NIGERIA: CHALLENGES TO MODERATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP97S00289R000200230011-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 24, 2011
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: August 1, 1984
• Content Type: SNIE

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Nigeria: Challenges
to Moderation
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SNIE 64.28
1 August 1984
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SNIE 64.2-84/S
NIGERIA: CHALLENGES
TO MODERATION
Information available as of 16 July 1984 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate.
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE ...................................................................................... 1
KEY JUDGMENTS .............................................................................. 3
DISCUSSION ........................................................................................ 7
Responses to the Challenges ............................................................. 7
Holding Off Economic Collapse .................................................. 8
Garnering Public Support ............................................................ 8
Checking the Military .................................................................. 11
Chances for Constructive Change ................................................... 11
Domestic Economic Constraints .................................................. 12
The International Environment ................................................... 12
Administrative Roadblocks .......................................................... 12
Political Realities ........................................................................... 12
Uncertain Outlook ............................................................................ 13
Senior Officers Muddle Through ................................................ 13
Nigerian-Western Relations ......................................................... 14
Opportunities for Outside Meddling ........................................... 14
Prospects for Overthrow .............................................................. 15
Likely Successor Regimes-Turning Away From Moderation? ... 15
Moderate Officers Seize Power ................................................... 15
Radical Officers Seize Power ....................................................... 16
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SCOPE NOTE
This Estimate assesses the outlook for political instability in Nigeria
over the next two years as the moderate* senior officers who seized
power last December attempt to hang on in the face of continued
economic deterioration and the constant threat of a coup. The SNIE
highlights the depth of the political challenges facing Nigeria and the
narrow range of options and resources available to current leaders who
seek to continue Nigeria's generally moderate, pragmatic, and pro-
Western domestic and foreign policies. In addition, we outline the most
serious threats-particularly from frustrated radical' junior and middle
grade Army officers-to the regime, possible opportunities for in-
creased Soviet and Libyan meddling, and the implications of Nigeria's
uncertain future for the United States.
Nigeria's economic problems are not dealt with in detail in this
Estimate. Nor does the assessment include extensive treatment of the
outlook for political stability and economic development in the longer
term. More detailed analysis of these prospects will depend in large
measure on the government's performance during what we believe will
be the critical next two years.
'We realize that not all senior officers are "moderate," nor are they likely to act with moderation at all
times. At the same time, not all junior officers are "radical," particularly if that word is taken to mean leftist
or Marxist-Leninist oriented. The critical point is that a government led by junior officers probably would
act more impetuously than one led by senior officers and may not be as friendly to the West.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
Nigeria's political climate during the next two years will be highly
volatile, subject to sudden, unanticipated and perhaps violent leadership
changes, and there could be temptations to experiment with political
and economic structures either along radical populist lines or to redress
perceived ethnic inequalities. Preoccupation with coup threats and
potential popular unrest will prevent whoever governs from taking even
the first halting steps toward longer term economic recovery and
establishing stable political institutions.
The fragile social fabric and political order already severely
strained by persistent ethnic and regional rivalries, and by growing
public frustration with the inability of any Nigerian government to
realize the country's economic and political promise, will be further
strained if economic decline remains unchecked. Serious ethnic division
and ungovernability over the longer run would increase Nigeria's
vulnerability to breakup along regional lines which the 1967-70 civil
war narrowly averted.
Barring decisive changes in their approach to economic problems,
the moderate senior northern officers who seized power last December
may at best be able to muddle through, maintaining Nigeria's existing
structure and generally pro-Western domestic and foreign policies
while holding at bay coup plotting by junior and middle grade officers.
In any event, there is a better-than-even chance that less senior officers
will seize power, perhaps violently lashing out at those they hold
responsible for failing to realize Nigeria's economic and political
potential. We foresee very little possibility in the near term that
Nigeria's armed forces will return power to civilians, but some form of
mixed military/civilian government may evolve, possibly dominated by
radicals.
Even if General Buhari's government manages to hang on, the
facade of senior officer unity is likely to fray in the face of economic
woes that defy quick solution and dwindling public support. A shuffle
of key officers-a strong possibility-could provide cosmetic change
but will do little to improve the regime's lackluster and disorganized
performance or ameliorate the discontent of others in the military who
hold this and past governments culpable for Nigeria's current economic
decline, political decay, and international ineffectiveness. Moreover, the
government will find it increasingly difficult to allay the already strong
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suspicion among southern and minority tribal groups that the current
regime is little more than an extension of the former northern, Muslim-
dominated civilian government in uniform.
Despite the dismal outlook under a senior officer dominated
government, prospects for economic recovery and political stability will
worsen considerably in the short run if junior or middle grade officers
take power. Driven more by nationalism and populism than by leftist
ideology, these officers are likely to focus first on housecleaning and
retribution against former civilian and military officials. The potential
for widespread and serious violence will increase substantially as less
experienced officers wrestle with holding in check always powerful
ethnic, regional, and religious rivalries during a prolonged period of
political uncertainty and economic decline.
There is little likelihood in the near term of a significant economic
turnaround given Nigeria's volatile political atmosphere, haphazard
mechanisms for making and implementing economic policy, and
paucity of financial resources. Economic and oil policies are likely to
become more unpredictable if the downward economic spiral shows no
signs of slowing. ~f pushed to the wall, frustrated military leaders may
consider attempting to "go it alone," breaking with OPEC and renounc-
ing Nigeria's international debt obligations.
