PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP98-00979R000100770001-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 24, 2014
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 30, 1953
• Content Type: NIE

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ASSISTANT DIRECT ifite
SECRET
SECURITY IN RMATI ON
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH ASIA
NI E-79
Approved 23 June 1953
Published 30 June 1953
The Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this
estimate on 23 June 1953. The FBI abstained, the subject
being outside of its jurisdiction.
The following member organizations of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee participated with the Central Intelli-
gence Agency in the preparation of this estimate: The
intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,
the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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WARNING
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PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH ASIA'
THE PROBLEM
To estimate probabl trends in South Asia in the absence of general war, particu-
larly with respect to: ( ) the prospects for the survival of non-Communist govern-
ments in India and akistan; (b) relations between India and Pakistan; and
(c) relations of the go ernments of the area with the Soviet Bloc and the West.
CONCLUSIONS
1. The present non Communist regimes
of India and Paki tan are likely to re-
main in power at 1least for some years to
come.
a. In India, Nehru's personal position
is virtually unshakable. His Congress
Party is still far stronger than any opposi-
tion party or probable coalition of such
parties and has an excellent chance of
being returned to power in the next gen-
eral elections in 1957. The Communists
\\) are not now a serious threat to the regime.
? b. In Pakistan, political power and in-
fluence remain concentrated in the hands
of a few Muslim League leaders, who en-
joy the support of the military, and seri-
ous contenders for their power have not
as yet emerged.
1 This estimate is principally concerned with the
two major countries of the area, India and Pak-
istan, but also considers probable developments
in the other mainland states, Afghanistan,
Nepal, and Bhutan, insofar as they bear on the
situation in India or Pakistan or otherwise af-
fect US security interests in South Asia. Ceylon
is not included in the estimate in view of its
lack of close involvement in the affairs of the
mainland states and the specialized nature of
the problems it presents for US security interests.
2. However, both countries have prob-
lems of economic, social, and political
backwardness which they will find diffi-
cult to solve and which if not effectively
dealt with may ultimately undermine
the stability of their governments.
3. India has a grave economic problem
because .of the high and increasing ratio
of population to developed economic re-
sources. The current five year develop-
ment program cannot be executed with-
out substantial foreign aid, and even with
such aid successful execution is not cer-
tain. At best, moreover, most of the
gains contemplated under the present
program will be absorbed by population
increases. Even if the present plan suc-
ceeds, India will still face the formidable
task of accelerating economic growth to
a point where employment opportunities
and production are increasing more rap-
idly than population.
4. Prospects for any marked strengthen-
ing of Pakistan's economic position are
also poor. The current slump in the
world demand for jute and cotton has
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forced curtailment of Pakistan's eco-
nomic development program and has
weakened Pakistan's foreign exchange
and fiscal position at a time when the
country faces a serious food grain short-
age. Pakistan will find it difficult to re-
duce its dependence on jute and cotton
because of the unavailability of other
crops of comparable long-run earning
power and because of its low potential for
industrial development.
5. A formal settlement of the Kashmir
dispute at any early date remains un-
likely. However, the recent improve-
ment of relations between India and Pak-
istan makes it probable that further prog-
ress will be made toward resolving other
outstanding disputes, and Pakistan may
eventually acquiesce in the partition of
Kashmir along present lines. There is
little likelihood of a resumption of hos-
tilities between India and Pakistan.
6. The dispute between Afghanistan and
Pakistan over the status of the latter's
Pathan tribesmen is likely to continue
indefinitely, although it is unlikely to
lead to war.
7. India will almost certainly maintain
its present position of non-alignment in
the East-West struggle, regardless of So-
2
viet or Western actions, so long as it does
not believe its own interests to be directly
threatened. Although it would do its
utmost to counter Communist attack on
its own territory or on Nepal or Bhutan,
it would probably not assist in repelling
Communist aggression against any other
country except possibly Burma or Pakis-
tan. India can be expected to continue
its efforts to reduce East-West tensions
and to establish itself as a leader among
the self-governing Asian states.
8. Pakistan would probably be willing to
provide the West with base rights and
possibly with troop commitments in re-
turn for substantial military and econom-
ic aid and Western security guarantees.
9. Conclusion of a military_ assistance
agreement between Pakistan and the
West would be resented by India and in-
crease tension in the subcontinent, but it
would probably not result either in war
between India and Pakistan or in a break
between India and the West.
10. Afghanistan is friendly to the West
but will remain committed to a policy of
passive neutrality in view of its extreme
vulnerability to Soviet military and eco-
nomic pressures.
DISCUSSION
INTRODUCTION
11. The continued existence of South Asia as
part of the free world is important to US
interests, principally because its loss to Com-
munist control would be a serious psychologi-
cal and political blow to the West. In addi-
tion, South Asia is of potential strategic and
economic value to the West.
12. The destinies of the states of mainland
South Asia are closely linked. They share a
common heritage of former British rule or
influence and face common problems of de-
veloping bases of political stability and over-
coming social and economic backwardness.
