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Declassified in Part- 'Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-0139414000200090001-8 . ?-? William 0. Walker III University of New Mexico Press Albuquerque. ? -3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 CHAPTER 1 lent of the Harrison ? diets into criminals :lion allowed physi- lical use. This sug- under his Care, a maintenance. The ditional regulations ether the signatures 3unts of drugs pre- ? prosecutors for the t possession of nar- rded as violation of with this conten- 241 U.S. 394, the oader regulation of until 1919, in two des (1919) 249 U.S. J.S. 86?would the maintenance could ice. Another ruling 922) 258 U.S. 280, Ven in good faith." enforcement and 11 the organizational sue were contend- therapy, and custo- , vith supervision of lintenance and ad- h Service, on the der therapeutic or er uniformly held 918-19 may have The Public Health Committee of the of cure and turned Lawrence Kolb of t an addict was a Culture and Bureaucracy -- 19 psychopath, by choice. Countering this position was the difficult practical experience of Internal Revenue in accomplishing effective law enforcement. The bureau came to support a curative solution for addiction. Under its auspices, forty-four narcotic clinics were set up for the purpose of assisting gradual withdrawal, or providing maintenance' for addicts if necessary. Commissioner Daniel C. Roper praised the work of the clinics in his annual report for fiscal year 1918-19, but the bureau's next? report, subsequent to the Supreme Court decisions of 1919, condemned the clinics for "pro- viding applicants with whatever drugs they required for the satis- faction of their morbicLappetites" and applauded "the wisdom of the policy being pursued. "59 The fluctuating support for strict law enforcement, judicial deci- sions, and the complexity involved in actually reducing narcotic use help to explain in one sense why the nation's maintenance clinics never became more than a transitory experiment which had largely ended by July 1920. The Public Health Service and the AMA's Committee on Habit-Forming Drugs both lauded the clo- sure of the clinics.60 In another sense, the bureaucratic differences over narcotic law enforcement support conclusions in other studies concerned with the role of bureaucracies and institutions during the Progressive Era. Whatever its particular characteristics, the Narcotic Division of the Prohibition Unit of the Treasury Department, established in December 1919 after the passage of the Volstead Act, can be seen as representative of the organizational movement for efficient man- agement. Strict law enforcement therefore need not be seen as distinct from social reform. In this instance, as institutionalization in a penal rather than a therapeutic or curative facility for what was essentially a medical matter (although not universally recognized as such at the time) became a major organizational objective, humanitarian social reform lost its remaining importance. At this juncture, Kolb's depiction of addicts as psychopaths becomes indis- tinguishable from the reality of government policy.61 Interest- group administrative liberalism, as Theodore Lowi describes it, had replaced older, less administratively reliable ways of handling the socially unacceptable practice of narcotic consumption." - -- To implement antinarcotic policy, the Congress provided the Narcotic Division, under the direction of Levi G. Nutt, a budget for fiscal year 1920 amounting to $515,000, almost twice that of the ? ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for '4;16 Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 idelaCs=4111%. AlS104111:141klida' CHAPTER 1 ? prior year. Increasing violations of the Harrison law probably led to larger budgets for its enforcement. From 1916 to 1919, the number of known violators ranged from a low of 1,100 in 1917 to a high of 2,400 in 1919. There were 3,900 known violators in 1920, .an average of 10,300 in 1924-26, and ari average just below P9,000. for 1927-28. Of the 7,738 persons in federal prison at the end of the fiscal year 1928, nearly one-third, or 2,529, were imprisoned for Harrison law offenses. Daniel Roper believed that the drug ploblem in the United States was out of control by 1920. Terry and Penens concluded that enforcement practices induced higher lev- els of addiction, drug peddling, and associated criminal activity. Of America's addicts, the Special Committee observed, "From infor- mation in the hands of the Committee, it is concluded that, while drug addicts may appear to be normal to the casual observer, they are usually weak in character, and lacking in moral sense."63 In many ways, the law and the evolving organizational structure through which it was administered had made the addict population of the United States into a social class not unlike that of Latin America, associated with extralegal, antisocial behavior. Official tolerance for drugs and related activity differed greatly. Moreover, the depiction of addicts in the United States as a coherent social class, useful for administrative purposes, did not reflect actual racial or socioeconomic conditions. There existed no distinct drug culture, no unified group similar to the Andean coqueros, the participants in rescates, or the rural poor, often Indians, who for generations had worked the land for the benefit of others. It was within the context of its emerging federal antinarcotic activity that the United States encouraged Latin American partici- pation in the larger, international campaign against narcotics. And it is from the perspective of the aspirations of officials in Washing- ton juxtaposed with the vastly different cultural history of Latin America that the success or failure of the narcotic foreign policy of the United States should be assessed. No Latin American country attended the Hague conference of 1911-12. At that meeting it became evident that the campaign against illicit drug traffic needed Latin American support to be effective. This was especially true in the case of Peru, the world's Culture and leading' charged presente. ton Wrig represen of the int there to out that Peruvian their bus , vention 1 was to 13( The g( ' State De ence. Be conventi( industry. except Pi if they 1 revenue volvemei tion in P In deli July 1913 that the unless Pi by sever conferen. the pron States. The d( third cor. June 191 support I tension i States or horizon ?i forty-foth Hague C Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 iJ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25 : CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 - _ ? CHAPTER1 law probably led [916 to 1919, the 1,100 in 1917 to a violators in 1920,- e just below 9,000 ion at the end of , were imprisoned ved that the drug 1920. Terry and Iduced higher lev- riminal activity. Of Ned, From infor- eluded that, while ual observer, they oral sense."63 izational structure addict population dike that of Latin behavior. Official greatly. Moreover, a coherent social not reflect actual d no distinct drug an coqueros, the Indians, who for : of others. - deral antinarcotic ? American partici- lst narcotics. And icials in Washing- history of Latin foreign policy of ;ue conference of 'at the campaign in support to be Peru, the world's ?), Culture and Bureaucracy 21 ? , leading.coca leaf exporter. The government of the Netherlands, charged with obtaining signatures to the convention by the nonre- presented states, asked the United States for assistance." Hamil- ton Wright composed a detailed memorandum for United States representatives in Latin America. which. outlined the brief *history of the international antinarcotic campaign and requested countries there to sign, the supplementary protocol. Wright's letter pointed ? 4.. out that the conferees at The Hague realized the importance of S. Peruvian and Bolivian acceptance of the convention and concluded their business only after agreeing that the signature of the Con- vention by Latin Ainerican states was essential if the Convention was to become effective."65 The generally favorable response from Latin America pleased State Department officials, but Peru and Bolivia withheld adher- ence. Bolivia objected to the linking of coca with opitun in the convention and was reluctant to take any action threatening its coca - industry By the end of 1912, though, all Latin American countries except Peru indicated a willingness to sign the Hague Convention if they had not yet done so. Peru was undecided because of revenue derived from the coca trade and because of limited in- volvement in opium traffic, primarily within the Chinese popula- tion in Peru.66 In deliberations during the second conference at The Hague in July 1913, Great Britain and Germany reiterated an earlier concern that the 1912 convention would be, worthless regarding cocaine unless Peru signed. Peruvian reluctance was delaying ratification by several important narcotic manufacturing states. Before the conference adjourned, Peru promised to sign the convention, but the promise was made only after urgent appeals by the United States. The delay in depositing ratifications led to the convening of a third conference. The start was postponed from May until mid- June 1914 because officials in Washington were seeking Mexico's support at the meeting and hoped the delay might serve to lessen tension that arose between the two countries over the United States occupation of Veracruz earlier that year. With war on the horizon in Europe, the conference took place. By its final session. forty-four of forty-six nations had signed or pledged to sign the Hague Convention. Eleven countries had completed ratification, ? npriaccifiari in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 - ? F^:, , ? ? ?? -St -2`z^:4_ ?,? 1 -1-4 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25 : CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 _ S _;?-? ; ' "3" ./???? 3 -????"???-,7?-??-r ; ,? ? ; . . '.;???`? 4:7;.';?-1;.s ' - 11: 22 1 . 1' . ; including Venezuela, Guatemala, and Honduras as well as the United States.67 Although adherence to the convention was grad- ual, it provide?d a basis for subsequent international antinarcotic , ? Through 1920 in Peru and Bolivia, adherence to the convention- tres did not signify its implementation. Both nations refused to jeopard- ., . ize their lucrative coca leaf operations." Only Mexico, of the Latin - CHAPTER 1 American countries crucial for control, tried in any way to restrict . drug-related activity. Early in 1916 the de facto government pro- : hibited opium importation. The following year President Venus- . ? ? ,g tiano Carranza sought to outlaw opium transactions in Baja ?!- California, but his own lack of control and the alleged complicity of the governor there in the trade (as discussed in chapter 2) nullified Carranza's efforts." These episodes presaged future difficulties that would impede antidrug activity throughout Latin America and cause concern in the United States. The overriding fear in Washington, then as later, was that illicit drugs produced in Latin America or shipped there from Europe or Asia would find their way to the United States. Compounding the matter, few Latin American states admit- ? ted the existence of a drug problem within their borders. With a rise in smuggling as a probable consequence of greater actions against drugs, concern in Washington over inadequate controls in Latin America was no doubt warranted. The legal-organizational process leading to the formation of a strict drug control program seems clear; just as apparent, conversely, is the cultural and eco- nomic background of Latin American inattention to controls in the early 1900s. The incongruity between the two would be further . revealed as the United States continued to press for more effective international controls on drug traffic. ; ? . . ? ?.? " . - ??.? P.,'N-** ? "i; 2 Influences hemisphere lems remail sired by o: especially emerged to nevertheles participated United Stat ence intern mitment at chimerical. ence in Ge internatiom domestic p were at wo America's fi would help number of The excellent, d spective.1 restrictive. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 CHAPTER 2 , and an ou6po- ipported Blue's g. "An effective red by compro7 )sals the United ? ;tipulations that illegitiinate and for proper con- wrote, "that no e . . . two are LC session made nnpromise was ry departments e time, nongov- licy Association base of support sured a lengthy it home, but in nce antinarcotic the fifth OAC H. Brent, Dr. 1 of the Foreign ;hes defined the rter to initiate a session opened ted, Porter told y's proposals as rther debate." rdained condu- le international ;: "If when I get o me, he ought ast have been, heir efforts and ; in Septembef, o convene two Led to a consid- Bed in the Far The Road to Geneva 35 East, while the second would deal with the limitation of manufac- tured narcotics and their derivatives, and the restriction to legiti- mate .needs of raw materials produced for export. In formulating a _ program of that nature, the League virtually assured United States participation in the latter conference, as NILT shall presently see:" Latin American participation in the international movement fol- lowed an uncertain course as well in the early 1920s. Explanation - of this uncertainty can be found in the nature of the directives issuing from Geneva andin the unsettled domestic conditions then prevalent. In the first place the Opium Advisory Committee had unintentionally erred in transmitting questionnaires regarding cul- tivation, production, and manufacture only in French and English, the two official languages of the League. Replies reached Geneva belatedly, if at all. The use of Spanish, a goodwill gesture to countries largely unconcerned about drug control, might have improved the situation. The lack of substantive data in responses further underlined the differences in attitudes. Annual reports for 1921 came only from Chile, Cuba, Guatemala, and Venezuela; Bolivia sent a partial report." The import-export certificate system received even less attention. By the fifth session of the OAC only Mexico, not a member of the League, and Panama were experi- menting with the system; several other countries were considering doing so. As late as August 1925 only Cuba, Guatemala, and Haiti joined Mexico and Panama in using the certificates. Peru once contemplated adoption, but decided against doing so." In short, the administrative directives .of the League had little impact in Latin America. . Even more important, domestic conditions worked against the adoption of controls. Mexico, for example, was burdened with border difficulties and an increase in drug use by its own populace. Border conditions in the 1920s had not changed appreciably since the end of the revolutionary decade.47 Chihuahua, Sonora (one of the states most dramatically affected by the Revolution), and Baja California Norte continued to meet American demands for narcot- ics and oilier illicit pleasures. The situation in Baja stood as a. dubious legacy of the governorship of Esteban Cantu, 1915-20." While in office Cantti virtually set up an autonomous regime de- spite Carranza's efforts to the contrary. He cemented his hold on .:.- Q. Declassified in in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 H.; 1-3 ? --- Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 ? . ??? CHAPTER 2 ? ? ? . power, Ontil.forCed'ot;i of office, by licensing gambling, ? prostitu- tion, and other vices illegal across the border. Narcotics, too, were readily available. Not surprisingly, numerous Americans, including some business interests in the West, preferred Canttl's control of Baja and the enjoyments found in Tijuana to the more restrictive, anti-American leadership of Venustiano Carranza in Mexico City.49 As in Tijuana, so, too, in Ciudad Juarez. To some observers the notoriety achieved there was truly appalling. -United States Consul John W. Dye remarked that "Juarez is the most immoral, degen- erate, and utterly wicked platre I have ever seen or heard of in my travels. Murder and robbery are everyday occurrences and gam- bling, dope selling and using, drinking to excess and sexual vices are continuous. It is a Mecca for criminals and degenerates from both sides of the border." Said an American evangelist: "I would rather shoot my son and throw his body in the river than have him spend an hour in the raging inferno of Juarez."5? Conditions in Juarez, exacerbated by continuing economic dependency upon El Paso and by the imposition in Texas of prohibition in 1918, sparked the inflammatory comments. The sentiments of Dye and the evangelist should not be viewed in isolation, but need to be seen in the context of the border's history since the Mexican War. In brief, a predisposition to illegal activity, including smuggling, emerged along the border soon after the war. Border areas are often regions of great opportunity. This potential took concrete form from the 1850s to the 1890s with the establishment on the Mexican side of a free zone for trade. Within the Zona Libre, whether through legal or illegal activity, standards of living were generally higher than in the interior, a result of considerable trade with the United States. Both this American orientation and discrimination in favor of the Zona ultimately aroused such strong domestic opposition that the Diaz government abolished the free zone. The resultant economic dislocation at Paso del Norte, the area encompassing Ciudad Juarez and El Paso, was particularly felt in the agricultural sector of the economy. To com- pensate for the socioeconomic travail of recession, Juarez turned to the tourist trade?a way of life even More dependent on the United States than existed with the Zona Libre." Tourism, of course, serves many masters; and tourism flourished during reform times in the _United States, notably during the era of _ , 45,1 ' ? ? - The Road to Geneva-- prohibition. The suited largely fro side of the borde Mexican side by reciprocal..Durin ing? its AissOlute I arms trade with though Mexican revolutionary via cess to narcotics- Compounding tic drug problem! officials could no the governor of prohibiting trade thereafter, the M. the domestic use alleged drug-inch ported growing Excelsior chargeC their habit while paper's campaign when in July Cob narcotics except smuggling and re: decree at the mo The geographi( the Mexican Rev dent.56 -Moreove: effective drug cor intoxicating prom expressed in expE While such goal! aspirations of pec dismayingly more of drug-related b. Although Mex quently chronicle them briefly, as ir ent interpretatior Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 ? ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25 : CIA-RDP98:01394R000200090001-8 CHA1FTER 2 ;?' ? )1ing, prostitu- tics, too, were :tans, including itei's control of )re restrictive, Mexico, City." ? %. observers the [ States Consul- degen- heard of in my nces and gam- id sexual vices ;enerates from 'elist: "I would than have him Conditions in iency upon El 1918, sparked not be viewed if the border's ;ition to illegal rder soon after mrtunity. This 1890s with the trade. Within vity, standards or, a result of this American ma ultimately a government )cation at Paso I El Paso, was mmy. To com- arez turned to _ on the United ism flourished ring the era of prohibition. The rampant 'vice that Dye and Others decried re- . suited largely from .a demand being treated on the United States side of the border, the fulfillment of which had been forced to the Mexican side by social and legal Proscription. Illegal activity was - reciprocal. During the revolutionary decade, as Juarez wasacquir- ing its dissolute reputation; Americans were carrying on an illicit arms trade with various revolutionary factions in Mexico.52 Al- though Mexican needs from the contraband trade subsided as revolutionary violence abated, American demands?including _ ao- cess to narcotics?on the illegal border economy continued. Compdunding difficulties at the border for Mexico were domes- tic drug problems that President Alvaro Obregon and other federal officials could not readily bring under control. In February 1923 the governor of Yucatan, Felipe Carillo Puerto, issued a decree prohibiting trade in opiates, cocaine, and marijuana.53 Shortly thereafter, the Mexico City newspaper Excelsior called attention to the domestic use of narcotics. Demanding corrective action against alleged drug-induced violence by young Mexicans, the paper re- ported growing national concern about the spread of addiction. Excelsior charged that perhaps 90 percent of the addicts acquired their habit while in the nation's hospitals and sanitariums." The paper's campaign against narcotics elicited government response when in July Obregon prohibited by decree the importation of narcotics except for legitimate needs.55 The high incidence of smuggling and residual corruption of officials probably nullified the decree at the moment of its promulgation. The geographical and ideological configuration of forces during the Mexican Revolution restricted Obregem's authority as presi- _ dent.56 More-over, intern- al conditions reduced the likelihood of effective drug controls. That is to say, the Revolution put forth the intoxicating promise of democracy and socioeconomic change, as expressed in expanded political participation and agrarian reform. While such goals necessarily raise the level of expectation and aspirations of people in a revolutionary situation, fulfillment is a dismayingly more gradual process. As a result, established patterns of drug-related behavior persist even as changes occur. - ? - Although--Mexico's revolutionary? tribulations have been fre-- quently chronicled and analyzed, it seems worthwhile to recount them briefly, as indirect, though substantial, support for the pres- ent interpretation. The Mexican Revolution did not appreciably Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 -- ? - 41- Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 ;. o ? .74:7 pr. -? ' = 4 , CHAPTER 2 . _ The .Roact.to_ . alter at once the life-stylsof many Mexicans. At length, an enlarged.. I The e: middle class :took shape, but only as . part of a larger political which ag structure wherein persisted from times past patterns of marginality, 4 depicted internal colonialism, and a distinctly plural society. Access to effec.. ? . ? , - the Revc tive political participation was therefore not easy, and many groups, . ? ::, culture ( ? especially rural -ones, 'whether- native or' mestizo, remained for a .. ??. Change 'I long time in virtual isolation from national political activity." Few ' charted. previously marginal groups became organized well enough to de- ''''.' block of i mand effective participation or to insure that the nation responded ...? income ( ? to their political concerns."--------- _ statistics In the place of democracy, then, Mexico has experienced a ,-.;? ment; ar modern continuatioriof essentially caudillo-dominated rule, even , :;, be apprt if a particular president's hold on power was brief or uncertain?as , : f persister , was the case until the time of 1?47.aro Cardenas." In effect, one ,, If the: .,. ruling elite replaced another. However diminished actual demo- ::' factional cratic opportunity and practice have been, there has simultane- .? Thermid ,:. ously existed a high degree of aspirational politics?at least until ,:, obscure? recently. Therefore it is reasonable to conclude that the Revolution .,,, the richr redistributed and broadened the base of power, gradually enlarging ?.;" Mexico E the size and enhancing the power of the middle sector. To argue for mode additionally that this process guaranteed a cohesive nationalism, as 4 concentr has been done," seems to claim too much in view of our knowl-;; to 1910. ,,, edge of those who do not share in the process. ?. economil A look at early attempts at agrarian reform further brings into class, su question the extent of the benefits of the Revolution. As with ?4 length N.% democracy, it has been difficult to transform the promise of change i-, - regime." into reality. It is possible, in fact, to question the putative nationaland econ commitment to reform.61 Specifically, the revolutionizing effect of :, ety long '.:-? the ejido on land reform is less than its proponents have claimed. ? ?.4 - - On -th. Practical limitations of the ejido were evident even with the inclu- ?-..., tradition; sion of Article 27 in the Queretaro Constitution of 1917.62 The :, ? zation th; need for change was great, however. Around 1920 perhaps 70 :, oppresse .,, percent of the labor force was engaged in agriculture, and an ceeded i -? equally high percentage of the population lived in rural communi- did to sc . ties. (It is probable that 90 percent of the rural families owned no t.: during ti land on the eve of the Revolution.) In ten years the rural population , lives?so of Sonora had increased by nearly 45 percent,6_3_ While _Mexico's _ _. .f: society, _ total population had declined?as had agricultural production. Sig- ?...' The er nificant change in the form of actual agrarian reform would not ,? and acco: alter these conditions- until after 1930." . Wages, ir -74 ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 -- Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25 : CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 _ CHAPTER 2 - :h, an enlarged arger politiaal" of marginality, ccess to effee-. - - I many groups,' -emained..ftir a activity.57 Few enough to de- ion responded experienced a ted rule, even uncertain?as In effect, one I actual demo- has simultane- -at least until the Revolution ually enlarging ctor. To argue nationalism, as ? of our know!