Substantial additional revenues-whether from increased oil sales,
eased debt burdens, or new loans-would give Lagos some breathing
space, but would not contribute much to restoring Nigeria's longer term
economic health. Those in power would find it difficult to resist
pressure to ease current restrictions and divert added monies into
relieving popular hardships, thereby further delaying overdue structural
reforms to lessen dependence on oil revenues. Moreover, endemic
corruption and maladministration would further dilute the impact of
any substantial increase in revenues.
Whoever rules will continue to claim an African leadership role for
Nigeria, but Lagos will have few economic resources to influence events
and will be preoccupied with domestic concerns. Nevertheless, criticism
of Western policies in southern Africa will not abate and probably
would increase, particularly under more radical leadership.
Prolonged political ferment will provide new opportunities for the
Soviets and the Libyans to increase their now limited influence in
Nigeria. While Moscow and Tripoli will find it difficult to make
significant inroads as long as senior officers remain in control, a more
radical, less sophisticated, and more impressionable field grade officer
government probably would be more willing to at least entertain
overtures for closer relations, especially if promises of economic and
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military help are used as lures. Moscow and Tripoli also may be able to
fan anti-Western attitudes by attempting to lay the blame for current
economic conditions at the doorstep of the West and Nigeria's histori-
cally pro-Western leaders. In addition, support funneled to radical
Muslim groups, disillusioned students, and economically disadvantaged
workers is likely to have greater impact as economic conditions
deteriorate and the government becomes more shaky. Nevertheless,
Moscow and Tripoli's political influence would be limited, particularly
since neither is capable or willing of taking on Nigeria's economic
burden.
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DISCUSSION
1. Nigeria-almost 25 years after independence-
continues to search for political institutions that will
allow for political sharing of power; dampen ethnic,
regional, and religious rivalries; and wisely use eco-
nomic resources. Twice-in 1966 and 1983-the
Army has overthrown civilian governments, citing as
justifications rampant corruption, mismanagement,
election rigging, squandering of resources, and sullying
of Nigeria's international image. Twice-in 1966 and
1975-Army officers have seized power from fellow
officers, accusing them of many of the same political
and economic sins committed by discredited civilian
regimes. Despite a record of political and ethnic
ferment that has led to four coups and a civil war from
1967 to 1970, Nigeria's military and civilian leaders by
and large have sought to avoid radical social and
political change at home in preference for relatively
moderate and pragmatic policies. At the same time,
they have sought to maintain close-if sometimes
strained and difficult-ties with the West.
2. Nigeria's fifth military Head of State-Major
General Muhammadu Buhari, a 41-year-old Muslim
Hausa from Kaduna state-since seizing power in
December 1983 has attempted to steer his government
in the broad tradition of his military and civilian
predecessors. Political power rests largely in the hands
of senior officers of northern Muslim origin, many of
whom served during the 1975-79 military govern-
ment, and the regime once again has turned to civil
servants-mainly holdovers from previous govern-
ments-to provide technical and administrative exper-
tise. (See inset.) While Buhari and his fellow officers
overthrew former President Shagari's civilian adminis-
tration, they were quick to assure Nigerians and the
international community that the takeover did not
signal a turn toward more "radical" policies, and that
Lagos would respect existing commitments.
3. In our estimation Nigeria's current moderate
military leaders face serious challenges to their leader-
ship and policies. In particular, there appears to be
growing concern among younger Nigerians over the
degree to which Nigeria's oil wealth has been squan-
dered, and recognition that a "business-as-usual" ap-
proach is not a sufficient answer to the seemingly
intractable problems of corruption and mismanage-
ment. Nigeria's political climate during the next two
While members of all three branches of the Nigerian
armed forces sit on the present Supreme Military
Council (SMC), all the top posts are held by high-
ranking officers of the Army. In addition, although it is
accurate to describe the SMC as dominated by Muslim
northerners, the organization is not an exclusive Muslim
nor northern Hausa group.
Overall, the ethnic composition of the armed forces is
difficult to ascertain with accuracy, but certain general-
izations can be made. Successive Nigerian governments
have attempted to recruit proportionally from the
various regions. The officer corps historically has been
recruited from among leading families and tended to be
dominated by northern Muslims, Christian and Muslim
Yorubas, and predominantly Christian Middle Belt
minority groups. The few Ibos on the SMC hold lower
ranking posts and supported the federal government
during the civil war.
The organization of the Nigerian armed forces closely
parallels US rank structure. The term senior officers
refers to those officers at the rank of brigadier and
above. "Junior officer" roughly corresponds to the ranks
lieutenant through captain; "middle grade officer"
corresponds to major, and lieutenant colonel through
colonel. The term field grade officers as used through-
out the text may include members from the latter two
groups.
years and beyond is likely to become increasingly
volatile and unpredictable as leaders and their critics
wrestle with what should be done about economic
hard times and what government institutions are best
suited to hold Nigeria together. While no clear alterna-
tive leaders or political philosophies have yet emerged
to capture the public imagination, whoever governs
Nigeria must now add to their list of difficulties the
issue of contending with newer generations of Nigeri-
ans who are frustrated with what they see as the
"failed politics and policies of the past," and believe
their country must recapture its lost promise by
moving in new directions.
