INTERVIEW WITH WILLIAM E. COLBY DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 11, 2012
• Sequence Number: 46
• Publication Date: October 31, 1974
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
INTERVIEW WITH WILLIAM E. COLBY
DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Washington, D. C.
"U.S.News & World Report" October 31, 1974
Q Mr. Colby, many people around the world question the
moral right of the CIA to spy on friendly countries, as
I
opposed to countries that are potential enemies of the U.S.
How do you answer that?
A It comes right down to the concept of state sovereignty
and the right of a country to protect itself. That includes
the right to carry out such operations in the world as are
believed necessary for self-protection. I think that mor l-
ists over the years have accepted some degree of clandest ne
work as part of the normal relationship between states.
any case, is spying any less moral than developing weapon
systems, or many of the other things that nations do in t eir
self-interest?
Q How do you decide whether to operate in a friendly, or
neutral, country?
A The decision concerning any intelligence operation is
determined by the answer to four questions: What is the
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
1vv- y? V - ~ 1
befit being sought? What is the risk of exposure? What
is the impact of exposure? And how much does it cost?
In certain situations, you don't have to conduct clan-
estine operations to get the information you are after.
o you're foolish if you run the risks and absorb the cost
of ordering a clandestine mission. Obviously, in a frien
country the adverse impact of exposure is going to be very
eat. So that is a very negative factor. But there will
e some situations in sane parts of the world where a well
onceived, low-risk operation is necessary to get at some-
hing terribly important.
What about covert operations like the one the CIA con-
ucted in Chile before the overthrow of the Allende regime
k Again, it's a matter of the United States taking a de-
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
COLBY IvU - 3
cision that a certain course of action is important in th~
best interest of this country. There have been exposures
before. The Bay of pigs operation against Cuba, of course.,
is a notable example.
Q Do you, as the Director of the CIA, decide that a cove t
operation-such as against Chile should be conducted?
No, these decisions are very carefully structured. The
authority for these operations stems from the National
Security Act. This says that the CIA will carry out such
other functions and duties -- beyond the gathering of in-
telligence -- as the National Security Council may direct
from time to time.
Furthermore, we explain to congressional subcommittees
how we use the funds that are appropriated annually for t
IA. We have no secrets as far as these subcommittees are
concerned. We answer everything that they ask. I don't
escribe each operation but if a member of a subcommittee
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
coLBYIW -4
asks what we are doing in any particular country I'll giv
him a fair picture.
Q Who actually makes the decision that a covert operati
should be undertaken?
A The actual operation is approved by a policy committee
of the National Security Council -- the Forty Committee.
If there is concern about the situation in some country,
we go look at it. and see what we could do that would help
implement national policy. Then we go up to the Nationale
Security Council and say, "Here is what we think we can d
to carry out a general policy of defending ourselves and
improving our position with regard to that country." If
our proposal is approved, we go ahead and carry it out.
I'm not suggesting that the CIA in any way has been pushed
or shoved in undertaking actions of this sort.
Is clandestine activity the major element in CIA activity
-- even in these days of detente?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
COLBY IVU - 5
A To get the answer to that question, we have to stand
back and examine what United States intelligence includes
It includes what is called "the Community" -- embracing
the intelligence services of the Army, Navy and Air Force
the Defense Intelligence Agency, the FBI, intelligence units
in State, Treasury and the Atomic Energy Commission. All
of these agencies collaborate on the intelligence job.
fter all, intelligence consists essentially of the collect-
ion of information -- by overt and covert means -- the ass ss--
ment of all this information and deriving conclusions and
judgments about the world from these assessments.
In 1971, President Nixon said that the Director of Central
Intelligence should take a leadership role in this whole
effort. And I've tried to do this. Essentially I have
four jobs.
One of my jobs is to be head of the intelligence "com-
munity." I don't have authority over these other agencie
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
COLBY IVU - 6
but I do have certain influence on them because of my re-
sponsibility ponsibility to report on what they are doing and other
powers I have.
A second job is the running of the Agency -- the CIA.
Third, I have to be substantively informed about situatio
around the world so that I can participate in National
Security Council meetings. Fourth is the job of acting a
a kind of public spokesman and handling problems like our
recent troubles.
Now, to get back to your question: By reason of the w
the "community" is structured, clandestine activity does
represent a considerable percentage of CIA's activity.