- ler brings into ition. As with mise of change tative national nizing effect of have claimed. kith the inclu- 4' 191732 The perhaps 70 lture, and an iral communi- lies owned no tral population .vhile Mexico's oduction: Sig- rm would not "?:x` The Road to Geneva The extent of social and economic deprivation. in Mexico, for, which agr- a`rian reform was intended to be a major fanacea, can be depicted with some precision: There Was much to be done after the. Revolution; life meant little more for many Mexicans than. culture of poverty. Drawn even in the broadest strokes, gradual? ? change is evident when differences between 1910 and. 1930 are.... charted. Education at the primary level chipped away at the solid block of illiteracy So, too, were slight improvements noticeable in income distribution and the general level of poverty.65 Although statistics on unemployment,.: -or more accurately underemploy- - ment, ire meaningless in the modern sense, its pervasiveness can be appreciated when seal" in the context of Mexico's traditional, persistent agricultural-village economy." ? ? If the foregoing suggests that the Mexican Revolution, however factional and regional it may have been, experienced an early Thermidorean or reactionary phase, that conclusion should not obscure the essential complexity of the revolutionary process and the richness of its ultimate achievements. The Revolution brought Mexico economic growth, industrialization, and prepared the way for modernity. There continued at the same time, nevertheless, a concentration of wealth, but with a broader social base than prior to 1910. Instead of having a leveling effect, however, subsequent economic growth and urbanization, while expanding the middle class, sustained discernible class distinctions. There emerged at length what Peter H. Smith has termed "a stable, authoritarian regime.?67 Limited political participation, social differentiation, and economic privilege for the few still characterize Mexican soci- ety long after the Revolution. On the surface the preceding analysis does little to alter the - traditional view of the rural Mexican, or campesino, a characteri- zation that finds the campesino to be scarcely more than a helpless, oppressed peon.68 At issue is not whether the Revolution suc- ceeded in changing the status of the campesino, for it inevitably did to some degree, but rather how campesinos may have acted during the Porfiriato to gain a measure of control over their own lives?so that we may revise our understanding of their role within _ society._ _ The emerging picture s-uggesis-a life-style of mutual adjustment and accommodation, especially in terms of service and the level of wages, in contrast to one of unbridled exploitation. Not that land- *' npniassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Cop Approved for Release 2013/07/25 : CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 Co, 1; - ??? ? ' CHAPTER 2 - owner control suddenly became undesirable; rather, labor short- ages,: particularly in the center and north of Mexico; changed the forms of control latifundistas endeavored to employ. Before the Revolution the transition of the campesino out of peonage re- mained sadly incomplete. It was not unusual therefore to find him out of Work, dispossed,pf the land he shad.worked for another's- advantage. In the course of modernization of the work of the agricultural laborer to a form over which he exerted some control, a clash of values resulted?the impact of which ironically threat- ened the survival of his cultural heritage. The, demands of. an , increasingly market-oriented economy no doubt disrupted natural agricultural rhythms, often alienating the campesino from wage labor even when it was available.69 ? The scarcity of work, alienation, the threat of cultural change, and the promises of revolutionary caudillos combined to bring peones actively to the Revolution. In the south this meant joining with Zapata in a radical quest for land reform, consecrated, as it were, in the Plan de Ayala. For the Zapatistas, the Revolution was agrarian-based and political in nature, advancing a more coherent ideological position than evident elsewhere. The northern support- ers of the revolt against Victoriano Huerta, led by Carranza and Pancho Villa, were far less unified. Villa's revolt, described by John Womack, Jr., as "more a force of nature than of politics," com- manded the allegiance of a diverse group of followers: dispossessed campesinos, cowboys, railroad workers, bandits, Yaqui Indians, and others. This congeries of social misfits and the downtrodden gave little organized support to the nationwide uprising. An effort to join with Zapata in opposition to Carranza and the Sonorans failed markedly.7? What the Villistas brought about, "howeve-r, was their own brand of chaos in Chihuahua and parts of Sonora (for which they con- tended and lost)?a social anarchy whose impact was felt even after the revolutionary decade ended. Yet the Villistas could not ordain chaos in the north on their own. Social upheaval was generously abetted by economic dislocation, the result jointly of internal civil \strife and international conflict. Nor were the actions of the Villistas as directionless as has been generally assumed, despite their being declared "outside the ,law,"-One of the principal examples of their alleged anarchy, the raid on Columbus, New Mexico, on March 9, 1916, may actually have been a rational if erroneous response by _ e Vi tween of that ficially Villa's raid c troubh, and ec, clear al had to Nun thoritiel ent, on; Yuma,. tian Tei; a dry z, petitioi ics, thel alent a situatic cernibl barely. preseno Atti tively the Qui stand ti PeruviE use cot largely succeec ites, it This Peru d lasting "dictate of demo an expE class di nationa rlcfir in Part - Sanitized CODV Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25 : CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 ? CHAPTER 9 [er, labor short- 2o, changed the by. Before the of peonage re- _ fore to find him? ed for another's ie ? Work of the d some control, onicallY threat-. demands of an ,srupted natural- -- sino from wage ,ultural change, bined to bring s meant joining nsecrated, as it Revolution was more coherent rthern support- y. Carranza and scribed by John politics," corn- rs: dispossessed Yaqui Indians, e downtrodden ising. An effort I the Sonorans heir own brand hich they con- felt even after >uld not ordain was generously )f internal civil ; of the Villistas )ite their being imples of their 0, on March 9, is response by _ The Road to Geneva 41 the Villistas to the relationship their leader believed existed be- ? tween Carranza and the Wilson administration:" A minor aspecim of that episode, but important for, our purposes, and which super- ficially lends credence to the charges of anarchy, discloses that L._ Villa's men probably smoked marijuana to steel themselves for the ? ,raid on Columbus." Marginal men and, marijuana,, border:!: ?? : troubles and drugs: whether in the context of revolution, social ? and economic dislocation, or simply vice, the association was clear and the message direct. Domestic and international controls had to be made more effective. Numerous incidents occurred in the early 1920s providing au- thorities ample opportunity-to reiterate these sentiments. At pres- ent, one example will serve to make the larger point. Citizens from Yuma, Arizona, acting in conjunction with the local Women's Chris- tian Temperance Union, petitioned the State Department to set up a dry zone along the' border with Mexico. The practical effect, the petitioners argued, would be to halt the flow of liquor and narcot- ics, thereby containing the "unbridled vice and debauchery" prev- alent along the border." Attempts at control of this and similar situations met with scant success. Drugs continued to play a dis- cernible if veiled role in Mexican society. The Revolution had barely touched the foreign and domestic preconditions for their presence. At the same time, the situation in Peru presented a compara- tively clear picture, bound as it was to the observable culture of the Quechua and Aymara Indians. It is simpler therefore to under- stand the context in which drugs helped to shape the contours of Peruvian society. Primary, of course, was the presence of coca. Its use could not be eliminated, and scarcely reduced. Army officers, largely from the middle class, considered it an achievement if they succeeded in denying Indian conscripts their quid of coca. Urban- ites, it seems, smoked tobacco." This type of incident reveals much of the place of the Indian in Peru during el oncenio, the dictatorship of Augusto B. Leguia lasting from 1919 to 1930. Leguia, who disingenuously held that "dictatorship is more popular than anarchy," imperiled the fortunes of democracy in Peru until his ouster. The fortunate coincidence of an expanding, supportive middle class and the impetus given that class during the First World War to participate more actively in national political life assisted. Leguia's rise to power in 1919. The -rre- SAP r _ASV_ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 tt. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25 : CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 a CHATTER 3 7 .--- .._ . approach to drug control. In 1923 the government issued a numbeJ. of decrees establishing a partial state monopoly over the commerce 6 in drugs.. By placing restrictions on imports of opium and cocaine, the government intended to limit usage to legitimate medical purposes.23 Concern, however, about drugs as a serious social . problem only arose five years later. The case of Uruguay raises an - important question with broad implications, If within a short pe- riod of time the nation changed from giving casual attention to drugs (the 1923 laws) to acute concern over their prevalence and ? misuse (the warnings of the National Health Council), how serious must the situation have been when drugs first received legislative _ response? As one official later Piit it, drug usage in 1923 had "acquired the proportions of an actual plague."24 If this were true in Uruguay, what were actual conditions elsewhere in Latin Amer- ica? - Insufficient information leaves that question largely unanswered. Such is not quite the case with Mexico, however. The government there had equated increased drug usage with social problems since the early years of the decade, as the executive decrees of 192.3 and 1925 attest. Their promulgation had no discernible effect on a worsening situation. Marijuana continued to grow wild throughout the country and opium poppy cultivation flourished especially in northern states. The poppies were frequently processed into mor- phine and heroin. This indigenous crop, along with opiates smug- gled into Mexico from abroad, served both domestic addicts and 1 innumerable others in the United States. In a further attempt to control the situation, President Calles signed a decree late in 1927 94_ banning the export of heroin and marijuana.25 Two years later a revised penal code enumerated strict penalties for those persons found guilty of illegally growing or manufacturing drugs.26 ? Success in the Mexican effort depended, of course, upon effec- tive enforcement of the decrees. As before, congruence between intent and actual procedure seemed coincidental. For instance, Henry Damm, the United States consul at Nogales, reported the growing of large quantities of opium poppies in the region, yet Damm had no indication that local authorities were trying to halt cultivation. Similar reports reached the State Department from other consular districts in northern Mexico." ? Revelations similar to Damm's came also from Mexicali where Consul Frank Bohr learned of the existence of a lucrative, wide- ? ., ? , Rebuilding if' spread co opium de Mexicans United S available was set a Chinese , Bohr's co) The cons drug.28 TI enforcem, In addi had to cor Nuevo LE centage o Condition sular reqt there." 1 Mexico's I also from the Unite De spit? Mexico se held in th could achi effort had not s tried evolved fr, of citizens Recognizii Departme in a confe change on to attend t a backdroi depicted : [considera reached ar tion on kn in March 1)p:cl2ssified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 CkAPTER 3 Rebuilding the Politics f Drug Control sped a number the commerce m and cocaine, imate medical serious social. _ iguay raises an ? bin a short pe- al 'attention to )revalence and , [1), how serious ived legislative .. e in 1923 had this were true in Latin Amer- ly unanswered. he government problems since Bes of 1923 and )1e effect on a throughout d especially in !ssed into mor- opiates smug- tic addicts and her attempt to -ee late in 1927 o years later a those persons drugs,26 _ se, upon effec- ience between For instance, reported the he region, yet trying to halt partment from dexicali where icrative, wide- 59 spread commerce in opium. Bohr managed to arrange a visit to an opium den run by Chinese nationals. There the consul found Mexicans and *Chinese as well as black and white citizens of the United States. Inside the den many varieties of narcotics were available for sale and consumption on the premises; a special room was set aside for the smoking of opium. Upon Bohr's arrival the Chinese operators expressed suspicion. about his presence, -but Bofir's contact secured entry by buying a small amount of cocaine. The consul's report does not reveal whether he partook of the drug." This incident underlines the difficulty inherent in drug law enforcement for Mexican officials. _ _ In addition to internal narcotic problems, Mexican authoritig-' had to cope with the ubiquitous matter of smuggling. At Juarez and Nuevo Laredo, officials rarely confiscated more than a small per- centage of the quantifi of-drugs adiiinfedly_crossing_the b?order. Conditions in the Matamoros-Brownsville area resulted in a con- sular request for a special agent to investigate the illicit traffic there." The poor record of interception stemmed not_only_frona- Mexico's lie-tfifiger?Trs,and funds to patrol the border properly, but als-o-EC?n the absence of any cOo-peiative antismuggling effort with the-Mired ,States." Despite the difficulties they faced, upper echelon leaders in Mexico seemingly possessed antidrug sentiments similar to those held in the United States. Neither side working alone, however, could achieve the results each desired. Yet the idea of a common effort had been considered earlier and abandoned, but for reasons not strictly pers,aining to drug control. The plan for cooperation evolved from tlie previously mentioned request in 1924 by a group of citizens in Yuma, Arizona for a dry zone along the border.31 Recognizing the unilateral nature of the dry zone proposal, State Department officials instead issued an invitation to Mexico to join in a conference to create channels for improving information ex- change on illegal drug activity. All border consuls were instructed to attend the meeting in El Paso scheduled for May 1925.32 Against a backdrop that portended further smuggling at Ciudad Juarez and depicted Ensenada in Baja California as "an entrepot of some [considerable] quantity of narcotics,"33 the two sides quickly reached an agreement. Both pledged regular exchange of informa- tion on known smugglers and their activities. The pact took effect in March 1926.34 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 --1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25 : CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 ILLEGIB ? - ? ? 60 CHAPTER 3 The treaty was not an open-ended one, so as the conclusion of the initial year of its operation approached; the United States? notified Mexico of its intention to terminate the agreement. The decision resulted from an assessment by State Department officials of political and economic contitions within Mexico. Secretary of State Frank Kellogg e?cplained.theAlecision in a conversation, with. the British 'Ambassador Sir Esme Howard. Painting a picture of chaos and imminent disintegration of Mexican society, the secre- tary described a situation in which business activity was slowing -down and revenues decreasing. Kellogg feared that opposition to,,, Calles by "radical Communists" would prevent any corrective ac- tion. "Mexico,''',, he-told Howard, "[is] evidently on the brink of ancial collapse."35 In a postscript to the termination of the treaty, Consul Jon Dye in Juarez reacted to its lapse indifferently. He felt that the Mexican government had not seriously endeavored to enforce the accord.36 True, the task of transforming commitment into effective action often failed, producing understandable exasperation on the part of officials who were reminded daily of the large quantity of drugs moving northward. In April 1931, when a special Mexican agent arrived in the Juarez-El Paso area to assist the consul there, William Blocker remarked that "the arrival of the narcotic agent. . . would indicate that the Mexican Government has at last decided to clean up the drug traffic on this section of the border."37 The vicissitudes associated with drug control activity throughout Latin America in the latter half of the 1920s prevented the United States from discrediting the work of the League of Nations at the 1928 Havana Conference.The___r_eneiging. -definition_of drug usage as a social problem was demonstrated more, by thmle.L.v goyem- IVIileh acted, ttirough acceptance...of the,..1925_Geneva ? vention than by sole adherence to the.1912 agieeas ate- United States desire& By the start of the meeting in Havana, Latin American nations including Brazil, Chile, Nicaragua, Uru- guay, and Bolivia with reservations, had signed the Final Act of the 1925 convention; others were reportedly about to sign. These ratifications, plus those from outside the Western -Hemisphere, guaranteed adoption of the convention. The-action-of-the-United States at Havana only_added-to-its-isolation-from- international- antinarcotic activity. That is, the refusal of the United ,States. to _ _ _ _ Rebuilclini disavov willingi States i Desr Mrs. Al product her frec some w accepta that oth convent told M Affairs done. 39 calling skeptick. toward again. 1 policy I moveml Calch idea. IL for 192i been th merit." other if That as progran discoun cluding scured countrie Renel drug coi in whicl producil have hac channel: cially tn _ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25 : CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 r CHAPTER 3 ? rclusion of Led States nent. The nt officials - -- ;cret4ry. of. ;ation with ? picture o the secre- as slowing._ position to rective ac- e brink of 11 Jon Dye le Mexican accord.36 tive action the part of y of drugs ican agent ksul there, e narcotic t has at last border. "37 throughout the United ions at the drug -make ew govern- !neva Con- eement, as in Havana, agua, Uru- il Act of the ign. These emisphere, the United iternational d States to Reblditiethe-Tolitic &Drug Uoliti-ol 61 disavow fully the .ri c_. wit ngness o Latin Americans to follow the_lead of the United S tat-eri ii--o-theTin-atteii:in?clu-d in g arcotics 38 - Despite -he-r Support for the position of-the State Department, Mrs: Wright knew thit Americari policy was. inherently counter- . . . . - productive to 'effective drug control;In Jan. u'arj, 1928 during orie her frequent discussions with Nelson Johnson, she suggested that some way should be found to have the 1925 convention made more acceptable. She offered few specific proposals except the vain hope that other nations' might be wiling to accept an amendment to the convention so it would not be,adopted in its present form. Johnson told Mrs. Wright that Porter and the Division of Far Eastern Affairs were studying the situation to determine what could be done." Caldwell and other officials realized that she was right in calling for a reassessment of policy. Johnson, though, remained skeptical; he saw no feasible way to revise Washington's policy toward the League. But Mrs. Wright interposed her ideas once again. In March she urged the secretary of state to formulate a policy reasserting United States leadership in the antinarcotic movement. This meant convening a new conference.4? Caldwell reversed his prior isolationist stance and supported the idea. He wanted the United States to ask for a conference, possibly for 1929, and then approach it with greater flexibility than had been the case in 1924-25. Johnson was not persuaded of the idea's merit. "So far as I know," he told Caldwell, "we have no program other than that which our delegation offered at Geneva in 1925, which was rejected and would be rejected again by the powers."" That assessment seemed accurate, since, -by_ks_insistence on a program of limitation at the source, the United_States-strongly disc---ordagd?consideration of any other drug control scheme, - 4 cliiiminufa-cturing restricti9ns. American rigidity thus ob- ScTIFF-d the cultural, -financial, and political difficulties some countries had in accepting Washington's program wholesale.42 Renewed cooperation with the League was essential for effective drug control. If nothing else, the OAC provided an available forum in which pressure, however limited, could be brought to bear on producing and manufacturing nations. Such pressure might not have had sufficient influence if exerted through bilateral diplomatic channels. To United States officials this must have seemed espe- cially true concerning Latin America by 1928. At the time of the - ? , 4'1'1 3i; ? 'HA ri ????.. t?? .? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 Heti-111i is addicted to drugs," Porter remarked several months before his death, "is sick. He or she is the victim of a disease and should be placed where treatment can be given. You can't cure a sick person by sending that person to jail. "76 That sentiment seemed to be anathema to the commissioner of narcotics in 1930, as his actions ? in office would soon reveal. ? Flexibility rather than rigidity marked the relationship of the United States with the international drug control movement at that time. During its January 1931 session the OAC, with Caldwell's active support, enlarged the list of narcotics that might become subject to manufacturing limitations at the May conference.77 In his instructions to the delegation Stimson told Caldwell and the other members (including Anslinger) not to oppose a convention "which would be acceptable to other governments and unaccepta- ble to the United States . . . , provided it would seem likely to accomplish the desired restriction of manufacture." The secretary of state hoped that the United States would be able to accept any convention agreed upon.78 Prior to the opening of the Conference for the Limitation of the Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs, Stimson also encouraged Latin American participation at Geneva. Some hesitancy about commit- ting themselves wholeheartedly to League-directed antinarcotic activity still existed, but over half the countries there sent repre- sentatives to the conference." In attendance were Argentina, Bo- livia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Ven- ezuela. Physical presence in Geneva did not ensure active partici- pation in the deliberations. Mexico, for instance, assisted in administrative procedures, but contributed little to the substantive discussions. This reluctance may seem anomalousmhen compared With her eputinuing domesticproblem with.drugs. Yet as Martinez de Alva explained for his government: :There [is] no problem of narcotic drugs in Mexico. Mexico produce[s] no raw material, [does] not manufacture narcotic drugs, [does] not export them and [does] not even consume them except for legitimate require- ments.-"8? Under Mexican law the activities mentioned were illegal- unless carried out under strict government supervision. The state- ment of the Mexican representative, otherwise disingenuous, be- comes explicable if it is remembered that Mexico, still immersed in th. a woi existi. Ar role main who ment a dir. remi This supp ' have abou In dent Cald have Ansl of ax subr Next colic the; exce pose of rz B. sive Agri stric of el vent sum - .71 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 ? .or,' Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 CHAPTER 3 ? onths before his ;e and should be ire a sick pers-OV' it seemed to be , 10, as his actions .41 lationship of the novement at that with Caldwell's t might become conference." In :aldwell and the Ilse a convention s and unaccepta- seem likely to .? The secretary de to accept any ..imitation of the ncouraged Latin y about commit- ted antinarcotic here sent repre- Argentina, Bo- nican Republic, iuguay, and Ven- re active partici- Ice, assisted in ) the substantive when compared Yet as Martinez I no problem of a raw material, export them and timate require- ;ned were illegal sion. The state- ingenuous, be- still immersed 71 Rebuilding the Politics of Drug Control ? ? . ? . ' ? - 71 ' in the spirit of its revolution, was participating for the first time in a world narcotic conference and probably did not want to admit the existence of any blemishes on its antinarcotic record. ? Argentina, the only other Latin American nation to play a vocal role in the conference, naively became involved in the debate over manufacturing limitations. Its representative, Fernando Perez, i who had no constructive proposals to present, disiiiiiieTEIaire- m----e-rti -That overproduction and eTh7C?essiVe-Foicsiiinption of drugs had .. --a-dttetrilatioirs'hip. Perez told the assembled delegates in terms reminiscent of those heard years earlier in the United States: The spread of drug addiction and the development of the illicit drug traffic are not the effect of over-production, but are due to the moral perversion of the drug addicts and of the unscrupulous. traffickers who supply them with material for their vicious practices. This assessment of the motives behind drug usage led Argentina to support a proposal of the Soviet Union which, if adopted, would have expanded the scope of the conference to include a discussion about whether to place limits upon raw material cultivation.81 In more contentious times the United States would have ar- dently supported a similar drug control plan. To the credit of Caldwell and his superiors, the United States delegation did not have to labor under such restrictions in 1931. Instead Caldwell and Anslinger backed a Franco-Japanese proposal-based on the concept of in alien and .competitive..market..First,..each?government would submit to a central office..annuaLestimates.afiegitimate ,needs. Next, internal regulations would limit the supply of available nar- cotics 6-those requirements. Finally, the central office would have 1 the authority to regulate narcotic traffic as -a means of restricting i excessive exportatioq.82 If this plan had been adopted as com- posed, it would have ultimately resulted in limiting *e production of raw narcotic material. Because of objections, especially Germany's, to so comprehen- sive a plan, the scheme could not be adopted without modification. Agreement in principle was reached, however, on the need for strict supervision of the quantity of raw materials in the possession of each manufacturer. Accordingly, one provision_ofithei.931.con- verition was _ intended ..to,prevent-the-accumulation?of_excessive supply. Going beyond the 1925 convention, the new one made the Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25 : CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 r ? , ",? --. 7,--77. .47 '7-17 4 ? ??.: V-K1i s." ? ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 .74 .? s .C?t-a."`?. 14,1 P . ? ' ? 1 , 72.?. : I, :I ? . :-?-?-?: ? 1 1 to.. t. 4 4! ? i4?Z-, , - ! --? \ . ? ? ? ? . ? . ? ?"rnr;it", P?4 ? %; ! ? estimates of legitimate narcotic requirements binding on the nation . . submitting them: The Permanent Central Opium Board would try It to curtail violations of the agreement by exercise of its supervisory ' - , and administrative duties. The.PCOB also received the authority ? e',.,,,,,,, ., . ? ? ,-..rt.;,- to place embargoes on countries exceeding their import and export ? ....w?ie.?, ?. ? .-,?,,, .T:=-3. . . estithatei. In sum, the manufacturing limitation conference sought I, 3,I to bring under contitil-brthe-League-c-bmmerce in tlie7Thref ..,..: ' 4 : ? ... ifr; ?, "preparatiairof the opiuriiTZR-5731-icrthe -- - -: T-Fe, work-OT The conference pleased the United States govern--- . ment. If the convention . did not exactly duplicate Washington's ,..- - - position, it at least embodied many of the ideas Caldwell and his , ,,,,, .? - `::P .i . '? ? associates found crucial to effective control. Caldwell therefore - , L. signed the convention and protocol of signature on July 18. He a.refrained from signing the final act only because the United States did not belong to the League. Other signatories included the major -, manufacturing countries?Germany, Great Britain, Japan, the Netherlands, and SWitzerland." Among the Latin American states, ' Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Guatemala, Mexico, .Panama, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Argentina ad referendum signed the convention. Nicaragua, a nonparticipant, deposited the , ._ .? ,,,.