Responses to the Challenges
4. Buhari and his fellow senior officers began their
tenure by pledging decisive action to revive Nigeria's
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flagging economy and to bring corrupt civilian politi-
cians to book. Instead, their actions to date have
amounted to a holding action aimed at staving off
further economic decline and preventing another coup
by junior and middle grade officers, many of whom
feel shortchanged by their lack of influence in the
postcoup government. Most of the populace see the
government as adrift and regard senior officers as little
different or better equipped to deal with Nigeria's
myriad political and economic problems than their ill-
fated civilian predecessors.
Holding Off Economic Collapse
5. Senior officers seized power in the midst of
Nigeria's worst economic crisis (see inset) since inde-
pendence in 1960. While Nigeria's economic down-
turn stems in' part from the inability of the Shagari
government to cut spending in the face of dramatical-
ly reduced oil revenues, past military governments
must also share the blame. Successive military rulers in
the 1970s-presented with the prospect of the rapid
development fueled by what was then seen as almost
unlimited oil revenues-ignored agriculture and em-
barked on overly ambitious and wasteful industrial
development projects. The reckless spending of the oil
boom years has dissipated Nigeria's financial resources
and has fed corruption, taxed Nigeria's bureaucracy,
and widened the gap between the majority of the
population and the wealthy in government and
business.
6. The early confidence of senior officers that
Nigeria's economic slide could be halted simply by
more prudent management and the return of ill-gotten
gains from former civilian politicians has now given
way to a better recognition of the depth of economic
.problems. This recognition, however, has not led to the
charting of an effective economic action plan. With
little consistent policy direction from the ruling coun-
cil and no individual or department charged with
overall responsibility for coordinating recovery effects,
economic decision making under Buhari continues to
be characterized by contradictory economic signals
and conflicting policy statements.
7. Early efforts by the military government to force
traders to lower prices and increase supplies of con-
sumer goods had little impact beyond alienating pow-
erful trading interests. The regime quickly was forced
to shift gears, backing off on promises of better times
ahead and calling instead for greater austerity, disci-
pline, and sacrifice in recognition that it had little
alternative but to continue many of Shagari's policies.
The Buhari government in fact has been forced to
pare civil service rolls, cut already inadequate and
poorly administered public services, reintroduce un-
popular taxes and school fees, further reduce imports,
and restrict the power of Nigeria's states to borrow
abroad.
8. At the same time, Buhari's economic advisers
have fitfully pursued IMF negotiations and debt re-
schedulings, unsuccessfully sought loans from potential
donors such as Saudi Arabia, and obtained a modest
increase from OPEC. While key technocrats may
recognize the need for an IMF agreement and struc-
tural economic reform, senior officers continue to
search for less politically risky solutions to Nigeria's
economic crisis which so far have proved elusive.
9. The Buhari government continues to pay lipserv-
ice to the need to lessen dependence on oil, increase
agricultural production, develop indigenous industries,
and build Nigeria's infrastructure. From the perspec-
tive of the military leaders, however, basic reforms
must take a backseat to the politically more pressing
priority of making some apparent headway against
immediate problems.
Garnering Public Support
10. While there was little public mourning over the
demise of civilian government, unhappiness with the
Shagari administration has yet to be transformed into
active support for the Buhari regime. Although senior
officers have tried to present a dynamic image, they
appear increasingly at a loss about how to maintain
this image as it becomes more and more obvious that
they will be unable to fulfill rash promises made in the
wake of the coup to get the economy moving, lower
prices, clear up salary arrears, and swiftly punish
former civilian politicians.
11. Nigerians in past economic good times have
exhibited a remarkable tolerance for endemic corrup-
tion, political chicanery, and administrative inefficien-
cy and mismanagement. There is increasing evidence,
however, that public disenchantment with the seem-
ingly inevitable cycle of failed civilian regimes fol-
lowed by military regimes is growing and that this
disillusionment goes beyond unhappiness with the
performance of the government of the day. Although
the degree and spread of discontent is difficult to
gauge, growing numbers of Nigerians appear to be
increasingly cynical about what they see as an unwill-
ingness by traditional elite groups to jeopardize
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Barring a dramatic change in economic policy or an
unexpected upsurge in the demand for Nigerian oil,
whatever regime governs in Lagos during the next two
years is unlikely to make much headway in overcoming
the country's daunting array of economic problems.
Despite longstanding government promises to lessen
dependence on oil, 95 percent of Lagos's total foreign
exchange receipts and 80 percent of government reve-
nues still come from oil. Oil production has fallen from
a high of 2.3 million barrels per day in 1979 to between
1.3 and 1.6 million barrels per day in 1984 (see chart).
Oil revenues this year are likely to reach only $14
billion compared to a peak of $24 billion in 1980.
Shortages of foreign exchange, a buildup in external
arrears, and a lack of credit lines have caused shortages
of imported raw materials that have virtually crippled
most sectors of Nigeria's import-dependent economy.