India and Pakistan are under additional
political, economic, and military strain as a
result of continuing controversy over the dis-
position of Kashmir, the division of irriga-
tion waters in the Punjab, and various other
problems resulting from the partition of
British India. Afghanistan and Pakistan
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have a long-standing dispute over the status
of Pakistan's Pathan tribesmen.
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION
AND TRENDS
India
Present Situation
13. At present India enjoys a considerable
degree of governmental stability. Prime
Minister Nehru's personal leadership is un-
challenged. His Congress Party holds almost
three-quarters of the seats in the national
parliament, has effective majorities in most
of the state legislatures, and has managed to
retain control in the remainder. Organiza-
tionally, the government is strong: the for-
merly autonomous princely states have been
absorbed into the federal structure, central
government authority over the states has
been firmly established, and the administra-
tive skills developed under the British Indian
Civil Service have been effectively utilized.
The security forces are loyal and capable of
maintaining order.
14. However, in spite of this currently strong
political position, India's present leaders will
almost certainly, over the long run, experi-
ence increasing difficulty in maintaining their
present high degree of prestige and power.
Growing public consciousness of India's low
standard of living and of the pressure on the
economy caused by the high and increasing
ratio of population to developed resources is
arousing among nearly all classes popular
discontent which is likely to become increas-
ingly significant. Moreover, various ele-
ments in the population have special griev-
ances. Refugees from Pakistan are generally
dissatisfied with the government's resettle-
ment and rehabilitation program. Students
are dissatisfied with the jobs available to
them. There is a sizable number of Hindu
extremists who are unreconciled to the crea-
tion of Pakistan and to the government's
secularism. Members of the old landowning
aristocracy are embittered by loss of privileges
and by the prospect of expropriation. There
is considerable pressure for the establishment
of linguistic states along the lines of the new
state of Andhra, which the central govern-
ment has reluctantly decided to set up for the
Telegu-speaking areas of Madras state.
15. Moreover, the Congress Party organiza-
tion is declining in effectiveness. At the
local level, many Congress leaders are old-
line party bosses who wish to retain the sup-
port of the landowning class. These leaders
are reluctant to implement land reform and
are increasingly out of touch with the aspira-
tions and needs of the average citizen. More-
over, new leaders of ability are not in evi-
dence. At the national level, the Congress
Party suffers from being a heterogeneous mix-
ture of reactionaries, middle-of-the-roaders,
and moderate leftists held together chiefly by
Nehru's personal prestige and leadership. In
the event of Nehru's death, the internal divi-
sions within the party would be accentuated,
and would probably lead eventually to its
breakup into right and left-wing elements.
Political Trends
16. Although popular support of the Congress
Party will probably decline, the present gov-
ernment is virtually assured of retaining
power until the next general elections in 1957.
Moreover, barring major setbacks to the econ-
omy, it has an excellent chance of being re-
turned to power in the central government
and most of the states at that time.
17. Nehru himself is a major source of party
strength, since his enormous personal pres-
tige and popularity give the party a tremen-
dous advantage in a country where the aver-
age voter has only the most fragmentary
knowledge of political issues. Even if Nehru
died, however, the Congress Party would prob-
ably be able to secure a plurality if not an
absolute majority in the 1957 elections, pro-
vided that it held together. The various
opposition parties have not only failed to
produce any strong leader with a mass appeal
comparable to that of Nehru but also lack
well-developed political organizations capable
of competing effectively with the Congress
Party on a nationwide scale. The opposition
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group with the greatest popular support in
the 1951-4952 elections, the Praja Socialist
Party, has no immediate prospect for chal-
lenging the government. Rightist groups
like the Bharatiya Jan Sangh and the Hindu
Mahasabha, which favor a stronger policy
toward Pakistan and generally appeal to the
Hindu reactionary element, are unlikely to
score more than local successes.
18. Nevertheless, India's stability and unity
will continue to be seriously threatened by
disappointment over the unrealized expecta-
tion that independence would insure the
rapid solution of India's numerous problems,
and by the divisive effect of regional, ethnic,
religious, and linguistic differences.
The Communist Party
19. The Communist Party of India has only
about 40,000 actual members and continues
to be weak in material resources and plagued
by internal dissension and confusion over tac-
tics. Among industrial and transport work-
ers, where Communist influence was once
strong, the party still suffers from the pop-
ular reaction against its former policies of
violence.
20. In the 1951-1952 general elections, by em-
ploying the popular front appeal and by con-
centrating on districts where the Congress
Party was weak, the Communists and their
allies won 27 out of 499 seats in the lower
house of parliament. The six million votes
mustered for Communist or Communist-
backed candidates represented only 5 per-
cent of the total cast, and even that amount
probably included a high proportion of simple
protest votes against the Congress Party
regime. Nevertheless, the Communists and
their sympathizers constitute the largest
single opposition bloc in parliament and in
four of the state legislatures. Although the
Communists have not succeeded in exploiting
their gains in the last elections to the extent
that initially appeared possible, they may
make further gains in the next elections.