- ? first ratification with the League, followed closely by the United -it,l ' ,? ..? States in April 1932. Enough nations deposited their ratifications for the conventionto.ta e.effecton-July9,..19331r e Ar ,----u The presence of the United States and numerous Latin American countries at Geneva in 1931 and the convention drafted during the conference underscored the changes which had transpired since , 1925 in the attitudes of the American republics toward interna- ,: ? '4 " ? tional drug control. The United States had altered its method of ...44.. administering domestic policy with the creation of the Federal A . ; . Bureau of Narcotics. As of 1930 Congress possessed less authority 4- . 0 than before to formulate policy Henceforth le_gislative action would -..-1,. ,. reinforce rather than define the antidrug _efforts of the_executive ?b_____)ranch-Try-formallyticipating in the activities of the OAC, the Department of State reduced congressional influence over narcotic 4: 1 ? foreign policy as well. The results of the 1931 Geneva conference - 1 - - - seemed 63 demonstrate both the_efficacy of shared power within _ Ali ': ; . the .executive branch and the return of the United States to lead- - -:*::f 4. - 5,.. r4.?4 I ? ership in the international movement Disputes with Congress " , , ili'i.Y. ? 1 over the nature of policy could only undermine that position. .. .'n : , Simultaneous attempts to build, let alone rebuild, the politics of - it li -,.;.--4,.-- .i -' _ ,.. il . , I , '1r i ? , gt: Oi t -4 I I -sr' ? CHAPTER 3 - .1 ??? r ? ?t'I Rebuilding the ? drug contrc had existed particularly ceive drug tered existi Uruguay er drug comrr ineffective. scale fin- an-4 major obst throughout trols. Neve recognition controls, a been able ti state there ence over t the logical ( I control, wh bureaucrac vided the policy chan Cci? ????? ? ? 44^ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 - Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200696-001-8 CHAPTER 3 . . . , hg on the nation Board would try )f its supervisory ed the authority iport and export inference sought .ce in the chief. Loa I States govern- te Washington's '.aldwell and his !dwell therefore on July 18. He le United States !hided the major am, Japan, the e rican states, iexico, Panama, ad referendum :t, deposited the by the United heir ratifications 15 Latin American afted during the transpired since toward interna- its method of of the Federal !d less authority lye action would 3f the executive of the OAC, the ice over narcotic leva conference d power within I States to lead- with Congress lat position. d, the politics of Rebuilding the Politics of Drug Control 73 drug control in Latin America Produced a closer ielationship than had existed previously with the League of Nations. Several nations, particularly Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia, began gradually to per- ceive drug usage as a social problem. Remedial action rarely al- tered existing conditions, however. On the other hand, Mexico and Uruguay employed legislative and administrative means to restrict drug commerce and usage. Yet even those efforts proved largely ineffective. Financing was unavailable for proper control?if large- scale financing could have helped; official corruption became a major obstacle; and dru_g_y_se as Raft of the cultural heritage throughout Latin America militated against comiirehensive con- trsheless, at the close of the Geneva conference of 1931, Ignition existed in Latin America of the need for additional controls, a recognition that hemispheric diplomacy alone had not been able to produce. In the 1930s, the growth of the bureaucratic state there would contend with drug-related traditions for influ- ence over the direction of drug policy. The United States seemed the logical choice to lead the way toward greater hemispheric drug control, whether by example or direct diplomacy. A reconstructed bureaucracy and a revised narcotic foreign policy ostensibly pro- vided the example of sound management necessary for effective policy change. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 `,.91ft1774- 464a67.%..4' ? ?.! Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25 : CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 r ? e ? I 4 '.??: ? tiet-;*`? ? ?, ? , ? ? Vvr; ? . ? , fa ?;,5 Api .(1Y- 1.4j. r4i5,YAf ? ? -? 14-4 ? A . r The adoption of Ale 1931 Geneva Convention buoyed hopes for rapid progress in the worldwide antinarcotic campaign. Shortly after the convention went into effect in July 1933, the World Narcotic Defense Association celebrated. The association's leader, Capt. Richmond P. Hobson, a Spanish-American War veteran who had become an active campaigner for several organizations, deliv- ered a number of speeches praising the work of the Geneva confer- ence. In another tribute the Literary Digest heralded the implementation of the convention with an article entitled, "End of the Illicit Drug Traffic Now in Sight."' Unfortunately, such euphoria was unwarranted. For nations steadfastly committed to the eradication of illicit drug commerce and usage, including the United States, the convention provided an additional tool to help in the fight. Nations with less systematic- programs, especially those in Latin America, were encouraged to reconsider the extent of their antidrug activities. In some cases more vigorous actions would be undertaken. For their part United States officials believed that the recent integration of foreign and domestic drug policies would mitigate some of the nation's drug problems. They miscalculated the complexity of the situation. ? In the early 1930s domestic addiction remained at a considerable level, a steady stream ? of illegal drugs, including marijuana and opium, continued to-flow north from- Mexico, and new problems ? appeared for policymakers as Central America and Colombia be- came important locales for, smuggling opiates and cocaine from " .7V1 ? narlaccifipri in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 76 CHAPTER 4 Drug Control in the . ? . , Europe. These conditions plus a general inability to control illicit narcotic commerce by Latin American governments offered_ offi- cials in Washington scant hope for success in their endeavars. Conservative estimates provided by theFederal Bureau of Nar- cotics placed the number of addicts around 100,000 in 1926; six years later the official figure had increased by 20,000. This amounted to approximately one addict per one thousand people. - Testifying in 1930 on his bill creating the bureau, Stephen C. Porter stated that the most reliable estimates of addiction ranged from 200,000 to 1,000,000 addicts. Porter personally felt that the accurate number approached 400,000.2 If Porter's statistics exag- gerated the real extent of addiction, the government's figures underestimated it. The point is that addiction was probably not decreasing, despite the enforcement programs being carried out under the provisions of the Harrison Narcotic Law and its amend- ments. On the twentieth anniversary of the law's passage, an editorial in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch termed it a failure which had only produced large-scale smuggling. The Federal Bureau of Narcotics denied the allegation asserting that addiction had de- creased during the two decades of the law's operation.3 Moreover, the continuing depiction of addicts as social deviants belied the faith officials placed in their capacity to reduce addic- tion. In 1932 Treasury Secretary Ogden L. Mills found addicts to be "mentally defective and psychotic," easily given to the influ- ence of other addicts. Bureau Commissioner Anslinger doubted whether addicts could ever play a useful role in society. In remarks before the Attorney General's Conference on crime held in Wash- ington in December 1934, he commented that "we understand that none of these addicts would have become habitu?had they possessed the mental stamina to resist the drug. The mere fact that they could not control their craving, and yielded time after time even when they knew from experience that they faced a jail sen- tence, is indisputable proof. . . that many of them will relapse to the ravages of the old habit and form underworld associates." To Anslinger, addicts were "derelicts from a sinking ship."4 Only occasionally in the 1930s was there heard a dissent from such views. Dr. Walter L. Treadway of the Public Health Service, reflecting perhaps his bureau's difficult historical experience with drug addiction, warned of the danger in a facile dismissal of the social and env that addiction more visible v recidivism di addiction was the approach punitivb meal forcement pat not obtain a la At this time tic controls cal law. Long be states were cl? ing and enfon served not as not to pass col October 1932 form State L narcotic act. drugs without form State Na cocaine; mar. provisions of licensing of n receptive atm. of articles abo the governm( added its sum throughout th states had pui The renova /vacuum isolat exigencies brc ulous work of problem app( various goven veles adminis plated change from the Tres Initiative for I npclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 , Z ? ' Declassified in Part- Sanitized CopyApproved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 _ CHAPTER 4 'fifty to control illicit nments offered offi- their endeavors. . ieral Bureau of Nar- 100,000 in 1926; six !d by 20,000. This le thousand people. >ureau, Stephen G. of addiction ranged rsonally felt that the rter's statistics exag- overnment's figures n was probably not Is being carried out Law and its amend- e law's passage, an A it a failure which Federal Bureau of t addiction had de- peration.5 :ts as social deviants ity to reduce addic- ills found addicts to r given to the influ- Anslinger doubted society. In remarks ;rime held in Wash- lat "we understand habitu?had they ;. The mere fact that led time after time ley faced a jail sen- hem will relapse to orld associates.* To ng ship."4 eard a dissent from )lic Health Service, cal experience with ile dismissal of the --4 .1 - Drug Control in the Americas, 1931-1936 social and environmental causes of addiction. Treadway pointed out that addiction appeared in all social classes, although it remained more visible within the lower class. He also felt that a high level of recidivism did not so much lend support to the assertion that addiction was a function of a pathological personality. as it refuted the approach which 'sought to control drug usage primarily by punitive means.5 Since Treadway's views ran counter to the en- forcement patterns practiced by the Bureau of Narcotics, they did not obtain a large audience within the policy-making bureaucracy. At this time the major instance of an attempt to improve domes- tic controls came in the movement to adopt a uniform state narcotic law. Long before 1930 it became evident to officials that many states were defaulting to the federal government the task of enact- ing and enforcing adequate antidrug legislation. The Harrison law served not as a model for some state legislatures, but as an excuse not to pass complementary state laws.6 At its annual conference in October 1932 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni- form State Laws accepted a draft proposal for a _uniform state. iI?otic act:Under the terms of the draft, no person could trade in drugs without specific authorization. The final version of the Uni- form State Narcotic Drug Act related primarily to the opiates and cocaine; marijuana was incidentally included under the general provisions of the act. The proposal also recommended the strict licensing of manufacturers and wholesalers. Hoping to create a receptive atmosphere, the Bureau of Narcotics prepared a number of articles about the need for the act. It is noteworthy that early in the government's campaign, the American Medical Association added its support for the adoption of the act. The rapid response throughout the nation pleased the bureau; by 1936 twenty-seven states had put the act into effect.7 The renovation of drug control policy did not proceed in a vacuum isolated from contemporary events. In fact, the economic exigencies brought on by the depression almost negated the metic- ulous work of the State Department and the young bureau. The problem appeared in the form of a proposed reorganization of various government agencies just as President Franklin D. Roose- velt's administration was settling into office. Among the contem- plated changes was the transfer of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics from the Treasury Department to the Attorney General's office. Initiative for the change apparently came from the Bureau of the Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25 : CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 - 78 CHAPTER 4 Budget and its director, Lewis W. Douglas, who convinced the ? commissioner Of prohibition, A. V. Dalrymple, that the interchange of agents for narcotic and prohibition law enforcement would in- crease the operational efficiency of the bureaus being merged.8 --- Stuart J. Fuller, a narcotic expert speaking for the State Depart- . ment,?offered.tw. o *o'bjectiOn.' Firit, any change might contravene ? Article XV of the 1931 Geneva Convention which required each signatory to maintain a separate, central narcotics office. Further:- more, the proposal would probably place the enforcement of nar- cotic 4ws in a situation similar to that Which existed before the establishment of the Bureau of Narcotics. In a cover note on a memorandum to Undersecretary of State William Phillips on March 31, 1933, Fuller wrote, Our Narcotics Bureau has been held up at Geneva as a model one." Fuller therefore concluded that to: abolish the Bureau of Narcotics would be regarded as a dis- tinctly retrograde step and would discourage abroad the cen- tralization and coordination of foreign narcotics administration which the American Government has repeatedly urged.8 Fuller took his case both to the Justice Department and the prohibition chief. He informed Dalrymple that the 1931 conven- tion had been composed and signed on the insistence of the American Government." Any alteration in the policy structure would make it appear that the United States had reneged on its antidrug commitment, causing embarrassment for the State De- partment.1? Reports also reached Washington detailing concern by the Opium Advisory Committee over the proposed merger. Presi- dent Roosevelt finally ended all speculation when he told Phillips that there would be no merger or abolition of the bureau, espe- cially in view of the treaty obligations incurred in 1931.11 The defeat of the proposed merger underscores the bureaucratic skills at work in the management of national narcotic policy by Harry J. An slinger and his colleagues in the Department of State. After an early decrease in funding as a result of the depression, they were able to maintain appropriations for the Bureau of Narcotics at a relatively constant level throughout the depression, New Deal, and the years of the heavy fiscal demands generated by the Second World War. (See Table. 2.) In financial terms at least, the stability of Drug"Control in the TABLE 2. Annual Ai Fiscal Year 1931. 1932.- 1933 ? ? 3934 ? . 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 Source: Compi6tior funding shows as a regular al ment. With th policy could b longer subsum the case since , support for th. more concerte As had been its direct relat required mud ing in their effi A crucial obst Mexican gove Usage apparer persisted, am society.12 Des; decrees of the tion. A report in the severity ar minister of go, nation, an acti gling operatio and then tram Calles, the mo - Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25 : CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 7% ? CHAPTER 4 ? ? : 1- .convinced the le interchange lent would in- rrierked.9' . State Dvart- lit contravene required each Hee. Further- -- - ement of nar- ed before the Per note on a -1 Phillips on eau has been re concluded -ded as a dis- road the cen- Elministration y urged.9 lent and the 1931 conven- tence of the Cy structure neged, on its le State De- g concern by erger. Presi- told Phillips areau, espe- 1931.11 The ucratic skills by Harry J. ate. After an 1, they were arcotics at a New Deal, the Second e stability of Drug Control in the Americas, 1931-1936 ? ? .----. ? TABLE 2. Annual Appropriations for the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 1931-1950 79 Fiscal Year Appropriation . fiscal Year Appropriation 1931 $1,712,998 1941 $1,303,280 . .1932, .. , $1,708;528 -: ? 1942 ? - ?$1,278,47$. .. 1933 ? $1,525,000 - 1943 - $1;289,060 1934 $1,400,000 1944 $1,150,000 1935 $1,244,899 -1945 $1,338,467 1936 $1,249,470 1946 $1,167,400 ___ 1937. . 51,p5,0001947 _ . $1 300 000 1938 I ? ' ..___..... $1,267,000 , 1948 $1,430,000 1939 i ' $1,267,000,..) 1949 $1,450,000 1940 1 $1,306,700 1950 $1,610,000 Source: Compilation of Federal Bureau of Narcotics annual reports funding shows that public narcotic policy had finally taken its place as a regular and institutionalized function of the federal govern- ment. With the end of the controversy over reorganization, drug policy could be 'looked upon almost as an entity unto itself?no longer subsumed within broader policy considerations as had been the case since 1914. By having to devote less time to obtaining support for their policy at home, drug officials were able to give more concerted attention to related problems abroad. As had been the case for some time, the situation in Mexico and its direct relationship to drugs smuggled into the United States required much of the energy officials in Washington were expend- ing in their effort to .improve the quality of control in the Americas. A crucial obstacle to their? goal arose out of the difficulties the Mexican government faced in handling its own drug situation. Usage apparently increased in the early 1930s. Marijuana smoking persisted, and heroin was found among the lower levels of society.12 Despite claims to the contrary by the government, the decrees of the 1920s had not really alleviated a deteriorating situa- tion. A report in the newspaper Excelsior on June 12, 1931 revealed the severity and extent of the situation. In a letter to the paper, the minister of government, Carlos Riva Palacio, announced his resig- nation, an action resulting from his alleged complicity in a smug- gling operation which was introducing illegal drugs into Mexico and then transporting them to the United States. 13 Plutarco Elias Calles, the most powerful man in Mexico and now ex-president, Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 , ^h- _ 4 Nr? ? t"1.4;:i?Z"Pd''.. ? ;?,-;?"%e r- _ ????.?,- ? 4 ?k "te, - Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25 : CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 4-3 , 1 ! ' ? CHAPTER 4 had the noininal president, Pascual Rubio OM. z, accept the Minis- ter's resignation. There existed no certainty, however, that Riva Palacio was intimately connected with the smugglers. Others men- tioned in connection-with fife --Op-eratio-n were the president of the -4 Federal, District, the governor. of.San Luis Potosi, and also mem.; hers of the staff of Rubio Ortiz. "The most charitable construction to put on the action of the, President," declared United States Military Attach?ol. Gordon Johnson, Is that the sudden expo- sure Of so m-any high officials of his Administration might be politi-?-,--.1 cally disastrous."" _ _ _ - ? - - - In short, a government crisis seemed at hand. Mexico's financial condition, more precarious because of the depression, was worse than at any time since 1915. Credit was poor; gold and silver were in short supply. With the resignation of the head of the presidential staff, Calles's faith in the ability of Rubio Ortiz to govern effectively nearly evaporated. Fortunately for Mexico, the power and prestige of Calles held the government together. In August the crisis passed when Gen. Lazar? Cardenas, who would become president in 1934, accepted an appointment to Riva Palacio's former position.15 It is not clear that the appointment of Cardenas had a causal effect, but shortly thereafter the government undertook a reassess- ment of the operation of its drug control policies. Specifically?the. Public Health De artment_sought to establish rspecial,hospitals,to _ca-r-e-fol?-a-daicts: the program wasobligatory?and_ the departmept h-a-dS-a-iiih-o-fizad-aict's ,discharge. -Und er.th e_pl an ,,fre e _care would be provided for.poorer,Addicts.,Finally,,,physicianS,were,to - be held responsiblejor,the .condition.of.patients -upon .their.,re-.. Z ? 4, lease." Nothing came of the proposal until Cardenas took office asl---- ; 17-Ment. At the end of August 1934 the new administration pub- lished a revised sanitary code and decree of implementation. U der provisions of the code, if an addict had drugs in his possession ? , for personal use, he would be, consigned to the Public Health Department, not to the criminal courts. But if an addict supplie others with drugs, he would be subject to criminal prosecution after undergoing treatment. Most important, the Department. of Public Health would constitute the ultimate authority concerning --possible prosecution for _ _ _ 1: Implementation of the sanitary code left Mexico's drug law en- 1:i forcement practices at variance with those of the United States. )?? Pouletjy an agency with a medical function rather - ? --_--- -t-,.`1 ,,,e! ? Drug Control ii . . ?\ than by or enforcemei partmept Medicai 'att ? applicabilit ? the United solely for I control woi Washingtm Despite doubtful th drug situati United Pre standing co named Me: were being Mexican of denied the man ufactur Whatever t , ernmenes British and from Persia financially, ) cially stimul denials, the Based up Mexico City smuggling. : ment for th year official with Consul ico next ref unrestricted State Depai quest, altho Mexico wit] Mexicans lu exchange of While rel . ? 4lio- ? nne-Imccifipri in Part - Sanitized Com/ Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized C,o,pyi8:k.pproved,..for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 - ? . CHAPTER 4 Ccep. the minis: , 'ever, that Riva rs. Others men- president of the- , and also rtiem. -;.- ble construction' j United States le sudden expo- might be politi- lexico's financial sion, was worse and silver were 'the presidential wern effectively ,ver and prestige the crisis passed ne president in mer position.15 tas had a causal rtook a reassess- Specifically, the cial hospitals to the department t plan, free care ysicians were to ; upon their re- las took office as tinistration pub- mentation. Un- n his possession ; Public Health addict supplied [nal prosecution Department of )rity concerning o's drug law en- United States. function rather Drug Control in the Americas, 1931-1936? ILLEGIB thari by one -(the 'Bureau :of-Narcofics).-emphasizing4mnitive4aw enforcement and administrative efficiency., The Public.Health De7 par"-Tinerif?planned treat addicts first as individuals meriting medical attention; their particular situation would determine the applicability of criminallaw..C9nversely, enforcement practices in the United States blurred distinctions between sale and possession solely for personal use. Whether the Mexican approach to drug control would prove any more successful than that advocated in Washington remained to be seen Despite the intentions Of the Cardenas. administration, it was - doubtful that the new' regulations had a discernible impact on the drug situation in areas distant from Mexico City. In April 1935 the United Press news wire carried a story from Geneva stating that a standing committee of the League of Nations, probably the OAC, named Mexico as a nation from which large quantities of drugs were being smuggled into the United States. It also noted that Mexican officials took part in the illicit activity. The government denied the allegations, putting the blame for smuggling instead on manufacturing nations with insufficient controls over exports. Whatever the level of official corruption and complicity, the gov- ernment's countercharges had a basis in reality. In Manchuria, British and Swiss interests were seeking to have the opium trade from Persia legalized: an increased trade would prove lucrative financially, particularly if the demand for narcotics could be artifi- cially stimulated in places other than China.19 Notwithstanding the denials, the level of smuggling from Mexico remained high.19 Based upon _i_Les_orLiallie....early-1930sr-the-govermnent.in _t_q7 a eat_,,np.,..,_.10.y___illing19...act_with?the...DattriAtack.t.o-stgp smuggling. In 1930 the two countries concluded an infoppal=agree-- rri-e-Zr ol'rn-Zaiaiiirairiforrnation on drugs.16 The following 'arafli-crals sent a special agent to coordinate antidrug activity with Consul William Blocker in the Juarez-El Paso region.21 Mvs- ico next requested that agents of both countries be permitted unrestncted-bgrthere ursuant-kitiFird Stare-Department and Bureau of .Narcotics turned down the re- quest, alihougli-United States agents would continue to-cross into Mat& vith Anslinger's express approval.22 By mid-1932 all the Nexicanslad.,achieved.was anotherjnformallrrangement,ZW exchange of information.23. While reluctant to engage in cooperative activity, the United :1; ? ILLEGIB ?=1.' Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Cop _ Approved for Release 2013/07/25 : CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 CHAPTER-4 States took several. unilateral steps to detect and prevent illegal . traffic. Around 1930 private planes began smuggling drugs out of Mexico. In response, an antidrug air patrol operated from various . sites in Texas starting in 1931. During the first two years of the --- program no drugs were seized, only liquor. Yet authorities re- mained' Convinced that 'smuggling by air Was a. Prime means. of ? '4* getting drugs into the United States.24 In addition to west Texas, Baja California continued to serve as a prominent locale for smuggling. The consul at Ensenada, William ? Smale, suggested that the State Department pressure Mexican authorities to act by taking steps "which would reduce to a mini- mum the travg and expenditures of American tourists in Baja California. . "25 Not until Operation Intercept thirty-five years later would the United States try, ih a comparable situation, to take the action Smale suggested. In place of economic pressure, a meeting was held on October 10, 1934 in Los Angeles to dissemi- nate information on smuggling to representatives from the state, treasury, labor, and justice departments. The need for the meeting became evident after the district supervisor of the Bureau of Nar- cotics in San Francisco stated that he saw no reason to believe anything other than liquor was being smuggled into the United States.26 Such ignorance of the actual situation was unacceptable in An- slinger's Bureau of Narcotics; nor would it help matters in Baja California. In January 1935 Smale found "the matter of smuggling. . . taking more and more of the time of this office. "27 The meeting in Los Angeles provided some assistance. Communi- cation lines between State Department representatives and 'Treas- ury agents, who had often operated in Mexico without consular ----- knowledge, were improved. Smale and other consuls would re- ceive any urgent information from the Customs Border Patrol Office in San Diego. In turn, they were required to report period- ically to a general coordinator in Los Angeles.28 The transfer of a clerk at the consulate, Paul Carr, to the employ of the Treasury Department provided additional help for Smale. Carr undertook most of the daily work concerning smuggling. He worked for the Treasury Department in order to avoid the necessity of presenting a formal request to the Mexican government to allow him to move freely about the Ensenada area. As noted previously, the United States had no interest in reciprocal operations of this kind. "It is Diug mad of th Ye illici Was rela3 he rf mari able area in oil matt In a feeli: of th gling the sive Nom sion 1932 had f- Illi the e the acros tion respo the E begui in th( in oti State: versu On drugs Latin ation 1929 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 ? ,? ? ' ? r:4 .1 t?1, . - ? ' I v za_rj ? ^ ? ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 , ? : ?77. , . ?-? 4.1 '-?104' )?? ? ?';rV. - CHAPTER4 d prevent .illegal ;ling drugs out of ited from various two years of the , A authorities re- ?-). prime means of 4 /.. , ? %. nued to serve as ` ? nsenada, William iressure- Mexican reduce to a mini- ; tourists in Baja t thirty-five years situation, to take omic pressure, a 3geles to dissemi- n from the state, for the meeting le Bureau of Nar- reason to believe I into the United acceptable in An- p matters in Baja "the matter of le Of this office. "27 ;tance. Communi- itatives and Treas- without consular consuls would re- ms Border Patrol Ito report period- The transfer of a )y of the Treasury Carr undertook le worked for the ssity of presenting glow him to move iously, the United of this kind. "It is ? ;4.? ? ; t -. ? 4.1 " ?.? ? _ L' , ? . Drug ontrol in the Americas, 1931-.1936 ' ; 83 inadvisable:, &nate was told, "to notify the Mexican Government of the general nature of the appointee's duties."" Yet as Smale well knew, the United States could do little.abont illicit drugs in Baja without assistance from Mexico_City. Assistance ihfore reiarinfonitatafro-his superiors. On one occasion in March 1936" he reported learning of extensive cultivation of opium poppies and marijuana in remote regions of Baja. ? The only action Smale was able to take was to have a staff member take a "vacation" in the -afea-and report on -conditions there. This and similar occurrences- in other consular districts moved the United States to bring the matter of border smuggling to the attention of the OAC in Geneva. In a presentation distinguished by sensitivity for the diplomatic feelings of Mexico, and therefore symbolic of the reciprocal nature of the Good Neighbor Policy, Stuart J. Fuller declared that smug- gling presented a problem on both sides of the border. In response, the Mexican delegate, Manuel Tello, promised a more comprehen- sive exchange of information on drugs would be forthcoming. Nonetheless, available records for 1936 do not reveal the conclu- sion of any agreement to augment the previous ones of 1930 and 1932." It seems unlikely that the Mexicans could believe, as they had at Geneva in 1931, that there was no drug problem in Mexico. . ? , Illicit drug activity also flourished elsewhere in Latin America in the early thirties. Most governments failed to respond even with the rudimentary measures of control prompted by smuggling across the Mexico-United States border. Instead, official inatten- tion and incompetence, even corruption, defined the spectrum of responses to drug problems:Such a situation brought -- -- the extent to which Latin American_governments-actually?had begun to view drug .usage.and .traffic,as .domestic,sociat.problems in_thejate,1920s..It also demonstrated the difficulty of inculcating in others by whatever means the antidrug fervor of the United States. As before, the division remained in part one of culture versus bureaucracy. Only Uruguay embarked upon a serious campaign to control__ drugs: In -June 1931 the State Department distributed throughout_ Latin America a questionnaire seeking information about the situ- ation there. Uruguay's reply showed a flurry of activity between 1929 and 1932. In May 1929 the Geneva Convention of 1925 had _ - - ? - , -? - ?,t.r - 12, t=t_ - ? - ? - l?k - . Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 7"'"`i Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 CHAPTER 4 gone into effect. Then came the implementation of an import- export. certificate system and a decree in March 1932 seeking to control further commerce in drugs. Most important, the govern- ment gave full power to the National Council of Public Health to supervise the enforcement of all narcotic regulations.31 _ In 1933 the government created the ornately titled Special Corn- -mission for the -Defense Against Toxicomania and Control of the Narcotics Traffic to work with the Public Health Council. The duties of the special commission included supervising compliance with all domestic and international regulations, compiling statistics on the extent of addiction, and promoting an antidrug educational campaign throughout the country. To assist the work of the special commission Uruguaj, planned to spend $10,000 per year.32 As was true elsewhere, attention to domestic matters alone could not mitigate the narcotic situation. The Uruguayan government also had to deal with the possibility of increased drug traffic result- ing from apparent Japanese efforts to establish an industrial center in the Free Zone of Colonia across the Rio de la Plata from Buenos Aires. The Anti-Opium Information Bureau in Geneva, a clearing- house for narcotics data, asked Uruguay to scrutinize closely any questionable activity in Colonia. Of particular concern to the bu- reau was the relative proximity of Bolivian coca fields, an available source of illicit cocaine.33 Unlike officials in Geneva and Washing- ton, Uruguayan authorities did not believe Colonia would become a transit point for smuggling. Dr. Jos?ora, a foreign office official in charge of narcotics, told United States representatives in Mon- tevideo that Colonia had never played a prominent role in illegal traffic. Problems with illicit drugs centered around the border with Brazil. Nonetheless, Uruguay promised to supervise any unusual activity in Colonia. By the mid-thirties, it should be noted, the feared Japanese industrial center had not come into existence.34 At this same time Uruguay took other steps to guard against the introduction of unwanted drugs. At the Seventh Pan-American Conference at Montevideo in December 1933 the government urged those Latin American republics which had not yet ratified the 1931 Geneva Convention to do so quickly.35 Uruguay also sought assistance from the Opium Advisory Committee. At the OAC session in May 1934, Alfredo de Castro asked the committee _ . _ _ _ to make a special appeal to all Latin American governments urging the prompt submittal of their annual reports. He further requested Drug Contro that Gen paigns support, putting t Availal Alth ernment all comn prefect ( officers N early -19 1930-34 as before with citie United is of min Urugu This fact to restrii ernment tation, e action w officials came ill, The law any phy: cantly, a funding the mon No of Urugua3 tempt al neva C, Smuggli prising, than all( instance allotrnef. Not u drug lay - ? ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25 : CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 CHAPTER 4 Drug Control in the Americas, 1931-1936 In of an import- 1932 seeking to' :ant, the govern-. Public Health to ions.31 - led Special ,Corn-: d -Controtof the'''. th Council. . The ising compliance ,mpiling statistics drug educational ork of the special per year.32 itters alone could tyan government rug traffic result- industrial center lata from Buenos ;neva, a clearing- inize closely any ncern to the bu- elds, an available ;va and Washing- ia would become eign office official :ntatives in Mon- ent role in illegal d the border with -vise any unusual Id be noted, the nto existence." guard against the th Pan-American .the government d not yet ratified .35 Uruguay also Immittee. At the ;d the committee rernments urging lather requested that 'Geneva encourage the development of drug education cam- paigns by individual nations. The suggestions received substantial. support, including Fuller's for the United States, and resolutions putting them into effect passed easily.36 - Available evidence suggests that Uruguay's efforts were succeed- ing. Although, not formally establishing. a state monopoly, the gov- ernment effectively -assumed full.autliority to supervise' and direct all commerce in drugs." Also, the public health minister and prefect of police in Montevideo offered cash rewards to those officers who were most productive in their antinarcotic work. By early 1937 drug- co-n-sumPtion--seems Io have fallen below the 1930-34 level. What illegal drugs were uncoveredcame primarily, as before, from Brazil and secondarily from Argentina. "Compared with cities of similar size in the United States or Europe," observed United States Minister Julius Lay, "drug addiction in Montevideo is of minor importance."38 Uruguay imported all its narcotics, both raw and manufactured. This fact plus careful regulation of sale and consumption did much to restrict illicit traffic there. Finally in September 1937 the gov- ernment officially created a state monopoly governing the impor- tation, exportation, and distribution of all narcotic substances. This action went beyond the more limited effort of 1923. Public health officials took charge of the monopoly. Possession of narcotics be- came illegal whether intended for personal use or sale to others. The lair putting this program into effect outlined stiff penalties for any physician or police official who violated its provisions. Aignifi- cantl a state hos s ital was set u ? to treat addiction.jar,t of the ndmg for the institution would come_from revenues.derivedfrom, the monopocr.3? No other Latin American nation followed the example set by Uruguay. Argentina, for example, had never made a serious at- tempt at drug control. The government acceded to the 1925 Ge- neva Convention but did not actually sign the document.4? Smuggling was uncontrolled around Buenos Aires. not sur- prising, therefore, that Argentina--tended to. import_more__drugs than allowed under the terms of_the 1931 convention. In 1935, for instance, imports of morphine and cocaine exceeded the stipulatO allottieids."-- - " ? Not until three years later did Argentina enact a comprehensive drug law. In February 1938 the government placed controls on the Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 , CHAPTER 4 traffic in opium, heroin, and -cocaine', and began import and export supervision. In a comment on Argentina's action, the assistant secretary of the treasury, Stephen B. Gibbons, declared that the - regulations were malleable enough to permit phy-sicians to pre- scribe sufficient quantities f.drugs. to Maintain addicts in. their . In? Gibbons's view, Argentina's annual? estimates far sur- passed the actual yearly need. A newly created Section of Narcotics Control in the government evidently did not deem it necessary to revise national drug requirements.42 The narcotic-situation in Honduras seemectequally out of control? early?irthrd,rtar-denr-i tile?eighteen months_prior to the end of g33---11-tonditiaS?iMpoAed- enough morphine, eighty-seven kilo ?g raffig,--ftrinteritsr medical and scientific requirements-_ for one- l?he sukill, far in excess of quota allotments, came mainly from France, Germany, and Switzerland, nations tradition- ally reluctant to adopt manufacturing limitations. In 1934 when Honduras received another twenty-two-year supply of morphine, League of Nations officials suspected wholesale forging of import certificateS.43 Considerable amounts of the imports, including morphine and cocaine, found their way into the southern United States, particu- larly the New Orleans area, where local authorities managed to seize a portion of them. At least one other seizure took place in Dallas. When the smuggling continued, the United States began using Coast Guard vessels to track ships on which drug couriers were believed to be traveling. Consular officials in the Honduran ports of La Ceiba, Tela, Puerto Cort? and Belize provided the Coast Guard with information on ship movements. The State De- partment viewed the reconnaissance efforts as a temporary meas- ure which might provide a deterrent to smuggling. Such an eventuality was, of course, unlikely, given the historical role of smuggling in Central America during depressed economic times. In the 1930s as in earlier eras, smuggling became a part of the local way of life?a potentially rewarding enterprise for some individuals during the worldwide depression." Numerous Hondurans received narcotics from Europe, but one man, Jos?aria Guillen Velez, seemed to acquire larger quantities - than most. (It was morphine from one of his shipments that officials .in Dallas seized in 1932.) Guillen Velez, owner of a pharmacy in Puerto Cort? accepted shipment of forty kilograms of morphine ''I?ij??.;-; ? Dru fro }lc tio - act of Ur mc ye drt tici the pot in cial Yet dei we' ?ne pro wa Frr mat yen con con and plat om: imr pr the wag II Oct offic hayi and _ nprdaccified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25 : CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 CHAPTER-47+ mport and export 7, on, the assistant leclared that the hysicians to pre----- addicts in their siimatei far 'kir': ction ofNarcotics m it necessary to' ? ally out of Contrci17? ior to the 'end of ighty-seven kilo- irements for one allotments, came nations tradition- s. In 1934 when Ply of morphine, forging of import morphine and d States, particu- ities managed to ire took place in ted States began ch drug couriers in the Honduran ize provided the ts. The State De- temporary meas-- ggling. Such an historical role of economic times. apart of the local some individuals Europe, but one larger quantities tents that officials of a pharmacy in anis of morphine WitiffieliT,1931=1 93b., - from France in 1933, an amount large enough to satisfy legitimate ? Honduran needs for fifty years...18 Faced with such a serious situa- tion, the government professed a desire to revamp its control activities. At the same time, however,. Dr. Ricardo Alduvin, dean of the medical faculty at the, national universi.ty.in Tegucigalpa, told United States representatives that the Director of Public Health, P. H. Ordonez Diaz, had authorized Guillen's imports of opium, morphine, and cocaine. Permission was evidently granted for the years 1933 and 1934.48 Official corruptionYO dOubt contributed to the ease with which drugs reached Honduras--Julius Lay reported that Honduran poli- ticians were susceptible to bribery. The depression exaggerated the consequences of the unhappy fact that Honduras was the poorest of the Central American republics. As was true elsewhere in Latin America, especially Mexico, accepting bribes helped offi- cials personally make the best of an economically difficult situation. Yet official corruption would mitigate in no way the impact of the depression upon Honduras. In Mid-October 1932, scarcely two weeks before scheduled presidential elections, Lay found trade 'nearly at a standstill."'" As had been the case since earlier in the century, Honduran prosperity primarily depended upon the banana industry, which was controlled by the United Fruit Company and the Standard Fruit and Steamship Company. Even had the com anies_notslom- inated the economy, the monocu hiral tra ition wo1d_have,pre7 venteaLan-efrafiv.eponse to the-depression., As.-it_was,, the. coyipanie, too were constrained in their_ability to_ameliorate conditions_The depression cut world banana prices, and Panama and Sigotoka disease devastated the fruit throughout the banana plantations, further damaging the nation's export-oriented econ- omy. Although the companies contributed in numerous ways to improving the quality of life in Honduras, the wages they paid provided little more than subsistence for workers and families" in the estimation of career diplomat Willard L. Beaulac. In 1933 wages were reduced 10 percent across the board.48 _ It was within this climate that a national election was held on October. 30, 1932. The victor, Tiburcio Carias Andino, would take office on February 1, 1933. At that time, no informed person would have predicted a future of amicable relations between Washington and the new Honduran government. In 1924 the United States ? ? . Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25 : CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 11 _ -88 -CHAPTER 4 helped tp prevent Carias from assuming the presidency. Then in 1928 the United States supported Vicente Mejia Colindres as Carias lost a relatively free election. After his electoral success in -- ? 1932, Carias imniediately had to quell a revolt by dissident ele-. ? t ments within the Liberal party. At the same time. the national , ? ? . ? . ? ? " ? ? . treasury Was virtually eMpty.49 ? ? ? . The two situations were not unrelated. While in office Mejia ?Colindres had kept potentially rebellious army factions in line by paying them with funds borrowed from the banana .companies. ? ,r ? ?Y ? (Repayment ofthe loans came in the form of reduced customs collections.) The vicissitudes of the depression did not afford Carias ? , , a similar option. Unable to obtain requested arms from the United States, Carfas received aid from El Salvador and soon put down the revolt. The denial of the request for arms, despite Lay's rec- ommendation to the contrary, could have only increased Carias Andino's wariness of the United States.5? In what cannot be interpreted as other than a diplomatic formal- ity, Carias pledged himself to a policy of cordial relations with other governments, "especially that of the United States." The pledge included reorganization of the departments of justice and public health. What this declaration portended for drug control, or United States influence, remained to be seen.51 Even had Honduras vindu acceded at once to the 1931 Geneva Convention, the problem of excessive narcotic importation would have existed. In turn, smug- gling would have continued unchecked.52 When a legislative de- cree in March 1934 finally put the convention into effect, the practical problem of enforcement still remained?as Dr. Al admitted." Essentially the- problefiffOr-the United Stites in Honduris -Was- that the governments of the two countries did not share the com- mon objective of the eradication of illicit drug traffic. As a result, reciprocity?a prominent aspect of the Roosevelt administration's Latin American policy?played a lesser role in the situation than the United States would have liked. No narcotics bureaucracy existed in Honduras that would take the United States cause as its own. The tacit assumption held by Washington in hemispheric . narcotic relations?that 'cultural and other impediments to effective - --- ? drug control could be mutually overcome?simply was not rele- vant. There were practical limits therefore to what American diplo- macy could achieve. ? ^ Drug Contro Severa Its two r the Unit( .the hemi dent Roo', from pot( Good Ne Americar spread al Mexico: rocally Americar HoweN, been, he noninten roughgoil discover be used wholesal rebuild 1933 and tation of Julius hand. La situation such acti uncovers means of declared, supply h frustratio forged in to convi( served a administ Hondura the cowl ambition Fuller's 5.. against C ? _ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 ? . CHAFFER 4 sidendy. Theri in ejia Colindres as - ectoral success in - - by dissident de-77j? imp the ,national?,? - e in office Mejia actions in line by alma _companies. reduced customs I not afford Carias s from the United d soon put down lespite Lay's rec- increased Carias liplomatic formal- lations with other tes." The pledge ustice and public :ontrol, or United n had Honduras 1, the problem of d. In turn, smug- t a legislative de- t into effect, the ?as Dr. Alduvin in Honduras was )t share the corn- affic. As a result, t administration's he situation than dries bureaucracy itates cause as its in hemispheric rnents to effective - --- ply was not rele- t American diplo- Drug Contra in the Americas, 1931-1936 89 ? Several bornif!en.6-are in order about the Godd Neighbor Policy. ? Its two primary tenets, military and political nonintervention by the United States in Latin America and the return of prosperity to the, hemisphere, became evident within a short time after Presi- dent Roosevelt took office.54 Laterin the decade, Inilitarysecuiity. from potential Axis subversion became inextricably linked with the Good Neighbor Policy. Throughout, the idea of reciprocity in inter- American relations provided a basis for giving the policy its wide- spread appeal._ In the .words of Josephus Daniels, ambassador to Mexico: "The only hope of the Good Neighbor Policy lies in recip- rocally applying it with-justice and fair dealing between the Pan American States . . ."55 ? However skeptical of United States intentions Carias may have been, he joined in the general approval of Roosevelt's policy of nonintervention." This gesture should not be construed as a tho- roughgoing acceptance of the Good Neighbor Policy. As Would be discovered in other countries, particularly Brazil, reciprocity could be used to domestic political advantage without being accepted wholesale. As we shall soon see, Carias realized this as he tried to rebuild the Honduran economy and cement his hold on power. In 1933 and 1934, reciprocity did not necessarily extend to implemen- tation of a policy to curb illicit drug traffic. Julius Lay experienced the selectivity of Honduran policy first hand. Lay felt that the prosecution of Guillen would improve the situation, but he remained pessimistic about the likelihood of any sucb action. An official search of Guillen's pharmacy in June 1934 uncovered no evidence linking him to the narcotics trade. "By means of forged government certificates," an exasperated Fuller declared, "Honduras has imported sufficient morphine . . . to supply her legitimate needs for a century." Compounding the frustration, it was later learned that under Honduran law the forged import certificates would not have been evidence enough to convict Guillen of a crime.57 Lay learned, too, that Guillen served as minister of government and justice under an earlier administration and entertained hopes of becoming the president of Honduras. As such, he tried not to alienate any elements within the country, including the banana companies that might thwart his ambitions.58 Even a League of Nations inquiry prompted by Fuller's statement did not convince the government to take action against Guillen.59 In an ironic epilogue to the Guillen affair, which .. ? -XL Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 - . ;'Vsc ",+ '7'7;1'7 ,;" '-`aw. ? P-t.' LAO, .2'71t4,?:?%?t'. ?- ? 42 - ? Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 _ .1. 'An,' 4,?? :II! ? t4-4?1:??' tie ?, 1. 04-) du. ,q,-? ? ? 7, ?N.i.,? ''.; ?-? ' ? , .^* 4, ? ? ??? ? . . ? CHAPTER 4 ? . ? ? . " - will be discussed in greater detail later, the Department of State learned that Guillen participated in at least two abortive attempts . -- -to-remove -Carfas Andino from power in -1935 and 1936.- Had the revolts suCceeded, Guillen would have become acting president of ' 6?. ?? - ' : Honduras. Smuggling from Honduras was not the only problem troubling . American officials. Elsewhere in Central America, especially in _ Panama and the Canal Zone, illegal drugs were abundantly avail- able. !Costa Ric dC?l?thbi?o-Countrie? With negligible con-7'7' trols,-Ifrequentbi 'ierved as 'transit points for drugs bound for Panama. United States authorities regarded Panamanian police as generally honest, but helpless to control the situation. One side effect of this condition was that a large percentage of U.S. Army personnel receiving hospital care in Panama were suspected of being addicts. 61 If little could be done in a remedial way in Panama, continuing problems in Honduras (in addition to the difficulties posed by Guillen) made the situation there even less amenable to. resolution along lines desired by the United States. Throughout his tenure as minister, Lay suspected the government of complicity in the drug traffic. It did not surprise him greatly therefore when Dr. Ricardo Alduvfn, who had occasionally been helpful to Lay, resigned his post at the university. In his capacity as dean of the medical faculty, Alduvin possessed the authority to issue or withhold narcotic im- port certificates. On at least one occasion, Alduvin signed a certifi- cate for a firm to import narcotics from a New Orleans company, the Meyer Brothers Drug Company, which was not authorized by .!'er ? YTI? the Bureau of Narcotics-to export drugs to Honduras. The news- ::y7 paper El Cronista revealed that throughout his service as dean, Alduvin had granted import authorizations to a select group of ; businessmen suspected of participating in the illicit traffic.62 Dr. Francisco Sanchez replaced Alduvin. He evidently wanted , to change his predecessor's policy, declaring that only "pharmacies of good reputation will be allowed to petition importations of - narcotic drugs through the Faculty of Medicine." Trying to assist Sanchez, Commissioner Anslingerturned down a request from the_.___ . .. ? . '4 ' ( Meyer Brothers Drug Company to export morphine to Honduras. At best, Anslinger's action served a symbolic purpose. Without a 1:141 strong antinarcotic Commitment on the part of the Carfas govern- ''' ' ---,---=?ment; little could be done to stop the persistent smuggling. The ? ?1.. ,r6.6 ? 1.2 Drug Control it I murder of narcotic siti 4- :13y that t to ignore tl- prior antin; Affairs, An ance. He a: investigatoi request;. SI New Orlea; ; United Stat by officials i ger knew, 4 narcotic cot nothing. What co nomic revii ' valued at $ dropped oN Trade with of banana e 1937-38. B tion's total the United Carias was Secretar. program pi begun inn 18, 1935. 'I diveracat of customs quickly for conceivabl3 many; it a$. Japan, a tr; concluded, economic a dependenc tunes of Ca a guarantet .t-r. ''....24 .....,-,.....--. .....i Z..4.1.,:. 4.1...--.4.-......1.,..9-i Aloe ..... ... ? 6 -.... 2.- -. -..c. 'A , ?. ? . . 4,-- - -; ,' - - - ; 4.,1,27t:4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25 : CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 "CHAPTER 4 .tmen't of State )rtive attempts 1936. Had the -- - ag president of lem troubling , especially in undantly avail- negligible con-._ igs bound, for anian police as tion. One side of U.S. Army e suspected of ma, continuing lties posed by le to resolution it his tenure as ?ity in the drug en Dr. Ricardo y, resigned his nedical faculty, Id narcotic im- igned a certifi- eans company, authorized by ras. The news- ?rvice as dean, elect group of t traffic.62 dently wanted ly "pharmacies nportations of Crying to assist quest from the to Honduras. -- Be. Without a Carias govern- nuggling. The ?,- Drug Control in-the ArriFfieli-1,1931=1936 91 murder of.Satiche-'ilti Julyr 1935 tegtified to just *how chaotic ffie narcotic situation had become." ? ? ? By that time, the Honduran government could no longer afford to ignore the problems caused by narcotics, yet it had virtually no prior antinircotie.experience.to rely upon. T.I4eMinister offoreign.. Affairs, Antoni6 Bermudez, tamed to the United States for assist- ance. He asked the Federal Bureau of Narcotics to send a trained investigator to Honduras. American authorities turned down the request. Shortly after the death of Sanchez, federal agents and New Orleans police had seized a shipment of heroin bound for the United States through Honduras. Distrust of the government there by officials in Washington abounded. One agent, Fuller and Anslin- ger knew, could not compensate for the lack of a systematic anti- narcotic commitment." The overture from Honduras accomplished nothing. What concerned Carias more than drug control was the eco- nomic revitalizaton of Honduras. In 1929 Honduran exports were valued at $24.6 million, dropping to $7.4 million in 1938; imports dropped over the same period from $14.9 million to $9.5 million. Trade with the United States also plummeted, as seen in the value of banana exports: from $20.9 million in 1928-29 to $4.2 million in 1937-38. Bananas accounted for more than 80 percent of the na- tion's total exports; and fully three-quarters of the export trade to the United States in 1934 consisted of bananas.65 The task for Carias was to diversify ancr increase the volume of exports. Secretary of State Cordell Hull's reciprocal trade agreement program presented a partial solution to Carias. Negotiations were begun in mid-1934, and an agreement was signed on December 18, 1935. The agreement did not help to lay a basis for economic diversification, though. It may even have resulted in the reduction of customs revenues in Honduras, a liability which Julius Lay quickly foresaw. Moreover, a total reciprocity agreement might conceivably threaten banana markets in Great Britain and Ger- many; it assuredly would harm the import of cotton goods from Japan, a trade previously dominated by American merchants. As concluded, the agreement made few concessions to Honduran economic aspirations." Despite, or perhaps because of increased - --- dependence upon the United States, the domestic political for- tunes of Carias improved. If nothing else, Honduras had obtained a guaranteed export market?not an inconsiderable achievement Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25 : CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 - ? 