But if you measure that against the whole of the intelli~
"C
.unity," it's a rather small percentage of the total
"community" effort.
Has detente changed the character of your work or redu
he need for clandestine intelligence?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
COLBY IVU - 7
A I wish it would. If you get to the logical end of
detente then logically we would have established a relation-
ship of mutual trust and collaboration in the world with
the Soviet Union. This, in turn, would encourage the Soy ets
and convince them that they ought to be more open with th it
information. But that's not the situation now.
Unfortunately today the Soviet attaches can go to almo t
any newsstand in this country, pick up a copy of a techni a
aviation magazine and from it learn a vast amount of deta 1
about our weapons system. Unfortunately we have to spend
hundreds of millions of dollars to get that kind of info
tion about the Soviet Union. We couldn't satisfactorily
fulfill our responsibilities unless we did spend those m
lions of dollars on clandestine gathering of useful infor
mation.
Q There is growing pressure for the CIA to restrict itself
to the collection of foreign intelligence such as you've
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
ust described, and abandon your covert operations -- that
is., aiming at the overthrow of governments. How do you re
ct to that idea?
The nation would not collapse if the CIA tonight were
of permitted to conduct covert operations any longer. In
act, because of a change in policy over the years, we do
onsiderably less of these than we did during the worldwide
onfrontation with the Soviets and the expansionist drive
of the Communists in the 1950s. And we do considerably
ess than during the period in the '60s when we were deali
with Communist insurgency and subversion. The detente has
ecreased the problem. Consequently we don't do very much
e still do some. But covert actions are a very small per,
entage of our total effort at the moment.
Why is it needed at all?
I think there are a number of situations where a little
iscreet help to a few friends of the United States or a
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
r- - - 7 1
ittle help to a few people espousing a certain policy or
rogram in a certain country can enable us to influence a
ocal situation in a way that may avert a greater crisis i
he future. So I think the tool is important to preserve
o that we can use it if we have to.
Do you assume that undercover agents from friendly
ountries are operating in the United States?
Sure, I do. The fact is that the FBI has captured a
umber in the past. You have to recognize that in dealing
ith a lot of countries around the world it's accepted tha
e all engage in this kind of clandestine gathering of in-
elligence. Nobody gets emotional about it. It's been g
ng on since Moses sent a man from each tribe to spy out
he Land of Canaan.
There has been some comment that budget cutbacks have
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
hurt intelligence gathering to the point where Secretary
of State Kissinger goes into talks with the Russians with
inadequate information. Is there any truth in that?
A We obviously are suffering budgetary pressures from the
inflation problem. I think we are still giving a very go
intelligence product to our Government. I have great con
fidence in it. There have been some things that we have
turned down because they were totally out of reach in terms
of financial commitments involved. These have been in the
category of things that would have really made our intelli-
gence more complete but I don't think that it has dropped
elow a danger line at this point. I don't think it has im-
periled our ability to negotiate at the moment.
However, we do have a problem coming up because of the
inflationary squeeze as we project ahead a few years. We've
tried to respond to this by focusing our effort on the more
important things and dropping off the thing that we may h e
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
58
needed in a different world.
Q Where have you been able to cut back?
A Luckily, today we are not required to maintain the sea e
of effort that we did in past times in Southeast Asia, fo
example. Our problems in some of the other parts of the world
are really a lot more manageable than they were when we
were deeply concerned about the situation in a large numb (r
of countries that were under pressure of Communist subver
sion or insurgency. The impact on the world balance coul
have been quite substantially affected if any one country
had made a very substantial change in political direction
Today, I think the world balance is a little more stable.
The real challenge for intelligence is to provide the
kind of information that enables us to negotiate and enables
us to anticipate future developments in a lot of countries
that would be of great importance to us. Obviously, the
subject of economics has become important in the past few
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
OLBY I VU - 12 1
ears. Twenty years ago -- even 10 years ago -- this was
largely handled on the side as not much of an intelligence
problem. Terrorism has become a problem to us. The nar-
otics problem has grown in the past few years. But other
ituations correspondingly have declined and we've been ab
to compensate.
Mr. Colby, the CIA has been widely criticized for its
involvement in Watergate
The CIA did two wrong things in the Watergate affair.
he first was providing Howard Hunt paraphernalia for use
n his work for the White House. The second was making
vailable to White House employes the psychological profil
f Daniel E]lsberg. They weren't earthshaking errors, but
they were wrong. We know we shouldn't have done it and we
ve told our employes that we won't do it again.