There is no present indication that they could
gain control of the central government or
even a place in a governing coalition, but
4
they might possibly gain control of a few
state governments.
21. The Communists have a capability for
stirring up disorders in certain rural districts,
notably in south India, where Communist
guerrilla forces have in the past been active.
It is also possible that the Communists might
be able to elect enough party members or
sympathizers to gain a significant influence
in the local governments of these areas. The
Communists might in addition be able to ex-
ploit conditions in Nepal, where discontent is
widespread, where the ease of small-scale
border crossings from Tibet facilitates assist-
ance by the Chinese Communists, and where
the primitive level of communications and
administrative control makes subversion
easier.
22. However, any Communist resort to insur-
gency or violence would almost certainly en-
counter vigorous government counteraction,
and it is unlikely that the situation would
get out of hand. The Indian Government
has reasonably effective security forces and a
loyal army at its disposal and has shown an
increasing tendency to deal firmly with Com-
munist subversion and violence. The gov-
ernment has also taken increased pains to
guard India's northern borders and those of
Nepal, and in the absence of extensive guer-
rilla operations supported from Communist
China is unlikely to lose control of the situ-
ation there.
Economic Trends
23. In the long run, India's stability will de-
pend to a large extent on the government's
ability to cope with the fundamental eco-
nomic problems which confront it. In part
India's economic difficulties stem from the
low rate of capital formation, maldistribution
of wealth, primitive farming methods, incom-
plete utilization of land and water resources,
and a complicated and archaic system of
land tenure and crop financing. An even
more important source of difficulty is that
of population density. There are already far
too many farmers for the arable land avail-
able, and the Indian industrial sector, though
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fairly large in absolute terms, is still too small
to absorb more than a fraction of the surplus
rural population. Of the approximately 70
percent of the working population dependent
on agriculture, about a third are landless farm
laborers who are unemployed for a large part
of the year. The food production of the area
now comprising India has long been inade-
quate to meet its needs, and India now im-
ports grain at the rate of about 3.5 million
tons a year. Moreover, the problems of un-
deremployment and of maintaining current
consumption levels are becoming more acute
as a result of population growth averaging
approximately 4.5 million persons, or about
1.2 percent, a year.
24. The Indian Government is making a
start at attacking these problems by means
of a Five Year Plan instituted in April 1951.
The plan's primary objective is to increase
food grain production by 7.6 million tons a
year over the 1949-1950 level of 54 million
tons, thereby reducing the need to spend
foreign exchange on food imports. The plan
also calls for an increase in cotton production
to make Indian mills independent of foreign
sources. A program of cottage industries is
being set up to reduce rural unemployment.
The plan includes a blueprint for land re-
font, embracing ceilings on individual land
holdings, abolition of the extortionate zamin-
dari system of rent collection, the develop-
ment of farm cooperatives, and other changes.
Only small public expenditures for industrial
development are planned, and the govern-
ment proposes to rely primarily on private
initiative for further development of medium
and large-scale manufacturing.
25. The program faces a serious shortage of
funds, particularly in the form of foreign ex-
change needed to purchase irrigation equip-
ment, farm machinery, and other critical
items unavailable locally. Over the remain-
ing three years of the program, the Indian
Government expects to fall short of raising
the funds needed to finance the plan by the
rupee equivalent of about $750 million ? or
about 18 percent of the total plan budget ?
despite maximum use of available fiscal re-
sources, including deficit financing. In terms
of the plan's foreign exchange requirements,
the Indians expect a deficit of $280-320 million
a year even after allowing for the use of
India's remaining sterling balances in excess
of its bare needs for currency backing and
working capital. Unless India succeeds in
obtaining foreign assistance in overcoming
these financial difficulties, important parts of
the development program will almost cer-
tainly be curtailed.
26. Even with adequate financing, the pro-
gram's success would be far from assured.
While it appears to call for more modest in-
creases in agricultural production than might
theoretically be achieved, substantial progress
in this central aspect of the program will de-
pend on the government's ability to make the
most of the limited administrative and tech-
nical skills at its disposal and, above all, on its
ability to win effective cooperation from the
peasants. Moreover, state authorities will
probably continue to move slowly in carrying
out land reform. Another drought might
further delay the program, by forcing diver-
sion of funds to food imports.
27. In any event, the present program repre-
sents only a limited first-stage attack on the
difficulties which confront India. Even if the
projected 11 percent increase in national in-
come from 1951 to 1956 is achieved, much of
it will be absorbed by an expected population
increase of about 7 percent, leaving little
margin for improving living standards or for
financing further economic development.
India's task is to accelerate economic growth
to a point where employment opportunities
and production are increasing more rapidly
than population.
28. India's low rate of saving ? now only
about 5 percent of national income ? severe-
ly limits economic growth. The Indian Gov-
ernment recognizes the importance of in-
creasing the proportion of national income
available for investment. By taxation, by re-
strictions on consumption and on unproduc-
tive accumulations of wealth, and by other
measures, it hopes to achieve modest increases
in the rate of productive saving during the
Five Year Plan and further increases in sue-
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ceeding years, to the point where 20 percent
of national income will be available for net
public and private investment in 1967-1968
and thereafter. These goals, however, ap-
pear unrealistic. With most of India's pop-
ulation existing lostre at a bare subsistence
level and with population increases tending to
swallow up any increases in production re-
sulting from the development program, it is
most unlikely that the rate of saving could be
raised from 5 percent to 20 percent in so short
a period.
