INTERVIEW WITH WILLIAM E. COLBY DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
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K
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37
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December 22, 2016
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May 11, 2012
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46
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Publication Date: 
October 31, 1974
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 INTERVIEW WITH WILLIAM E. COLBY DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Washington, D. C. "U.S.News & World Report" October 31, 1974 Q Mr. Colby, many people around the world question the moral right of the CIA to spy on friendly countries, as I opposed to countries that are potential enemies of the U.S. How do you answer that? A It comes right down to the concept of state sovereignty and the right of a country to protect itself. That includes the right to carry out such operations in the world as are believed necessary for self-protection. I think that mor l- ists over the years have accepted some degree of clandest ne work as part of the normal relationship between states. any case, is spying any less moral than developing weapon systems, or many of the other things that nations do in t eir self-interest? Q How do you decide whether to operate in a friendly, or neutral, country? A The decision concerning any intelligence operation is determined by the answer to four questions: What is the Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 1vv- y? V - ~ 1 befit being sought? What is the risk of exposure? What is the impact of exposure? And how much does it cost? In certain situations, you don't have to conduct clan- estine operations to get the information you are after. o you're foolish if you run the risks and absorb the cost of ordering a clandestine mission. Obviously, in a frien country the adverse impact of exposure is going to be very eat. So that is a very negative factor. But there will e some situations in sane parts of the world where a well onceived, low-risk operation is necessary to get at some- hing terribly important. What about covert operations like the one the CIA con- ucted in Chile before the overthrow of the Allende regime k Again, it's a matter of the United States taking a de- Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 COLBY IvU - 3 cision that a certain course of action is important in th~ best interest of this country. There have been exposures before. The Bay of pigs operation against Cuba, of course., is a notable example. Q Do you, as the Director of the CIA, decide that a cove t operation-such as against Chile should be conducted? No, these decisions are very carefully structured. The authority for these operations stems from the National Security Act. This says that the CIA will carry out such other functions and duties -- beyond the gathering of in- telligence -- as the National Security Council may direct from time to time. Furthermore, we explain to congressional subcommittees how we use the funds that are appropriated annually for t IA. We have no secrets as far as these subcommittees are concerned. We answer everything that they ask. I don't escribe each operation but if a member of a subcommittee Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 coLBYIW -4 asks what we are doing in any particular country I'll giv him a fair picture. Q Who actually makes the decision that a covert operati should be undertaken? A The actual operation is approved by a policy committee of the National Security Council -- the Forty Committee. If there is concern about the situation in some country, we go look at it. and see what we could do that would help implement national policy. Then we go up to the Nationale Security Council and say, "Here is what we think we can d to carry out a general policy of defending ourselves and improving our position with regard to that country." If our proposal is approved, we go ahead and carry it out. I'm not suggesting that the CIA in any way has been pushed or shoved in undertaking actions of this sort. Is clandestine activity the major element in CIA activity -- even in these days of detente? Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 COLBY IVU - 5 A To get the answer to that question, we have to stand back and examine what United States intelligence includes It includes what is called "the Community" -- embracing the intelligence services of the Army, Navy and Air Force the Defense Intelligence Agency, the FBI, intelligence units in State, Treasury and the Atomic Energy Commission. All of these agencies collaborate on the intelligence job. fter all, intelligence consists essentially of the collect- ion of information -- by overt and covert means -- the ass ss-- ment of all this information and deriving conclusions and judgments about the world from these assessments. In 1971, President Nixon said that the Director of Central Intelligence should take a leadership role in this whole effort. And I've tried to do this. Essentially I have four jobs. One of my jobs is to be head of the intelligence "com- munity." I don't have authority over these other agencie Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 COLBY IVU - 6 but I do have certain influence on them because of my re- sponsibility ponsibility to report on what they are doing and other powers I have. A second job is the running of the Agency -- the CIA. Third, I have to be substantively informed about situatio around the world so that I can participate in National Security Council meetings. Fourth is the job of acting a a kind of public spokesman and handling problems like our recent troubles. Now, to get back to your question: By reason of the w the "community" is structured, clandestine activity does represent a considerable percentage of CIA's activity. But if you measure that against the whole of the intelli~ "C .unity," it's a rather small percentage of the total "community" effort. Has detente changed the character of your work or redu he need for clandestine intelligence? Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 COLBY IVU - 7 A I wish it would. If you get to the logical end of detente then logically we would have established a relation- ship of mutual trust and collaboration in the world with the Soviet Union. This, in turn, would encourage the Soy ets and convince them that they ought to be more open with th it information. But that's not the situation now. Unfortunately today the Soviet attaches can go to almo t any newsstand in this country, pick up a copy of a techni a aviation magazine and from it learn a vast amount of deta 1 about our weapons system. Unfortunately we have to spend hundreds of millions of dollars to get that kind of info tion about the Soviet Union. We couldn't satisfactorily fulfill our responsibilities unless we did spend those m lions of dollars on clandestine gathering of useful infor mation. Q There is growing pressure for the CIA to restrict itself to the collection of foreign intelligence such as you've Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 ust described, and abandon your covert operations -- that is., aiming at the overthrow of governments. How do you re ct to that idea? The nation would not collapse if the CIA tonight were of permitted to conduct covert operations any longer. In act, because of a change in policy over the years, we do onsiderably less of these than we did during the worldwide onfrontation with the Soviets and the expansionist drive of the Communists in the 1950s. And we do considerably ess than during the period in the '60s when we were deali with Communist insurgency and subversion. The detente has ecreased the problem. Consequently we don't do very much e still do some. But covert actions are a very small per, entage of our total effort at the moment. Why is it needed at all? I think there are a number of situations where a little iscreet help to a few friends of the United States or a Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 r- - - 7 1 ittle help to a few people espousing a certain policy or rogram in a certain country can enable us to influence a ocal situation in a way that may avert a greater crisis i he future. So I think the tool is important to preserve o that we can use it if we have to. Do you assume that undercover agents from friendly ountries are operating in the United States? Sure, I do. The fact is that the FBI has captured a umber in the past. You have to recognize that in dealing ith a lot of countries around the world it's accepted tha e all engage in this kind of clandestine gathering of in- elligence. Nobody gets emotional about it. It's been g ng on since Moses sent a man from each tribe to spy out he Land of Canaan. There has been some comment that budget cutbacks have Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 hurt intelligence gathering to the point where Secretary of State Kissinger goes into talks with the Russians with inadequate information. Is there any truth in that? A We obviously are suffering budgetary pressures from the inflation problem. I think we are still giving a very go intelligence product to our Government. I have great con fidence in it. There have been some things that we have turned down because they were totally out of reach in terms of financial commitments involved. These have been in the category of things that would have really made our intelli- gence more complete but I don't think that it has dropped elow a danger line at this point. I don't think it has im- periled our ability to negotiate at the moment. However, we do have a problem coming up because of the inflationary squeeze as we project ahead a few years. We've tried to respond to this by focusing our effort on the more important things and dropping off the thing that we may h e Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 58 needed in a different world. Q Where have you been able to cut back? A Luckily, today we are not required to maintain the sea e of effort that we did in past times in Southeast Asia, fo example. Our problems in some of the other parts of the world are really a lot more manageable than they were when we were deeply concerned about the situation in a large numb (r of countries that were under pressure of Communist subver sion or insurgency. The impact on the world balance coul have been quite substantially affected if any one country had made a very substantial change in political direction Today, I think the world balance is a little more stable. The real challenge for intelligence is to provide the kind of information that enables us to negotiate and enables us to anticipate future developments in a lot of countries that would be of great importance to us. Obviously, the subject of economics has become important in the past few Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 OLBY I VU - 12 1 ears. Twenty years ago -- even 10 years ago -- this was largely handled on the side as not much of an intelligence problem. Terrorism has become a problem to us. The nar- otics problem has grown in the past few years. But other ituations correspondingly have declined and we've been ab to compensate. Mr. Colby, the CIA has been