The value of imports in 1983, including those from
Nigeria's major trading partners-the US, the UK,
France, West Germany, and Japan-declined nearly 30
percent from 1982 levels. Most industries are operating
at 25 to 30 percent of capacity, and few companies
have been able to avoid large-scale layoffs. More busi-
nesses will have to close this year due to the lack of
import credits, or failure to shift to domestically pro-
duced supplies. In addition, the government has fired
thousands from the bloated civil service, reintroduced
unpopular taxes and fees, frozen wages, and drastically
scaled back or abandoned some overly ambitious devel-
opment projects. Lagos also has barred further borrow-
ing by the nearly bankrupt 19 states whose share of
federally apportioned oil monies-their principal
source of revenue-has been cut back drastically by
Nigeria's reduced oil earnings.
For many Nigerians, spot shortages of essential com-
modities (including food), high prices, growing unem-
ployment, and deteriorating public services are making
life increasingly difficult and frustrating. Nearly 30
percent of the population lives in urban areas and are
dependent on the money economy. Moreover, Nigeria
has become a major importer of food since domestic
agriculture-inefficient in the best of times and recent-
ly hurt by drought conditions-has proved unable to
keep pace with population growth averaging 3.4 per-
cent annually according to the US Census Bureau.
While previous Nigerian governments have pledged to
use oil revenues for social betterment, the average
Nigerian today feels he has benefited little from the
country's oil wealth which is seen as having ended up in
the hands of relatively few businessmen and the govern-
ment elite.
The growing difficulties associated with doing busi-
ness in Nigeria along with Lagos's tangled international
financial relations are seriously erroding the confidence
of foreign investors and creditors. Reports of companies
shutting down operations in black Africa's largest and
potentially most lucrative market have increased appre-
ciably in the last year. Moreover, the inability of
Nigeria to clear up some $6-9 billion in short-term
arrears and reach agreement with the IMF are jeopar-
dizing future borrowings.
Nigerian leaders will find their debt increasingly
burdensome during the next two years as Lagos is
forced to spend an increasingly large portion of export
revenues on servicing its debt. Nigeria's debt service on
its medium- and long-term debt will exceed $3 billion
this year. While Lagos thus far has managed to remain
current on these obligations, Nigeria's debt service ratio
could climb to 25 percent this year, compared to 3
percent in 1980.
Despite the pressing and recognized need for an IMF
agreement, the nationalistic Nigerians are showing
growing signs of trying to "go it alone," most likely by
increasing oil production, continued tight import re-
strictions, and trying to coerce favors from their credi-
tors. Lagos's adamant refusal to devalue its currency
have put negotiations with the IMF on hold and stalled
efforts to reach agreement with official creditors. More-
over, negotiations with potential bilateral donors-such
as Saudi Arabia-have proved desultory and show little
sign of providing Lagos with significantly increased
revenues.
The ability of any Nigerian government to unilateral-
ly manage the country's economic crisis effectively is
questionable. Nigeria lacks an effective and timely
economic decision making apparatus. And follow-
through implementation of policy by the ponderous and
inefficient bureacracy is erratic at best. Moreover,
Nigeria's administrative weaknesses are compounded
by rampant corruption and infrastructure shortcomings
that include sporadic power supplies, overburdened
transportation facilities, and inefficient industrial
plants.
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Figure 2
Nigeria: Selected Economic Indicators
Real GDP Growth
Percent
Consumer Price Inflation
Percent
5.5
0.4
-2.1
-3.1 -3.0
-5.3
-6.7
Foreign Exchange Reserves, Yearend
Billion US S
Composition of Real GDP, 1981
Percent
Construction 13.0
Services 32.0
e Estimated.
b Projected.
Oil Production
Million b/d
Composition of Exports, 1981
Percent
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their own privileged position by seriously tackling
corruption and by their inability to boldly tackle
Nigeria's myriad economic and political problems.
12. This general malaise is compounded by south-
ern-particularly the Yoruba-and minority tribe
frustration with what they see as simply one more in a
long line of northern, Muslim-dominated govern-
ments. The Buhari regime's claim that it represents a
significant change from past governments has been
hurt in the military and public at large by the
preponderance of senior northern officers in key
positions on the ruling military council, the retention
of many powerful technocrats associated with the
Shagari administration, and the belief in some circles
that key former northern politicians will not be treated
as harshly as former southern politicians in corruption
trials.
13. Moreover, special interest groups that offered
early support for the coup increasingly have voiced
growing skepticism as the regime's policies-or lack
thereof-impact more directly on their welfare. Stu-
dents and labor, in particular, have found it difficult
to support measures that have included reintroduction
of school fees, increased worker layoffs, and wage
freezes. While Buhari can take some solace that these
groups lack the organization and resources to offer a
serious direct challenge, his regime increasingly finds
itself being forced to spend scarce political capital to
keep students and workers in line.
14. With little to offer Nigerians in the way of
economic hope, the regime has been forced to rely
heavily on symbolic ploys. The detailing of financial
misdeeds of former civilian politicians, fanning Nigeri-
an xenophobia by raising the specter of a mercenary-
led invasion and "sinister forces" pushing an IMF
agreement, and launching a highly publicized "war
against indiscipline" have given the regime some time,
but the impact is wearing thin. Moreover, even popu-
lar steps such as trying corrupt former politicians carry
risks if it appears that the government has singled out
certain ethnic or political groups for harsh treatment
while overlooking misdeeds of others.
15. Senior officers have become increasingly intol-
erant of open questioning of their rule. The military
has issued decrees that allow press censorship, jailing
of critical journalists, and restriction of legal challenges
to government decisions. How far the government is
willing to go in implementing authoritarian decrees
that run counter to Nigeria's traditions of a
freewheeling press and independent judiciary remains
unclear, but thus far the government has gained little
public currency for the moves.