29. The government also plans a nationwide
program of birth control. However, a signifi-
cant reduction in population growth would
require successful execution of a mass educa-
tion program of imposing dimensions and
difficulty. Actually, the rate of population
growth is likely to increase in the short run as
a result of public health measures.
30. India thus faces formidable economic
problems. Failure to solve them would prob-
ably result in a continued slow decline in
living standards and in an increasing sense
of economic insecurity. These conditions
would almost certainly stimulate increasing
social unrest and might eventually have seri-
ous political repercussions. Popular confi-
dence in the regime would be weakened if
the regime fell conspicuously short of achiev-
ing the goals of the Five Year Plan.
Pakistan
Present Situation
31. The political situation in Pakistan gives
promise of stability. With general popular
consent, political power remains concentrated
in the hands of a few top leaders in the Mus-
lim League, the organization which assisted
the late Mohammed AR Jinnah in the crea-
tion of an independent Pakistan. There are
no other significant political parties. The
government has complete control of radio
broadcasting facilities and has on occasion
been able to exercise considerable influence
over the press. The armed forces are ade-
quate to maintain internal security, and their
leaders appear disposed to work closely with
the civilian leadership.
6
32. The Government of Pakistan has recently
been strengthened as a result of Governor
General Ghulam Mohammed's summary dis-
missal of Prime Minister Nazimuddin on 17
April. This move, which brought to the
premiership Mohammed AR, then Pakistan
Ambassador to the US, represented a vigorous
effort by a strong element within the Muslim
League, spurred on by the permanent Secre-
tary of the Defense Ministry and the Army
Commander in Chief, to halt the decline in
government effectiveness, strength, and popu-
larity which had set in following Nazimuddin's
installation in late 1951. Under Nazimuddin
the Muslim League had become increasingly
involved in personal and provincial rivalries,
and the government showed growing weak-
ness and opportunism in the handling of the
serious problems which confronted it.
33. Pakistan's present leaders were particu-
larly concerned about Nazimuddin's failure to
take strong measures against religious ex-
tremists and their supporters in the Muslim
League. This group opposed establishment
of a modern secular state and was insisting
that the new constitution now being drafted
conform strictly to traditional Islamic law.
The group also attempted to stir up popular
opposition to the "unorthodox" sect to which
Foreign Minister Zafrulla Khan belongs.
34. Dissatisfaction also arose over Nazimud-
din's handling of the serious economic prob-
lems posed by the drought of 1951-1952,
which confronted Pakistan with a substantial
food grain deficit, and by the decline in the
world demand for cotton and jute, which
forced a reduction in Pakistan's gold and for-
eign exchange holdings to the bare minimum
needed for currency backing and severely re-
duced the government's tax yields.
35. Additional dissatisfaction arose over the
government's continued lack of success in
obtaining a favorable settlement regarding
Kashmir and other points of difference with
India. Finally, the general tendency toward
disunity and bickering was accentuated by
the problem of allocating legislative represen-
tation under the new constitution between the
isolated province of East Bengal, which con-
tains over half the population and seeks a pro-
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portionate voice in national affairs, and West
Pakistan, whose leaders are forced to concede
East Bengal a special position but are reluc-
tant to give it more political power than all
the other provinces combined.
Political Trends
36. The recent shake-up in the Pakistan Gov-
ernment does not eliminate the problems and
internal weaknesses which have confronted
the regime. Rivalries within the Muslim
League will almost certainly continue. The
conservative mullahs, or religious teachers,
will continue to be a potential source of trou-
ble. Nevertheless, the new government has
already made progress toward restoring the
regime's prestige and appears to be providing
the country with more vigorous and progres-
sive leadership.
37. Any political struggles within the fore-
seeable future will almost certainly be con-
fined to the Muslim League leadership. None
of the opposition leaders or parties, including
the small and immature Communist organiza-
tion in Pakistan, shows any signs of develop-
ing into a serious political or subversive threat
to the present leadership. The conservative
religious elements appear to have no desire
to function as a political party and moreover
will find it difficult, in the face of determined
governmental and military opposition, to re-
sume even the limited-objective pressure
group tactics they have employed in the past.
Although top military leaders played a major
part in the recent cabinet shake-up, we do
not believe that they would seek to take over
the government themselves except in the
event of a default of progressive and energetic
civilian leadership.
Economic Trends
38. Pakistan has a predominantly agricultural
economy. Although there is some mining,
the country has little industrial plant, and it
still lacks many of the commercial services
which before partition were furnished by the
area now comprising India. Most manufac-
tured goods must be imported. Jute and cot-
ton exports have provided about three-
quarters of the foreign exchange earnings
7
and, through export duties, almost as high a
proportion of the government's revenues.
