ADDRESS BY ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER, DCI - PROTECTING SECRETS IN A FREE SOCIETY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-00498R000200100001-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 15, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 25, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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Address by Admiral Stansfield Turner
Director of Central Intelligence
National Press Club
Washington, D. C.
Wednesday, 25 October 1978
PROTECTING SECRETS IN A FREE SOCIETY
In the nineteen months that I have been Director
of Central Intelligence, I have come into the habit of
screening the press clips first thing every morning.
I almost hold my breath until I know if today's disclosures
include some of our sensitive sources of intelligence.
Sometimes it comes out through a leak, sometimes from
the forced testimony of one of our officers in court
and sometimes from the subpoena of a document or notes.
As a result, I have almost come to think of you in the
media and we in intelligence as being adversaries. In
recent months, however, I find that we are really in
the same plight together. As often as not, the press
clips disclose that it is, you, the media who are being
taken into court and forced to defend the secrecy of your
sources or it is you who are receiving the subpoenas.
At least if I understand it, the essence of the court
cases involving Mr. Farber, the Stanford Daily and others
is whether preserving the confidentiality of a newsman's
sources is essential to meeting his obligations and to
the continued success of your profession.
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Let me assure you that if this is anything of a
problem to you, the danger of disclosing sources is the
number one threat to our American intelligence community
today. The focus of the media with respect to intelli-
gence for almost four years now has been on actual and
alleged abuses of the past. I sincerely believe the threat
to our country of excesses in intelligence operations is
far less today than any time in our history. The real
danger is that we will be unable to conduct necessary
operations because of the risk that they would be
disclosed. Let me give you some examples of why I say this.
First, allied intelligence services are losing confidence
that we can keep a;secret. We suspect that some are holding
back information. One recently withdrew a proposal for a
joint covert action which would have been beneficial
to both nations. It did so when reminded that I must
notify eight committees of the Congress of every covert
action. They could not imagine that the plan would not
leak.
Beyond, this, agents overseas who risk their lives to
support our country even though they are not even citizens of
it ask, "When will my name appear in your press?" This is
not a transient problem; it is a trend that could under-
mine our human intelligence capabilities for a decade or
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more. In this kind of a climate there simply may be fewer
volunteers to be sources for us in the future.
Finally, with respect to the dangers of a lack of
secrecy too many leaks can lead to intelligence by timidity.
A timid reporter will never land the big story. A timid
intelligence officer will not take the risks which are a
part of his. work if he must add the high probability that
his sources will be exposed in our media. All three of
these examples are part of the same fundamental question of
question of protection of sources, and are not at all
different from the problem which you face.
I do not know what your profession is doing about
this problem we have in common. I would like to describe
our response thus far. First, we recognize that a lot
of the problem is right on our own doorstep. Sometimes
it is our own people who provide the leaks. Sometimes it is
former employees. Sometimes we are vulnerable to deliberate
espionage. Accordingly, we can and are tightening our
internal security procedures. You can always tighten up,
but it is a matter of compromise between having such tight
controls that we cannot do our job with reasonable
efficiency and striving so much for efficiency that we
do not properly control our secrets. The tables today
are perhaps tilted a bit too much in the direction of
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efficiency. I am working to turn them back and I hope
that will make it more difficult for you to obtain our
secrets.
We are also doing things externally. We have a
policy of greater openness. My presence here is evidence
of my personal commitment to keep the public better in-
formed by being more open about intelligence activities
where and when that is possible. How will openness help
us preserve secrets? Well, simply by reducing the ex-
cessive corpus of secrets that now exists within our
government. Today so much information is unnecessarily
classified that we have lost respect for the classified
label. By making as much as possible available to the
public, we reduce the amount that is kept secret. In
turn this makes it easier to engender respect for that
which remains classified.
It takes more than openness, however, to preserve
secrets. Basically there must be some renewed acknowledgment
in the media and in the public that secrecy is legitimate.