Checking the Military
16. The most immediate and serious threat to the
power of senior officers comes from within the mili-
tary. Nigeria's 130,000-man armed forces are once
again an active political arena subject to the ethnic
and regional rivalries, personal ambitions, policy dis-
putes, and power plays that characterized civilian
politics. Senior officers are well aware of the fragility
of the military's cohesion, potential challenges to their
authority, and the divisive impact on military disci-
pline and training that comes from renewed military
involvement in governing Nigeria, but thus far have
been able to do little more than implement stopgap
measures designed to forestall coup attempts.
17. There appears to be a growing gap between
senior officers-most in their forties and beneficiaries
of rapid promotions during past military and civilian
governments-and more junior and middle grade
officers frustrated over promotion prospects, and their
lack of influence with more cautious and conservative
superiors. This discontent is compounded among many
southern and minority tribal officers who are disillu-
sioned with what they see as persistent northern
Muslim domination of national affairs.
18. Thus far, the regime has counted on the shuf-
fling of command and personnel assignments, forced
retirements, and its extensive but flawed security
apparatus to forestall would-be coup plotters. But
these measures also have added to the list of com-
plaints by field grade officers and done little to
ameliorate root causes of discontent. Moreover, while
the government has attempted to meet the training
and equipment needs of the services, there is little
evidence to suggest that this has won the government
greater loyalty within the ranks.
Chances for Constructive Change
19. Without major changes in economic policy,
there is little likelihood during the next two years that
the severity of economic and political problems facing
the current government will ease or that resources
available to the government will dramatically in-
crease. More realistically, the options available to
senior officers for launching an effective economic
recovery program and developing stable and popular
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political institutions will narrow further. Senior offi-
cers will be unable to let down their political guard as
they attempt to juggle public demands for immediate
improvements with the steps necessary if Nigeria is to
begin the difficult tasks it has set for itself of achieving
self-sufficiency in food production, lessening depend-
ence on imports, refurbishing and extending the now-
decaying infrastructure, streamlining and revitalizing
its bureaucracy, and developing nonoil sources of
revenue.
20. Nigeria's bleak economic prospects for the next
two years will allow the regime to hold out little public
hope that living conditions will improve for most
Nigerians. The regime will find itself on a constant
tightrope as it calls for discipline and sacrifice, prom-
ises to pursue "economically responsible" policies, and
reaffirms its commitment to economic development.
Buhari and his fellow officers face the prospect of
constantly scrambling to ensure steady supplies of
food, hold prices within reason, and keep import
dependent industries at least partially open.
21. Engaged full time in attempting to stave off
economic collapse, the government can do little more
in the near term other than to reaffirm its commit-
ment to eventual structural changes. There is little
prospect that senior officers will feel politically confi-
dent enough to embark on economic reform that they
believe would produce social dislocations and raise
ethnic and political tensions. Reviving agriculture and
reducing dependence on food imports will remain the
number-one priority, but few significant policy
changes to bring this about can be expected. Exacer-
bating the problem will be a lack of resources, bureau-
cratic mismanagement, and government uncertainty
over how to best proceed. The government will contin-
ue to funnel funds into costly high visibility projects,
such as the new capital in Abuja and the Ajaokuta
steelworks, with little likelihood of an economic
payoff.
fort-will find it difficult to overcome present policy-
making and bureaucratic disorganization and strictly
adhere to an agreed-upon course of economic action.
23. As senior officers become more economically
desperate, they are likely to view increasing oil pro-
duction as the least politically painful alternative.
Senior officers recognize, however, that their leverage
on the oil market outside OPEC is limited and will
continue to profess support for OPEC. Given current
market conditions and Lagos's past commitment, it is
unlikely that Nigeria would leave OPEC. Withdrawal
from OPEC probably would be viewed as a last
desperate resort by senior officers.
24. Substantially increased oil revenues or major
loans from bilateral sources such as Saudi Arabia-
unlikely prospects-would provide Lagos with more
funds and help ease the immediate economic burden.
The government would probably use the added reve-
nues to win temporary popularity by loosening import
restrictions and increasing government spending.
Moreover, the receipt of additional funds probably
would postpone consideration of necessary economic
readjustment still further.
25. Senior officers face a difficult and long-term
task in revamping an oversized and inefficient
bureaucracy-at both the federal and state levels-
that has been hard hit by a lack of resources and policy
direction, purges, constant political interference, poor
working conditions, and corruption. The issue of cor-
ruption will be increasingly burdensome and difficult
to sidestep, for all Nigerian governments have found
the longer they hold power the more vulnerable they
become to charges of corruption. The regime is likely
to continue to punish selected individuals found guilty
of the most egregious forms of corruption, but move
more warily lest pressure for a wider inquiry set off
forces that could upset the balance of power and
threaten the government's control.
22. As long as senior officers hold power, Lagos is
likely to attempt to avoid renouncing its debts or
turning away from its international financial obliga-
tions. This is likely to be difficult and frustrating,
however, as senior officers resist any "financial
strings" that they think could provoke a backlash at
home. Moreover, Lagos-even with a good faith ef-
26. The twin impressions that this regime is little
more than another in a long line of northern-dominat-
ed governments and that it has no new solutions to
Nigeria's problems will be increasingly hard to dispel.