The country is therefore extremely vulnerable
to changes in the world demand for these
products. The area included in Pakistan has
in past years produced a small food surplus,
but grain production has fallen considerably
below requirements during the last two years
as a result of shortage of rainfall, and per-
haps of some diversion of grain acreage to
cotton and jute production.2 While popula-
tion density is great in East Bengal, popula-
tion pressure does not at present constitute for
Pakistan as a whole the major problem it does
for India.
39. Pakistan has sought to build up its econ-
omy under a Six Year Development Plan in- V
stituted in 1951 and a supplementary Priority
Plan under which certain more easily com-
pleted and immediately useful projects were
pushed ahead during the first two years of.
the six-year period. Thus far the emphasis
has been on developing transport, power, and
manufacturing facilities to replace those
which remained with India under partition.
These plans have proved inadequate and are
being revised to provide greater emphasis on
increased agricultural production.
40. Although some progress will probably be
made, prospects for any marked strengthening
of Pakistan's economic position are poor.
The development program will probably con-
tinue to be hampered by the administrative
inefficiency which, together with inadequacies
in the plan itself, has slowed progress to date.
Moreover, the slump in world demand for jute
and cotton has not only sharply reduced the
funds available to the government for develop-
ment purposes but has also cut down on the
foreign exchange available for normal pur-
chases abroad and on the funds available for
2 The Pakistan Government has attempted to
blame the grain shortage on India, charging the
latter with diversion of excessive amounts of
water from jointly utilized portions of the Pun-
jab drainage system. However, the primary dif-
ficulty appears to have been an over-all short-
age of water rather than any excessive Indian
diversion. In any event, only limited areas of
Pakistan depend on rivers and canals subject to
Indian control.
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normal government operations. In dealing
with the long-term implications of this prob-
lem, Pakistan faces a basic dilemma. So long
as it continues its present emphasis on jute
and cotton, its economic position will be pre-
carious. On the other hand, since Pakistan
lacks the resources for extensive industrial de-
velopment, it can obtain greater diversifica-
tion and stability in its economy only by con-
centrating on crops yielding lower returns
over the long run than jute and cotton.
41. Pakistan's current food shortage is prob-
ably temporary, though the country will
remain vulnerable to recurrent drought.
Without substantial grain imports the food
situation will become extremely serious dur-
ing 1953.
MILITARY TRENDS IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN
42. India's military establishment consists of
an army of approximately 400,000 men, in-
cluding 6 infantry divisions, one armored
division, an armored brigade group, and 8 in-
dependent infantry brigades; a navy of about
9,000 men equipped with one cruiser, 3 de-
stroyers, and smaller escort and patrol vessels;
and an air force of 14,000 men and 670 air-
craft, including 85 jet fighters. Pakistan has
an army of about 206,000 men, including 8 in-
fantry divisions, an armored brigade, and an
infantry brigade; a navy of about 5,000 men
equipped with 3 destroyers and other escort
and patrol vessels; and an air forice of 9,000
men and 330 aircraft, including 30 jet fighters.
43. The military forces of India and Pakistan
represent outgrowths of the military estab-
lishment developed under the former British
Government of India. They have mainly
British equipment, follow British tactical and
organizational doctrine, retain some British
officers in command as well as in advisory
and instructor positions, and continue to send
students to British military schools. Both
officer corps are loyal to the existing regimes;
morale and discipline are high; and combat
effectiveness is fairly good. Both military
establishments appear capable of coping with
any internal security problem which might
arise, including in the case of Pakistan that
8
of controlling the Pathan tribesmen of the
North West Frontier Province. Major im-
provement in Indian or Pakistan military
capabilities is unlikely without substantial
foreign assistance.
44. The primary external mission of each
force is defense against the other, and most
combat units of both forces are deployed
along the common Indian-Pakistan fron-
tiers. The greatest concentration is in the
Punjab-Kashmir sector. Pakistan has one
division and India somewhat larger forces in
the Bengal area. India is superior in exist-
ing combat strength and supply facilities,
has greater manpower resources and a
stronger economic base for supporting a war
effort, and enjoys certain terrain and stra-
tegic advantages. However, in the event of
a war between the two countries, India would
face logistic difficulties of its own and prob-
ably would not be able to subdue Pakistan
without a long and mutually exhausting
struggle.
45. Without major outside logistic support,
India and Pakistan would probably be un-
able to defend themselves successfully, even
in cooperation, against determined attack by ?
Communist China or the USSR. However,
such a Chinese Communist invasion of India
or East Pakistan is highly unlikely because
of the ruggedness of the terrain and the long
supply lines which would have to be devel-
oped and maintained. A Soviet invasion of
West Pakistan would encounter more favor-
able terrain and greater facility for providing
adequate logistic support. It is not believed,
however, that the Soviet Bloc would attack
either Pakistan or India, except possibly in
the event of general war.
