disappearance of White buffer states. It has
won new recruits from Nonwhite youths fleeing police
crackdowns at home and has gained springboards
abroad for staging attacks. The result has been a grad-
ual increase in the level and sophistication of oper-
ations, marked in 1980 by dramatic attacks against po-
lice stations, a suburban bank near Pretoria, and the
SASOL synthetic fuel plants.
72. These operations have enhanced greatly the
ANC's appeal to young urban Blacks. In fact, impris-
oned ANC President Nelson Mandela (see figure 8)
has become the symbol of liberation for Blacks. ANC
theorists have recently begun to emphasize the impor-
tant role student boycotts and Black labor unrest could
have in intimidating the White community and in
breaking down White authority. The ANC, however,
is still not an effective organized resistance force inside
South Africa. Successful ANC operations, in fact, have
resulted in heightened government security measures
and have brought neighboring countries that support
the group under increased pressure from Pretoria.
Prospects for Change Through 1982
73. The scope and pace of change in South Africa's
racial policies over the next two to three years will
depend on a host of variables, not the least of which
will be the attitudes of the Afrikaner community. At
the beginning of Botha's third year in office, Afri-
kaners have more favorable views toward change than
at any juncture in the country's history. This reflects
both the impact of verligte admonitions over the need
for reform and the conditioning effects of the limited
changes already implemented. Recent polls show that
a substantial majority of Afrikaners prefer Botha's cau-
tious approach to change in race relations over any
verkrampte retrenchment. Yet, Treurnicht and like-
minded Nationalists have a powerful constituency,
and even many Whites who consider themselves
verligtes believe that significant changes have already
occurred. Thus Botha-who must face a general elec-
tion by November 1982, his first as Prime Minis-
ter-will continue to move gingerly on racial issues,
advancing in those areas where White resistance is low
and withdrawing or postponing proposals that elicit a
significant White backlash.
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74. The easiest and fastest changes will continue to
take place, in the realm of petty apartheid. More ho-
tels, restaurants, and theaters will be opened to Non-
whites, more permits will be issued for mixed-race
sporting events, and the gradual desegregation of pub-
lic transportation will continue. A number of discrimi-
natory statutes are scheduled to be eliminated in an
omnibus bill in the 1981 parliamentary session. On the
other hand, the Mixed Marriages and Immorality Acts
will in all likelihood remain on the books.
75. Moreover, in order to build a small Black en-
trepreneurial class and revitalize the economically
moribund urban business districts, the government
will probably follow through with its plans to revise
the Groups Areas Act. As a result, Nonwhites would be
allowed to establish small businesses in central parts of
the currently all-White cities. As long as such revisions
do not affect residential areas, most Whites will have
little trouble accepting them.
76. Pretoria will extend greater local autonomy to
the town councils and other government-created bod-
ies in the larger Black townships in order to enhance
the credibility of cooperative urban Black leaders,
probably even ceding some control over the raising
and allocation of revenue. The next two years are also
likely to see significant increases in government spend-
ing for urban Black housing and for extending basic
services such as water and electricity to the Black
communities.
77. Botha can be expected to encourage industry to
close the gap between White and Nonwhite pay, and
the government may become involved in the current
effort by Nonwhite labor groups to set a minimum
"living wage." Greater cooperation between industry
and government in easing the shortage of skilled labor
is inevitable. Training a skilled Black worker is
costly-about nine times as expensive as subsidizing
the passage of a skilled White immigrant-and private
industry, despite the provision of tax incentives, has
yet to embark on training programs extensive enough
to make a dent in the shortage. The government con-
sequently will probably follow through with its plans
to help establish about 300 industrial training centers
and 12 new Black technical institutes, including one in
Soweto.
78. To meet industry's demands for "trainable" en-
trants into the labor market and to help dampen stu-
dent unrest, Botha appears prepared to undertake sig-
nificant changes in the education system. His most
likely course will be to set up a common syllabus for
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Blacks, which could be followed by creation of a single
Ministry of National Education to administer separate
education for each racial group. While expenditures
for Nonwhites might take a quantum leap under a
unified educational ministry, differences will remain
between per capita spending for White and Nonwhite
students. Bringing Nonwhite facilities up to the level
of White facilities would alone entail staggering costs,
and Whites will not condone having their own educa-
tional standard lowered to subsidize improvements for
Nonwhites.