If someone called today from the White House and asked
he CIA to do something improper, what could you do about
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
~OLBY IVU - 13 1
(Mr. Colby: Please
supply date.)
Well, that's very clear. In Syr confirmation hearing
I said that if I was ordered to do some-
ping improper beyond my authority, I would resign. That'
asy. Also our employes have been instructed that if ther
is any question at all about anything that they are being
asked to do they are supposed to come to me. My contentio
s that if anybody really tried to misuse the CIA at this
point the organization would explode from inside. It real-Ly
ould. And that's good because it's the only protection
e have against this kind of problem.
Do you operate at all inside the United States?
We are forbidden by law to engage in any activities af-
ecting the internal security of this country. That's pre ty
lear. Now what do we do inside the United States? We have
large building up on the Potomac River. We obviously
have a lot of employes there. In order to know something
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
COLBY IVU - 14
about them before we hire them, we conduct security inves
tigations. We also make contracts with people around the
country to supply us with things that we can use in our
activities abroad. And we sign contracts for research pr S-
ects so that we can expand the base of our knowledge.
We have a service in our Agency that goes around and
talks to American citizens who may have knowledge of some
foreign situation that they are willing to share with their
Government. We identify ourselves as representatives of
the CIA and we assure these Americans that they will be pro-
tected as a source. But we don't pay them and we don't con-
duct operations to obtain this kind of intelligence in the
United States except to the extent that it is provided vo -
untarily.
We also have some support structures in this country
for our work abroad. We have business and other relation-
ships that make it possible.for some of our people abroad
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
COLBY IVU - 15
to appear to belong to something else rather than the CIA
We also collect foreign intelligence from foreigners in
America. This is intelligence about foreign countries an
has nothing to do with protecting the internal security o
this country against those foreigners. That is the job o.
the FBI.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
IOLBYIW-16 1
A number of Congressmen complain that there is no effec'-
ive control over the CIA. Is there any reason why your
gency shouldn't be subjected to tighter supervision?
I think we have responded to Congress's right and desir
to know about the details of our activities over the years
in the form that Congress itself has arranged. Now, the
rrangements we have with our oversight committee in Con-
ress is a lot more intense today than in past years. Twe ty
ars ago all of this was considered a very secret affair.
oday it's much more open. That's the way Congress wants
it and we are responding.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
DOLBY IVU - 17 ,
Mr. Colby, do you feel the effectiveness of the CIA is
impaired by all the publicity you've been getting lately
%bout secret operations?
Obviously this has raised questions among some of our
oreign friends about the degree to which we can keep Be-
rets. Leading officials of foreign governments who are
oncerned about this have brought it up in discussions wit
e. We have had some individuals who have worked with us
in various parts of the world who have indicated a disin-
lination to work with us any longer because of the very
eal dangers to them of exposure.
In that respect, we have been hurt a little. But fr
like the way our society runs. I think it is perhaps
ique that the chief of intelligence has to be exposed, a
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
 . ...........?...,,.......? ...~ -..., _,....._,, .. .,mod. ..,... _. ._ .-..-~._.__..._.. _ _..._ _.__..._ . .__
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
ICOLBY IW - 18
he is in America. But I think America gains a great deal
58
of strength from it.
How do these leaks affect morale at your agency?
You have to draw a distinction between leaks that lead
to criticism of our programs and policies and leaks that
expose our people. I think that we can and should stand
up to the criticism. But the tendency to expose our people
can be very difficult and also very dangerous. You will
recall Mr. Mitrione,who was killed in Uruguay. LDan Mit one,
a U.S. police official assigned to train police in Uruguay
as kidnaped and killed by the Tupamaro guerrilla on Aug t
10, 1970 He was murdered -- that's the only word for it.
He was alleged to have been a CIA officer, which he was n t.
I think it is reckless to go around naming people as bei g
identified with the CIA.
Q Why can't you prevent former CIA. officials from publis -
ing books that reveal secrets of your agency and the name
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
COLBY IVU - 19
of secret agents?
A There are criminal penalties for people who reveal in-
cane-tax returns or census returns or even cotton statis-
tics. But there are no criminal penalties for people who
reveal the name of an intelligence officer or agent or an
intelligence secret. I just think that's wrong.