46. Even with substantial Western military
aid, Pakistan could probably furnish few if
any troops for early employment outside the
subcontinent in the absence of a comprehen-
sive settlement with India. The shortage of
qualified officer and administrative personnel
and the lack of an adequate logistic organi-
zation would make difficult any sizable in-
crease of present forces, which are now small
even for their primary mission of defense of
Pakistan's borders.
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47. Pakistan, however, will continue to be of
potential military value to the West because
of the strategically located airbases which it
can provide.
RELATIONS AMONG THE STATES
OF THE AREA
Relations between India and Pakistan
48. Relations between India and Pakistan
have been strained ever since their establish-
ment as independent nations in 1947. Their
most important dispute has been over the
disposition of Kashmir, where actual fighting
between the two sides took place until halted
by a UN cease-fire at the beginning of 1949.
They have also come into serious conflict on
economic and financial matters. Before par-
tition, Pakistan's jute and cotton acreage and
India's processing mills for these products
were complementary sectors of a single econ-
omy. Since partition, however, both India
and Pakistan have sought to become self.
sufficient in the growing and processing of
jute and cotton. The strains caused by this
economic rivalry have been increased by the
mutual imposition of restrictive trade con-
trols and by the fact that India devalued its
rupee at the time of British devaluation
whereas Pakistan did not. Additional dis-
putes have arisen over refugee properties,
division of the assets and liabilities of the
former British administration, treatment of
religious minorities, and the division of water
rights in the Punjab.
49. Over the course of time some differences
have been successfully ironed out. A trade
agreement was recently signed, for example,
enabling Pakistan to obtain coal for its rail-
roads and factories, and India to obtain jute
for its Bengal mills, without the punitive
duties formerly in effect. Partial agreement
has been reached on handling the continuing
migrations between East and West Bengal.
Further progress will probably be made
within the period of this estimate, particu-
larly in view of the new Pakistan cabinet's
apparent desires to clear up outstanding
issues with India and the scheduling of early
talks between the two prime ministers. A
possible basis for solution of the important
9
Punjab waters dispute is a proposal that the
World Bank finance related development
projects which would provide additional irri-
gation for both countries.
50. Although India-Pakistan relations are
now better than at any time since partition,
formal agreement on the pivotal Kashmir
issue remains unlikely in the near future.
India, which not only controls the most val-
uable parts of Kashmir but also claims that
the state is already legally part of ' its terri-
tory, has little desire to risk its present posi-
tion under the UN demilitarization and pleb-
iscite proposal to which it has agreed in prin-
ciple. It has therefore refused to proceed
with demilitarization except on terms prejudi-
cial to Pakistan, and has repeatedly hinted
that partition offers the only solution. Pak-
istan, with the weaker bargaining position,
appears more willing to compromise and may
eventually become reconciled to its inability
to shake India's grip on Kashmir; there are
already some signs that Pakistani emotion-
alism on the subject is beginning to subside.
Until such time as Pakistan is ready to accept
the loss of Kashmir, however, the Pakistanis
are unlikely to accept demilitarization and
plebiscite terms which would stack the cards
heavily in favor of confirming Indian control
of Kashmir. If assured of a fair plebiscite in
the Vale of Kashmir, which has a Moslem
majority, they might accept partition of the
remainder of the state. Since the Vale is the
richest and most populous area of Kashmir,
as well as its historical center, India would
probably be unwilling to follow through with
such a plebiscite.
51. Although the military forces of India and
Pakistan continue to be lined up opposite
each other, there appears to be little likeli-
hood of a resumption of hostilities. India
has virtually no incentive to risk a war.
Despite past talk of a second round, Pak-
istan's leaders, particularly the military, ap-
pear to be convinced of the folly of attacking
India's superior forces.
52. Conclusion of a military assistance agree-
ment between Pakistan and the West would
increase tension in the subcontinent but
would probably not lead to war between India
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and Pakistan. If Pakistan's military capa-
bilities should be significantly increased as a
result of such a military agreement, Pak-
istan's leaders might consider an attack on
India. However, Pakistan's numerically in-
ferior forces would have to be very greatly
strengthened to make such a venture mili-
tarily attractive. Moreover, we believe it un-
likely that Pakistan would resort to war if it
had reason to believe that the Western Powers
would react sharply against such a move.
India, for its part, is unlikely to start a pre-
ventive war.
Relations between Pakistan and
Afghanistan
53. Relations between Pakistan and Afghan-
istan are strained. Ever since 1947 the Af-
ghan Government has waged an unsuccessful
propaganda and diplomatic campaign for the
establishment of an autonomous "Pushtoon-
istan" for the several million Pathan tribes-
men in Pakistan's northwest frontier area.
The territory involved was once part of
Afghanistan, and, after its annexation by
British India in the late nineteenth century,
its inhabitants continued to maintain close
relations with their kinsmen across the bor-
der, who comprise the dominant Afghan tribal
group. Pakistan's policy of extending eco-
nomic aid and social improvements to the
Pathan tribes within its borders has not only
materially reduced their traditional restive-
ness but has also done much to gain their
loyalty and to weaken their ties with Afghan-
istan.