79. Programs for the expansion and consolidation of
the homelands will in all likelihood continue to exist
largely on paper; the political and financial costs of
buying tip White-owned farmland and transferring it
to Black control will remain prohibitive over the next
two to three years. Some incorporation can be ex-
pected, however, along the lines of Mafeking, an eco-
nomically distressed White town that was absorbed by
a neighboring Black homeland, with extensive safe-
guards for Whites, including the retention of their
South African citizenship.
80. Botha will undoubtedly face up to the Black
citizenship issue by devising a convoluted plan requir-
ing Blacks to become citizens of the independent
homelands while extending a common South African
identity and passport. This and other aspects of future
homelands policy will not go down well with the
verkramptes, who will argue that a shared economy
and common national identity will inevitably fuel de-
mands for political power sharing.
81. As part of a new regional approach to economic
development and planning for the homelands, Botha is
trying to breathe life into plans to build a series of
industrial parks along homeland borders and to target
existing industrial centers near the homelands for in-
creased government and private investment. In an at-
tempt to make these plans work, the government will
probably share control over the industrial parks with
the homelands governments and will probably give the
homelands a portion of the taxes and profits gen-
erated. Nevertheless, the homelands remain economi-
cally unviable-unable to offer the jobs that would
stem the flow of Blacks into the cities, or even to
achieve much productivity in their basically agrarian
economies.
82. In discussing possible future political
dispensations for Nonwhites, Botha has hinted at a re-
organization of South Africa's political structure on a
"consociational" and confederal basis that would,
according to some of his interpreters, resemble the
Swiss cantonal system. Cooperation and Development
Minister Koornhof has described the proposed system
as one in which Blacks-and presumably other ethnic
groups-would choose local governments, which in
turn would be involved with decisionmaking on na-
tional issues at a confederal or federal level.
83. Whatever other institutional innovations Botha
introduces over the next two to three years, the de-
termination he has shown in creating the President's
Council suggests that it figures importantly in his
plans. Botha has yet to reveal its exact functions be-
yond vague generalities. For the short term, the Coun-
cil will play only an advisory role; its five standing
committees may replace some of the many investiga-
tory and consultative commissions appointed by
Parliament.
84. The government will probably devise some
replacement for the rejected Black advisory council.
Blacks could eventually be allowed membership on
the President's Council. In such a case, urban and
nonindependent homelands leaders may be included
in the Council, with some associative role for the in-
dependent homelands.
Implications for Stability
85. Government reforms will continue to lag be-
hind Nonwhite expectations and will undoubtedly be
rejected by Nonwhite youths and intellectuals. Policy
changes that would have partially satisfied Nonwhite
demands several years ago are only now being made.
In addition, Blacks, Coloreds, and Asians alike rec-
ognize that Botha's objective is not the creation of a
multiracial government but the preservation of effec-
tive White control. Government persistence in uni-
laterally devising formulas for change and then, under
the guise of "consultations," presenting reforms on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis will continue to reinforce this
skepticism.
86. Over the long term, Botha's program will prob-
ably result in significant improvements in living con-
ditions for some Nonwhites. Within the majority Black
population, however, the primary benefactors of gov-
ernment programs will be the 10 to 15 percent of
Blacks who have urban residency rights. Life for
homeland and rural Blacks will probably remain one
of grinding poverty. Equally important, it will take
several years for improvements to materialize for ur-
ban Blacks, and an even more volatile ,situation could
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develop as expectations for change far outpace the
government's ability to deliver.
87. More fundamentally, Botha's strategy for creat-
ing an urban Black middle class may be bankrupt;
even if it is successfully implemented it may do little
to assuage Black demands for full political rights.