widely criticized for its involvement in Watergate The CIA did two wrong things in the Watergate affair. he first was providing Howard Hunt paraphernalia for use n his work for the White House. The second was making vailable to White House employes the psychological profil f Daniel E]lsberg. They weren't earthshaking errors, but they were wrong. We know we shouldn't have done it and we ve told our employes that we won't do it again. If someone called today from the White House and asked he CIA to do something improper, what could you do about Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 ~OLBY IVU - 13 1 (Mr. Colby: Please supply date.) Well, that's very clear. In Syr confirmation hearing I said that if I was ordered to do some- ping improper beyond my authority, I would resign. That' asy. Also our employes have been instructed that if ther is any question at all about anything that they are being asked to do they are supposed to come to me. My contentio s that if anybody really tried to misuse the CIA at this point the organization would explode from inside. It real-Ly ould. And that's good because it's the only protection e have against this kind of problem. Do you operate at all inside the United States? We are forbidden by law to engage in any activities af- ecting the internal security of this country. That's pre ty lear. Now what do we do inside the United States? We have large building up on the Potomac River. We obviously have a lot of employes there. In order to know something Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 COLBY IVU - 14 about them before we hire them, we conduct security inves tigations. We also make contracts with people around the country to supply us with things that we can use in our activities abroad. And we sign contracts for research pr S- ects so that we can expand the base of our knowledge. We have a service in our Agency that goes around and talks to American citizens who may have knowledge of some foreign situation that they are willing to share with their Government. We identify ourselves as representatives of the CIA and we assure these Americans that they will be pro- tected as a source. But we don't pay them and we don't con- duct operations to obtain this kind of intelligence in the United States except to the extent that it is provided vo - untarily. We also have some support structures in this country for our work abroad. We have business and other relation- ships that make it possible.for some of our people abroad Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 COLBY IVU - 15 to appear to belong to something else rather than the CIA We also collect foreign intelligence from foreigners in America. This is intelligence about foreign countries an has nothing to do with protecting the internal security o this country against those foreigners. That is the job o. the FBI. Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 IOLBYIW-16 1 A number of Congressmen complain that there is no effec'- ive control over the CIA. Is there any reason why your gency shouldn't be subjected to tighter supervision? I think we have responded to Congress's right and desir to know about the details of our activities over the years in the form that Congress itself has arranged. Now, the rrangements we have with our oversight committee in Con- ress is a lot more intense today than in past years. Twe ty ars ago all of this was considered a very secret affair. oday it's much more open. That's the way Congress wants it and we are responding. Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 DOLBY IVU - 17 , Mr. Colby, do you feel the effectiveness of the CIA is impaired by all the publicity you've been getting lately %bout secret operations? Obviously this has raised questions among some of our oreign friends about the degree to which we can keep Be- rets. Leading officials of foreign governments who are oncerned about this have brought it up in discussions wit e. We have had some individuals who have worked with us in various parts of the world who have indicated a disin- lination to work with us any longer because of the very eal dangers to them of exposure. In that respect, we have been hurt a little. But fr like the way our society runs. I think it is perhaps ique that the chief of intelligence has to be exposed, a Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 . ...........?...,,.......? ...~ -..., _,....._,, .. .,mod. ..,... _. ._ .-..-~._.__..._.. _ _..._ _.__..._ . .__ Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 ICOLBY IW - 18 he is in America. But I think America gains a great deal 58 of strength from it. How do these leaks affect morale at your agency? You have to draw a distinction between leaks that lead to criticism of our programs and policies and leaks that expose our people. I think that we can and should stand up to the criticism. But the tendency to expose our people can be very difficult and also very dangerous. You will recall Mr. Mitrione,who was killed in Uruguay. LDan Mit one, a U.S. police official assigned to train police in Uruguay as kidnaped and killed by the Tupamaro guerrilla on Aug t 10, 1970 He was murdered -- that's the only word for it. He was alleged to have been a CIA officer, which he was n t. I think it is reckless to go around naming people as bei g identified with the CIA. Q Why can't you prevent former CIA. officials from publis - ing books that reveal secrets of your agency and the name Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 COLBY IVU - 19 of secret agents? A There are criminal penalties for people who reveal in- cane-tax returns or census returns or even cotton