I am charged in the National Security Act with the pro
tection of intelligence sources and methods from unauthor
ized disclosure. But the only tool I have is a secrecy
agreement that we have our people sign as a condition of
employment. We have invoked this. agreement against one o
our ex-employes who wrote a book. We are currently engag d
in a battle -- a civil action -- in the courts to determi e
whether we really can enforce it. I have made recommenda-
tions that would make it possible for us to protect Intel
ligence secrets more effectively. These recommendations
would apply only to those of us who voluntarily sign an
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
COLBY IVU - 20
agreement that gives us access to these secrets.
Q Mr. Colby, can we get back to the question of the nece -
sity for the United States to maintain a big secret intel-
ligence operation in an era of detente?
A Yes -- I didn't fully reply to that. I feel it is es-
sential to the protection of our country, not only in the
military sense but also in the sense of protecting us aga nst
the other kinds of problems we face overseas -- economic
pressures, problems that can start in various parts of th
world and eventually involve us. Through our intelligent
work we are able to anticipate these problems. For example,
if you don't know that another country is developing a par-
ticular threat, you can be caught very badly off base.
Beyond that, our intelligence work makes it possible t
engage in negotiations. The SALT agreement between U.S.
and Russia on nuclear arms limitation is the most obvious
example. Without the knowledge we had of Soviet weapons
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
through our intelligence activities it would not have bee
possible for us to negotiate.
We also have what I would call a peacekeeping role.
On a number of occasions, we have seen situations develop
ing in a dangerous manner. By alerting our Government in
good time, it has been possible to defuse these situations.
What part do spy satellites and other forms of modern
echnology play in your work of collecting intelligence?
Quite frankly, technical intelligence has revolutionize
he intelligence business. You have seen the photographs
that came out of the U-2 operation over the Soviet Union.
e now have similar photos on many different areas of the
orld. You can realize the great importance of this devel
pment if you think back to the great debate in 1960 about
he missile gap. People took up strong positions on both
ides and we at the CIA were trying to determine what real
as happening -- whether a missile gap actually was openin
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
COLEY IVU - 22 I
p in favor of the Soviet Union. Today it would be impos-
ible to have that debate because the facts are known.
hey are right out there flat and very easy to see.
This kind of technical intelligence has made the SALT
agreement possible. For years we insisted that any arms
greement would require inspection teams to monitor on the
round what the Russians were doing. Given their closed
ociety, they wouldn't permit it. That stalled-negotiatio
or years. Today we can make an agreement and I can tell
he President and Congress that we can monitor,it without
n-site inspection teams.
Some people argue that these satellites and other forms
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
COLBY IVU - 23
of technical intelligence can do the whole job and that
there is no longer any real need for clandestine agents
ferreting out information. Do you agree with that?
A Not at all. It's true that in closed societies like t e
Soviet Union technical systems can tell us to a great ex-
tent what is there. But they can't tell us what is going
to be there in three or four years' time because of deci-
sions that are being made in a board room in Moscow today
They can't tell us the political dynamics of a situation
and allow us to assess how it is changing. And they can'
tell us the intentions of people who may be bent on decei -
ing us. Intelligence of this sort can be obtained only
by what we call "clandestine collection."
Q Looking at Russia's intelligence operation -- the KGB -
how does it compare with ours in scale and effectiveness?
A I think Soviet intelligence is going through a change -
a good change. For years the big thrust was on stealing e-
crets. You remember the atom spies in America and
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
COLBY IVU - 24+
all that sort of thing. But in the past few years they
have become more aware of the significance of assessment -
the analysis function of intelligence. They've set up in-
stitutes to study us, realizing that the facts really are
easy to obtain in America. The problem is assessing what
we might do, which in itself is a terribly complicated and difficult intelligence problem.
Q Are you suggesting that the KGB no longer maintains spies
in this country?
A Oh, they do -- sure, they do. What I am saying is that
they have moved from total dependence on espionage to greater
reliance on other sources and other ways of collecting an
assessing intelligence. You can only say that's a change
for the good.
But the Soviets still run very extensive covert opera-
tions around the world. In any kind of foreign mission
they send abroad -- for example, delegations to internati nal
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
COLBY IW - 25
organizations -- there always will be KGB people or people
from GRU, their military intelligence. They also conduct
a long-term program of training people and putting them i
place under false identities to stay for many years. Co]. nel
Abel was an example of that. They have the benefit, of
course, of indirect support from a variety of Communist
parties around the world.
