TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM E. COLBY REID & PRIEST WASHINGTON, D.C.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-00418R000100130003-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 28, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: January 31, 1980
• Content Type: MISC

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UNITED STATES HOUSE OF EPRE.SENT=-T IVES
PERMANENT SELECT CC~4MMTI TTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE
January 31, 1980
Testimony of
William E. Colby
Reid & Priest
Washington, D.C.
MR. CHAIRMAN. American soldiers expect to face
hostility, danger and even death from an enemy. They
expect the nation which sends them into combat, however,
to protect them against being shot in the back by fellow
Americans. In several laws, Congress does exactly that-
one is of course the punishment for treason r_or giving
aid and comfort to the enemy. A more precise one is the
statute punishing anyone who, "with intent to interfere
with, impair or influence the loyalty, morale or disci-
Aline of the military or naval forces.... advises, counsels,
urges, causes or attempts to cause insubordination, dis-
loyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty" among their fellow
soldiers. (18 U.S.C. 2387)
Congress has enacted a number of other acts to
protect particular officers of the government against assault
murder or manslaughter. These include
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the President and Vice President (18 U.S.C. 1751) , Members
of Congress (18 U.S.C. 351), and officers and employees
of the United States (18 U.S.C. 1114). Congress has also
provided punishments for individuals falsely impersonating
government officers (18 U.S.C. 912); the Supreme Court
has said that the proper purpose of that Act is "to main-
tain the general good repute and dignity of government
service". (U.S. v. Lepowitch, 318 U.S. 702 (1943))
Mr. Chairman, American intelligence officers abroad
face hostility, danger and possible death from hostile
governments, terrorist groups and individuals. They do
this in conformity with the intelligence mission assigned
them by our Constitutional executive and legislative author-
ities. I hope that this mission will be clarified in the
near future by the adoption of a new legislative charter,
as the President has suggested. But the National Security
Act of 1947 and subsequent annual appropriations for our
intelligence services over the past thirty years consti-
tuted a Congressional determination that intelligence was
a necessary service of our American government and that
its officers and employees, and their families, and our
foreign agent sources were serving the American nation.
The dangers to intelligence personnel abroad
have been increased in recent years by the sensational
and irresponsible exaggeration of a comparatively few
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incidents in the history of CIA, to give a totally false
impression of the scale of its missteps and misdeeds and
stimulate attention and hostility to its activities. And
the vulnerability of our officers has increased as a re-
sult of inadequate official and unofficial cover avail-
able for their protection and of unauthorized revelations
by erstwhile fellow intelligence officers repudiating
their solemn undertaking to respect the necessary dis-
cipline of the profession. Other Americans opposed
to intelligence for ideological reasons have developed
a cottage industry of exposing fellow Americans. They
frankly admit this dangerous action as a cynical tactic
to veto Congress' determination that the service is im-
portant to the protection of our republic.
Danger is not the only threat these practices
pose. The identification of our officers increases sur-
veillance of their actions by hostile governments and po-
litical groups so that they cannot carry out their mis-
sions. Other governments can also be politically com-
pelled to act against their presence when their iden-
tification is trumpeted, although they would be more per-
missive if they could pretend ignorance. And the career
potential of highly motivated, selected and trained officers
can be ruined by this sort of deliberate sabotage.
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The personnel of our intelligence services have
carried on their duties as well as they could despite
these harassments and dangers. But it is far past time
that the Congress should provide the necessary protec-
tion and support that the honorable men and women of
intelligence deserve in their service abroad. The Congress
has protected our military forces; it has protected our
currency against counterfeiting; it punishes citizens who
refuse to pay-taxes out of disagreement with the laws en-
acted by our Constitutional system; it even took pains to
omit the identities of intelligence personnel from the
published accounts of its extensive investigations in
the last five years of past intelligence activities. It
now must act against those who would deliberately destroy
what the Congress has determined is essential to protect
our country -- an effective intelligence service.