statis- tics. But there are no criminal penalties for people who reveal the name of an intelligence officer or agent or an intelligence secret. I just think that's wrong. I am charged in the National Security Act with the pro tection of intelligence sources and methods from unauthor ized disclosure. But the only tool I have is a secrecy agreement that we have our people sign as a condition of employment. We have invoked this. agreement against one o our ex-employes who wrote a book. We are currently engag d in a battle -- a civil action -- in the courts to determi e whether we really can enforce it. I have made recommenda- tions that would make it possible for us to protect Intel ligence secrets more effectively. These recommendations would apply only to those of us who voluntarily sign an Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 COLBY IVU - 20 agreement that gives us access to these secrets. Q Mr. Colby, can we get back to the question of the nece - sity for the United States to maintain a big secret intel- ligence operation in an era of detente? A Yes -- I didn't fully reply to that. I feel it is es- sential to the protection of our country, not only in the military sense but also in the sense of protecting us aga nst the other kinds of problems we face overseas -- economic pressures, problems that can start in various parts of th world and eventually involve us. Through our intelligent work we are able to anticipate these problems. For example, if you don't know that another country is developing a par- ticular threat, you can be caught very badly off base. Beyond that, our intelligence work makes it possible t engage in negotiations. The SALT agreement between U.S. and Russia on nuclear arms limitation is the most obvious example. Without the knowledge we had of Soviet weapons Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 through our intelligence activities it would not have bee possible for us to negotiate. We also have what I would call a peacekeeping role. On a number of occasions, we have seen situations develop ing in a dangerous manner. By alerting our Government in good time, it has been possible to defuse these situations. What part do spy satellites and other forms of modern echnology play in your work of collecting intelligence? Quite frankly, technical intelligence has revolutionize he intelligence business. You have seen the photographs that came out of the U-2 operation over the Soviet Union. e now have similar photos on many different areas of the orld. You can realize the great importance of this devel pment if you think back to the great debate in 1960 about he missile gap. People took up strong positions on both ides and we at the CIA were trying to determine what real as happening -- whether a missile gap actually was openin Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 COLEY IVU - 22 I p in favor of the Soviet Union. Today it would be impos- ible to have that debate because the facts are known. hey are right out there flat and very easy to see. This kind of technical intelligence has made the SALT agreement possible. For years we insisted that any arms greement would require inspection teams to monitor on the round what the Russians were doing. Given their closed ociety, they wouldn't permit it. That stalled-negotiatio or years. Today we can make an agreement and I can tell he President and Congress that we can monitor,it without n-site inspection teams. Some people argue that these satellites and other forms Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 COLBY IVU - 23 of technical intelligence can do the whole job and that there is no longer any real need for clandestine agents ferreting out information. Do you agree with that? A Not at all. It's true that in closed societies like t e Soviet Union technical systems can tell us to a great ex- tent what is there. But they can't tell us what is going to be there in three or four years' time because of deci- sions that are being made in a board room in Moscow today They can't tell us the political dynamics of a situation and allow us to assess how it is changing. And they can' tell us the intentions of people who may be bent on decei - ing us. Intelligence of this sort can be obtained only by what we call "clandestine collection." Q Looking at Russia's intelligence operation -- the KGB - how does it compare with ours in scale and effectiveness? A I think Soviet intelligence is going through a change - a good change. For years the big thrust was on stealing e- crets. You remember the atom spies in America and Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 COLBY IVU - 24+ all that sort of thing. But in the past few years they have become more aware of the significance of assessment - the analysis function of intelligence. They've set up in- stitutes to study us, realizing that the facts really are easy to obtain in America. The problem is assessing what we might do, which in itself is a terribly complicated and difficult intelligence problem. Q Are you suggesting that the KGB no longer maintains spies in this country? A Oh, they do -- sure, they do. What I am saying is that they have moved from total dependence on espionage to greater reliance on other sources and other ways of collecting an assessing intelligence. You can only say that's a change for the good. But the Soviets still run very extensive covert opera- tions around the world. In any kind of foreign mission they send abroad -- for example, delegations to internati nal Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 COLBY IW - 25 organizations -- there always will be KGB people or people from GRU, their