THE B1 IS A BUMMER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-00498R000200020118-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 23, 2007
• Sequence Number: 118
• Publication Date: March 13, 1981
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Approved For Release 2007/03/23: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200
ART I C r O pl,C., 1 THE WASHINGTON POST
13 March 1981
Stanfield Turner
The'A
s a -Bum'
,rsiv i ,.. aai r-4a?.?. .. ~ r Y - ..
If the military received the green light and all the
money it needed for the BI and another giant air
craft carrier today, it would be five to six years be-
fore we saw the BI and: seven to. 10 years before the
carrier could respond to an operational order. We
are making these budget decisions not for today, but
for.,10, 20, even.40 years from today. We can't let
ourselves be emotionally tied to. the past or lack the
vision for what we will need militarily from .1985,
through 2020-the useful life of-these systems. We,
must have the courage to be bold and act on the
hard evidence of where military. weaponry is tend-'
ing. If we are to remain strong and build the kind of
military we will need in the coming years, we must
begin to modify the kind of aircraft and aircraft car-
riers we build today in rather dramatic ways. .
The manned bomber, be it a B1 or a carrier-based:
aircraft, is designed to penetrate the enemy's defenses
-and deliver a weapon close to a target. However, this;
tactic is being made obsolete today by technology than
enables the enemy to better defend against bombers.,
Satellite sensors can pick up data, which in turn cani
be rapidly processed and then sent around the world]
instantaneously by digital data transmission. The re-
sult will be near-assured detection of the bomber as it:
penetrates enemy defenses, the immediate calculation
of how to intercept it and the dispatch of smart guided'
missiles to pursue it relentlessly to destruction.
The technologies we are counting on to help us de
fend our bombers are lagging way behind. Thei
newly disclosed Stealth technology may extend the.
aircraft's ability to penetrate. It is too early to judge:
just what operational applications Stealth: will have.
But this uncertainty raises the question of whether
we would want to use manned penetrating aircraft:
even if their vulnerability were reduced.'
Technical sensors can also be used to detect the;
targets we want to- attack, whether they are fixed or'
moving. The same processing and data relay can pro-;
vide that data to a command center far from the bat-i
tlefield, where it can beevaluated more accurately; '
and moredispassionately than,it can.by pilots whosei
missions and skins are on the line. The data flow!,
from the command center can: then direct a weapon]
to be launched from weToutside the battle zone andl
can control that weapon precisely to its target.
It is a long. and proud tradition to place a man ini.
an aircraft over the target.: Butit is a dying tradi
tion, and pride should not stand in the way of doing; '
the job better and more safely. The risks to the pilot;
are unreasonable, and the probability of hitting the!
target less than with a remotely controlled system. =
Adm. Turner 3uas for,iierly director of the CIA.
We will still need bombers. But without the re-.
quirement for large, complex aircraft that can pen
etrate sophisticated defenses, a standoff variety cane
be built smaller and more simply, and we will. be
able to afford more of them.
The giant aircraft carrier, not only its penetrating
bomber, is also a dying breed. At $3.5 billion for one
ship-no aircraft-it is. too expensive. At 100,000
tons and.1,000 feet in length, it's a- sitting duck.
must be carefully rationed, so often they are not:
bomber, the trends of technology are all making the
The extant cruise missile will permit carrier.
planes to also stand off and fire 'at a distant target.
The V/STOL, now being used extensively by the
Marines-and the Soviets, is also a reality. Between
the cruise missile, V/STOL and the technology that
helps each do its job, the aircraft carrier too can
shrink in size and cost, and many more ships can be- 7
If. we proceed with. the giant aircraft carrier and -
the BI over the years ahead,. when the trends of..
technology are strongly against them, we will find
will have neither the funds nor the. motivation to
pursue the coming alternative systems as vigorously.
as we must. 'We -will feel safe because, if the chips are
ever down, military commanders will withhold earri-'
ers from zones of high threat and curtail use of Bls
near the big, important, well-defended targets. The
dollar cost, the blow to the nation's prestige and the
loss to our total military inventory would be just too
great to risk losing even one carrier. or a few Bls.
Above all, we must avoid becoming embroiled in
all the detailed arguments about the qualities of
these two systems. Their qualities, as exceptional as:
they may be, are not bargains if they exceed our
needs-if we-can do the same job better for less. Our'.
focus must be on the end product. Can they do what
needs to be done better than other systems?
The evidence clearly says no. Technologies to de-
feat the BI and the supercarrier are outdistancing
,technologies that can beused to defend them. An&
new technology offers far better alternatives.
In 1868, the USS Wampanoag was a steam-drivenW
warship that could go twice as fast as any sailing
warship afloat, and, because it was propelled by a'
steam engine, it was not subject to the vagaries of
the wind. It surely was a naval tactician's dream.'
Unfortunately, naval officers did not see it that way.
Instinctively, they rejected it as something too revo-
lutionary, decrying its profound differences. from
ships in use at the time, not its performance. It.was,
averred that if sailors did not have to climb the rig
girlg in wind and storm, they would grow soft and
would pale in the face of battle! In 1869, the Navy
dropped Wampanoag from the fleet. Another ship of
its equal was not commissioned for. almost 30 years. ,
 Approved For Release 2007/03/23: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200020118-1
It- took a, long time for the country to recognize
that the Wampanoag was the wave of the future and
that the beloved and battle-tested sailing ship was
an anachronism. We cannot -today afford to remain
sentimentally attached to . manned, penetrating
bombers and to large ships of any description for
their own sake. Both are just too vulnerable, and
growing more so by the day.
There is an understandable national concern that'
we are not keeping up with the Soviets in military
competition. We will certainly have to spend more on
defense to correct that. But, more important, we must
spend it with all the leverage our advancedtechnologi
. . -, ,
-:cahbase and our inherent ingenuity will give us.