Symbolic campaigns such as the "war against indisci-
pline" may make the government appear to be in
control, but will be overshadowed by the more power-
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ful image of government indecisiveness and protection
of northern interests in the face of economic
stagnation.
27. In our estimation, dismal economic prospects,
coupled with the growing impression that the govern-
ment is a contributing factor to the economic decline,
could produce a potentially explosive situation. While
Nigeria's ethnic, religious, and regional diversity will
make it difficult for any nationwide protest movement
to gain the cohesive strength necessary to seriously
challenge the military for control, the regime might
face a growing number of small-scale outbursts against
whoever is perceived to be in authority. Urban over-
crowding, growing unemployment, delayed salary
payments, high prices, shortages of consumer goods
including food, and further reductions in already
grossly inadequate public services could spark demon-
strations that will strain Nigeria's social fabric and
weaken the regime's credibility. Even the extensive
extended family system-which has cushioned the
impact of economic downturns in the past-will be
hard pressed to cope.
28. The always contentious issue among southern
and minority tribal groups of "northern domination"
will become more salient over time if-as appears
likely-northern senior officers prove unwilling to
give other tribal groups key positions on the ruling
military council. In the north, radical Muslim
groups-although they can claim little widespread
following at present-may find more receptive audi-
ences for their anti-Western antisecular government
philosophies as economic conditions worsen. Northern
universities will provide particularly fertile recruiting
grounds as students search for more satisfying alterna-
tives to what they see as status quo, foreign-influenced
secular governments and outmoded, conservative tra-
ditional elites.
29. We do not believe conditions in Nigeria have
deteriorated to the point of ungovernability or the
imminent disintegration of the Nigerian nation. The
continued failure of this regime to exert decisive
leadership, however, will undermine the government's
credibility and contribute to the growing impression
among many Nigerians that more dramatic change is
called for. Prolonged leadership crises and unrelenting
economic hardship during the next two years are
likely to contribute to heightened ethnic, regional, and
societal rivalries and may serve as precursors to more
widespread and serious societal ferment.
30. For the time being, competition for political
power is likely to be waged largely within the military.
There is little prospect that they will relinquish control
of the political process in the near future, or quickly
establish procedures for the orderly transfer of politi-
cal power to civilian hands. Moreover, although public
frustration with military rule is likely to grow as the
lack of progress becomes more evident, the wide-
spread perception throughout Nigeria that the last
experiment in civilian government was a failure will
take time to dissipate. Nevertheless, the military has
little choice but to continue relying on civilians for
administrative and technical expertise and a mixed
military/civilian government could begin to evolve.
Senior Officers Muddle Through
31. Under these circumstances, the most optimistic
outlook for Nigeria during the next two years revolves
around senior officers muddling through, struggling to
limit the political fallout from economic decline and to
keep opposition in the military and the public at large
off balance and in check. While such a scenario could
contribute to a surface calm and impression that
Nigeria is "making do" as usual, there is little prospect
that senior officers would be able to carry out the
more far-reaching economic reforms that would con-
tribute to political stability.
32. Senior officers are likely to continue to publicly
state their commitment to honor Nigeria's economic
obligations. At the same time, however, the regime
also is likely to become increasingly desperate to
record any success. Sharply worsening economic con-
ditions could lead the regime to believe that, despite
the negative economic impact, it has no political
choice but to chance dramatic action. Moves such as
formally breaking off negotiations with the IMF,
leaving OPEC, a debt moratorium, or renouncing
Nigeria's foreign debt, however, would win the regime
only temporary popular acclaim, at the cost of longer
term economic recovery.
33. Senior officers will become less tolerant of open
opposition as public disillusionment and military frus-
tration mount. The regime will move forcefully to
crush any challenge to its rule whether from labor and
students, the press, or spontaneous outbursts by reli-
gious fanatics. Efforts to clamp down, however, proba-
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bly would be viewed by much of the public as a sign
of weakness rather than strength.
34. Even if senior officers manage to discover plots
and fend off coup attempts by disgruntled officers,
living with the constant threat of a coup, steadily
eroding public support, and insurmountable economic
problems will increase the probability of dissension
within the ruling military council. Conflicts are likely
to be particularly intense among ambitious senior
officers on the ruling military council, particularly
among those now holding largely political positions,
and those who still command troops. Leadership shuf-
fles including the strong possibility of a palace coup
are likely. The new leadership would attempt to
demonstrate greater vigor, but such a coup could result
in a narrower power base and create new political and
ethnic divisions, making the regime all the more
vulnerable to a coup from below.
Nigerian-Western Relations
35. The tone of Nigerian-Western relations will be
determined in large part by Lagos's hopes for sympa-
thy for Nigeria's economic plight and willingness to
come to Nigeria's aid, including interceding with the
IMF for less rigorous terms for financial support.
While senior officers are likely to attempt to avoid a
sharp rupture in Nigerian-Western ties, relations may
become more testy in the face of persistent demands
from the Western governments and creditors that
Lagos adopt policies along the lines proposed by the
IMF. Senior officers will find it difficult, as the
economy deteriorates, to resist laying blame for the
current mess at the doorstep of the West, international
creditors, and the IMF. Lagos will continue, however,
the timeworn Nigerian practice of pleading for under-
standing of its "unique" problems and stressing the
need for Nigeria's "friends" to distinguish between the
government's public statements geared for domestic
consumption and its more reassuring private de-
marches on political issues.