Q The Director of the FBI said the other day that there
now are so many Soviet spies in America that he is having
trouble trailing them. Why do we let so many in?
A We let them in as diplomats or in some other capacity.
You have to realize that there has been a very large increase
in the number of Soviet citizens in the United States, as
compared with 10 years ago -- partly a result of detente.
Now, if you get an increase in Soviet citizens in this
country you inevitably are going to get an increase in
Soviet agents because of the role that the intelligence
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
CoLBY IVU - 26
apparatus plays in their society.
You see, in the Soviet Union the intelligence service
is a very, very powerful institution because of its responsi-
bilities for internal security as well as foreign intelli
gence. They have, in effect, merged the CIA and FBI. An
their intelligence service carries a very high degree of
responsibility for party discipline and public discipline
Consequently, the KGB has institutional power that is qui e
a lot stronger than ours. I'm glad to say that our domes-
tic influence is far weaker.
(END INTERVIEW)
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
1 - Colby
The massive flow of information pouring in to Washingt~,
requires William Colby, as Director of Intelligence, to m ke
constant evaluations of fresh global developments bearing
on U.S. interests.
The following, in his own words, is the appraisal Mr.
Colby gave the editors of "U.S.News & World Report" of
tensions around the world, what they mean, what they cowl
lead to and the possible impact on the superpowers.
(space)
Strategic balance: U.S. vs. Russia. "The Soviets are
mbarking on deployment of new missile systems that obvio -
y will increase their strategic power considerably.
But we do not see that in the foreseeable future they
will have dominance over us. We have both reached the poi it
here we can destroy each other and the rest of the world,
and they know it.
"You ask if the transfer of American technology to the
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
P - Colby
oviets is a matter of concern.
"We know that military purposes are a very high priority
n Soviet decision-making. We do have procedures that put
limitations on things of direct military value. And they
ave a problem of adapting technology which in our way of
oing things works because of the competitive system. That
is a problem they've got to do some adjusting to.
"The Soviets are, of course, far behind us technologica ly.
hey are able to challenge us in arms competition by takin
much more disciplined approach and putting in their major
alent -- particularly talent. One very interesting thing
is to compare the Soviet military work in space with the
oviet civilian work in space. There is an obvious quali-
ative difference between the two. The military work is
uch, much better."
(space)
Detente: Why Soviets want it. "There are three main
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
3 - Colby
reasons for Soviet interest in promoting detente with the
United States.
"First, they obviously want to prevent the kind of hor en-
dous confrontation that is possible in this age of super-
eapons. The idea of a military exchange between us is
just so incredible now that even they realize that something
has to be done to avoid it.
"Secondly, they do insist that they be recognized as ore
of the world's two superpowers and get the status that
their strength entitles them to.
"Thirdly, they would like to accelerate their development
in economic and technical terms, because as they look at
his enormous power of the West -- America particularly,
but also the other countries -- they see it moving at a
tremendous rate and they hope to benefit by a greater degr e
of exchange and participation in that movement.
"The Soviet agreement to liberalize emigration policies
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
4 - Colby
s something that gets very close to the bone on Soviet
ecisions. But it obviously was a matter of great imports
to American policy and had to be handled in some fashion.
"Generally, the Soviet concern over internal discipline
is very high. This is partly a result of detente. They
are a little nervous about what detente can do in terms
of getting new thoughts and new political drives going
ithin the Soviet Union. And they just don't want that t
a ppen. it
Soviet empire: Starting to crumble? "The Soviets face
real problem as their satellite states in Eastern Europe
how signs of strong dissatisfaction over iron-fisted con-
rol from Moscow. The Russians have made it clear that th
are not going to brook any substantial break in the Easter;
European buffer zone.
"But, at the same time, they obviously have the problem
of dealing with the new political ideas that are circulati
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
5 - Colby
in some of those countries -- including demands for great
freedom of action.
"The old idea of total Soviet dominance and control is
under challenge even from some of the Communist Party lead
ers in Eastern Europe."
(space)
Western Europe: Communist penetration. "One thing th
Soviets want to see is Communist participation in the gov-
ernments of Western Europe.
"This is in line with Communist ideology which says that
ollapse of the European free enterprise system is inevitable
and that the movement of Communist forces from minority
oices to participation will enable the Communists to take
over governments and run them.
