'THE MILITARY BUDGET'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-00498R000200020111-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 23, 2007
• Sequence Number: 111
• Publication Date: April 8, 1981
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

TAT
F om
Approved For Release 2007/03/23: CIA-RDP99-00498R000 00020111-8
CH 1IS'1I_~`1 SCIENCE i _ONII'OR
g April 1981
'Fte e* Yial o ial'',`oGVhat mss" the ,,Wavy
. L d. to see you emphasi2e the im-
Portanee ending sea lanes. I think it is a
bitoptimistidto believe that our capability to
1;:tltink comparing total. number s{ ofsb ps
or :tonnages ._is more likely "to mi tead ?the
American public than to help. .Instead, there
are several'subissues in which one can com-
pare commensurables. The first is the poten-
tial battle for the North Atlantic or the Pacific
sea lanes. Here.the issue is the large number
they;. re:discusaing;;h the:new-
get. ?_.:.;.
Twenty years is a long dine away: On top
of that 30 years is an unrealistic figure for the,
this number we- have been- sustaining only a
400-ship Navy over the last. 10 years and would,
haveta increase' by ,,200 to-get tor a,S00-slk1
are:"#,alking aboutiheir just catting the-sea of`Soviet submarines,, and Baolthres vs. thei
lanes-as are action independent of other mili size of?. Allied defensive forces. Under these
tary conflict, you have a point. Essentially the circumstances whether the Navy has 450 or
Soviets would be attacking a Vital interest of 600 ships is more relevant, when. placed in
the United States clearly cannot afford to these terms.. Battles for sea control.are.wars
dothat. i" of-attrition,,aurd' you're going to have to take
Tberissue, ho er, is: if we fallintoapro- substantial lossesbefore.you have eradicated
longed-convential conflict in Europe, a la the threat..
Worldi-Wars I nd II, could the Soviets cut us Another comparison is -whether we can
off? The scelo may seem improbable td project our power from the sea to the land as
many;,Qanci' there-is evi 2ence.that, the. Soviets the Navy is, desigeed to . do. Here you, can
are not givin'g:digh p'ciority to planning for a make judgments concerp-ing.w Irere you want
campaign against our shipping in the Atlan- to do it. Sometimes the Navy talks about go-
tic. They have higher-priority tasks closer to mg up into the Norwegian Sea to take out the
home- Neither the Kaiser nor Hitler made Soviet forces in the Kola Peninsula. Whether
such preparations: either. we could do that is one judgment. Remaining
However, in.hatbgnstancesas soon-.as war in,the Mediterranean to project power onto
broke out they sttf ted the great bulk of their the other is another similar judgment:-In both
naval.elfort to thatAask. Also, in?preparing of these it isn't 1,700,ships vs. 1;500 ships; it's
for both of those wars, the Europeans and our- what forces can be brought tir bear in those
seivesJailed to look to this role and bad to circumstances.
redirect the majority of our naval.efforts also. If you hypothesize a US-Soviet naval con-
In short, we all think a, prolonged conven- flict in some remote area of the world over
tional -:war in !Europe is glow -probability some: third-world issue, the 1,700,vs. 1,500 is
event-but our.preparationsforsuchawarare almost totally irrelevant. Now were down to'
sea lanes are an essential element of prepara-
tion that is being overlooked. ..
The fact that the Soviets have iced-in
ports, geogrepktteal restriutions`on the,aaitic,
insufficient air cover- for their carriers. and
surface ships is not importantly relevant.The
-real threat to the sea lanes will come from the
150 submarines and the Backfire, bombers in
the Kola"Peninsula. Neither is impeded by
ice: The submaruies.do-have to pass through
the gap between Greenland and the United
Kingdom-but that's not as easy to,pottle:up-as
is the Baltic or, the,,Black*Sea.,,The, Soviets
don't have tobring their carriers or, their sur-
face ships out"from ? under. air cover -to pose
this threat-,.,..,
do this may not be endangered today because
of the risks that the Soviets would face. If you
in the foreseeable future.
I think you are quite optimistic to suggest
that the argument yot e i nadeRsnay.bid+
-cate`thatadditional funds for defense may not
be necessary. The deferred maintenance, the
need, for more operational money,: and the
problems of- personnel alone would tax our
current budget. In, addition; many of the sug-
gestions for smaller mots: are not t oesse '
going tote leaa'exp~er save. :.
Clearly the initial cost of small carriers is,*~
less than that of-big carriers. One of the key
reasons for going-in that direction, hawever;
is to havemore carriers: In that way they are
in-snore places-at the. same time, in that,.waY.f
you can be prepared for some losses in a war
of attrition., Operating three' small carriers
will very likely costyoumore money than on-
crating one large carrier because there aril
efficiencies of scale: = `~
One of the great; irks I,feel to adveeati g?
less sophisticated and.essiexpensive syternis
is that the country will use that,
for having one small cag ier inst
d
f
e
ea
o
on
they are prepared for. i.e., the US Navy isl large carrier,. etc. There is, no question-that built. around the aircraft carrier, and the So- one small carrier is Tess capable than=.oni-
iet'
Na
i
b
r
. _ .
ilt
t
cruise Y
vy
y
s
a
ound
u
he
s
from ships; submarines, and aircraft. ! " Wash ton
You rightly questioned whether the mum-t
Der 600 means anything. It would be more rel-
evant to point out, however, that the prospect
of going to 600 is almost nil. The most optimis-
tic mathematics are that a ship lasts 30 years.
To maintain our present fleet of about 480'
;ships you then have to build 16 ships .a year.
This . is just about exactly what we have !
averaged for the past decade. To go to 600
ships in 10 years, you have to build 12 more
ships a year - or a total of 28; in 20 years, six
more ships a year, or 22, which is,about what
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