military intelligence. They also conduct a long-term program of training people and putting them i place under false identities to stay for many years. Co]. nel Abel was an example of that. They have the benefit, of course, of indirect support from a variety of Communist parties around the world. Q The Director of the FBI said the other day that there now are so many Soviet spies in America that he is having trouble trailing them. Why do we let so many in? A We let them in as diplomats or in some other capacity. You have to realize that there has been a very large increase in the number of Soviet citizens in the United States, as compared with 10 years ago -- partly a result of detente. Now, if you get an increase in Soviet citizens in this country you inevitably are going to get an increase in Soviet agents because of the role that the intelligence Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 CoLBY IVU - 26 apparatus plays in their society. You see, in the Soviet Union the intelligence service is a very, very powerful institution because of its responsi- bilities for internal security as well as foreign intelli gence. They have, in effect, merged the CIA and FBI. An their intelligence service carries a very high degree of responsibility for party discipline and public discipline Consequently, the KGB has institutional power that is qui e a lot stronger than ours. I'm glad to say that our domes- tic influence is far weaker. (END INTERVIEW) Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 1 - Colby The massive flow of information pouring in to Washingt~, requires William Colby, as Director of Intelligence, to m ke constant evaluations of fresh global developments bearing on U.S. interests. The following, in his own words, is the appraisal Mr. Colby gave the editors of "U.S.News & World Report" of tensions around the world, what they mean, what they cowl lead to and the possible impact on the superpowers. (space) Strategic balance: U.S. vs. Russia. "The Soviets are mbarking on deployment of new missile systems that obvio - y will increase their strategic power considerably. But we do not see that in the foreseeable future they will have dominance over us. We have both reached the poi it here we can destroy each other and the rest of the world, and they know it. "You ask if the transfer of American technology to the Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 P - Colby oviets is a matter of concern. "We know that military purposes are a very high priority n Soviet decision-making. We do have procedures that put limitations on things of direct military value. And they ave a problem of adapting technology which in our way of oing things works because of the competitive system. That is a problem they've got to do some adjusting to. "The Soviets are, of course, far behind us technologica ly. hey are able to challenge us in arms competition by takin much more disciplined approach and putting in their major alent -- particularly talent. One very interesting thing is to compare the Soviet military work in space with the oviet civilian work in space. There is an obvious quali- ative difference between the two. The military work is uch, much better." (space) Detente: Why Soviets want it. "There are three main Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 3 - Colby reasons for Soviet interest in promoting detente with the United States. "First, they obviously want to prevent the kind of hor en- dous confrontation that is possible in this age of super- eapons. The idea of a military exchange between us is just so incredible now that even they realize that something has to be done to avoid it. "Secondly, they do insist that they be recognized as ore of the world's two superpowers and get the status that their strength entitles them to. "Thirdly, they would like to accelerate their development in economic and technical terms, because as they look at his enormous power of the West -- America particularly, but also the other countries -- they see it moving at a tremendous rate and they hope to benefit by a greater degr e of exchange and participation in that movement. "The Soviet agreement to liberalize emigration policies Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 4 - Colby s something that gets very close to the bone on Soviet ecisions. But it obviously was a matter of great imports to American policy and had to be handled in some fashion. "Generally, the Soviet concern over internal discipline is very high. This is partly a result of detente. They are a little nervous about what detente can do in terms of getting new thoughts and new political drives going ithin the Soviet Union. And they just don't want that t a ppen. it Soviet empire: Starting to crumble? "The Soviets face real problem as their satellite states in Eastern Europe how signs of strong dissatisfaction over iron-fisted con- rol from Moscow. The Russians have made it clear that th are not going to brook any substantial break in the Easter; European buffer zone. "But, at the same time, they obviously have the problem of dealing with the new political ideas that are circulati Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 5 - Colby in some of those countries -- including demands for great freedom of action. "The old idea of total Soviet dominance and control is under challenge even from some of the Communist Party lead ers in Eastern Europe." (space) Western Europe: Communist penetration. "One thing th Soviets want to see is Communist participation in the gov- ernments of Western Europe. "This is in line with Communist ideology which says that ollapse of the European free enterprise