Botha's failure to achieve even the beginnings of rap-
prochement with the Colored and Asian communities
is a case in point. Coloreds and Asians long have bene-
fited from greater government attention, and on paper
they are equal partners with Whites in the President's
Council. Yet most of their leaders regard government
initiatives as halfway measures at best and are
demanding full political rights, not only for themselves
but also for Blacks. More important, Colored youths, as
the recent wave of school boycotts show, are even
more impatient than their parents in demanding eco-
nomic and political progress; improvements in the past
are irrelevant to the young. Thus, government moves
to allow Blacks to buy homes or to improve their edu-
cation are unlikely to satisfy current Black demands.
Moreover, a new Black middle class may well produce
a younger generation which, like today's Colored
youth, will have even greater expectation for change.
88. At best, many urban Blacks will remain apa-
thetic to government-created bodies such as the
Soweto Community Council. If Black leaders such as
Motlana or Buthelezi agree to participate in new
collaborative structures, they will probably use them
as platforms for demanding even more change. Botha
will then be faced with the choice of meeting some of
these demands to give credibility to those willing to
cooperate with the government, or ignoring the de-
mands and creating even greater tensions than would
have occurred in the absence of the collaborative
structures.
89. Black workers, fewer than 1 percent of whom
are now unionized, will become more organized and
more confident of their abilities to force economic-as
well as political-concessions from management and
government. Black consumers, as they have in recent
months, will continue to support striking workers by
boycotting products and protesting increases in the
cost of living. The government could respond to these
developments by cracking down on Black unions and
consumer organizations. Such actions, however, would
only work against attempts to establish a Black middle
class with a vested interest in maintaining the status
auo.
90. With Botha unlikely to introduce reform
quickly enough to satisfy Nonwhite demands, the
tempo of racial violence will probably quicken during
the next two years. The government will be forced to
deal simultaneously with two distinct forms of domes-
tic discontent-actions by laborers and consumers
aimed at improving economic conditions and more
violent, less focused demonstrations by militant Non-
white youths seeking more fundamental reforms.
There may be increasing linkages among these groups.
91. For their part, the Black insurgent groups, pri-
marily the ANC, will continue to pull off occasional
spectacular operations, possibly with increasing fre-
quency. Government security forces, however, prob-
ably will be able to prevent urban terrorism from be-
coming a serious threat to the government. The ANC
will increase its efforts to infiltrate student and labor
movements but will continue to be hampered by gov-
ernment security measures. Given the growing poverty
and despair of rural and homeland Blacks, the ANC
may find it easier to expand its activities in rural areas.
Nonetheless, rural violence is likely to remain less sig-
nificant than urban violence.
92. Between now and the end of 1982, racial vio-
lence could at times become sufficiently intense and
widespread to raise questions about Pretoria's ability
to contain it. Nevertheless, the overall pattern of un-
rest is likely to remain that of largely spontaneous
eruptions over specific local grievances. Lacking over-
all organization and leadership, these disturbances will
probably continue to be quelled by harsh police meas-
ures. Crackdowns against activist leaders will follow,
along with remedial but incomplete reforms. South
Africa is highly unlikely to break out of this self-
perpetuating cycle of violence and partial reform over
the next three years. Indeed, Botha, who has not hesi-
tated to use the tools of repression in the past, may feel
compelled to demonstrate to his White constituency
that, while he is determined to give Nonwhites a bet-
ter deal, he is equally determined to move harshly
against Nonwhites who refuse to do it his way. Botha
recently hinted for the first time that the Army could
be deployed inside South Africa to contain violence.
93. Faced with racial unrest and verkrampte
resistance to his reform program, Botha will in all like-
lihood continue to concentrate power in his own hands
and those of the new technocratic-business-military
elite at the expense of Parliament. So far there has
been little White opposition to the shift in the locus of
power. Although Whites are attached to their par-
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liamentary institutions, many would acquiesce if himself under this degree of pressure before the end of
Botha deemed it necessary to scrap or circumvent 1982, but he appears to be positioning himself to be
them in order to deal with Nonwhite violence or able to run South Africa as a strongman at some point
verkrampte obstructionism. Botha is unlikely to feel in the future.
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