Clearly there is a very fine line which we must tread. Too
much secrecy can impede justice or staunch the flow of in-
formation within our society. Too little secrecy can
give away data that is of vital importance to our nation.
It is a delicate balance between a government that serves
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its people poorly because it does not keep them informed
and one that serves them poorly because it does not
maintain necessary secrets. No government, no business,
no newspaper, no private individual can conduct his life
or business without some element of secrecy. Newsmen
feel that the release of their notes even to prosecute a
charge of murder would endanger an obligation to
individuals who help them and would set a precedent
adversely affecting the future of their profession. So,
too, do we in the field of intelligence react almost
daily. But, there is one difference between our attitudes
and obligations. Your case rests upon an interpretation of
the Constitution which today is being seriously challenged.
My obligation rests upon a law--the National Security Act
of 1947 which requires that the Director of Central Intelligence
in his person "shall be responsible for protecting our
sources and methods of collecting intelligence from un-
authorized disclosure." I must comply to the best of
my ability and conscience.
Still another difference in your perspective and
mine is that protecting sources is only one of my
problems of secrecy. It has become very suspect these
days to even refer to withholding information in the
name of national security. Abuse of this principle
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in the past, however, does not make it invalid today.
Quite simply, there is information which it is not in
the national interest to disclose. We cannot negotiate
a SALT treaty if we cannot maintain the privacy of our
negotiating position.* We cannot afford to develop ex-
pensive weapons systems or devices for collecting intel-
ligence and then tell those against whom we might have to
employ them what their precise characteristics are.
Because, however, we in the world of intelligence
are in the risk-taking business, and because there are
dangers to our national fabric from the improper use of
the intelligence process, clearly there must be special
checks on us. I believe that there are such checks today
and that the public can be more confident today than ever
before that the abuses of the past will not reoccur. Out
of the crucible of the past four Years of public criticism,
a whole new regimen of controls and checks has been con-
structed. These begin with the policy of greater open-
ness that I have cited to you.
Beyond this, we have established a thorough system
of control mechanisms to govern our day-by-day activities.
These start with two basic guidelines which are the frame-
work within which all intelligence professionals now
work. The first of these is that espionage must be
considered an extraordinary remedy. Clandestine means
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of gathering information should never be utilized when
the same information might be available openly. The
second guideline is that actions which we take in secret
must be defensible, in principle, in public. Clearly, we
cannot lay out publicly all the details of each instance
of espionage which we undertake, but we can in-public
defend the general classes of actions we utilize.
Beyond these guidelines, we have also established
a series of prohibitions. Some activities, such as
assassination, are so repugnant to our national stand-
ards as to warrant prohibition without exception. In
some cases, however, total prohibition is a bit too rigid
a position. Instead, we have injunctions which generally
prohibit certain activities unless there is a specific
authorization for them. This is analogous to law en-
forcement procedures in common use in our country. We
all recognize that there is an injunction against a law
enforcement agency invading the privacy of our homes,
except with the specific authorization of a search war-
rant. We too, in intelligence are establishing similar
procedures, sometimes with warrants, sometimes with other
provisions for approval. The utilization of members of
the US media for intelligence purposes is one example.
This is proscribed unless I personally make the exception.
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The most significant change in American intelligence
in recent years, however, and one that is truly revolu-
tionary is the introduction of effective external over-
sight from both the executive and legislative branches.
This oversight is intended to check on how the guidelines,
prohibitions and injunctions are being carried out, and
to relate the nature of our intelligence activities
to the attitudes and mores of the country as a whole.
An Intelligence Oversight Board has been function-
ing for almost three years. Composed of three members
from outside the government, presently former Senator
Gore, former Governor Scranton, and Mr. Thomas Farmer,
it reviews Intelligence Community activities and serves
as a place where anyone can report activities they sus-
pect may be illegal or improper. The Board reports its
findings directly to the President.
