THE MAJOR POWERS AND THE SOUTHWEST INDIAN OCEAN ISLANDS: PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP98-00244R000300210070-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 27, 2012
• Sequence Number: 70
• Publication Date: April 1, 1985
• Content Type: NIE

Director of
Central
Intelligence
The Major Powers and the
Southwest Indian Ocean Islands:
Prospects for Change
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/27: CIA-RDP98-00244R000300210070-4
National Intelligence Estimate
Memorandum to Holders
NIE 30/70-82
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April 1 ~S~ b
Copy
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/27: CIA-RDP98-00244R000300210070-4~
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/27: CIA-RDP98-00244R000300210070-4
KEY JUDGMENTS
Since the publication of NIE 30/70-82, The Major Powers and the
Southwest Indian Ocean Islands, the USSR's regional interests in the
island nations of Madagascar, Seychelles, Mauritius, and Comoros have
remained relatively constant. Moscow seeks improved naval and air
access and facilities, supports leftist policies and leaders, and encourages
local opposition to the expansion of Western military activity-most
notably the buildup on Diego Garcia. We believe that, in the near term,
the Soviets will continue to see the island nations as targets of
opportunity, but of low priority to Moscow's overall global interests. As
such, the area is likely to remain one of low-level but steady competi-
tion for influence between East and West.
Moscow's primary instrument for maintaining and expanding its
influence in the region is its willingness to provide military equipment
and training to local armed forces and security services. Moscow also
seeks political influence by appealing to the radical pretensions of leftist
leaders-particularly in Madagascar and Seychelles-and highlighting
the evils of "Western imperialism" and "capitalist exploitations." In
Madagascar the Soviets have pursued their traditional tactic of support-
ing a Marxist-Leninist party to increase their influence.
The USSR, however, faces a number of serious liabilities that
constrain its ability to gain greater influence. First and foremost, even
ideologically sympathetic leaders are disappointed in the amount of
economic aid provided by Moscow. Moreover, during the two-year
period of this Estimate, Soviet military capability in the region will
remain well behind'that of the West. These factors-coupled with the
considerable logistic difficulties-almost certainly will limit the willing-
ness and ability of Moscow to intervene directly in island conflicts.
Although relations have cooled during the past two years, Mada-
gascar is likely to remain a prime target for Soviet activity in the region.
Moscow will continue to use security assistance to maintain influence
with Antananarivo and limit the impact of Ratsiraka's economically
inspired "turn to the West," while continuing to press for naval access to
facilities at the port of Antsiranana (Diego Suarez). Likewise in
Seychelles, Moscow's willingness to play to the security fears of leftist
President Rene will continue to give the USSR considerable leverage.
Prospects for increased Soviet influence in Mauritius and Comoros are
considerably less, and both countries are likely to continue keeping the
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US relations with the island governments are not likely to change
dramatically over the near term. The United States can expect to be en-
gaged constantly in countering and fending off Soviet criticisms of the
West's interference in the affairs of the region-particularly with
regard to Diego Garcia-and the "unwillingness" of the West to support
the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace. While Washington's failure to meet
the islands' economic expectations could impose strains on relations, the
lack of alternatives for aid from other sources should place limits on ex-
pressions of discontent. The United States is unlikely to gain increased
air and naval access to the islands, but this will not seriously damage US
interests as long as the Soviets-as we believe will be the case-also fail
to.achieve any exclusive military access over the next two years. Given
the US presence on Diego Garcia and limited military access agree-
ments with Somalia, Kenya, Djibouti, and Oman, military access to the
islands is not critical to the US strategic position in the region.
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/27: CIA-RDP98-00244R000300210070-4