"Obviously, the Communists are playing a role in Portu=
al's Government now. They have considerable influence in
ther countries by reason of the 25 per cent or 28 per cen
f the votes they represent and the difficulties of organising
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
6 - Colby
governments among the fragmented parties on the other sid
.
"I think there's an increase in Communist Party influe
ce.
But a couple of curves are running: One is the increase in
Communist influence and the other is the increased indepe -
dence of European Communist parties from Moscow's control
It's really a little premature to tell where these curves
are going to cross.
"We are certainly not saying, "It doesn't matter whether
the Communists participate in power.' What I'm saying is
that this is a very complicated, multifactored matter to
look at.
"We've seen evidence of various agents the Communists
have had in NATO-related situations. If you get a Communi t
Party participating in a government which is a member of
TO, you then begin to put political factors into the han -
ing of intelligence matters -- and suddenly some of these
ecret matters become subjects of political controversy in
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
7 - Colby
various NATO countries. This can get very complicated."
(space)
Sino-Soviet hostility: War isn't imminent. "The Sovi s
take a very serious view of China as a danger to them in
he long run. Russian concern centers on Chinese missile
systems -- strategic systems. They have worked hard on
their intelligence about those matters.
"But I don't see a war starting in the near future, eve
hough there is considerable hostility on both sides of the
oviet and Chinese positions -- and there is a gulf betwee
hem. This hostility certainly will go on as long as the
resent leadership lasts on both sides -- and probably wil
of be all that different in the succeeding leaderships.
"I don't anticipate a great deal of change in Chinese
olicy or Chinese-Soviet policies after Mao Tse-tung and
;,hou En-lai pass from the scene. This goes beyond persona -
ities. I think the Chinese feel that they have to defend
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
8 Colby
themselves against Soviet influence and that this will cord
tinue more or less in those terms.
"The Soviets certainly want to avoid any Chinese-Amen
i
collaboration against them. As they see its the one elem
of that equation that they can make some kind of arrange-
ent with is America. They really haven't been able to d
uch with the Chinese."
(s pace)
Cuba: Castro's policy now. "Fidel Castro's attempts t
export his brand of Communist revolution to other countries
of Latin America have diminished greatly. The Cubans have
tressed in recent years the development of state-to-state
elationships and have tried to get out of the business o
eing accused of trying to overthrow everybody. And they' e
been quite successful with that new policy.
"As for Russia, the Soviets still rate Cuba as a geogra
'c asset, no question about it. It's a very substantial
ph-
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
9 -Colby
geographic asset, but it's a very costly one to them in
terms of the support the Cubans have required over the ye4rs.
"Cuba's present activities in Latin America -- stressi
state links rather than insurgency links -- are, in gener
of long-term use to Soviet interests. But Cuba is not a
spearhead of Communist revolution in Latin America."
(space)
1,
War in Mideast: Quite possible. "Another round of wa
between Israel and the Arabs is possible -- quite possibl .
"It depends on whether the U.S. can reconstruct peace-
making diplomacy and get that going. Obviously, the Raba
summit meeting at which Arab leaders named the Palestine
Liberation Organization as the sole legitimate representative
of Palestinians living on Arab land held by Israel puts a
new factor in it.
"As for the Soviet role: They do have a desire to play
the role of a major power, particularly in the Middle East,-
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
10 - Colby
ern area. They are endeavoring to express that through
their naval presence, through their aid programs, through
their military aid and so forth. The nature of their pol cy
right now is to keep that presence active, keep that caps
bility of influencing the situation. But at the same time
they have a considerable interest in continuing the deters e
program with the United States.
"The Soviets have indicated that they would go along
with a Mideast peace settlement in which they played a su -
stantial role. A settlement would deprive the Soviets of
a situation they have been able to exploit -- the Arab-
Israeli conflict. But also, at the same time, it would
remove a danger that the thing might go off the tracks.
They've got to try to go along a rather narrow track with cut
abandoning their influence, but, on the other hand, not
seeing the whole thing derail.
"The Soviets do get a certain amount of benefit from t
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1
11 - Colby
economic troubles that afflict the West as a result of th
oil problems, but they don't have to do much about that.
It's taking place pretty much on its own.
"On the other hand, they have to realize that an aggre
sive move to cut off oil would have to create a reaction
on our side. Certainly it would be a very direct affront
to any detente hopes that they have.
(END)
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/11 : CIA-RDP99-00418R000100100046-1