system is inevitable and that the movement of Communist forces from minority oices to participation will enable the Communists to take over governments and run them. "Obviously, the Communists are playing a role in Portu= al's Government now. They have considerable influence in ther countries by reason of the 25 per cent or 28 per cen f the votes they represent and the difficulties of organising Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 6 - Colby governments among the fragmented parties on the other sid . "I think there's an increase in Communist Party influe ce. But a couple of curves are running: One is the increase in Communist influence and the other is the increased indepe - dence of European Communist parties from Moscow's control It's really a little premature to tell where these curves are going to cross. "We are certainly not saying, "It doesn't matter whether the Communists participate in power.' What I'm saying is that this is a very complicated, multifactored matter to look at. "We've seen evidence of various agents the Communists have had in NATO-related situations. If you get a Communi t Party participating in a government which is a member of TO, you then begin to put political factors into the han - ing of intelligence matters -- and suddenly some of these ecret matters become subjects of political controversy in Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 7 - Colby various NATO countries. This can get very complicated." (space) Sino-Soviet hostility: War isn't imminent. "The Sovi s take a very serious view of China as a danger to them in he long run. Russian concern centers on Chinese missile systems -- strategic systems. They have worked hard on their intelligence about those matters. "But I don't see a war starting in the near future, eve hough there is considerable hostility on both sides of the oviet and Chinese positions -- and there is a gulf betwee hem. This hostility certainly will go on as long as the resent leadership lasts on both sides -- and probably wil of be all that different in the succeeding leaderships. "I don't anticipate a great deal of change in Chinese olicy or Chinese-Soviet policies after Mao Tse-tung and ;,hou En-lai pass from the scene. This goes beyond persona - ities. I think the Chinese feel that they have to defend Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 8 Colby themselves against Soviet influence and that this will cord tinue more or less in those terms. "The Soviets certainly want to avoid any Chinese-Amen i collaboration against them. As they see its the one elem of that equation that they can make some kind of arrange- ent with is America. They really haven't been able to d uch with the Chinese." (s pace) Cuba: Castro's policy now. "Fidel Castro's attempts t export his brand of Communist revolution to other countries of Latin America have diminished greatly. The Cubans have tressed in recent years the development of state-to-state elationships and have tried to get out of the business o eing accused of trying to overthrow everybody. And they' e been quite successful with that new policy. "As for Russia, the Soviets still rate Cuba as a geogra 'c asset, no question about it. It's a very substantial ph- Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 9 -Colby geographic asset, but it's a very costly one to them in terms of the support the Cubans have required over the ye4rs. "Cuba's present activities in Latin America -- stressi state links rather than insurgency links -- are, in gener of long-term use to Soviet interests. But Cuba is not a spearhead of Communist revolution in Latin America." (space) 1, War in Mideast: Quite possible. "Another round of wa between Israel and the Arabs is possible -- quite possibl . "It depends on whether the U.S. can reconstruct peace- making diplomacy and get that going. Obviously, the Raba summit meeting at which Arab leaders named the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole legitimate representative of Palestinians living on Arab land held by Israel puts a new factor in it. "As for the Soviet role: They do have a desire to play the role of a major power, particularly in the Middle East,- Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 10 - Colby ern area. They are endeavoring to express that through their naval presence, through their aid programs, through their military aid and so forth. The nature of their pol cy right now is to keep that presence active, keep that caps bility of influencing the situation. But at the same time they have a considerable interest in continuing the deters e program with the United States. "The Soviets have indicated that they would go along with a Mideast peace settlement in which they played a su - stantial role. A settlement would deprive the Soviets of a situation they have been able to exploit -- the Arab- Israeli conflict. But also, at the same time, it would remove a danger that the thing might go off the tracks. They've got to try to go along a rather narrow track with cut abandoning their influence, but, on the other hand, not seeing the whole thing derail. "The Soviets do get a certain amount of benefit from t Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1 11 - Colby economic troubles that afflict the West as a result of th oil problems, but they don't have to do much about that. It's taking place pretty much on its own. "On the other hand, they have to realize that an aggre sive move to cut off oil would have to create a reaction on our side. Certainly it would be a very direct affront to any detente hopes that they have. (END) Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1