BLOCK THE KHMER ROUGE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-00418R000100150024-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 15, 2012
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: April 28, 1989
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

ST A T
Declassified
STAT
Jeremy J. Stone
And William E. Colby
Block the
in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/15: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100150024-0
Khmer
Rouge
Cambodia suffered one of history's ultimate
horrors when the Khmer Rouge, wider Pal Pot's
leadership, killed between 1 million and 2 million
of its population. Incredibly, it now faces a repeat
Performance. With the impending September
withdrawal from Cambodia of the Vietnamese
army, the FbI Pot faction of the Khmer Rouge, still
run by Pol Pot and his senior lieutenants, is poised
to seize Power again from the sanctuaries it runs
with unchanged Draconian discipline along the
Thai border.
Its major asset is the dispute among the other
Cambodian political factions. The Khmer Rouge's
strongest Cambodian opponent is the incumbent
government established by the Vietnamese, and
now being left behind, the People's Republic of
Kampuchea (PRIG. This government is dominated
by former Khmer Rouge who defected, in fear or
disgust, from Pol Pot to the Vietnamese.
The PRK was a puppet of the Vietnamese, and
it does not run a multiparty state with human
rights and free speech. But one thing is incontest-
able. It is not running a Khmer Rouge state with
its emptied cities, suppression of every vestige of
human rights. separation of families and wide-
spread concentration camp conditions. It is clearly
preferable, from everyone's point of view, to
another Khmer Rouge government. And with the
departure of the Vietnamese, this Cambodian
government can be expected to take that nation.
alist course vis-a-vis the Vietnamese that Cambo-
dians traditionally take.
The second strongest potential opponent of the
Khmer Rouge, a distant second, are the forces of
Prince Sihanouk and his ally, Son Sarin. Serious
voices now advocate American "lethal" aid (overt
or "covert") to these forces. But as long as these
forces maintain their now anachronistic coalition
with the Khmer Rouge-a coalition designed by
the West in 1982 when all efforts were concen-
trated on forcing out the Vietnamese-any such
lethal aid would have to be expected to be used, in
the first instance, against the PRK.
This could only help, militarily and politically, to
open the door to the Khmer Rouge. After all, with
full recognition of the errors of U.S. policy toward
Sihanouk since the Eisenhower period, it is clear
to all that he cannot now, by himself, replace the
PRK while holding off the Khmer Rouge and thus
return Cambodia to the peaceful rural kingdom of
yesteryear.
Accordingly, any aid to Sihanouk (and Son Sann)
should be subject to two conditions: that they
withdraw from the coalition government of Demo-
cratic Kampuchea, which the Khmer Rouge domi-
nates, and that the aid not be used in a civil war
against the PRK.
TM Wbhington Post /Q ? 1 s
The New York Times -`-~a
The Washington Times _
h
O Washin
The Will Strut Journal
The Christian Science Monitor
New York Daily News
USA Today
The Chicago Tribune
Indeed, the United States should support an
terms between Prince Sihanouk and the PRK, which they must work out them.
the
ad"eii beginning, , at try Prince Ulanouk and the~ PRK's Print
Minister Hun Sen on May 2 in Jakarta.
In fact, the United States could usefully seek
the Cooperation Of the Soviet Union to bring these
two contenders together by using the separate
nce of each on Prince Sihanouk and the PRK
rely. In addition, the two sugherpoa~ers
should urge the Peoples Republic of
China to cut
off the support it has long given the Khmer Rouge
out Of its antipathy to the Vietnamese. With the
secretary of state going to Moscow just before the
Smo-.Soviet summit of May 15, this is an opportu
nity for the United States to play just nadh a
constructive role.
Tentative agreement already exists at the inter-
national level to cut off military aid to all factions in
September when the Vietnamese withdraw. Eve-
y' in such Promising circumstances, the United
States should put much greater emphasis on
cutting off the lethal aid given to the other factions
than in Providing it to Prince Sihanouk. To jeopar-
dize that cut-off for a few million dollars of lethal
aid to Prince Sihanouk-aid which many observ-
ers consider of more political than military signifi-
cance anyway-would be a colossal error.
U.S. Policy in Cambodia has too many goals. Its
single immediate goal should be to block the
return of the Khmer Rouge. Then, in the fullness
of time, we shall be able to press Phnom Penh.
whoever is running it and in whatever period, to
fallow democratic practices.
But if we try to achieve all of the goals we
might wish at once and in specified and contro-
versial ways-ustalling Prince Sihanouk as the
leader of an interim government with four parties
(including the Khmer Rouge) and holding free
elections with U.S. inspection of the Vietnamese
withdrawal-we might well play into the hands of
Poi Pot's lunatic but ruthless group.
In sum, in our opinion, to do other than to focus
all our immediate efforts on preventing the return
of the Khmer Rouge would be to make what is
best the enemy of what is absolutely essential.
fe yJ. Stone, president of the Federation
of American Scientists recently returned
from Cambodia. William E. Colby, a
Washington lawyer, is a former director of
central intelligence.
Page /6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/15: CIA-RDP99-00418R000100150024-0