GEORGE BUSH: POLITICAL AMBITIONS...

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-00498R000100010119-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 19, 2007
• Sequence Number: 119
• Publication Date: November 12, 1975
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Approved For Release 2007/06/19: CIA-RDP99-00498R000100010119-2
George Will
41--1 tlr~
~ - gorge
When nominated to be Director of the
Central intelligence Agency, George Bush
said he did* not, think that being Director
would forever prevent him from seeking
political office..Obviotsty he hopes it.wili'
not, and his hope was stroked by President
F o d's declaration that Bush is not ex-
cluded from. consideration as his 1976
-running mate:
- Bush may. not have to worry about a CIA
attachrnentbecoming a political handicap.
The Senate may refuse to confirm him.
1 .1
Like SOme men (he
served two terms), Bush is one of Mr.
Ford's guys, which is ine" But at the CIA
he would be the wrong `.kind of guy at the.
wrong place.at theworst passible time.
The CIA ..is, under" a cloud of dark
? suspiciore based, on proven misdeed's- The
.suspicion is.that the CLXs a threat tocivil
liberties, and: perhaps to tranquillity,
because it is insubordinate or otherwise
immune to proper con 1.
But lack of control over the CIA is no
longer the grav- -.roblem. - Congress,
awakened from its 'org seep, is alert to its
oversight duties. And-the- executive
branch, having been reminded of the law,
can keep the CLA rating this side of
criminality.
Today the most pressin' problem is not
to-prevent the. CL3 from doing: what is
THE I;AS _T_ ;GTOTi POST
12 Nov o er 1975
forbidden. Rather. V-e problem is to see
? n
O _ 10 n,
Defense Secretary Sentesinger, ?' an
apolitical man, was the foremost critic
within the administration of Secretary
is gatherand report accurate information., Soviet Union has the ability to surpass the
But gathering and reporting are dif- limit in the near future, and would (to so if
ferent operations" And it is possible to there were no.agreernent.
imagine situations in which the CIA would Or suppose the administration wanted
be pressured to suppress. inconvenient an. intelligence report minimizing this or
udormation, or to report things convenient that verification problem-say, the dif-
to the political purposes of an.ad- ficulty of verifying Soviet compliance with
;:iinistration. range limits on cruise missiles.
Imaginean administration looking to the Or suppose the administration could get
next election and determined to celebrate a CIA report supporting the hitherto un-
detente as its finest achievement: Imagine supported Soviet contention that the Soviet
that the administration is excessively Backfire bomber-which can deliver
anxious to. achieve another strategic arms nuclear weapons over intercontinental
agreement with the Soviet Union. distances-nevertheless lacks the
Suppose the administration trium- strategic significance, and should not
pliantly signed an agreement limiting the count against the Soviet total of 2,400
number of strategic vehicles-missiles strategic vehicles permitted by the
and bombers-on each side. Critics might Vladivostok agreement. Such a CIA
say the limit is a false ceiling. Critics report would concede a Soviet point
might charge that the limit is as high as without seeming to be a concession, and
the Soviet Union can or wants to go during could grease the skids for a ,pre.-election
th_? term of the a~:reNment. Therefore, the agreement.
a reement is an eoteo;r exercise, a limit Recent events have made it wise to
that does not limit. ,That is what Senator worry about the iwssihility that the CIA
Henry Jackson said about the 2,400-vehicle will become compliant to political
limit agreed to at Vladivostok.) pressures in ' reporting intelligence in-
Then the administration-would ap- formation, especially information that
?preciate ? a CIA rennrt..arffuina that the might tarnish the image of detente.
Kissinger's policy in negotiating with the-
Soviet Union-sometimes called-"the
policy of preemptive concession.'= ivlr:
Ford wants to. replace Schlesinger with
Donald Rumsfeld. another vice I
presidential aspirant. Thus it is all the-i
more imperative that the-CIA be run by a
man not susceptible to political- con- I
sidera tiors or pressures. ;
The problem with Bush is less that he'j
has a political past than that he so ob-'
viously and avidly.wantstohavea political
future.
STAT
As chairman of the Republican National 1
Committee during Watergate Bush. was"
very considerate about. the than who ap='
pointed him. In spite of all the available
evidence, he never expressed independent
judgments inconvenient to Richard Nixon..',
It might be rash to expect Bush to
display at the CIA a capacity for politically
inconvenient independence in judging:
intelligence. That is why the Senate may!
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