144:?"r04-00 92 CHAPTER 4 . ? ? . in depressed economic tithes. However 'minimal' economic pre- dictability was something the opponents of Carias could not pro- vide. In Peru and Bolivia, where domestic antidrug activity directly affected the international situation, rfew. constructive measures ? were undert en. This lack of activity proved to be Partidularly. disappointing to officials in Geneva and Washington. Prior to 1931 each nation had begun to consider drug use as a societal problem; it was hoped that remedial actions might follow. Peru made a start in the desired direction. In March 1932 a bill was introduced in the Constituept,Assembly placing restrictions on cultivation and use of the coca leaf 67 As before, the issue of the stability of Peru's economy became closely linked with the question of coca restric- tion, as did Peruvian tradition. An official in the narcotic office of the government told William C. Burdett, United States Consul General at Callao-Lima, that Peru wished to comply with the regulations of the League ollCafions especially since "the_use?of coca constitutes one of the-most pernicious habits of-the Indian populations. The official acknowledged that coca chewing could not .6e?ftilly- halted, but felt that coca production could be con- trolled. In course, the international trade in cocaine would surely decline." Upon completion of a brief trip through Peru's coca-producing regions, Burdett reported that coca controls were unlikely. "Amer- ican engineers operating some of the most important mining enter- prises in the world in Peruvian highlands," Burdett noted, "have been unable to report adverse effects from coca upon their men." He doubted as well whether export laws could successfully restrict... illicit commerce: "There is, however, no guarantee," Burdett stated, "of conscientious enforcement of these laws. Enforcement is vested in the Bureau of Health, which has in recent years been accused of more corruption than any other section of the Peruvian government." Five different men headed the bureau between 1930 and 1932, a period when Peru was on the verge of civil strife after the ouster of Leguia in August 1930.69 Any hope of effective coca control therefore seemed unrealistic. Ultimately the bill limiting coca leaf cultivation failed to secure passage; and for the year,1932 Peru produced more than 3.5 million kilograms of coca." It was not until 1936 that the government made another attempt to regulate the coca leaf. A planting crisis in Cuzco, a major area Dru; for coc of I the . ? ? per . for Cre tivf the- figh tion wer duo Coca prof Sepi for s ing ? coca E: narc? of lt Unit ' conti cont( non Unitg clear gling antid can r look; In two could spons tions. devisi ! ! ' in Part - Sanitized CODV Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 CHAPTER 4 ? ? . ? )nomic. pre- ald not pro- vity directly re'? measures:. ; pariicalarly ?rior to 1931 tal problem; made a start itroduced in ltivation and lity of Peru's coca restric- :otic office of tates Consul ply with the e "the use of the Indian iewing could mild be con- would surely ca-producing ikely. "Amer- ruining enter- noted, "have ri their men." .sfully restrict ee," Burdett Enforcement at years been the Peruvian Detween 1930 vil strife after effective coca 3 bill limiting the year 1932 OCa.70 ather attempt a major area Drug Control in the Americas, 1931-1936 93 for production, kibstintially diminished die revenue derived from coca sales. Moreover, a malaria epidemic drastically cut the'supply of Indian labor. These occurrences induced officials to reconsider the role of the coca leaf in Peru.71 No action was taken then, perhaps because of the international narcotic conference scheduled for June in Geneva. During these smile years the newspaper La Cronic,a was calling for a more vigorous policy. The lack of substan- tive aCtion led the Pan-American Sanitary Bureau to remark that the government of Peru did not seem disposed to waging .a serious fight against drug problemS.72 _ Like Peru, Bolivia failed-in the early 1930s to limit coca produc- tion. Nearly two million kilos were grown in 1932, most of which were consumed domestically. International pressure to restrict pro- duction brought a response from a landowners' association in the coca-rich Yungas region." Illustrating further Bolivia's rejection of proposed coca controls; President Daniel Salamanca rescinded in September 1933 a tariff on Peruvian coca in transit through Bolivia for shipment abroad. Bolivian laborers, .employed in Chilean mj- ing thejob, Controls on coca would not soon come to Bolivia." Except in Uruguay and to a lesser extent Mexico, the record of narcotic control in Latin America between the Geneva conferences of 1931 and 1936 was not an encouraging one to officials in the United States and at the League of Nations. Patterns of usage continued, tied as they often were to historical traditions and contemporary developments; and smuggling became a phenome- non more widespread than ever before in the hemisphere. The United States suffered most from this situation. By 1936 it was clear to officials in Washington that they could not eliminate smug- gling by their own endeavors. Moreover, the perceived emerging antidrug commitment of the late 1920s in important Latin Ameri- can nations proved largely illusory. The only alternative place to look for assistance was Geneva. IJ.LWjng-to-re.strict,illicit traffic,_international authorities ,had two means available not regularized by earlier conventions. They could either atteinpf-IO Control' sources of supply or they75131a ? a sponsor move lo increase domestic penalties_for -druglaw,viola- lions. The OAC decided to concentrate on the second tactic. After eleVisinea draft conv-eritioif, the-Ciiinmittee Called' a corm- atconfer- r ? i ? T. STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25 : CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 _ I ? t ? -CHAPTER-4? Drug Control hi thi A) encejor June. 1936. -Although originally unenthusiastic about .the proposal, the United States sought additional information about the scope of the conference. The Department of State hoped to broaden. the agenda. "The American Government considers it im- ?portant" a department communiqu?tated "that thA_Conference . co. n-sider'pre'Verition.. and 'punishrrient Of illicit cultivation, gather- m?g, and production of the poppy, coca, and cannabis.,-75 The 1.111--ue ap?p-edred-ttieTiciiura-ge Washington's plans. "Any delega- tion at the conference may propose any matter," declared Eric Einar Ekstrand, director of the Opium Traffia and Social Questions -- Section. The draft convention; Ekstrand suggested, merely offered a basis for discussion. The State Department accordingly made preparations for formal participation at the conference.76 Before the first session was held it became apparent that the attempt to enlarge the scope of the conference agenda would encounter opposition. Peru objected to further restrictions on coca leaves?evidently havinTdecklednotto.reconsider the role-of.coca - ...!2ae.V. Enrique Trujillo Bravo was instructed to reverse the position Peru had taken on the 1931 convention. He was to amend Peru's acceptance of the convention with reservations similar to those of Bolivia. He also hoped to obtain a quota for manufactured cocaine.77 Dr. Carlos Enrique Paz Solari, Vice-Director of the Pan-American Sanitary Bureau, suggested the change in Peru's position. In a pamphlet issued under the auspices of Peru's Socie- dad Nacional Agraria, Paz Soldan wrote that exports of coca leaves and raw cocaine had fallen dramatically sincethemid-tw-entiqs. As result,much of the current cocasrop was being consumed dst ? mestically. If Peru were to restrict coca production, afieconomic cnsis would occur. To placate those favoring restrictions, Paz of- Iiaseveral options. Peru might attempt to regulate production through the creation of a state monopoly. He suggested, too, that Peru erect its own facility to manufacture cocaine. Paz envisioned as well the establishment of a national_institute_to,study the impact of coca on Indians, a proposal commensurate with the desires of The indigeniltas. Finally, he advocated a program to educate the masses about the possible dangers of coca usage.78 - Over half the American republics sent delegations to the confer- - ence along with Peru. These included Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Ecua- dor, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Uruguay, and Venezuela. For Ward, a legal ad tatives." The a of the draft coni ishment.. The .f would reduce i ment. Although fenders, he did asked other nat _ _ purposes the na tion relates." In ation would mail the United Stat cultivation rest?' suppression of t In reply Port posal fundamer should not be cl be introduced further wished activities in con' nabis." The bul belief that the d-1 international ag noting, as we 1141 tevideo in 1933 hensive drug cc Portugal rem' proposal from sented a seriow amendment we pared to refrain Department of action a decade] delegation." Ultimately a ci and Portugal di conference fina "cultivation rest -44 - Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 7".? ??? Declassified in in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25 : CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 ^ a+, CHAPTER 4 ? ? - ? ? c about the ation about e hoped to -- iders it im- COnferenCc on, gather- bis."75 The ny delega- dared Eric I Question rely offered ingly made 76 nt that the !nda would ons on coca role of coca reverse the as to amend S similar to anufactured !ctor of the e in Peru's eru's Socie- coca leaves wenties. As Burned do- n economic.-- - Ins, Paz of- production d, too, that envisioned the impact desires of ducate the the confer- Uba, Ecua- tguay, and ? ' Drug COntrol in the Americas, 1931-1936 ? 1 ' ? !? Venezuela. For the United States, Fuller, Anslinger, and Frank S. Ward, a legal adviser in the State Department, served as represcn- tatives.78 The conference .begar.i- with discussion of the first article' of the ()raft .convention, which -.enumerated offense meriting pun- ishment. The framers hoped that the threat of severe penalties would reduce illidirtraffie:?Arolic-e Fuller proposed an amend- Although in agreemeiiriiii_tliftfie_ .rieved' to punish,d_rtjg_of: fe'ndersrhe-did-not-think-theliffe-nses should be listed. Instead he to medical and scientific pl'imrcerth=rcotittiriiliZnqf substances to which this tionrelatet"In'turn;-Ward explaih.ed that the absence of enumer- ifiould malce clearer the purpose of the conference. In short, the United Slates-delegation -had-subtly-asked..for..a.prograin,,of cultivation restriction in ,order to control the usage .of 41 drugs; supTh7r---essi3r?i of The illicit rride was nOT In reply reply Portugal and Great Britain claimed that Fuller's pro- posal fundamentally altered the purpose of the conference and should not be Considered. Fuller rejoined that any subject could be introduced as Ekstrand had stated, and noted that his delegation further wished to discuss "prevention and punishment" of illicit activities in connection with opium poppies, coca leaves, and can- nabis.80 The burden of Fuller's argument reflected his country's belief that the draft convention added little of substance to previous international agreements. Uruguay supported the United States, noting, as we have seen, that the inter-American meeting at Mon- tevideo in 1933 passed a resolution recommending more compre- hensive drug controls than those then in existence.81 95 _ PoriUgal remained adamant and sought to eliminate Fuller's proposal from additional consideration. This turn of events pre- sented a serious problem for the United States delegation. If the amendment were not considered, Fuller and Anslinger were pre- pared to refrain from further participation at the conference.82 The Department of State, mindful of the difficulties caused by such action a decade earlier, advised against any rash action by the delegation." _ Ultimately a committee was appointed to study Fuller's proposal and Portugal dropped its challenge to the amendment. The full conference finally settled the matter bo place the "cultivation restriction" proposal into the Final Act as a iesCcima4i- Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved -for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 _ . ? , ,!, " Drug -Control-int] ? dation rather than in the text of the convention. After this step was talceri the United .States delegation confined itself during the re- mainder of the conference to occasional observations. At one point, for example, when discussing whether to use the words "if willfully committed", in the article advocating punishment for drug law offenses, Anslinger made unmistakably clear the position. of his .? government. concerning .such violations. "The work of narcotic au. - ? .thorities would be radically handicapped," he stated, "if, wten prosecuting for illegal possession, for instance, or for illicit sale, they were obliged to prove willful commission." " Mere possession ?? of proscribed substances served as presumptive evidence of law --- vidlation; it was that approach which the State Department and Federal Bureau of Nakotics wanted other nations to adopt. The final convention did not reflect the American sentiment. Rather it resembled the preconference draft. In a cable to Wash- ington, Fuller ,and Anslinger charged that countries with minimal narcotic problems controlled the formulation of the convention. Additionally, opium monopoly countries had been especially un- cooperative since they feared revenues would fall if any restrictions were accepted on opium beyond those already in existence. "It has become evident," the two concluded, "that most European nations are not prepared to sign any convention which would provide for a really effective system [of control]." On June 26, twenty nations excluding the United States signed the convention. Fuller termed it "a retrograde step" for his country and found its provisions inadequate.85 Other American republics signed the pact, including Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Honduras and Peru were not present at the final session." Years later Anslinger further explained the decision not to sign the 1936 convention_He noted that it applied only to trade in and distribution of manufactured narcotics. Such narrowly defined pro- visions meant that it "would afford no Constitutional basis of Fed- eral control of the production of cannabis . . . and the opium poppy." As we shall see presently, control of marijuana was becom- ing a matter of increasing concern to the bureau. And even though no opium poppies were grown in the United States, the commis- sioner's point was clear: "Provisions of the Convention would weaken rather than strengthen the effectiveness of the efforts of the Americal ses."87 Indee American 4:,o the United the conventi patterns of I ? ? ? ? ? ? ? - ? ? ???--.. ? ? ? ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25 : CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 i...0";." 4-q-4,444;-'7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 . Control Across the Border . - 4, United States?Mexican narcotic diplomacy between 1936 and 1940 offers the most demonstrable example of the impact of Wash- ington's antidrug policies on relations with other countries. In the early 1930s the governments in Mexico City and Washington, D.C. concluded two agreements providing for the exchange of informa- tion about drug traffic across their common border. By the middle of 1936, Treasury Department agents had undertaken operations in Mexico to gather additional information about smuggling activi- ties. Although occurring on a limited basis, these operations took place without the concurrence of the administration of President Lizaro Cardenas.' The increasing strain in relations between the two countries over petroleum, commercial policy, and other mat- ters in the late thirties gave a greater importance to common antidrug efforts than they might have otherwise enjoyed. From 1936 to 1940 United States drug diplomacy threatened to exacer? bate the sensitive state of affairs existing with Mexico and accord- ingly brought into question the reciprocal nature of the Good Neighbor Policy of the Roosevelt administration.2 In November 1936 Ambassador Josephus Daniels, acting as he sometimes did to lessen tension between the two countries, ques- tioned the secrecy surrounding the presence of the Treasury agents in Mexico. In particular Daniels objected to the appearance in the Mexico City region of Alvin F. Scharff, the assistant supervising customs agent at San Antonio, Texas. The ambassador doubted that 119 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy 'Approved for Release 2013/07/25 : CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 CHAPTER 6 ? - ? Control Acro the presence of agents .in Mexico without the knowledge of the government there served any useful purpose and might offend the Mexicans.3 The activities of the agents may have shown that United States ? officials were dissatisfied with the way Mexico was carrying out the ? . . ? . r :agreenients cif 1930 and 102.4 The Meiicadgo.Verninent, though', felt differently about the accords,. On October 16, the Weekly News Sheet, published by the publicity department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, lauded the joint antinarcotic efforts of the two nations, and especially rioted the reduction of smuggling through the Port of Mazatl?6 (It should be noted that Daniels failed to verify the accuracy of the report during a discussion with Jos? Siurob, chief of the Department of Public Health.6) Mexico seemed desirous of improving and expanding even fur- ther its activity against narcotics. In January 1937 Luis G. Franco, chief of the Alcohol and Narcotic Service of the Public Health Department, told Daniels that he wanted to meet with United States customs agents at a border city in order to alter the earlier agreements so that Mexican agents, if need be, could cross the border into the United States.? Narcotic authorities in Washington rejected the proposal, just as they had turned down a similar request some years before.8 Border crossings by agents, it seemed, would remain a one-way proposition. Although the Mexican officials failed to secureapproval from the United States for border crossings, they took other steps to in- crease antidrug activity. Franco and Siurob favored strengthening sections of the national penal code dealing with illegal narcotics. Such a legislative process would take many months to complete, yet the situation demanded immediate attention. "Mexico is not only an important producer of drugs," the newspaper El Universal observed on February 25, "but .' . . also the chief distributing center for this continent." The Public Health Department quickly expanded the scope of its activities beyond simply a legislative response to drug problems. A centralized narcotics administration was planned and set up under Siurob's direction. Broadly defined, the National Auxiliary Committee's responsibilities consisted of devising ways to eliminate illegal narcotic traffic in Mexico.8 after operations began in April 1937, El Universal reported that the committee was considering the creation of a national narcotic monopoly.1? ?11=fOrts under Siurob's direction elicited a generally favor- ? L ? 1 able resr view sooi unable to related p: been .mei that. the: since lg.: abuse.12 Availak having. lit comment constituti were esp( aboundec committe de la Gar, either th( He argue the antid: tion. The Franco II governnu cornmitm While : gram, Ur Marihuan interestec missioner ari jurailk- In fact, A vation of marijuana. Whether any more Tello, the that mad; elements ? inarijuana are comm The numl Whatex Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 - ? ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 CHAPTER-6 wledge of, the ght offend the United States Lrrying out the ment, though, Weekly News le Ministry of -ts of the two ;gling through Lniels failed to ;ion with Jos? ding even fur- uis G. Franco, Public Health t with United [ter the earlier could cross the in Washington own a similar nts, it seemed, woval from the m- steps to in- strengthening egal narcotics. s to complete, 'Mexico is not El Universal ef distributing rtment quickly !y a legislative administration -oadly defined, consisted of Mexico.9 Soon reported that itional narcotic ;enerally favor- - Control Across the Border 121 able response .from United States personnel in Mexico." Their view soon changed, however. In at least .two instances Daniels was unable to substantiate Mexican claims of succes injiandlingstrug- related prob ems. The matter of smuggling at Mazatl?has already been mentioned. He also could not verify a government assertion that The incidence of addiction in. Meiico had fallen- dramatically since 1935. In fact, a story in Excelsior reported a rise in drug abuse." Available evidence suggests that Mexico's antidrug activity was having little discernible effect upon domestic conditions. Excelsior commented that for the campaign to be successful both the federal constitution and penal code would require amending. Changes were especially necessary in the nation's prisons, where drug usage abounded." Not everyone agreed that the newly formed national committee was the proper agency to handle the situation. Angel de la Garza Brito, who headed the rural hygiene program, felt that either the Treasury or Interior Department should be in charge. He argued that as long as the Public Health Department controlled the antidrug effort, political rivalry would supersede effective ac- tion. The accuracy of this allegation seems doubtful. During 1937 Franco had achieved a cooperative relationship among various government bureaus, and thus strengthened Mexico's antinarcotic commitment and effort." While Mexico was endeavoring to improve its drug control pro- gram, United States officials were advocating passage of the 1937 Marihuana Tax Act. The Bureau of Narcotics therefore became interested in Mexico's marijuana policy. Through_Daniels?,Com,? missioner Anslinger learned_that.Me?cico restricted the.growing of iffjuana, or hemp, for rope fiber without proper authorization, In?faet, Article 202 of the Mexican Health Code forbade the culti- vation of Indian hemp. Other provisions of the code outlawed marijuana possession, sale, use, and any form of commerce." Whether the restrictions were effective cannot be determined with any more precision for Mexico than for the United States. Manuel Tello, the Mexican representative to the OAC in Geneva, claimed that marijuana smoking took place primarily among the criminal elements in his country. Excelsior saw no reason to minimize marijuana's suspected dangers: -Many of the crimes of blood. . . are committed under the pathological influence of marihuana. . . The number is beyond count:17 Whatever the extent of cannabis usage or the effectiveness of is 1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 122 CHAPTER 6 drug conteo? I, an administrative change in February 1938 inter- rupted the work of the Public Health Department. Siurob resigned as department chief to become governor of the Federal District of Mexico City, and Franco left the Federal Narcotics Service. for a position with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.18 These changes' ended the first phase of United States?Mexican narcotic diplomacy between 1936 and 1940. While Mexico's attempts to enhance its antidrug activity had not yet produced noticeable results, a process: NiFitirderwayViiria presaged the government's being more criti- ?fdnrgabiIse. Just as promising from the United States point of Wqis Mexico's desire to work more closely with Washington to halt the northward flow of illegal substances. To that end, Siurob and Franco had met in 1937 with H. S. Creighton, supervising customs agent at San Antonio, to discuss coordinating their coun- tries' antidrug efforts along the border.18 But by the time the Mexicans had left office, no formal plans had been agreed upon. Leonidas Andreu Almazin succeeded Siurob at the Public Health Department, and Leopoldo Salazar Viniegra took Franco's place at the Federal Narcotics Service. Salazar had earned a good reputation in Mexico as a result of his work with addicts in the national mental health hospita1.2? Shortly after taking office, he met with customs agent Creighton. Mexico, he stated, could only reduce the flow of illegal drugs through government controlled distribution, with the aid of an expanded antidrug educational campaign, and through the construction of more hospitals to treat addiction. Salazar did not underestimate the difficulty of the task. "It is impossible to break up the traffic in drugs," he told Creigh- to?n,_13-ecause of the corruption of the police and special agents and -d-s-o because of the wealth and political influence of some of the traffick-ers.:21 During the meeting Salazar mentioned that he did eiMsider it his duty to act as a policeman in supervising drug control activity.22 In so doing, he implicitly warned that his policy on control would probably not parallel that of the United States to the same extent as his predecessors'. Despite the obstacles he envisioned impeding effective drug control, Salazar seems to have favored the continuation of cooper- ation with the United States. He requested the assistance of cus- ? Control Across toms agen the states burning of Such col antidrug -c fore Salazr Thomas H were corn: attitude tc unspecifiet from his minimize program fc ington's. (I States offic nonmedica Before t produced f the federal ment the and to crea the faciliti( included a for the sal( In reacti ment, wrot particular') tions no lit from the st clinics nea eluded that inevitably : put it, bon on the Arm sum, ambu hands of ad ington belii commerce trade." Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 ? .