'COERCIVE ACTIONS' ON IRAN CONSIDERED

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-00498R000100200120-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 15, 2007
• Sequence Number: 120
• Publication Date: April 13, 1980
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
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Approved For Release 2007/06/15: CIA-RDP99-00498R000100200120-9
.'ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE - l
['OERGPiE
AGTIOiIS'
ON IRAjt
CONSIDERED
Carter Weighing New Steps Short
ol.butrignt Military Moves
By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special toThNewYork Tim-g
:r~SciINGTON; April 12
- President
Carter, acknowledging that*. the., latest
economic and political sanctions will
probably not force, Iran to free the hos-
tages, says that he is considering further
"coercive action" shortof military force.
._ In_.an interview with out-of-town edi-
tors; conducted yesterday and made pub=-
S TAT
dorsed the policy, disclosed by Adm.
Stansfield Turner. Director of Central in-,
telii.. nce, of allowing the use of journal-
ists for undercover work, a reversal of
the policy of the Ford Administration,
which barred the use of journalists.
At a convention of the American Soci-
ety of Newspaper Editors, Admiral
Turner became involved in a controversy
with editors oppos to t e po icyas Ieop-
a izing eern egn y o c rrrespo n en s.
Mr. Carter sal : " n a rape y c an
ing international situation, where on oc-
casion our nations own security or exist-
ence might be threatened, we do not want
to pub is y iorec ose the option o to ing
certainaction atmi t necessary.'
"I think Admiral Turner expressed the
policy accurately," the resident said.
"We are not now using any newspeople.
This wou one on y under extreme
circumstances and the personal approval
o eRt er mira urnerormyself would
be reouir
Mr. Carter said there was a "similar
question" in using other professions such
as'clergymen or schoolteachers, and h
tic today, Mr. Carter refused to foreclose
the possible use of militarypower.
"We obviously have reserved for our-
selves the right to use any means permit-
ted under international- law," he said,
and since we are a seriously aggrieved
party with our own nationals being held
and our own embassy grounds being,,
taken, this would not foreclose the options
of using military force if I decide it is nec-
essary.
Declines to Give Details
Asked how likely such a decision was,
he replied, "I would rather not comment
any further."
On another matter. the -President en-
NEW YORK TIMES
13 APRIL 1980
tndicated that he did not want to rule out
using-- anyone t necea~ary.
Tii dte fFanian os`tage crisis, the Presi-
dent announced . on. Monday that the
United States. 'was severing diplomatic
relations with Iran, imposing a ban on ex-
ports, canceling' outstanding visas for.
Iranians to enter the United States and in
vestigating the use of $8 billion in seized
Iranian assets to pay American claims.
In the interview Mr. Carter expressed
doubt that these actions on their own
would compel Iran to free the Americans,
50 held at the embassy and three at the
Foreign Ministry, who ended their 23d
week in captivity today.
"It is hard to predict that unilateral
sanctions on the part of the United States
would be adequate to force them to re-
f ,lease the hostages," he said. "I think our
I experience so far has indicated to the con-
I trary. We still-have additional capabil-
ities of imposing punitive action or coer-
cive action against Iran short of exercis-
ing our military options. We are consider-
ing what we will do next."
The United States has made an effort,
so far not particularly successful, to en-
list the backing of its allies. Mr. Carter,
to" press his case, taped an interview
today that will be shown -tomorrow on
Western European television stations.
"If we can. induce our European allies
- the Japanese and others - to join with
us in the imposition of sanctions and in
the imposition of diplomatic restraints,
then, of course, it will greatly magnify
the impact of all those sanctions collec-
tively," he told the editors.
His comments ' in the interview re-
flected the United States' dilemma in
dealing with the crisis. On the one hand,
Mr. Carter wants to signal the Iranians-
and the allies - that he is determined to
.push forward on a course of steadily in-
creasing pressure on Iran. To make such
a course credible, he must include the
possibility that military force -perhaps
anaval emining o arbors
- might be used ultimately.
The United States has also been aware
that the use of force would endanger the,
lives of the hostages and cause problems
in relations with Moslem countries likes
Pakistan, which have stated that in a
militarj crisis they would side with Iran.
Moreover, the allies haie;said that al
conciliatory attitude toward Iran holds a
better chance of success than one of im-
posing harsh measures.
After the announcement of the new
sanctions, the United States asked itsi
i allies to take firm measures, including!
the-withdrawal of ambassadors and pos.;
sibly the breaking of relations, but they
have decided to respond differently.
Today they called on President Abol-
hassan Bani-Sadr of Iran to set a date for
the release of the hostages. The Western
i
ambassadors will now return home to re-
port. JJ
This has the effect of a withdrawal
of ambassadors, but the action is being
taken without leaving the impression that
the allies are trying to punish Iran for the
hostage crisis. The Americans would 1
prefer that the move be more punitive.
In answer to other questions from the
editors on foreign policy, Mr. Carter said
the United States was superior to' the
Soviet Union in military capability, eco-
nomic capability and political influence- .1
Approved For Release 2007/06/15: CIA-RDP99-00498R000100200120-9