THE RISK OF CATASTROPHE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-00498R000100200092-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 15, 2007
• Sequence Number: 92
• Publication Date: April 17, 1980
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Approved For Release 2007/06/15: CIA-RDP99-00498R000100200092-1
1 CLE APP. r.,i zD
c' van s+~
Henry Brandon:
The world is on a danger-
ously slippery slope. Once
again it is facing a madman
unwilling_ to accept the
basic principle of civility on
which the peaceful coexist-
ence of nations rests. Once
again he has the kind of
stubbornness-and irration-
that could, in the end,;
ality
lead to catastrophe.
President Carter showed
admirable patience with the
theatrics of the Iranian gov-
ernment until it proved un-
able - on the orders of Aya-
tollah Khomeini -.even to
takd custody of the hostages.
He then had no -alternative
but to invoke sanctions.
At the same time, if we ac-
cept the analysis of the
situation that Adm. Stan-
field Turner, the director of
the Central ate igence Ag-
ency, gave tote American
,Society o ewspaper i-
ors as wee R, we come to
.realize was an exasperat-
ing an pert ous situation'
the president is lacing.
Explaining why it is so
difficult to come to any con-
clusion about the prospects
for the release of the hos-
tages, the admiral replied to
a question:
"I would find irvery dif
ficult to give you any reason
to assume that Khomeini
will accede to pressure.- This
man has a history of resist-
ing pressures and of refus- ;
ing to compromise. Our pa-
tience has not succeeded.,
Clearly it seems to me we
have to try other means. But
I'cannot predict the work-
ings of the internal dynam-
ics of power in Iran.
A senior administration'
official in close contact with
the situation, when asked
how he assessed President
Bani-Sadr's position in the
wake of this rebuff, said that
one must assume that his
prestige has suffered seri-,
ous damage and,;lherefore,
his. stand his. been weak
ened. By the-logic of these
events the power of the mili-
tants was reinforced. - . _s
THE WASHINGTON STAR' (GREEN' LINE)
17 April 1980
American policymakers
frankly admit that they are
well aware of the limited
value of political and eco-
nomic sanctions even if'the
allies help to make them
more effective. The hope
against hope is, as one of
them put it, that they will
help to "make it sink in
that Iran is isolating itself
politically from the rest of
,the world and that its'eco-
nomic life is bound to be
come increasingly precari
ous.
-The trouble is that while
.it. Will "sink in" with the
Bani-Sadr government; it
probably will not with'
Khomeini, who lives in his
self-imposed, splendid isola-
tion; or with the militant
students who hide behind
the American embassy
walls, concerned only with
holding on to the hostages.
Since the earlier expecta-
,tion that American patience.
would strengthen President
B.aniSadr has failed, Presi-
dent Carter now is hoping to
reinforce his influence by
-the imposition of sanctions.
Under rational circum-.
stances this calculation may
have some vitality.........
But it could also weaken
-him further and play into
the hands of those forces
which are secretly backed
by the Soviet Union. Eco-
nomic sanctions could has-
ten change, but they cannot
control its direction. The
risks must not be underesti-
mated..
The desire among the
allies to help is strong, and, I
hope, they will recognize
that this crisis is not just an
American problem. So far
they have badly underrated
the emotional explosiveness
-of the issue in this country
and overrated the extent to
which-.i0 ti is part of the
`American "power struggle,"
"
the primaries (though it is
obvious that Whit e'House
aides are increasin
haunted by the fear thatglyan
up-resolved hostage issue
could cost President Carter
the election).
Pressures from Islamic
countries, many of Whom-'
have already indicated their
sympathy, would also help,.
but they are unwilling to'
exert themselves, they say,
because they: resent the
Camp David accords.
There is much'loose talk
about military sanctions
even though early on in this
crisis, when military judg- I
ment was not influenced by
political necessities, the
military experts said pri-
vately that there are no real
military options they could
recommend.
President Carter is thus
facing a dire, exasperating
situation with no obvious
solutions in sight. He must
continue to put pressure on
Iran, despite the inherent
political risks, because he
cannot allow American
interests to be challenged
with imipunity. But he must . 11
not allow himself to 'be
pushed into a Sarajevo-like
minor crisis that could
develop into- a cataclysmic I
one.
President Carter deserves
sympathy, understanding
and patience, not the whip-
lash of American public
Opinion.
Approved For Release 2007/06/15: CIA-RDP99-00498R000100200092-1