WHITE HOUSE BRIEFING ON SALT II

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP98S00099R000501010024-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 1, 2012
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: May 25, 1979
• Content Type: MEMO

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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/01 CIA-RDP98S00099R000501010024-7
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NFAC 2782-79
25 May 1979
FROM
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
SUBJECT White House Briefing on SALT II
1. Action Requested: None; for information only.
2. On 22 May 1979, I attended a luncheon and briefing
at the White House on SALT II at the invitation of Anne Wexler.
Attending were about 100 men and women from different backgrounds,
including former State and Defense officials, business executives,
industrialists, clergymen, educators, leaders of patriotic
organizations, retired military, and the like. (Examples--
Messrs. Packard, Rush, Ailes, and Pace, Ambassador Lodge,
Admirals Moorer, Burke, and Raborn, Generals Decker, Walt, and
Cushman, Chairman of the Board for General Motors and for
J.C. Penney.) The Deputy Director, ACDA and the DoD Arms Control
representative were also present.
3. After lunch the briefing was conducted by Mr. Zbigniew
Brzezinski, who presented a historical overview, to include
SALT I; the negotiating history of SALT II; an explanation of
the Treaty, protocol, and statement of principles for SALT III;
a discussion of the verification problem; and expanded on the
reasons why SALT II should be ratified. The briefing and
following question period lasted about one hour.
a. His theme was that strategic arms limitation
was the central issue of US foreign policy, deeply rooted
in US-Soviet relations. He stated that SALT II met the
four main US negotiating objectives, namely (1) cap the
offensive strategic nuclear arms race; (2) seek equal
aggregates in delivery vehicles by end 1981; (3) impose
some qualitative limitations; and (4) achieve the first
agreed reduction in numbers of vehicles.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/01 : CIA-RDP98S00099R000501010024-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/01: CIA-RDP98S00099R000501010024-7
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Subject: White House Briefing on SALT II
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b. With respect to verification, he admitted that
several months might elapse before we discovered any
Soviet violations, but that this was not significant,
because it was "totally impossible" for the Soviets to
achieve any strategic advantage either for (1) political
blackmail purposes, or (2) actual war-fighting capability.
c. He stressed that SALT 11 enhances strategic
stability, predictability, and equality with respect to
the two nuclear super powers; that with SALT II, neither
side will be able to blackmail the other; and that the
agreement will give the United States a measure of
confidence in determining what strategic nuclear forces
the Soviet Union will possess in 1985. He noted that
it would end neither the arms race nor political
competition, and that's why we need SALT III.
d. In the question period, he discussed the relation-
ship of the aborted Vladivostok agreement and SALT II,
the rationale behind the qualitative limitations, and
the telemetry encryption problem. In response to one
question, he indicated that any proposed changes or
amendments to any part of the agreement would not be
acceptable to the Soviets.
e. It was a forceful, no-nonsense presentation.
4. The President then joined the group and took the podium,
speaking for about 20 minutes and then fielding questions. The
session lasted about one hour. In the first 5 minutes, the
press and TV networks were present.
a. The President dwelled on his firm belief that
SALT II was a good agreement that was not only in the
best interests of the United States and the Soviet Union,
but also the whole world. He discussed SALT in the
context of arms control negotiations across the whole
spectrum of conflict and stressed the relationship between
SALT and nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. He stated
ilia bride in the success of his nonproliferation policy,
poi-.titig out that in the absence of such a policy, ten
to twel,e nations, including South Africa, might now be
ntteleaf powers or on the verge of becoming one. Pakistan
and India ware also cited as specific examples of positive
Afefiddt nonproliferation policy actions.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/01 : CIA-RDP98S00099R000501010024-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/01 : CIA-RDP98S00099R000501010024-7
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Subject: White House Briefing on SALT II
b. He painted the dire consequences of rejection of
the agreement, declaring that it would "weaken the whole
fabric of the Free World" and force an accommodation with
the East, and give the Soviet Union an enormous propaganda
advantage as a peace-loving nation.
c. Pointing out the agreement was not negotiated in
a vacuum, he described the close and constant consultation
that has gone on with the Congress, State, and Defense.
He also emphasized that SALT II had the support of the
JCS and that all our allies were in favor of it. The
outcome of the issue in the United States, however, was
in doubt, he noted, and he therefore needed our help,
hoping that we would play a dynamic, active role in
"accurately acquainting" the people in general and the
US Senate in particular.
d. Most of the question period focused on verification,
reaction in the Senate, and his coming Summit with Brezhnev.
e. On verification, the President stated that the
"experts" were "absolutely convinced" that there was "no
way" that the Soviets could cheat and get away with it.
He said he will consult with Brezhnev on the use of third
country territory for verification purposes and discussed
some of the implications.
f. Some Senators, he said, were out of date and were
not fully informed on the details of the agreement, while
others simply did not trust the Russians. He could not
predict the outcome of the Senate debate, stating that
amendments to the Treaty or protocol would be tantamount
to rejection, as the whole agreement would have to be
renegotiated. He added, however, that a change in the
principles for SALT III might be accepted.
g. His reiterated theme was that the moral, peaceful
United States, the champion of human rights, will prevail
in any competition with the Soviet Union, and that morally,
religiously, and spiritually we were obviously superior
td the Soviets.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/01: CIA-RDP98S00099R000501010024-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/01 CIA-RDP98S00099R000501010024-7.
Subject: White House Briefing on SALT II
h. On the question of who was number one militarily,
he quoted the JCS as stating we were number one now, but
the long term balance was worrisome. He sketched US and
Soviet military forces, bringing out some of the asymmetries
and special Soviet problems such as China and the reliability
of their Warsaw Pact allies. He stated that we can outperform
the Soviet Union in an arms race, but that it was unnecessary.
i. He ended up with a brief discussion of his forthcoming
Summit with Brehznev, stating that he intended to take up
conventional arms control, to include MBFR and arms trade
limitations in Africa, and control of antisatellite systems.
j. The President was articulate, and his sincerity
and spirited manner was impressive.
Distribution:
Orig - DCI
1 - DD C I
1 - ER
1 - DD/NFA
1 NFAC Reg
1 - PBC
2 - SRP
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/01 : CIA-RDP98S00099R000501010024-7