An even more vulnerable group of people are the
foreign and American sources and informants of American
intelligence. Many of these have responded to\the in-
creased dancer in recent years by withdrawing from secret
relationships or refusing to initiate them, in well jus-
tified fear that they would be exposed to retribution and
reprisal for contributing to America's better knowledge
and understanding of foreign developments. In today's world,
Mr. Chairman, we must reassure them that we have the will
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and the means to protect them, as we would our eyes and
As this committee well knows, however, the present
statutes of the United States "are totally inadequate to
provide this-reasonable support and protection of our
officers and informants. The attempts of the executive
to use contract law to control this pernicious activity
have been valiant, but are obviously inadequate. It is
also plainly undignified for this Congress to leave such
an important obligation to the mercies of such a skimpy pro-
tective device.
For these reasons, Mr. Chairman, I fully support
H.R. 5615 and commend the responsibility and initiative
of its sponsors, which I note with pleasure include every
member of this important committee. Its section 501(a)
will protect us against those who would obtain authorized
access to information about our officers and informants
and then repudiate a freely undertaken responsibility to
protect what they learn. Section 501(b) will extend this
protection against anyone who with the "intent to impair
or impede the foreign intelligence activities of the
United States" exposes our personnel or sources. That
specific intent puts their activity well beyond the
Constitutional protections of free speech, press and
assembly, especially as the intent must be proved by
more evidence than the mere intentional disclosure of
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and the
the information or inferences derived thereform,
proscriptions are clearly necessary and reasonable to
protect an important o Lublic function.
This bill, Mr. Chairman, is no "official Secrets
Act" on the lines of British legislation. it does not
even go as far as suggestions I previously made to this
which would have. included the secret techniques
e,
committee,
and sensitive technology as well as the human sources of
our intelligence agencies. it does, however, take a
major step forward for the protection of the individuals
who serve our intelligence community. This bill would
expressly and by
carry out the obligation our country
implication makes to protect the identities of Americans
p
and foreigners who risk their lives, their families and
their livelihoods to provide our country the information
necessary to give it better protection against the many
problems in the hostile world around us.
Some time ago, Mr. Chairman, I asked the Congress
to "give a signal" to our friends around the world that
we will protect the real secrets of American intelligence,
while we will not insist on the complete secrecy that en-
velopes the intelligence services of other countries.
Intelligence technology has expanded our knowledge of
the world immensely, but there are subjects which are not
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visible on the photographs or ascertainable by electronics.
We must depend upon brave Americans and brave
foreigners to provide us this material. We owe their
bravery the same debt of responsibility for their safety
that our country owes our soldiers when we send them into
action.
i have only two minor points in addition, Mr-
r consideration. The definition
r to submit for you
Chairman
in section 505(6) excludes from the category of agent,
in-formant or source of operational assistance, individuals
who are our citizens residing within the United States.
I would suggest that a number of such individuals should
be given the same protection as the same category abroad.
This could be of particular importance in securing the
assistance of American citizens in this country to arrange
cover protection for intelligence officers abroad and
conduct other activities abroad from an American base.
Exposure can wreck their businesses, curtail their foreign
connections and travel and subject them to public attack
for having helped their country. The definition does not
exclude foreigners residing in the United States, and I
believe it should not, so I find it somewhat contradic-
tory that it excludes our citizens within the United
StYates. IL f the concern is to ensure that the Agency not
rations within the United States actively
be involved in operations
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using informants and agents here for domestic purposes,
better systems of control are available in the new charter
legislation than leaving these other legitimate helpers
exposed in the fashion that this definition does.
It would also seem appropriate to consider the
addition of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to the
agencies listed in section 505(4). A number of their
informants and agents would seem to be entitled to the
same protection as we would give foreign sources. It may
be that this subject will be covered in separate charter
or other legislation for the FBI, but i suggest that it
is a subject that needs attention.
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