-nt-,f c ..? txx'r- 4:4 'f! ? - -2" - 4 L,L - L Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 -? At!: - .,,CHAPTER.? try 1938 inter- `''.1--TC- ? iiurob resigned leral District of ItZt : :s Service for a These changes, ? -.1i*t* otic diplomacy - . - to enhance its !sults, a.process eing more criti- 1 States point of. Washington to le end, Siurob pn, supervising ting their coun- y the time the t agreed upon. , at the Public ra took Franco's 3 earned a good addicts in the aking office, he ated, could only ment controlled rug educational tospitals to treat :ulty of the task. he told Creigh- tecial agents and of some of the med that he did ;upervising drug :d that his policy United States to g effective drug iation of cooper- 'rr" tssistance of cus- , . . Control Across the Border' '", ? - . I " ? '-------- ? t 101 ? 6-,41F1 tr1:7-Vld t4,0, \`4,1 +-- ?1. .;:. 4. 'r-ti ? ?" ? 123 ? toms agents in the destruction of opium poppy fields growing in the states of SonOra and Sinaloa. An-agent from Texas observed the burning of a number of fields in Apri1.23 Such cooperative activity failed to prevent doubts about Salazar's tidiui-C-om-m- Ifitin arising-within the United States. Be- fore Salazar had completed two months :in office,.Creighton and Thomas H. Lockett, a corhniercial attach?erving in Mexico City, were complaining to Jos?Siurob about the narcotic chiefs lax attitude toward, drug control. The charges .against Salazar were unspecified, buttheyeason_for the criticism. must have stemmed from his approach to drug law enforcement." Were Salazar to minimiie the punitive 'aspect of his antidrug activity, Mexico's program for control would become 'markedly different from Wash- ington's. (During deliberations over the Marihuana Tax Act, United States officials reiterated their belief in punitive treatment for the nonmedical and nonscientific use of drugs.25) Before the end of 1938 Salazar began to chart a course that produced further displeasure in Washington. Proposed revisions in the federal toxicomania regulations gave the Public Health Depart- ment the authority to establish methods of treatment for addicts and to create hospitals or dispensaries for their care. Entrance into the facilities would be voluntary. Most important, the regulations, included aproposal calling .for-the7fori-Mion. of.a,state.monopoly for tlr"-e sale of.drugs,26 In reaction, R. Walton Moore, counselor of the? State Depart- ment, wrote Daniels that the contemplated change in regulations, particularly the provision for drug sale by the government, "occa- sions no little concern to authorities in the United States." Judging fromthe. short-lived and disappointing experience with dispensing clinics nearly two -rileca-des earlier, officials in Washington con- cluded that implementation of the new Mexican regulations would inevitably lea to an increase .in .the_illicit_drug trade=g. oore put it, liOrderdi;f3r?sation..would "nullify the efforts being made on the American,side_to,suppress,the,abuse,oLnarcotic drugs." In sum, ambulatory treatment of addiction, by_placing-drugsrin.the hands of addicts, would create the very situationj:ifficials.in_Wash- ing?Gib-elievedJed,toillicit.druglraffic:-Only strict supervision of - -- ?mercei? drugs andconfinement of addicts could eliminate the - trade." PO. t'Att - Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 . . ? 124 CHAPTER 6 ? The disquiet Salazar was creating in the minds of United, States , officials increased further with the appearance of his article, "El Mito de la Marijuana." The fourteen-year study detailed wide- ? spread marijuana smoking by Mexico's lower classes, yet Salazar had not Uncovered evidence,of.'psychOies:fesufting.frorin.1 canna'birr?. ny deleterious effects, he argued, were psychologically_ saMe-d.,"7-le ilaimed that marijuana?usage distagt_provoke criminal iid.ses and in fact created fewer social problems than abuse. Salazar's doubts about the harmfulness ofmarijuarra -- stood in sharp contEast to the position ,taken,by_the_Bur,eau_of., diSCrig.SiOris-,Ortlie. 1937 Marihuana-Tax-Act:29 of appeared at once. A derogatory editorial was published by El Universal on October 22. Two days later the paper printed,an_article_by_IvlanueLGuevara.Oropesa, hrthe Mexican Association ofieurology..,?and_Psychiatry, ,44.1._itiris Salazar's conclusions. Next, Excelsior reported that many officials in the Public Health Department also disagreed with the contentions in Salazar's article. For the United States, Consul General James Stewart suggested that ridicule would provide the best means of combatting "the dangerous theories of Dr. Salazar Viniegra." And Bureau of Narcotics chief Anslinger reiterated his agency's unequivocal opposition to marijuana by referring to it as "the deadly drug."29 When the article appeared in the December issue of Criminalia, the editors felt compelled to print as a coun- terbalance to Salazar's piece an antimarijuana study completed in 1931. The view of marijuana presented in that article approximated the position of the Bureau of Narcotics.3? Salazar _supported-by-other-research on.marijuana_in?Mexico 31 - sought to refute his critics. The proposed alterations in the federal regulations, he explained, stemmed from the generally inefficient and often selective enforcement of prior antinarcotic laws in Mex- ico. Salazar it seems, did not question the propriety of antidrug .0,....1.101/1?0????(????????,..J. '..00.0.0?00000..A0...00.....00.0........ a_ctivity, but differed witkother officials in his,ucountry,?ancl,the? States over the best way of fighting drug proklemis. He descrilied all existing international agreements on narcotics, such as the 1931 Geneva Convention, as "practically without effect." ? Illegal drug traffic was "surreptitiously tolerated, if not encouraged? 13-651-ri-anriF,Courtries ,.which have agreed, to suppress it", Thus Mexico, to reduce smuggling and control the domestic drug situa- Control Acr. wc: control, Mexir; probleir. of late He .felt from thi governni addictio. addict a. The change ran comi develop' the Uni express tively Si Anslingo prevent! cerned Ansling,i fight ag; Such United availab11. the incii, eating t' from a Ai ington, addicts represe. States. the gov punitiw United propose Not c. had Ma Meeting, ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25 : CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 k?? ? ? ?./.' CHAPTER -6- Control Across the Border 125 or United States. . f his article, "El y detailed wide- sses, -yet Sa g from thp,use of . e Psychologically did not provoke 11 problems than ness of marijuana y the Bureau of ma Tax Act." ce. A derogatory ber 22. Two days uevara Oropesa, and Psychiatry, ported that many sagreed with the I States, Consul ?ould provide the es of Dr. Salazar ;er reiterated his referring to it as in the December print as a coun- tdy. completed in de approximated Lana in Mexico,31 ons in the federal ierally inefficient otic laws in Mex- dety of antidrug i.country and the ig problems. He n narcotics, such without effect." fnot encouraged; ---'- ippress it." Thus nestic drug situa- ? ? ? ? ? tion; . would Tit With a' relatiVely miteSted ,measuie for ? control, the narcotic monopoly. Mexico'rence-fienevineo eediSirazar that the solution to drug prar?ems ridriot rest with the,jailing_oladdicts or-the expenditure - "of rarde-siim?s from the national Ireasumto,track elusiversm_ ng1.90:. re-felt that _nite tes antidrug efforts,. foceiarnp,_.....le, suffered - ? frOin this eily -pUnitive and costly approach Salazar wanted governments to "alter their traditional perceptions of addicts and addiction. This meant re ' vising he_declared, "the concept of the - addict as a blair-WNWthy, antisocial individual."32 . ?T-Ilre?United States was not pm:eared to make such a fundamental change rug ,. con trol?philp s op Indeed,??STlazar 's position ran counter to Washington's foreign and domestic drug policies as developed during the previous twenty-five years. In the view of the United States, drugs were not to be dispensed for other than express medical and scientific needs. By adhering to this decep- tively simple formula every nation would insure cooperation, in Anslinger's words, with "other nations in the common effort to prevent the abuse of narcotic drugs." As the country most con- cerned with effective drug control, the United States had the duty, Anslinger felt, to supervise the vigilance of other countries in the fight against narcotics.33 Such a self-appointed task would seem to suggest success by the United States in its own struggle with drugs. Salazar held that available information offered an opposite conclusion. Arguing that the incidence of recidivism remained high, he cited statistics iildi- catin the three-fourthswitharawal-a7G7M7 of_the,patients om a voluntary program at the federal narcotics hospital in Lex- . ington, Kentucky. He also estimated that the thirteen hunerZ Zeals ii---Ti-e-rned as prisoners at Lexington for drug law violations represented barely 1 percent of the addict population in the United States. The remainder, he felt, had been virtually abandoned by the government to illegal drug merchants, the result of overly punitive narcotic policies.34 By attacking the antidrug efforts of the United States, Salazar hoped to dissipate criticism of his own proposed regulatory changes. Not content merely with a defense of his plans- at home, Salaiar-. had Manuel Tello elaborate upon the proposals at the May 1939 meeting of the Opium Advisory Committee meeting in Geneva. ????,.??????=??????????-??????????????m???????????????????????? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 , _ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25 : CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 ILLEGIB ? 126 CHAPTER 6 Tello, afterpromisitig the cOntin'uation orMeXico's antidg effort, , ? ? - reiterated Salazar's statement that addicts would Only be able to acquire drugs from official dispensaries or state-licensed _phyli- 'dans. The priricipal reactions to Tello's remarks came from dubious Unlied States and Canadian representatives who condemned drug - ? a dispensation schemes and advocated stricter supervision by Mexico of intercourse in narcotics. For the United States, Stuart J. Fuller asked Mexico to postpone for one year promulgation of the contro- versial regulations. 'tarry Anslinger, also in attendance, minced no _ ? 'words reminding Tello that cr---'rug aadicts "wsre_ criminals_first_ane1_, addicts afterwards:" He doubted as well whether Mexico's pro- posed action would be acceptable under the 1931 Geneva Conven- tion. Tello responded by reading a letter from Salazar defending the changes, but promised nonetheless to convey to his govern- ment Fuller's request for a delay in their promulgation.35 The pressure put upon Salazar by foreign and domestic critics to alter the nature of his antidrug activity so that it would conform more closely to that of the United States led to his departure from the Public Health Department in August 1939. He was replaced by Heberto Alcazar, public health director of the Federal District. Also, Jos?iurob returned to his former position as head of the Public Health Department, taking the place ofAlmazan, who while in office played a subordinate role to Salazar.36 Consul General Stewart applauded the change in personnel, noting that the "weakness and indifference" ofAlmazin had allowed Salazar "to advance his wild theories regarding narcotics and nar- cotic addicts." A representative of the Rockefeller Foundation in Mexico, Charles A. Bailey, told Stewart that Alcazar was "a man who will do just what he is told and will follow the policy which Dr. Siurob will outline."37 With Salazar's departure another phase of United States?Mexican narcotic diplomacy came to a close. Domestic disputes over his policies and contention with the United States over proposed drug law enforcement changes marked Sala- zar's eighteen months in office. His critics never tried to assess dispassionately the plans he hoped would improve antinarcotic activity in Mexico. As a result, he spent considerable time defend- ing him-self rather than putting his ideas- into operation.38 That a national narcotic monopoly would provoke controversy in the 1930s is undeniable; but that it contravened the 1931 Geneva Convention seems less certain, despite the assertions of United States officials - to the contrary. Whether a monopoly would have successfully ? "'-? - Contrc restz issue of Dan had lacici the 1 that to tt H. Slur( Ti more the : Offic user: Addi dapti strait myst ."defil prais, strug prom their Sit addic Drug gling depat regul cony( virtm Siu adver antint desirk repre; ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 ? . ^ -`"-,- zt.W. . "2 ?"": 4' Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 ? (??v? '01 -?; t"fx," ? t ? .:";;?,% - ?CHAPTER-6 - ? ? 's antidrug effort, ?1-..;:'.; ? 3 Only be able to - e-licensed physi- ame from dubious 12'7' condemned drug ." rvisionby Mexico s, Stuart J. Fuller/.,' tion of the contro; dance, minced no ? riminals first and -- ler Mexico's pro-?. . Geneva Conven- Salazar defending ey to his govern- ilgation.38 lomestic critics to it would conform is departure from He was replaced Federal District. on as head of the mazan, who while ige in personnel, nazdn had allowed narcotics and nar- ler Foundation in ,cazar was "a man the-policy-which ure another phase came to a close. )n with the United ages 'marked Sala- er tried to assess wove antinarcotic able time defend- peration.38 That a iversy in the 1930s eneva Convention ??tk,:?. ted States officials have -successfully -.- ; Colitiolltcross-the ? 127 - - ? ? - - restricte'd illicit drug activit-On Mexico at that time temaint a moot' ? issue. A The return to.offide of Jose Siurob, seemed to.promise A rebirth of 'Mexican-United States antinarcotic endeavors. Ambassador Daniels commented that under Siurob's earlier tenure relations had been cordial, but under Almazan "the spirit of cooperation was lacking:" Siurob'asked fora copy of the drug control regulations of . _ the'United States Public Health Service, and intimated to Daniels that he would like to establish in Mexico 'a control system similar to that found in the southern United States. Frequent talks with H. S. Creighton about drug law enforcement likely influenced Siurob's thinking on narcotic contro1.39 The American impact upon Siurob's antinarcotic beliefs became more evident in November in Mexico at the annual convention of the Pacific Coast International Association of Law Enforcement Officials. In an address to the gathering, Siurob depicted drug users in terms similar to those employed by United States officials. 4ddicts were individuals onstitutionally or educationally una- thpted to TErstr777?gle_for life;_t1?=less.not?satisfied_with,A straightand.noble,modeg,living,.......rthemeak,minds seducecijm m sterious pleasures." Drug-usage.demonstrated "deficiencies_of will.power." In, concluding.rhisjemarks, Siurob praised the_leading roIe .of.the -United -States,.-in-its-eontinuing struggleyith drugs.t? His words suggested that he was intent upon promoting closer ties between Mexico City and Washington in their antidrug activities. . Siurob's address, although showing a firm commitment against addiction, belied the nature of the policy he would seek to enforce. Drug problems in Mexico ranging from individual usage to smug- gling were producing much concern among officials in the health department. In an attempt to combat the situation, new drug regulations had been promulgated on October 23 prior to the convention of law officials, but surprisingly, these statutes were virtually the same as those put forth by Salazar Viniegra.41 --Siurob hoped that the policy would not elicit-all- - adverse reaction from Washington. He felt that cooperation in antinarcotic work between the two governments remained not only desirable, but possible. He continued to apprise United States representatives of progress in the campaigns against opium and Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 ,01.1 ,74st ?40,: _ ?? 4,1?11 ? tit !PI:4 11 f.j 128. ? CHAPTER 6 1 Control Across the B ? 4- - 4 ? . .? ? , \ --??? . .. - ? nianjuana." Siurob then announced that.he would attend a public' - health directors' conference scheduled for Washington in May ? 1940. He also asked Commissioner Anslinger to visit Mexico to discuss the training of narcotic agents in order. to deal more effec- tively with smuggling." ? ..: ?,?-? ?-- ? ? ..: '. '' ? ....-- : . ? ? . i The Department of State favored a trip by Anslinger since a ..4 meeting "should result in a better understanding on the part of competent Mexican authorities of the aims and policies . . . being - pursued by the United States."- Daniels thought that March would be a good time for Anglinger's visit since it was shortly before the .._,.. start of the public health caiference in Washington." On February 17, 1940, however, the trip and, more important, the Mexican-United States antidrug effort Siurob desired were seri- ously jeopardized. The new statutes creating a national drug mo- and providing addicts withincrease ,access,to,narcotics_had finally taken_effectA ' Anslinger at once informed the State Department that he would embargo all shipments of medicinal drugs to Mexico. A 1935 amendment to the Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act of 1922 authorized such action by the commissioner. Under the law-da:ugs, icould only be exported to countries for explicitmedic.al,and scien- tifis_mmoses. This stipulation _did_.not ,include.the -ambulatory treatmentfor addiction ..which,Mexico,..was, about-Ao.,undertake." ? State Department officials had received advance information that the regulations would become law. To have taken no position on them would have constituted tacit acknowledgment that they were acceptable. Authorities in Washington's drug policy hierarchy could not allow this unless they intended to reexamine their own restrictive and punitive methods of control. No top-level official was prepared to do that. ? To explicate his government's position on the Mexican regula- tions, Stuart Fuller prepared a lengthy memorandum. Mexico could call drug dispensation by physicians "medical use," he stated, but the United States found such a definition inconsistent with the meaning of the term defined in various international antinarcotic agreements. For instance, Fuller believed that the Permanent Central Opium Board in Geneva would regard drug dispensation through a national monopoly as a violation of the 1931 convention. No major country except Mexico was trying to handle its drug problem with a state monopoly. "The plan envisaged by the pro- t? posed legislati. followed in all tional narcotics isew' orthy,"te . .? for the purpOsi by the COmmi distribution foi Anslinger's cided with the settled interna issue export pe travening the embargo with But because ol ernment migh ments were iss actions." Mexico mile occurred. In fi ences with th( discuss ways c nieans conside officials to act conversations ? health chief m prepared to su most objection suppression of by licensed dc the formation problems. Siui lar desire to SE -"ions with Day .? commitment said, was to re unprofitable. _5' Daniels four ambassador th1 ciation of Me) medicinal expe Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 loilw.actittimmixastaavereireaminsammstraz....-- ?-??amta,,_q- - Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25 : CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 . . 7 CHAPTER 6 ?-? . ? ? : ,..c.1.72.:,,-tfx ? . lattend a public ; ngton in May.. iisit Mexico to eal more effec- ' , slinger'ince a on the part of Icies . . being Maroh would ?rtly before the 44 On February iportant, the tired were seri- honal drug mo- to narcotics had it that he would 4exico. A 1935 port Act of 1922 m- the law drugs !dical and scien- the ambulatory :o undertake." ace information &eta no position ;ment that they policy hierarchy tmine their own top-level official Mexican regula- andum. Mexico I use," he stated, isistent with the mal antinarcotic the Permanent- ug dispensation 931 convention. ." handle its drug ged by -the pro-, 4"1 ' ? "'M.. ??'.4.(r ? 1r;. 4f. 1_ Control Across the Border ? ? posed legislaiion," Fuller wrote,- '`differs coMpletely irorn' those ? . ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? followed in all countries in the world which are parties to interna- tional narcotics conventions." Even if.Mexican,actions were "pra;,., sewQihy,he.contmued,supplying addicts with narcotics "merely, ? for the purpose of satisfying their cravings cou1drnotbe.regarded.. WCommissioner of.Narcotics?as otherwige than constituting 'aistribution for abusive use. : . "4, 7 . -------Anslr?nger's embargo on medicinal drug exports therefore coin- cided - with the State Department's view, in Fuller's .words, "of settled international policy." In sum,- the commissioner could not issue export permits withOut breaking United States law and con- travening the 1931 Geneva Convention. Anslinger followed the embargo with the cancellation of his trip to meet with Siurob." But because officials in Washington hoped that the Mexican gov- ernment might be induced to reverse its policy, no public state- ments were issued detailing United States opposition or Anslinger's actions." .. Mexico mildly protested the embargo, but no diplomatic rift occurred. In fact, Siurob tried hard to reconcile Mexico's differ- ences with the United States. First, he met with Creighton to discuss ways of combating a recent increase in smuggling. One means considered by the two men was allowing health department officials to act as policemen in drug-related matters.5? Next, in conversations with Daniels and Stewart on March 14 the public health chief made a compelling offer. Mexico, he observed, was prepared to suspend those portions of the new regulations found most objectionable by the United States. Siurob promised to seek suppression of the provision allowing drug dispensation to addicts by licensed doctors. As a gesture of reconciliation, he suggested the formation of a bilateral commission to study border narcotic problems. Siurob hoped that Anslinger would demonstrate a simi- lar desire to settle the contentious matter. Throughout his discus- sions with Daniels and Stewart the Mexican official reiterated his commitment to a strong antinarcotic policy. His ultimate aim, he said, was to reduce domestic addiction and to render smuggling _ ?. unprofitable.51 ? _ _ Daniels found merit in Siurob's plan to alleviate the dispute:The ambassador thought. that his government might show some appre- ciation of Mexican intentions by suspending the prohibition on - --medicinal exports. Siurob, Daniels noted, was "greatly disturbed 129 . ? Declassified in in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25 : CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 ;410, ?.!; _ , : cHAPTER-6 apd wopld? like to.find a. way of cooperatiOri.". The Mexican even asked, without success, for an interview with Dr. Thomas Parran, Surgeon General of the United States Public Health Service.53 As was often the case during his tenure in Mexico City, .josephus Daniels had again surpassed officials in Washington in his efforts to Maintaih good relations With Mexico: Anslinger's reply to SiurOb's * . . . . . conciliatory offer provides a case in point. The commissioner mat- ter-of-factly told Fuller that the proper way to determine legitimate drug usage was to ascertain if the usage was lawful under interna- tional agreements";* meaning?in the view of the United States? circumscribed medical and scientific use. Fuller and Anslinger found Siurob's offer too vague to warrant a more receptive re- sponse. The Treasury Department wanted to send the commis- sioner's blunt statement of policy to the Mexican government, but the Division 'of American Republics in the State Department quashed the idea, noting that the memorandum . . ' . might also give offense:" Herbert Bursley of State proposed a compromise which would let Siurob rescind the regulations and still maintain his integrity at home. Bursley felt that there should be no hint of pressure from Washington on Siurob. He volunteered to tell the Mexican consul that "it might be well for Dr. Siurob to announce that he cannot carry out his program because of the worldwide shortage of narcot- ics caused by the European war and that therefore he is suspending or cancelling the regulations in question. "55 By the time Siurob arrived in Washington in May for the Fourth Congress of Health Directors of Pan-American Countries, he had done what he could to improve relations over narcotics with the United States. His -temporary suspension of Much of the new narcotic code left Public Health Department clinics as the sole dispensing stations in Mexico.56 On May 4 and 7; prior to the opening of the meeting of the health directors, discussions about the Mexican drug control regulations took place. Present at the sessions for Mexico were Siurob and an English-speaking assistant, Dr. Jose Zozaya of the Institute of Hygiene in Mexico City. Anslin- ger, Fuller, Bursley, Dr. Lawrence Kolb, and John W Bulkley of the Customs Bureau Division of Investigations and Patrol repre- ? sented the United States. Siurob found himself on the defensive during the first session. Implementing the regulations, he stated, concluded a process be- Cantrol . gun have 1 had ac Depar- ,over,7,, Who p probal the pi memo _? Unite( official losoph The stand k nation that of Vinieg monop ence official: state 11 interne As ti 7, Slur lations. dared, was a r promis._ but wa sensith cially o the go' to char; again." The; was like chief Ai suspeni resume the nail Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25 : CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 _ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25 : CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 ? ???t-. ? ? ? 1 r-e CifAifie e Mexican - fhomas Parran, th Service.5.3 As City, Josephus in his efforts to eply to \Siurob's imissioner mat- mine legitimate !under interna - United States? and Anslinger e receptive re- id the commis- overnment, but te Department . . . might also se which would his integrity at if pressure from Mexican consul that he cannot 3rtage of narcot- ie is suspending y for the Fourth runtries, he had rcotics with the _itch of the new nics as the sole 7, prior to the iscussions about . Present at the eaking assistant, ico City. Anslin- n W. Bulkley of Patrol repre: the first session. ed a process be- 'Control ACroii The ? 