36. The thrust of any initiatives, however, will be
blunted by preoccupation with domestic politics, a
shortage of economic resources, a lack of clear policy
goals, and other African states' suspicions of-and in
some cases hostility to-Nigeria's motives. Neverthe-
less, Lagos will continue to claim-and fitfully pur-
sue-a leadership role in continental African affairs,
regardless of the depth of the domestic economic
crisis. Senior officers, for example, will continue to call
publicly for an OAU solution to the Chadian conflict
and vehemently criticize South African racial policies.
37. Lagos's perception of its common interests with-
in the Nonaligned Movement, its suspicion of Western
involvement in African affairs, and public sentiment
in Nigeria are unlikely to make Nigeria back or side
with US and Western initiatives on issues. such as
Namibia, Cuban troop withdrawals from Angola, or
Chad. As long as senior officers hold sway, however,
the government is likely to attempt at the least to
temper Nigeria's proclivity for critical rhetoric. On
larger East-West issues, Lagos will attempt to maintain
a nonaligned posture, while leaning toward the West.
The United States and its European allies, however,
should have little hope that Lagos will take the lead in
rounding up support for the West or that Nigeria's
uncoordinated foreign policy making apparatus can be
counted on to pursue consistent policies.
Opportunities for Outside Meddling
38. The Soviet Union and Libya can expect to gain
little influence in government circles, particularly as
long as senior officers hold the reins of power. Individ-
ual officers within the ruling council, however,, may
prove receptive to overtures, especially if they carry
the promise of personal economic gain. Senior officers
are likely to attempt to maintain "correct" relations
with powers such as Libya and the Soviet Union, while
in reality holding these powers at arm's length. Nige-
ria's economic desperation, however, is likely to drive
Lagos to open negotiations with any power that could
be a potential aid donor. These negotiations are unlike-
ly to signal a change in policy or serve as forerunners
to closer or more extensive ties.
39. Outside powers can, and probably will attempt
to gain influence among frustrated ethnic, religious, or
other interest groups. While Moscow or Tripoli could
gain some following among increasingly disillusioned
Nigerians in search of alternatives to lackluster mili-
tary rule, Nigeria's social divisions will make it diffi-
cult for any group-especially one tied to outside
powers-to gain a widespread following. Nevertheless,
the potential power of these dissident groups to disrupt
an already shaky Nigerian government far outweighs
their current numerical weakness.
40. Opportunities for outside influence appear
greatest among radical northern Muslim religious
groups or among leftist student and labor groups
frustrated over what they see as the failure of conserv-
ative, status quo oriented governments to radically
transform Nigeria. Libya, for example, could find
sympathetic reaction among some northern Muslims
who reject both the secular national government and
the traditional northern emirate system.
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Prospects for Overthrow
41. In our estimation, there is a high probability
during the next two years that Nigeria's senior officers
will be faced with a coup attempt by less senior
officers and a better-than-even chance that such a
coup would succeed in toppling the current regime.
The persistent threat of a coup will strain the cohesion
of the military and severely test the authority of senior
officers. Unable to take the loyalty of less senior
officers for granted, the Buhari government-or any
successor government-faces the prospect of constant-
ly shuffling command assignments and retiring suspect
officers in an effort to forestall coups. Such moves-
along with extensive security surveillance-are likely
to uncover some coup plotters and deter others, but
will do little to ameliorate the root causes of discon-
tent, and, in fact, will produce intensified grumbling
about senior officer favoritism and tampering with
military procedures.
42. No clear consensus about how Nigeria should be
governed or who should hold power has formed
among the lower ranking officers. These officers'
discontent ranges from frustration over their lack of
influence with senior officers, to unhappiness with the
cautious and conservative policies of the Buhari gov-
ernment, to grumbling over the handling of service
conditions, including the potentially explosive issue of
promotions. Moreover, there appears to be an increas-
ing gap between senior officers whose moderate out-
look has been shaped by extensive foreign military
training, participation in the civil war, and firsthand
experience with the difficulties of governing Nigeria,
and more junior officers-many of whom have been
trained in Nigerian defense schools-who have been
strongly influenced by their perceptions of failed
civilian rule, declining international prestige, and the
squandering of Nigeria's oil resources.
Likely Successor Regimes-Turning Away
From Moderation?
43. The policy direction and stability of any gov-
ernment that comes to power by way of a junior or
middle grade officers' coup will depend in large
measure on how violent the coup is, and on the ethnic
composition and ideological bent of the conspirators.
Any such coup, however, is likely to set in train more
coup plotting among those whose own plans for a coup
may have been preempted. As a consequence, such a
coup will heighten political uncertainty, increase tribal
and regional tensions, severely undermine the integri-
ty of the armed forces, and do little to resolve the
economic dilemma facing Nigeria.
44. A majority of junior and middle grade officers
probably continue to believe that Nigeria's problems
could be corrected if only the government had the will
to proceed with vigor and to take decisive action.
Should a broad-based ethnic coalition of relatively
moderate junior and middle grade officers take con-
trol, they would probably attempt to steer a more
reformist than radical course. At the outset of their
rule, the necessity of solidifying their political control
would supersede the elaboration of a comprehensive
economic recovery plan.