54. Although this 'controversy is unlikely to
result in war between Pakistan and Afghan-
istan, it may drag on indefinitely. The Af-
ghan Government shows no sign of abandon-
ing its campaign despite its apparent lack of
success in arousing tribal feeling within Pak-
istan, and despite the fact that virtually half
its external trade normally passes through
Pakistan and has been intermittently sub-
jected to Pakistan , obstructions. Pakistan
will almost certainly continue to hold that
the status of the tribes is a domestic matter
in which Afghanistan has no legitimate in-
terest. In view of the basic nature of the
tension between Pakistan and Afghanistan,
any effective military collaboration between
the two appears improbable.
Relations between India and Nepal
55. India and Nepal have very close cultural
and economic ties. Despite its declared pol-
icy of non-interference in the internal affairs
of other nations, India has actively inter-
vened in Nepal's political affairs, particularly
since the Chinese Communist invasion and
occupation of Tibet. India has indicated
that it would take military action against
Chinese Communist aggression against Nepal.
In the past two years the Government of
India has sent a military mission and several
teams of administrative advisers to Nepal.
Should the political situation in Nepal deteri-
orate dangerously, India would probably in-
tervene in an effort to maintain a stable and
cooperative regime.
RELATIONS WITH STATES OUTSIDE THE AREA
India
56. India has pursued a policy of non-align-
ment in the struggle between the Soviet Bloc
and the West. While India is a member of
the Commonwealth and generally maintains
friendly relations with the US, it has firmly
dissociated itself from many Of the diplomatic
and military policies of the US and UK, and
has laid great stress on preserving its inde-
pendence of judgment and action. It vig-
orously opposes Western domination over
colonial areas and is a leader in the Arab-
Asian bloc in the UN. It has also sought to
reduce existing East-West tensions, which it
fears may result in a war that would eventu-
ally engulf India. Indian efforts in these
directions also reflect a desire to exercise lead-
ership and influence in world affairs.
57. Indian leaders believe that India has little
to gain by taking sides in the quarrels of the
great powers and much to lose if these quar-
rels lead to another world war. Although In-
dia's leaders generally recognize that Soviet
policies are aggressive, they believe that under
present circumstances the subcontinent itself
is not a likely target of Communist military
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aggression and that the West overemphasizes
the danger of such aggression elsewhere.
India's often critical attitude toward the West
stems in part from fear that Western efforts to
counter the Soviet threat may touch off a war.
58. Indian apprehension concerning Western
efforts to check the Communists has been
particularly evident in the case of Communist
China. India still believes that Communist
China's leaders might be weaned away from
their close tie with the USSR if the Western
world gave convincing demonstrations of its
willingness to live at peace with them. Al-
though India is cooperating quietly in UN
restrictions on shipments of strategic mate-
rials to Communist China, it did not vote to
declare Communist China an aggressor in
Korea and has continued to urge that Peiping
must be provided with a way of backing out
of the Korean war gracefully.
59. Despite past rebuffs from the Communist
powers, India will probably continue its at-
tempts to reach a modus vivendi with Com-
munist China and will remain convinced of
the importance of avoiding involvement in the
East-West struggle. Indian leaders almost
certainly regard recent Soviet and Chinese
Communist gestures of conciliation as vindi-
cating their views. Although further Com-
munist military moves in Southeast Asia
would greatly increase India's concern for its
own security, India is unlikely to participate
in Western defense preparations. In any
event, India would do its utmost to resist Com-
munist military attack on its own territory
or on Nepal or Bhutan, but it would probably
not assist in repelling Communist aggression
against any other country except possibly
Burma or Pakistan.
60. It is even more unlikely that India will
give up its policy of non-alignment in favor
of closer ties with the Soviet Bloc. India
would avail itself of profitable opportunities
for increased trade in non-strategic materials
with the Soviet Bloc, but such trade opportu-
nities are likely to be so limited as to involve
virtually no risk of drawing India into eco-
nomic dependence on the Bloc.
\ 61. India will almost certainly maintain its
present position of non-alignment in the East-
,
11
West struggle, regardless of Western actions,
so long as it does not believe its own interests
to be directly threatened. The continuation
of US economic aid would coritribute to In-
dian-economic stability and miztiLei...201E2,Le
a more favorable attitude toward the US? but
is-MITI/My ffindu?ce India to make a military
commitment to the West. Similarly, with-
holding of US aid would probably not result in
Indian alignment with the Soviet Bloc, al-
though the Indian Communists and the So-
viet Bloc might be able to benefit from the
psychological and economic repercussions of
such action. In the long run, despite its in-
dependent and neutral policies, India's gen-
eral disposition will probably remain favorable
to the West in the East-West struggle.
62. The inclusion of Pakistan in Western re-
gional defense and military assistance ar-
rangements would almost certainly evoke
strong Indian resentment, not only because
of its implications for the Kashmir dispute
but also because it would tend to increase So-
viet military interest in the subcontinent.