131 gun before he took offiCe: He, personally felt that the action might. - have been premature, although he noted that the new program.. had achieved some success. For instance, the first Public Health Department clinic in Mexico City placed under government care ? over 700 of the 4,000 addicts in the Capital, When Anslinger.akked, Who Provided.ihe remainder with drugs, Siurob agreed that they - probably obtained their drugs illegally. At the close of the session the public health chief received from Anslinger a copy of the memorandum in Which the commissioner had tersely'outlined the . _ . _ . . . United States conception of legitimate narcotic usage. Privately, officials urged Zozaya, who concurred with their drug control phi- losophy to explain further Washington's position to his superior.57 The problem was not that Siurob remained equivocal about his stand against drug abuse. In his address to the Pacific Coast Inter- national meeting the previous fall, he displayed a resolve similar to that of his counterparts in the United States. Rather, like Salazar Viniegra, Siurob felt it worthwhile to explore a national narcotic monopoly is a means of combatting illegal drug activity in prefer- ence to the less flexible system espoused in Washington. Mexican officials were not as convinced as United States authorities that a state monopoly would worsen the drug situation or that it violated international agreements. As the second session of the talks began in Fuller's office on May 7, Siurob had evidently reevaluated his position on the new regu- lations. "The Mexican regulations [are] entirely wrong," he de- clared, indicating that the drug control policy of the United States was a more appropriate response to the existing problem. Siurob promised immediate suspension of the _regulations still in effect, but warned that he could not publicize the policy change. The ? sensitive nature of Mexican?United States relations, arising espe- cially out of the petroleum disputes of the late 1930s, would leave the government, in the midst of an electoral campaign, vulnerable to charges that the United States: as Siurob put it, was "dictating again." The Mexican's fear of United States pressure and the reaction it was likely to occasion had some basis in reality. Bureau of Narcotics chief Anslinger closed the talks by telling Siurob that only formal suspension of the controversial regulation would permit him to- resume authorizing drug exports to Mexico. With this declaration the narcotic policy talks ended. In seeking an accommodation over Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 A ?1, ? , 132 CHAPTER 6 policy differences as Siurob and Daniels wished, the Mexican government made considerable 'eoncessions? while the United States did little to reciprocate. In fact, Siurob was unable to extract from Anslinger and his colleagues even a verbal pledge to intensify cooperative activity in the important region around El Paso and? ' ?? Ciudad Juarez:my ' ' ? ? ' ? ?- . ." ? ? ? ? ? ' ? ? The conclusion of the Washington discussions brought to an end the final segment of United States?Mexican drug diplomacy be- tween 1936 and 1940. The United States had been successful in its ? attempt to get Mexico to reconsider the nature of its drug control --- ? policy. Future antinarcotic collaboration was likely to proceed along lines set forth by officials in Washington. As Herbert Gaston of the Treasury Department told Secretary Henry Morgenthau: "I had a very pleasant conversation with Dr. Siurob and his associate Dr. Zozaya . . . They are completely won over to our method of ? handling the narcotics problem and ask our continued help and advice." Gaston concluded: "This is a notable victory for Harry Anslinger."66Anslinger's sense of achievement must have increased two months later on July 3 when Diario Oficial published a decree suspending indefinitely the February regulations. Thereafter, Mexican addicts would be dealt with under the more punitive statutes of September 1931.60 Jose Siurob, who held ultimate responsibility for the care of Mexico's addicts, may have had misgivings about the outcome of the talks in Washington. Shortly after his return home, but before publication of the governmental decree, he wrote Creighton and attributed the change in policy directly to the discussions. Creigh- ton's reply referred to "your conclusions with respect to the control- of illicit narcotics in Mexico.?61 On the same day that he wrote Siurob, Creighton sent the following note to Washington and en- closed copies of the two letters: Realizing the position the Bureau [of Narcotics] has taken with Dr. Siurob, I am very happy to now have the letter of June 17th in which he states that he has finally come to recognize the inefficacy of their experiment to control narcotic drugs by administering game directly to the addicts: While IT-77? believe that Dr. Siurob has taken this position now because of the manner in which the situation was presented to him while in Washington, you will observe from the enclosed that I am Control Across_ti_ trying .; ? own "vo ? The publica thoughts Siu Between. . ? shaped Mer closely to th the United colleagues Leopoldo S; intervention Neighbor P; stance be hr the United ently was, ti more under of view. Suc Througho selves a lea lengthy hist of Mexico's leadership a in Mexican propriety ol tween the t macy of dru situation. T commitmen Josephus D policy diffel - Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 :" 4 ' - ? "*." " ' ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 ?. t" ? e ' ? ?';A 1' L 4". ^ ??^"..." - ?.?4 . CHAPTER 6 - the Mexican. e the United able to extract ge to intensify? , 1. El paso-an? .4t.sg4 Light to an end liplomacy be; 't.;!):471,..%--:*-4 ? UceeSSful in its s drug control [y to proceed erbert Gaston forgenthau: "I d his associate mr method of med help and ory for Harry lave increased ished a decree Thereafter, pore punitive >r the care of le outcome of ne, but before Dreighton and sions. Creigh- to the control that he wrote ngton and en- q. f?'?,?-?'i.????? -??? ? ???', 40,,?P le.:7?kt-1 ??????; .;* 4 ? Tr; I " ? nfcl [cs] has taken a the letter of -14i,_47. ially come to ? mtrol narcotic. diets. While I ow because of = ? - Ito him while ????,;'41."' )sed that I am It ? Control Across the Border 133 - trying to convince him that he has made this change of his own volition.62 - ? ?. The publication Of the decree rendered moot whatever second ? ? thoughts Siumb may have entertained about the change in policy. ? ? Between 1936 and 1940 the United States had successfully re- shaped Mexican narcotic policy. Nominally, it would conform more closely to the legalistic-punitive policy espoused and followed by the United States. The exertions of Anslinger, Fuller, and their ----z--- colleagues helped force from office a dedicated public servant, Leopoldo Salazar Viiiiegia. Moreover, since their actions led to intervention in Mexican affairs, the reality of the professed Good Neighbor Policy of the Roosevelt administration must in this in- stance be brought into question. Had the drug control program of the United States been measurably more effective than it appar- ently was, the interference with 'Mexican policy might have been more understandable if no less objectionable from Mexico's point of view. Such was not the case, however. Throughout the 1930s officials in Washington arrogated to them- selves a leading position in hemispheric activity Because of the lengthy history of paternalism toward Latin America and as a result of Mexico's proximity to the United States, this self-delegation of leadership and assumption of moral superiority led to intervention in Mexican affairs. Anslinger and others never questioned the propriety of that interference. In the context of the disputes be- tween the two countries in the late 1930s, the politics and diplo- macy of drug control could have exacerbated an already sensitive situation. That it did not do so is testimony to the antinarcotic commitment of Jose Siurob and his desire, along with that of Josephus Daniels, to reach an accommodation over the narcotic policy differences between their two governments. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 1 1- Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/2-5 : CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 CHAPTER 8 World War Hand After .. 161 Cesar Gordillo cultivation had - - I had cultivation ) that if the de- ? - pium, he would ? ustry under the ate Department scourage poppy au of Narcotics, partment ought MUM in Peru for !mained the om- nisphere. .event its opium as through strict of opiates. Such ing stocks of op- , Anslinger let it the importation )ssessed supplies nment in Lima, lenied one firm's le same time the idly needed nar- not have enough ; upon a request, issue the export Washington had option of stricter ? opiates and the ;, exporting the al purposes. An nd of 1943 when the drug report- had nearly ex- iced that codeine tuickly approved !la?though it did not match United States standards of strictness?must have pleased officials in Washington. A Peruvian decree in November 1943 required all cocaine producers to sell to the government stocks, e)cceedii-g?a O-ne year's supply. The next spring the government even seriously considered the creation of a state monopoly to control cocaine. But there were obstacles. Eight or ten producers were maintaining their operations and did not want their permits revoked. They argued that they were performing a service by stockpiling cocaine during periods when there was an abundant &rca-leaf harvest. Still, the government's rationale for monopoly was that authorities were having to rely on the honesty of these _ producers to provide production statistics which the government. could not verify. Despite this, the monopoly did not come into eidstence during the war.36 Officials in Washington would have preferred some form of limitation at the source rather than a monopoly. But if there had to be one, a state monopoly for the production and sale of coca leaves, and not cocaine, would be preferable. Extensive_ supervision_ of coca cultivation instead of cocaine productiiiiiwas unlikely thougb. _ Despite the increased government activity resulting from wartime exigencies, the enforcement of Peruvian drug laws was not uniform through the mid-forties. Violators?especially-drug_sellersi_often received lenient treatment. Near the end of the war a change in policy m' have been in the offing. A key official in Peru's narcotics bureau told Julian Greenup that Peruvian authorities regretted the lack of a mandatory sentence for drug traffickers. But no evidence suggests that any changes were forthcoming.37 Drug problems in Mexico had always posed more difficulties for the United States than similar problems in the other Latin Ameri- can states, for Mexico was after all a contiguous neighbor. Geo- graphical proximity?and wartime?were not the only shaping elements of the relationship between the two countries. Also sig- nificant were political antagonisms originating at the time of the Mexican Revolution and the differing ways in which each society viewed drug use. But Mexico's renewed antidrug commitment, arising out of the discussions in Washington in May 1940 between United States and Mexican officials, had helped to minimize these difficulties. As administrations in Mexico changed from that of neclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25 : CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 - 162 -- . CHAPTER 8 i . ? .4 ?1tO . ? :1 ? ? Cardenas to Avila Camacho, Anslinger, H. S. Creighton, and the ' 4 others most concerned with the situation could only wait and see if .-....-1,,- .. .. - . the level of cooperation would remain the same.. ,- . . .: i.. Several indications. appeared late in, the year, suggesting that.. .... their hopes would not be realized. In December, Creighton asked ' -v...4.11. ? ? for and .received permission from his superiors ,to_resume_ thp Iiceof Sending operatives into Mexico to aid in the _tracIdng of --- _ . ., "drtig-riim g-glrs: 3-8 At the Same time, a scandal arose within -Mex- 'iCo's narcotic bureaucracy Excelsior reported allegations of i_rr- l'arFiaiees- in the- li.ealth department, including high-level, complicity in the drug trade. The arrest of an attorney, Jose Per- donio BenliZleVed-narcotics police discover numerous forged authorizations for excessive drug imports. Large quantities of these drugs, it was believed, ended up in the illicit traffic. Suspicion about the irregularities had surfaced in July when the League of Nations released statistics showing that Mexico was _ _ exceeding its import allotment for the year..0fficials in the Federal District subsequently learned of a delivery of 150 grams of cocaine to Perdonio. Two men who had previously served in the govern- ment, Albert P Leon as secretary general of public welfare and Francisco Bassols in the Office of Control of Medicine and Phar- macopoeia, denied granting the order for the delivery of the co- caine. The order had been questioned because the Department of Public Health employed a special form for all consignments over five grams. Perdonio refused to divulge how he obtained the required signatures. Following his arrest, the Department of Pub- lic Health ordered all suspicious narcotic imports halted and re- \stricted the granting of import authorizations. As Excelsior reported, illegal purchases continued?on proper forms which had obviously been altered.39 . . In his defense, Leon declared that the order found in Perdonio's possession was false. The order was supposedly issued to Dr. Heberto Alcazar, former chief of the Federal Narcotics Service. Yet Leon claimed that a different name, that of a woman, appeared on (.,. the order stub found in the office where Bassols worked. He further declared his and Bassols's signatures on the order to be forgeries.40 Alci7ar, trying to clear his name, told his friends at the United States Consulate General that he had done nothing irregu- lar. He concluded that someone wanted to discredit him and others formerly attached to the Department of Public Health. Alcazar felt V ? ILLEGIB World War II . , . that Pascu responsibl feelings e: Sanchez narcotics Allegati( United Sh only serve Anslinger that the sr behind wa Alvin Scha bet Dr. Vi eliminate Fernandez dal, but fel a change in icantly, thE printed a s: Perdonio I Alcazar in as a key fig had report Alcaza.r rep records wo As the ye control in the Carder damaged re indicated a example, income, op naturally fo One mitt Fernandez only way .sr had no ream his commit] with Fernat States gove: npclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 - Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 _ -CHAPTERS?. .ightbn; rand the' ly wait and see if suggesting that Creightqn asked to resume the n the tracking of ose within Mex- gations of irregu- ding high-level orney, Jos?er- iumerous forged uantities of these ffic. in July when the hat Mexico was Is in the Federal grams of cocaine d in the govern- blic welfare and licine and Phar- livery of the co- e Department of nsignments over le obtained the iartment of Pub- s halted and re- s. As Excelsior forms which had .nd in Perdonids y issued to Dr. )tics Service. Yet an, appeared on ols worked. He the order to be his friends at the nothing irregti- t him and others alth. Alcizar felt Woild Wir .and Affei . . that Paicual SancheZ Anojia, chief of the narcotics police, might be ' ? ? responsible. Sanchez had previously worked for Alcazar and ill feelings existed between the two. In fact, Alcazar thought that Sanchez might be a major participant in the illegal activities the. . narcotics police had uncovered...41. .. ? Allegations of complicity against?Alcazar worried officials in the United States, for high-level corruption in the government would only serve to increase drug smuggling. Were the charges true, Anslinger and the State Department_woulce:_roT?loric ude,_ _ trarthe7S-ifiCarid:-Frietice.-of cooperation which -J6se-SiurobJeft. _,...___'nd was fraodulent.-?Against this background, customs agent .? harff visited the new public health director in mid-Decem- ber. Dr. Victor Fernandez Manero told Scharff that he intended to eliminate any illegal or questionable activities in his department. Fernandez Manero admitted the potential seriousness of the scan- dal, but felt that the situation might provide its own remedy since a change in administrations and personnel was under way.42 Signif- icantly, the day after the Fernandez-Scharff discussion, ? Excelsior printed a story entitled, "The Narcotics 'Traffic Scandal Increases." Perdonio Benftez had revealed information further implicating Alcazar in the illegal activity. He possessed a note namin_g_Alcazar as a key figure in the scandal, and an agent of the narcotics police Ilaa reportedJy_yerified_the_note's -authenticity. To this charge Xrcazar replied that a careful check of Department of Public Health records would remove all suspicion from him.? As the year ended, the future course and effectiveness of narcotic control in Mexico seemed in question. Important officials in both the Cardenas and Avila Camacho administrations suffered from damaged reputations. Report's from several regions in the country _ _ indicated an increase in smuggling. In some border areas, for ( example, w_lte.getable.farming-had-failed_to produce_a_good. e income opium_poppies were_ being-planted, ,Smugglings_woul4 naturally follow." . Oifelinitigating factor in this situation was the avowed desire of Fernandez Manero for cooperation with the United States?the only way smuggling could be reduced.45 Officials in Washington - had no reason to question his sincerity, and rather hoped to-bolster --- hit commitment. Creighton arranged to go to Mexico City to talk with Fernandez Manero about the illicit traffic, while the United .........-.......z........m?swaomomor..., States government, prompted by the uncertainty of the situation , ? 1.6a- - Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Cop Approved for Release 2013/07/25 : CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 164 - CHAPTER 8 .. ? . ? ? . ? in Mexico, temporarily removed the narcotic agents_ operating. ) there." Diku-s-iioni-th-ok place early in February. One topic was destruction of the opium. crop. Creighton expressed disappoint- ment at the continuing poppy cultivation. in .Sonora and Sinaloa.. Yet both he and Fernandez Miner? knew that destruction was not 1 possible without the assistance of local officials.47 The Mexican . public health director told Creighton that he intended to supervise crop destruction of opium and marijuana plants in Baja California later in the month." , During the talks Creighton sought formal approval from the Avila Camacho administration for the continued presence of United States drug agents in Mexico. All prior agreements had been informal. Creighton's translator William K. Ailshie, vice consul at 'Mexico City, favored formalization because of the uneven record of drug control in Mexico. "The Federal Narcotics Service in Mexico City," he said, "does not have facilities to prevent the cultivation of poppy and marijuana plants throughout the Republic or the man- ufacture of opium derivatives, not to mention the illegal introduc- tion of narcotics into Mexico, chiefly from japan."49 The Mexicans soon agreed to formalization, but sought an official request from Washington.5? Herbert S. Bursley of the State Department at- tached a handwritten note to the report on the talks. It read: "I think it unfortunate that this question was aired. The situation regarding our people going to Mexico was OK."51 The United (States therefore deemed a formal accord unwise, and Mexico did I not insist upon one. Washington's reluctance did not greatly offend tie- Mexicans for the government named Dr. Zaragoza Cuellar Garcia, new chief of the narcotics service, as correspondent with the United States for the exchange of narcotic information. His selection reinforced the informal arrangements first made in the 1930s.52 Throughout the year the United States continued the practice of sending agents into Mexcoo?to- investigate smuggling and other drug-related activities. Three special agents arrived at the height of -antinarcotic efforts in the fall." Discretion was in order. As George Morlock commented: "I said. . . that I thought Treasury should be very careful not to overrun Mexico with its agents."54 By early 1.942 rumors of a government scandal subsided and cooperative efforts were moving ahead. Consul General William P. Blocker at Ciudad Juarez felt optimistic enough to report that "the ILLEGIB World war II; traffic in n Blocker kn of smuggli for. contink Service off Creighton, Bermudez. American,' bon of bm stated: "Rc ment wher Narcotic ones confr, came repo] crop found officials we vation and tional ant: competitor the Treasm met with f told Creigl impossible support thr stantly incr annual rep( Loaiza di ton. He oft Federal tr( destruction closely witl lines of con a substitute suggested t hoped that poppy culti Some de: April, obsel dor Fena.5? half of the c Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25 : CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25 : CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 ;ents, operating One topic was sed disappoint- Ira and Sinaloa. -- --- truction was not. .The Mexican' led to.pupervise ? Baja California )roval from the sence of United ? lents had been vice consul at Lneven record of ;rvice in Mexico he cultivation of Aic or the man- illegal introduc- 18 The Mexicans al request from Department at- alks. It read: "I 1. The situation "51 The United and Mexico did )t greatly offend aragoza Cuellar .espondent with aformation. His rst made in the the practice of ;ling and other xl at the height as in order. As ought Treasury a its agents."TM. Ll subsided and neral William P. report that "the WolId-War Wand Alter 165 traffic in narcotics as a whole has been sharply reduCed.?55 ut as Blocker knew, intermittent vigilance would never reduce the level of smuggling for more than a short time. To emphasize the need for continuing action; a meeting was held in the Customs Agency Service office in El Paso. Those in attendance included Blocker, . . . . . Creighton, a customs agent for. the El Paso region, and Antonio Bermtidez, the mayor of Ciudad Juarez, who was "strongly pro- American," as Blocker put it. Plans were discussed for the reduc- tion of border smuggling. Blocker's report gave no details, but stated: -Results of the campaign will be reported to the Depart- ment when achieved.:56 ? Narcotics problems in the state of Chihuahua were not the only ones confronting Mexico at the time. From Mazatl?in Sinaloa came reports of extensive opium growing. Some of the harvested crop found its way into the United States. In fact, several state officials were suspected of reaping large rewa7ds from poppy_culti- Vatititrand smuggling, while concurrently implementing the na- tional antinarcotic policy_by destroying_the_fields?of-their - competitors. Creighton, who had left his post in Texas to become the Treasury Department's special representative in Mexico City, met with the governor of Sinaloa, Rudolfo Loaiza. The governor told Creighton that stamping out the opium industry would be impossible since opium had nearly become the sole means of support throughout the state. Acreage under cultivation was con- stantly increasing, a fact noted by the Bureau of Narcotics in its annual report for 1942.57 Loaiza did not depict an entirely depressing situation for Creigh- ton. He offered three suggestions for reducing the opium traffic. Federal troops, CriCluding cavalry, might help supervise poppy &a-ruction. Alio, health department agents Could -work more closely with state and local officials. Finally, improved roads and lines of communication might help limit additional cultivation. As a substitute for the revenue derived from poppy production, Loaiza suggested that the state build qp its miningindustry. Creigh_tp.n h?...22011_rat agricyltural crops would beplanted.even,though.opium. ,poppy cultivation was more lucrative." Some -destruction of poppies took place in January, March; and April, observed by special Treasury Department employee Salva- dor Perla." He disputed Mexico's contention that one-third to one- half of the crop had been destroyed, for he believed that numerous 1 / ) npnlassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 `44 1 , .% 7- : 1.? Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25 CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 1.," -..-e. ..row....,,,....... .. . : . . , .. 1 l .. " ::: : " '. . ". . . . - ' 4 "..1 . V" : ! " - ; . ' :s: 1 - . . . s ...,....-....-7?,- . ^...,.....,v? ?-?-??,^ ???`-,? fr.."' Ni 4 , . -------x- - ?-.*: -,. s ?1.-, es - ?? ).-. e ? ? ? - ; .i .. .. r,.. ? ? ..--? n -1 -;,,,,- ? 1.? ?? }- X ,..1:.- .? ? ? ? 7??,,i ir,41$1. CHAPTER 8 :,....4.11.' 4, ? ' ? -, ? 5i ? , ? ' ? ?14.4.? fields had 'been harveted`before beink liunied. Also, the destruc- tion occurred only in Sinaloa?not in Durango, Sonora, and Chi- ............:.....4.- huahua where it was needed as well. (Sonora reportedly served as ? an important staging area for the smuggling of drugs into the . - . .- ?? . ? United States.69 `- - . .. . Creighton'shared Pena's doubts.61 In a related, intriguing,deyel- ?? f ?-k 1-? :; . opment a propo- s.....2,1emorgedy probably from one of Treasury ' s mu!, ........-4.5.v, ,....... II ? 1 ;. . iiriVexico, advocating that the...linited,States purchasetheMexican ' .. opium-crop. -Alihough he felt the proposal might offer -a way to ---'7"--r?-_i- ZA.? it4f. c'aiikarrmugg,ling, Creighton played down the idea in a report to his superiors.62 United States opium supplies were sufficient and .t; any purchases might encourage additional, unwanted planting of ? ;I poppies. Throughout the year Mexico requested assistance combating illegal drug traffic. In October Mayor Bermudez complained about the inadequacy of prior aid and asked for additional agents. Mor- lock, joined by other federal officials in the belief that smuggling ? around El Paso was increasing, approved the request. 63 Some s.o0-4 results were achieved when in December eight traffickers were arrested and eight pounds of opium confiscated." The campaign against border smuggling of opiates and marijuana continued into 1943. At a meeting in Washington with state and treasury department officials Fernandez Manero revealed that Avila Cam acho had directed the governors of Sonora and Sinaloa to - suppress poppy cultivation in their,states.,Fernandez iMprudently asserted that cultivation had therefore ceased.65 Within a month are?Sige?reFartment notifiTeliZeinTrDaniels's replacement, ?X, - George S. Messersmith, that conditions near Mazatl?were wors= ening. "The illicit traffic in narcotic drugs between Mexico and the United States has increased considerably since 1940," a cable read, "and unless checked will probably become as large as formerly existing between the Ear East and the United States." Treasury Department estimations that Mexico's opium produc- tion for 1943 would reach sixty tons, or three times greater than ? 1942, underlined the urgency of the message. The cable empha- - sized the need to suppress production. Messersmith was instructed was to find out if Mexico desired additional assistance. The cable also contained the prospect of unpopular, unilateral action: if exces- sive production continued, border guards would have to search all incoming vehicles and travelers from Mexico.6!....---- _ .1 ,)???-? ,1"14.05. World War . ? Creig Bulkley opium-f- oyer .90 making: even sti: assistanc amount the next Creig. Fernand governot Fernand three mi with Lo: Closing suggestic against n tions off worsenec protest t4 Subsec Bursley, inspectio send an success. 4 trip, Bun. on Ferna States err some pop been don poppies." reported To offic narcotics: ises,-and for 1943 rt record wc March 19. in Mexiec npc.I ssif ied in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 CHAPTER 8 World War II and After ),Ahe destruc- . lora, and Chi-. ? edly served as 'rugs into the triguing deyel-' ? .. Freasury's men 3e the Mexican offer a way to t in a report to sufficient and red planting of ice combating nplained about 1 agents. Mor- that smuggling quest.63 Some raffickers were and marijuana with state and revealed that t and Sinaloa to imprudently iithin a month ; replacement, lin were wors- Vlexico and the a cable read, ge as formerly es." opium produc- n greater than cable empha- was instructed nce. The cable . action: if exces- ve to search all Creighton -, went to Washington to discuss the. situation ? with - Bulkley and Morlock. He told them that. Chinese nationals began opium production around 1925, but that Mexicans now controlled over 90 percent of the operations. In. his opinion, Loaiza was not r making a genuine effort in Sinaloa to restrict production. Creighton ? ? 