45. In the short run, inexperienced, idealistic, and
politically unsophisticated junior and middle grade
officers would be overwhelmed by the magnitude of
their economic task and the impossibility of producing
quick results. Under pressure from colleagues favoring
more sweeping changes, the moderates could feel
forced to embark on more stridently nationalistic
policies, an extensive housecleaning of the bureaucra-
cy and armed forces, or perhaps even the execution of
some former civilian and military leaders deemed
responsible for the current economic mess.
46. Foreign and domestic policies would become
more unpredictable and erratic as the regime desper-
ately sought to win public favor and at least give the
appearance of making economic headway. Lacking
the resolve and support to stay with politically painful
economic recovery policies whose political payoff was
years away, the regime would fall back on stopgap
measures in an effort to prevent the economic and
political situation from deteriorating further.
47. Relations with the United States and other
Western governments would be more uncertain, but
the new regime, at least in its early days, probably
would continue looking to Washington for understand-
ing and support. The government probably also would
call for a more activist foreign policy and a "harder"
line on southern African issues, but prove unable to go
beyond harsher and more bellicose rhetoric because of
preoccupation with securing domestic control. At the
least, the West could expect stepped-up and more
unrealistic pleas for economic help as well as even
greater skepticism from Lagos concerning the wisdom
of acceding to an IMF economic reform package.
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48. Although moderate, this successor government
would be more inclined to publicly extol the virtues of
nonalignment and give powers such as the Soviet
Union and Libya a closer hearing, especially if prom-
ises of economic assistance are offered. However, the
regime would see little to be gained by chancing an
outright rupture with the US, the UK, and other
Western nations, Nigeria's most important economic
and military partners. As a consequence, any advan-
tage to be gained by the Soviet Union and Libya
would come from support they offered to dissident
radical groups to undermine what is certain to be an
inherently unstable regime.
Radical Officers Seize Power
49. Whoever governs Nigeria also must contend
with the threat of a coup by junior and middle grade
officers who believe that only a "revolutionary cleans-
ing" can set Nigeria on the road to economic recovery,
political order, and regional leadership. While some of
these officers undoubtedly will have gained exposure
to radical ideologies during their school years, the
great majority will have been "radicalized" by frustra-
tion with what they see as the decadence of civilian
and military elites and the inability of past govern-
ments to bring progress to Nigeria. This frustration is
fueled in the case of many southern and minority tribe
officers by bitter resentment over what they see as
their consignment to permanent second-class status in
a northern-dominated military establishment.
50. The regime probably would begin on a highly
populist and nationalistic note, concentrating first on
violently lashing out at the symbols of past govern-
ments, including wide-scale executions of former civil-
ian and military leaders. Radical leaders would show
little hesitation in making grandiose-and wildly con-
tradictory-promises about what can be accom-
plished, but quickly would discover that Nigeria's
economic problems were not correctable by the issuing
of a series of decrees. Ongoing economic negotiations
would move back to square one with radical leaders at
least tempted to claim agreements reached and obliga-
tions incurred by the former regime invalid.
51. A radical regime-if for no other reason than
that it held out the promise of change-could enjoy an
initial wave of public support, but tolerance would
wane as it became apparent that economic and politi-
cal conditions were not going to improve. The regime
also would encounter foot-dragging from existing elites
and conservative interest groups. Unchecked by a
strong central government, ethnic, regional, religious,
and social tensions probably would increase rapidly. In
the longer run, a prolonged political vacuum, worsen-
ing economic conditions, and heightened social and
ethnic tensions would create a climate of political
chaos and could provoke widespread violence, perhaps
setting the stage for a second civil war.
52. The shortrun stability of a radical government
would depend in large measure on the ethnic composi-
tion of the new ruling council. In a worst case
situation, a coup that struck out violently at northern
interests and was dominated by southern or minority
tribesmen would come under immediate threat of a
countercoup by remaining northerners in the Army.
Nor would another northern dominated government
bring political stability to Nigeria. Under these condi-
tions, the integrity of the armed forces could come
under challenge as competing factions struggled for
power.
53. The USSR and Libya probably would look for
opportunities to ingratiate themselves with groups
appearing to have the best prospect of coming out on
top in the power struggle. Even should they back the
"winner," however, their success probably would be a
mixed blessing. Neither Moscow nor Tripoli could
count on such a shaky government to assure them of
long-term influence. Neither is willing nor able to
supplant the West and assume Nigeria's crushing
economic burden.
54. Western and US interests would suffer under a
radical government which probably would fan Nigeri-
an xenophobia by encouraging distrust of Western
banking and business interests, and by raising the
specter of a Western-backed, antiregime destabiliza-
tion effort. Radical leaders probably would promise a
more "independent" oil policy and a lessening of
Nigeria's economic dependence on the West, and
perhaps even could threaten to expropriate some
Western interests in Nigeria. In the longer run and in
the absence of other alternatives, Lagos's dependence
on the West as its chief export market, major supplier
of imports, and most important source of capital could
work to temper Nigerian radicalism. In the short run,
however, Western leverage and interests almost cer-
tainly would be harmed. Moreover, the breach in
Nigeria's traditionally close relations with the West
would take considerable time to heal.
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