Western efforts to counter the Indian reaction
are unlikely to be very effective. Although
India would probably feel compelled to build
up its own military forces to maintain a bal-
ance with Pakistan, it would probably reject
any Western offer of military aid on the same
terms as that given Pakistan as involving un-
wanted military or political commitments.
Offers to guarantee borders or other Western
efforts to reassure India against possible Pak-
istan aggression would be unlikely to over-
come India's resentment. However, we be-
lieve that India would wish to retain US
economic assistance and to keep up at least
minimal good relations with the Western
Powers.
63. We believe that India will continue its
efforts to establish a position as a leader
among the emergent self-governing Asian
states.
Pakistan
64. Pakistan, though a member of the Com-
monwealth, has refrained from formal com-
mitments in the East?West conflict and has
sometimes been highly critical of the West on
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such issues as French colonial policy in North
Africa and the Western record in the Kash-
mir dispute. However, Pakistan's neutralism
lacks the doctrinaire quality of India's.
Pakistan's sympathies are definitely with the
US and its allies. Its failure to align itself
with the Western camp can be attributed in
part to its preoccupation with the Kashmir
problem and to its desire to win friends and
supporters in the Moslem Middle East, but
results mainly from the lack of any suffi-
ciently attractive Western offer in return for
its support.
65. If given sufficient inducement, Pakistan
would probably be willing to authorize West-
ern use of Pakistan air and naval bases in
wartime and possibly Western development
of such bases in peacetime. It might also be
willing to provide troops for defense of the
Middle East if assured that its Indian borders
would be secure. Pakistan's leaders have re-
cently displayed keen interest in being in-
cluded in a Middle East defense organization,
though there are indications that they have
been motivated largely by a desire to
strengthen Pakistan's military position vis-
a-vis India. In entering into defense ar-
rangements with the West, Pakistan would
probably seek to drive as hard a bargain as
possible and would almost certainly expect
substantial military and economic assistance.
12
It would probably also seek Western security
guarantees and might ask for specific West-
ern support in its disputes with India.
66. Pakistan will remain quick to recognize
the danger to its own position implicit in
increased Communist pressure or actual ag-
gression against Iran, Afghanistan, or South-
east Asia. Even if Pakistan failed to obtain
sufficient Western military aid to induce it
to join a defense organization, it would prob-
ably be inclined to participate in UN efforts
to resist aggression in these areas to the
extent which appeared safe on the basis of
existing relations with India.
Afghanistan
67. A basic Afghan foreign policy objective is
to avoid trouble with the USSR. Although
Afghanistan is friendly toward the West, it
depends to a considerable extent on trade
with the USSR and is highly vulnerable to
Soviet military aggression. If presented with
a sufficiently serious threat, it would probably
feel compelled to comply with almost any
demand the USSR might make of it.
68. In view of Afghanistan's dispute with
Pakistan over Pushtoonistan, the' Afghans
would tend to resent the inclusion of Pak-
istan in Western defense arrangements, but
it is unlikely that such action would signifi-
cantly affect Afghan policies.
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.Khanabad
Srinagar
(STATUS IN DISPUTE)
HANISTAN
Kandahar
?
Lahore
.Jammu
PU J
MAINLAND SOUTH ASIA
AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN, INDIA, NEPAL, AND BHUTAN
International boundary (demarcated)
International boundary (undemarcated)
Jammu Kashmir boundary
State or province boundary
Approximate cease fire line between Indian and
Pakistani forces in Jammu and Kashmir
Unsettled Pathan occupied area in North West
Frontier Province, Pakistan
(Pathan peoples are scattered throughout the remainder of
the North West Frontier Province and a heavy concentra
bon of Pot/ions exists along the boundary in Afghanistan
Proposed Andhra State in India
(The Andhra State mil be Inaugurated October I, i953)
Brahma utr
DELHI
NEW D HI
ALUCHIST
STATE
UN'
Al ?KATMANDU
?
Lucknow
RADESH
prahMaPUI
KARACHI
?
Patna
Rev stl? "")
VINDHYA
PRADESH
Dacca
Gulf of
Rajkot.
SAURASHTRA
c?
pJ BHAR
da
DIU
(Port) (90
NAGAR AVELI
(Port) 'GO
l'462?
Bhubaneswar.
Bombay
HYDERABAb
Hyderabad.
YANAO
(F,S)
Nova Go
Madras
ANDAMAN
ISLANDS
Port Blair
KEY TO NUMBERS ON MAP
1 Himachal Pradesh
2 Patiala and East Punjab States Union
3 Bila'spur
4 Bombay
5 South WazTrist5n*
6 North Wazinst5n*
7 Kurram*
8 Khyber*
9 Mohmand*
? 0
- LACCADIVE
?
it
ISLANI5S
(To Madras)
MAHE
(Fr)
PONDICHERY
(Fr)
KARIKAL
(Fr )
200 300 400
STATUTE MILES
0 50 100 200 300 400
*Pathan tribal areas within the
North West Frontier Province
Trivandru
Gulf
of
Mannar
CEYLON
KILOMETERS
hi
NICOBAR
isLANDS
0
Scale 1 10 000 000
12664 5 53
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