'even *suspected that United Site's 'funds niarkeil.for anti:I-colic assistance?were ending up in the pockets of smugglers. (The tm -Wild had risen from 20,000 pesos in 1942 to 250,000 pesos the next year.) -- Creighton- also had unsubstantiated evidence that denied ? Fernandez Manero's aroinarcotic commitment. While serving as governor of the gulf coast state of Chiapas in southeastern Mexico, Fernandez Manero amassed a personal fortune of between two and, three nullion_peins. At that time he maintained a close relationship with?a?aiza. The coincidence seemed important to Creighton. ClaiSrthe discussion, he regretted that he had no remedial suggestions. He doubted the likelihood of enhanced collaboration against narcotics with Mexico despite his belief in the good inten- tions of Avila Camacho. Morlock could only add that if conditions worsened, as was probable, the United States would issue a formal protest to the Mexican government. 67 Subsequent reports from Mexico were not encouraging. Herbert Bursley, now embassy counselor, alerted Washington that another inspection trip would be made to the northern states. He hoped to send an observer even though he doubted the trip would be a success. Questioning the sincerity of the commitment behind the trip, Bursely suggested that it was being staged to relieve pressure on Fernandez Manero from Mexican newspapers and the United States embassy. After the trip Messersmith concludeLthaL;while,;? - some poppy fields have been destroyed, nothing of impartancelas. been &lie, however, to prevent cultivation or to destroy growing. RTpiiii;" 68 Not surprisingly, the fall plantings in Sinaloa were reported to be the largest yet.69 To officials in the United States, relations with Mexico over narcotics seemed destined to follow a pattern of conference, prom- ises, and nonperformance, as the Bureau of Narcotics annual report for 1943 reveals. Had Jos?iurob remained in office after 1940 that record would probably not have differed. The pattern recurred in March 1944 when the Mexican government requested a meeting in Mexico with top-level officials from Washington." After this - Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25 : CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 ?????4 iwo 7, .e? s siS h 168 CHAPTER 8 ? . ? ? ?? particular gathering Messersmith expressed the frustiation.his col: leagues and predecessors had long felt. He belieyed_thatatihe_ 4, highest level the administration _wished to cooperate wjth_the triraVates and genuinely committed itself to .balting_poppy. ,FrOar the northern :border. .As before; Ldrng_agents_fmete. welcome on trips into poppy 'country: Sidney Kennedy, Creighton's replacement upon the latter's re- tirement, was also present at the meeting of narcotics officials. He thought that the United States should employ diplomatic protests to produce compliance by Mexico in antidrug activity. Yet diplo- macy, is Kennedy discovered, could not overcome the problems which made effective control difficult. Dr. Gustavo Baz, minister of public health, elaborated. In the first place the government's antinarcotic program was poorly funded. Agents did not have suf- ficient funds to meet their own expenses, let alone to pay inform- ers?a necessary practice. As a result age.2LIKej:sal_p,sce bribes from drug merchants. Second, for several years the govern- ,? - ment had only enough manpower to send two agents to supervise crop destruction even though the United States share of the pro- gram's cost had risen steadily. Baz suggested that one more agent and a small increase in funds from Washington would enable Mex- ico to destroy 25 percent of the poppy fields. He intimated that the program might falter without additional funds. The meeting concluded after one of Baz's subordinates presented a four-step plan to halt poppy growth. The measures included an ???????????. ? educational campaign advocating the cultivation of agricultural. "?crop?s, th?e withholding of public im'gation waters from lands with, poppie?s, the forcible removal of opium growers from public lands, aridllitiSrnsecution of selected growers as a warning to others. 71 flirm?ijcir drawback in the program as usual would be the difficulty of implementation. An early test of Mexico's resolve to fulfill its antinarcotic pledges came in June. At the urging of Salvador Pena, a crop destruction expedition with twenty-three soldiers traveled to Durango. An inexplicable delay of one _day alerted the growers_to.the-comind raid Upon arriving at_the.poppy fields,_ Mexican officials and.the? soldiers discovered local villages deserted and some of the fields . hurried: The soldiers made a superficial effort to destroy more flelds; several soldiers assisted with the burning while the other twenty guarded against a surprise ambush. At the conclusion of the ? ? ? ? World War II s -? abortiVe e: another tri Peru, actui , the flow of success. F( ity to affec country. Hemispl - inter-Amer national efl traveled to to adopt mc that printin reporting p that encour trols to thos visited twel and Mexico offer the pr As we ha ; tina, the Ar postwar rer vast illegal large quant From 19401 primarily fn principal sui United Stet of cocaine tr with the wa / ton's concer nally, most 4 early 1940s The war I When older, scrutiny tha: Organizatior ceived a fay( tion been 1: V .4 na(-1Qcifipr1 in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 ? - Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 ....r.i.??????.- , CHAPTER 8 - listration his col- - eyed that at the - operate with the , o halting 'pot?py-7- rug agents were In the lattees re-. Dtics officials. He plomatic protests Aivity. Yet diplo- ne the problems Lvo Baz, minister he government's did not have suf- le to pay inform- re susceptible to years the govern- ents to supervise share of the pro- t one more agent )uld enable Mex- ntimated that the linates presented ;ures included an n of agricultural s from lands with rom public lands, _ ning to others. 71 d be the difficulty tinarcotic pledges crop destruction to Durango. An !rs to the coming n officials and the ome of the fields- - - to destroy more ; while the other conclusion of the World War 11 and After 169 ---- abortive expedition, .the coordinator from? Durango declared that another trip would not be made.72 (See Appendix.) If Mexico, like Peru, actually desired to join with the United States in controlling the flow of illicit narcotics in the Americas, its efforts met with little -- success, Federal administrators simply did not possess. the capabil- ity to affect Conditions in the Major drug &Wing region' s of -the : country. Hemispheric drug control through 1945 became essentially an inter-American matter which reflected how the War halted inter:: -- national efforts. Just before the war a League of Nations mission traveled to Latin America hoping to influence governments there to adopt more comprehensive control programs. The League found that printing its documents in Spanish increased compliance with reporting procedures on the domestic drug situation. It was hoped that encouragement from Geneva might bring more efficient con- trols to those states plagued by serious drug problems. The mission visited twelve states including Argentina, Uruguay, Peru, Bolivia, and Mexico. Results of the trip gratified the League and seemed to offer the prospect of an intensive antidrug effort." As we have seen, the wartime history of drug control in Argen- tina, the Andean region, and Mexico thwarted this expectation. A postwar report on the extent of wartime drug traffic chronicled a vast illegal trade. Both the United States and Canada had seized large quantities of contraband raw opium originating in Mexico. From 1940 to mid-1946, a total of 428 kilograms of prepared opium, primarily from Mexico, was seized. That country, too, served as a principal supplier of morphine and adulterated heroin reaching the United States. On the other hand, the report minimized the extent of cocaine traffic. The stated reason was the preoccupation of Japan with the war, but that assertion should be tempered by Washing- ton's concern with illicit cocaine emanating from the Andes. Fi- nally, most of the marijuana confiscated in the hemisphere in the early 1940s came from Mexico." The war had several notable effects upon-the illicit drug trader When older establisga-CliaTirielifor -s?n-iuggling came under closer, new_ones opened. The International Labor__ Qrganization appealed for assistance by seamen's unions and re,- ceived a favorable response. Had this and other methods of detec- tion ree?n- largely effective, the flow of drugs would not have F Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 . .7" 'dr. t q _ " "1-.? ? , Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25 : CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 o ? ? ? ??,t ? ? ? , ? ??, ? f ????' a X .? .. ? 44 4 ,7 ? stopped. From Mexico, couriers often ,crossed the. Rio Grande by Wading or iwiMming and pushing their precious cargoes on rafts.. Traditional European and Asian transfer points closed during the J. war. The risky, bustling romanticism associated with Marseilles and " Hong Kong disappeared as drugs entered the United States after . Passing through less recognizable 'towns iii Mexico and Ceniral and South America. As for the quality of drugs, the. war evidently caused much adulteration of the opiates. The level of purity often did not reach 5 percent. Supply from the Americas, falling short of prewar inter- national levels, drove prices higher. On the other hand, the war set off an increase in the iMuggling of a cheaper substance, mari- , juana. By 1942 organized gangs were reportedly distributing it in ? the United States. The risks were great; the number of seizures rose appreciably for the next few years." Anslinger and his col- leagues hied to bring this situation under control by appealing, - where possible, to Latin American governments to improve their own control programs. There was little the United States could do legislatively. One law which was,passed, an opium poppy Control measure, proliibifeirdomesticoop_py cultivation except-uncleAa special license all;ving.p.Aisatialmnedic.1..xl and,scientificipur, ...,? iiirserTre-gre7n7;74issued.no,such,licenses.nuring the wan!! ?A7e7-17emerged in Washington that the global conflict had done much to reduce the number of addicts in the United States. The Bureau of Narcotics saw this as a continuation of a prewar trend initiated by its tough policies and vigilance in enforcement. A -,17P United Nations report echoed this sentiment.77 This feeling of - . success renewed the unresolvable controversy about the number of addicts. Apparently, the figure fell somewhere between 20,000, - ;7- 4-; CHAPTER 8 which would have been slightly more than one addict per 10,000 people, the bureau's estimated ratio, and 48,000, the number given by the Public Health Service in 1948. Anslinger termed the lower ? figure an irreducible minimum."78 The evidently low level of addiction prompted Congress in 1948 to consider closing the fed- eral narcotic farms, but Anslinger succeeded in keeping them open." As always the precise extent of addiction was not possible. to calculate; methods remained unreliable and self-serving. It is .; clear, however, that the level fell during the war, barely increased for the next two years, and then began a steady rise." - ? ? ? When this increase Was beginning, the bureau seemed to be ??%. 4, World War-Hind - searching. fo:. climate of pr addition," At publicity mil- - ? -.It has 'b pariicul "adverb stimulai otherwi- Abuse amoni quences but of drugs. "82 i liked to haw played a sign decade later goals. Anslinger' New York 1-1( times a leath persons possi coauthored, ' 'of the article reporting Ma sensationalist mation was n the research. dia report of] The comm atmosphere f ately detecte denounced it //done. Potent error, Anslini on the road t ated to heroi) was gone." during the lu The war and scientific deb T ??? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 ?"'" ?'; -5 . . ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 ?t, ? ?-? ??? _ -4? CHAFTER 8 i.7.1A ? -- ? f'? ? ' ? ? - io Grande by Axial:, ;oes on rafts .7:14-71:5 d during the farseilles and 1: States. affet *.? I Central and ? -1.1.4":'?*7.;.? - ?.u.-.- ..:aused much lid not reach ?????????,1. prewar inter- and, the war stance, mari- ributing it in q- of seizures and his col- )3, appealing, mprove their ates could do ioppy control ept under a cientific pur- g the war." let had done I States. The prewar trend Orcement. A lis feeling of the number oveen 20,000, ? per 10,000 lumber given led the lower low level of rsing the fed- eeping them ; not possible serving. It is ely increased .80 emed to be World War 11 and Mier 171 ? searching for a scapegoat to blame. "There has always been a climate of public opinion which has favored the spread of narcotic addition," -Anslinger declared.81 He especially feared that undue - --- pulplicqy might tempt people into narcotic use: ? . ? It has been our observation that direct propaganda on drugs, particularly to the youth, is likely to be dangerous, because it "advertises" the use of drugs for nonmedical purposes and - - - stimulates curiosity on the part of persons who would' not 'otherwise have become interested. , . -Abuse among youngsters resulted not from "ignorance of conse- quences but because they had learned too much about the effects of drugs."82 As one of the guardians of public morality, the bureau liked to have it both ways: in the 1920s an educational campaign played a significant role in the passage of the Marihuana Tax Act; a decade later public awareness impeded realization of the bureau's goals. Anslinger's tenacity in the fight against drugs was unrivaled. The New York Herald Tribune reported in 1948 that he carried at all times a leather-bound book containing the names of thousands of persons possibly involved in the illegal drug trade.83 In a book he coauthored, The Traffic in Narcotics, Anslinger disparaged many of the articles on narcotics appearing in the press. He found the reporting inaccurate and misleading, and he denounced the use of sensationalism for the sake of sales. As always, nonbureau infor- mation was regarded with skepticism, no matter how sophisticated the research. The acrimonious controversy over the 1944 La Guar- dia report offers a prime example." The commissioner claimed that the report contributed to the atmosphere favoring drug experimentation. "The Bureau immedi- ately detected the superficiality and hollowness of its findings and denounced it." In the eyes of the bureau the damage had been done. Potential users believed marijuana to be harmless.85 This error, Anslinger would argue in 1951, started many young people on the road to heroin. "They started there," he said, "and gradu- ated to heroin; they took the needle when the thrill of marihuana-- was gone."88 This position effectively reversed the bureau's stand ? during the hearings on marijuana control fourteen years earlier. 87 The war and immediate postwar years saw a continuation of the ? scientific debate on the effects of marijuana. At the very least, the . ? '":PA4j0 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 Appendix: Opium Poppy Destruction in Mexico, 1944 Durango AMERICAN CONSULATE Durango, Durango, Mexico, June 27, 1944 AIR MAIL STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL Subject: Opium Poppy Fields in State of Durango Destroyed. The Honorable The Secretary of State, Washington. Sir: I have the honor to transmit herewith copies, with translation, of a report of the destruction, under the supervision of the Servi- cios Sanitarios Coordinados (Public Health Service) of Durango, accompanied by kodak photographs, of the poppy fields and the work of destruction being carried on by the Federal troops and the men employed to assist in the work. The poppy plantings mentioned in the enclosed reports are located at the villages of METATES, QUEBRADA HONDA, and Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25 CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 - APPENDIX _ FRESNO which places are three days by horseback almost due west from Tepehuanes, the end of the railway line extending from Durango to Tepehuanes. These places are situated to the right of a line drawn from Topia to Copalquin, Durango, and about half way between those those places. These villages are located in the heart of the Sierra Madre mountains and are ,very difficult to reach. In fact the: only manner of reaching these villages is by horse or mule back. The people in that section of this state are quite uneducated and, ultrired-arid-wliCise [sic] standard of living is very low. It will be ? ? iiote-dTr-oiiitlieTeports transmitted herewith that the poppy plant-, ings-were on small parcels of land. This is due to the fact that the arricii?mt-Of 'finagle land in that secluded part of the state is in small tracts located in small valleys between mountains. The pictures accompanying this report will give a better idea of the terrain? in that section of the state. The expedition 'covered by the enclosed report was made as a result of representations made to the local Servicios Sanitarios Coordinados by Mr. Salvador C. PENA, Treasury Representative assigned to the American Embassy, Mexico, D.F. The originals of the documents enclosed herewith were delivered to this Consulate by Dr. Casimiro VALLADARES PINEDA, Chief of the Servicios Sanitarios Coordinados, Durango, and this office transmitted them to the Treasury Representative mentioned through the Embassy. It will be noted from the report submitted by Inspectors Juan Francisco CURIEL and Miguel Onesimo CALDERON that the 10th Military Zone, with headquarters in the city of Durango ordered Lieutenant Colonel of Cavalry Romulo Soto BURCIACA, stationed at Tepehuanes, to accompany the inspectors designated by Servicios Sanitarios Coordinados, Juan Francisco Curiel and his assistant, Miguel Onesimo Calderon, to the region where it was reported there were plantings of poppy for the purpose of destroy- ing them. Lieutenant Colonel Burciaga took a squad of 23 soldiers with him. It will be noted further from the report that there was -a delay of one day in the expedition getting started from Tepehuanes. Whether the pretextoffered for the delay was legitimate or not it, is-nof known, but it is stated in the report that the people of these -Villages had been notified two days previous to their arrival that government employees were on their way. Although it cannot be verified, it is not improbable that the poppy growers were in- formed from Durango of pending arrival of forces to destroy ......armar??????????..,..11=1. Opium Poppy De: their fields parted from It will alsc lack of coop( destination, were almost several perst Ramon GAN The enclo: assisted in t Valladares P: in the destru squad was g the natives fi that the reas to poppy we: Lieutenant women the n Valladares fu him that the are afraid th may come in stated that if to destroy p( to send insp that his loci being murd( The EXCI published ar Rodolfo LO./ Mazatlan, Si assassinated /grown in th( claim that ( published in of the local i The area v the Chief of extent, and s is practically npriaccifiari in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25 CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 APPENDIX thack almost due ke extending from d to the right of a rid about half way - in the heart of the reach. In fact the.. -se or Mule back. uneducated and.. E..ry low. It will be the poppy plant- the fact that the Le state is in small ? ins. The pictures of the terrain in rt was made as a rvicios Sanitarios y Representative 1 The originals of to this Consulate f of the Servicios transmitted them h the Embassy. Inspectors Juan )ERON that the city of Durango Dto BURCIAGA, .ctorS designated co Curiel and his on where it was rpose of destroy- ad of 23 soldiers that there was a .orn Tepehuanes. ;itimate or not it people of these heir arrival that igh it cannot be -owers were in.: 'Drees to destroy Opium Poppy Destruction in Mexico. 1944 . . 207 their fields prior to the time the inspector and.. his assitant de- ' parted from' 'this, city: ? ** ? ?i '`?? ? ? ?It-Wilrals-9 be noted that the report of the inspector mentions a lack of cooperation on the part of the people along the trail to their -destination, and upon their arrival at the villages mentioned they were almost depopulated. Although statements were taken from several persons, including principally women, but one individual, Ramon GAMIZ, was arrested and brought into Durango. The enclosed photographs will show that but one or two soldiers assisted in the destruction of the poppy fields. Doctor Casimiro Valladares Pineda explained that the reason so few troops assisted in the destruction of these plantings was because thelalance.ofthe squad was guarding those who were working in order to_prevent the natives from ambushing them. Doctor Valladares stated further that the reason that some of the women whose lands were planted to poppy were not arrested and brought into Durango was because Lieutenant Colonel BuzsAAga was afraid that if he arrested-these women the natives would ambush the troops along the trail. Doctor Valladares further stated that his inspector and assistant informed him thatthey_would not malce another trip to that section. They are afraid that some of those whose poppy fields were destroyed may come into Durango and assassinate them. The Doctor further staailiat if he is ordered to send inspectors to that section again to destroy poppy plantations, he will ask the Federal Government to send inspectors from Mexico City for that special _purpose, so, that his local inspectors will not be subject to the possibilities of being murdered in the city of Durango. The EXCELSIOR, one of the principal Mexico City dailies, published an article a short time ago to the effect that Governor Rodolfo LOAIZA, of the State of Sinaloa, which [sic] occurred in Mazatlan, Sinaloa, Mexico, during the Carnival last Feburary was assassinated by individuals belonging to a ring handling opium grown in the State of Sinaloa in the vicinity of Badiraguato who claim that Governor Loaiza double crossed them. That notice published in the paper has created even a greater fear in the minds of the local inspectors of the Servicios Sanitarios Coordinados. The area visited by the inspectors making the enclosed report to the Chief of Servicios Sanitarios Coordinados is but a few miles in extent, and since the terrain of the entire western part of this State is practically the same as that in which opium poppy was being , r?-? ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 , ; a ? ? / 2 -- 208 APPENDIX grown, and as considerable plantings of this poppy have been destroyed in the vicinity of Badiraguato, Sinaloa, located to the. 'West of the blantings in this State, and since that section is quite isolated, it is not improbable that there may be other plantings in that district which have not been reported. ? - It is difficult to arrive from the report of Doctor Valladares at the exact acreage?of poppy planting destroyed by the inspectors., but it. appears that the acreage destroyed, and already harvested prior to their arrival, amounted to approximately 232 hectares (1 hectare equals 2.47 acres), or 573.04 acres which is quite a sizeable acreage planted to this drug producing plant. ? ? - It will be noted from some of the enclosed reports that a part of the poppy plantings visited by the inspectors mentioned above had already been harvested when the inspectors arrived. It has been learned that opium poppy is planted in the district around Metates during the month of October. In order to prevent plantings from maturing it appears_necessaryt at a 1- I Wori Fie Ws t that section Three times a year; one time in EiFeeTribei'-''?aftei: the plants planted l'i-aTie-had time to come up and begin growing, another time in, Veb?ruary?so- as to destroy a second planting;_and_another_time g the latter part of April in order to destroy anylelds which may have been missed on the two previous_trips. This Consulate has been informed through the correspondent which first reported the existence of opium poppy to the Federal Health Department, Mexico City, whose name is mentioned in Doctor Valladares' report, that a Major Gorgonio ACUNA, as- signed to the 9th Military Zone with headquarters at Culiacan, Sinaloa, and who is a native of Metates, is the go-between for the growers and the purehasers for the opium which finds an outlet on the west coast. It was further reported that Major Acuna is associ- ated with an American, name not known, who purchases for 1,000 pesos per kilogram (1 kilogratn equals 2.2046 pounds) all the opium which finds an outlet to the west coast, and that this American smuggles the opium into Los Angeles. As stated above, the name of this American is not known, but it is reported that Major Gor- gonio Acuna acts as his go-between with the producers, so he can disclose the name of this party, if he can be made to talk. It is also reported that this American visits Mazatlan quite frequently. It is further reported that he advances money to the producers of opium in Sinaloa and Durango with which to clear additional lands for Opium Poppy Desi planting to pc the district IT. GUanacevi, r It is believ the inspect?r sive evidence extensive sea) real effort wa fact that it w: district, a pa that the groN these authori and quite po which these i As a precax to the Amen. office to the Respectfully E. W. Eaton American Vic Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 - Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8 APPENDIX poppy have been m, located to the at section is quite other plantings in T Valladares at the - inspectors, but it harvested prior to , ectares (1 hectare a sizeable acreage )orts that a part of ntioned above had ived. It has been et around Metates !nt plantings from visit that section the plants planted g; another time in and another time y any fields which ,s. he correspondent py to the Federal 3 is mentioned in mio ACUNA, as- rters at Culiacan, o-between for the finds an outlet on )r Acuna is associ- urchases for 1,000 nds) all the opium lat this American above, the name that Major Gor- ducers, so he can e to talk. It is also e frequently. It is roducers of opium Iditional lands for Opium Poppy Destruction in Mexico. 1944 209 planting to poppy. It appears that a part of the opium produced in the district mentioned finds its way to the United States through Guanacevi, Durangci; Parral, Chihuahua; and El Paso, Texas. It is believed that the enclosed copies of reports submitted by the inspector of Servicios Sanitarios Coordinados present conclu- sive evidence that opium poppy has been cultivated on a somewhat extensive scale in the immediate district visited, but that but little real effort was made to break up the ring of producers. Due to the fact that it was late in the season when these officials visited that district, a part of the crop had already been harvested. The fact that the growers were tipped off two days before the arrival of these authorities indicates that they have lookouts in Tepehuanes, and quite possibly in the city of Durango in the same office to which these inspectors pertain. As a precaution for greater safety, this report is being forwarded to the American Embassy, Mexico, D.F. for transmission by that office to the Department by courier. Respectfully yours, E. W Eaton American Vice Consul Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/25: CIA-RDP98-01394R000200090001-8