Oversight committees have been in place in Congress
for two years in the case of the Senate, and a little
over one year in the House. In both instances the re-
lationship between the Select Committees on Intelligence
and the Intelligence Community has been one of coopera-
tion and help, but at the same time definitely one of
oversight and supervision. There is no question that we
are answerable to-these committees. -
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Many in the Intelligence Community have come to
recognize the positive values for us in the oversight
process. Ultimate accountability is essential to re-
sponsible action. When the stakes are high, when pa-
i5
triotism?a driving force and when risks must be taken,
it is good to have the element of accountability hanging
over us. Oversight is forcing us to be judicious, to
think out both the risks and benefits of what we propose
to do.
The Congressional Oversight Committees are now in
the process of legislating guidelines, prohibitions, and
injunctions and further refining the oversight procedures
themselves in what'will be known as Charters for the
Intelligence Community. I strongly support this under-
taking. In the first place it will provide the legal
foundation for our activities. In the second place, it
will provide guidance so that the US intelligence officer
on the street in a foreign country and those of us
in the headquarters will have a better idea of what is
expected, what may not be done and what, if done,
must be justified convincingly to our overseers.
On top of all these governmental checks and controls,
we also, of course, view you, the media, as another important
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oversight mechanism in reassuring the public and in
preventing abuse. My plea to you, however, is to recog-
nize the similarity of our plights. We in intelligence
are professionals dedicated to secrecy who are constantly
having to defend ourselves against being pressed into
excessive openness. You are professionals dedicated to
openness who are now facing great pressures to dispense
with your secrets. I hope that you will recognize that
when we balk, for instance, at disclosing all the secrets
necessary to prosecute a case in court, we do not do so
in an arbitrary manner. We study these cases very carefully.
Moreover, we must be prepared to justify our positions
not only to the Attorney General- but to our oversight
committees.. Yet, it is right for you to question these
judgments, but please bear in mind that your over-
sight is frequently hampered by only having part of the
picture. You are at a severe disadvantage compared
with our Intelligence Oversight Board and our Congres-
sional committees since we cannot share our secrets with
you. This, indeed, places you in a difficult position.
With data that is incomplete, you must be concerned about
misleading the public or making disclosures injurious to
the national interest. You must constantly balance
those dangers with your obligation to keep Americans
well informed and to uncover malfeasance in government
where it exists.
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Another area of delicate responsibility for you is
in judging the validity of so-called "whistleblowers"
who come to you with tales of impropriety or inefficiency.
Many of these appear to have only the most altruistic
motives, and probably bring reassurances that what they
are disclosing is not justifiably secret. Let me sug-
gest that what is legitimately secret or sensitive is
not always obvious on its face, especially to former
officials who were third or fourth echelon at best and
who were never in a position to assess all of the equi-
ties involved. The potential in these situations for
abuse of you and your role is immense. What better way
to promote a forthcoming book than to titillate the
public through encouraging you to issue samples of un-
authorized revelations. How many so-called "whistle-
blowers" go through the oversight mechanisms that I have
described where abuses and undue secrecy can be ques-
tioned without compromising legitimate secrets? Frankly,
I have yet to see a whistleblower use these relief valves
fully before going to the court of last resort--you, the
public press. I am suspicious as to their motivation and
suggest that you might well be also. Further, when every
elected or appointed public official is suspect and every
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renegade whistleblower is automatically accepted as a
hero; when there is greater emphasis on criticizing and
tearing down our society than on building it up, I sug-
gest that we are heading for real trouble.
I do not envy you the difficult job of conducting
oversight and assessing the validity of your sources
without access to all of the information you need; or of
making the choices which you face in steering a course
between the Syclla of undue emphasis on criticism and
the Charybdis of taking too much on face value; or of
deciding whether the national interest is better served
by printing a secret or by withholding it.
I do not, however, accept the thesis sometimes
proferred that your responsibilities leave you no choice
but to print whatever you receive; or that the possibility
that someone else will print it anyway makes the question
moot. Nor do I agree that if you possess some information
it can be assumed that the KGB or other foreign intel-
ligence services have it too. But, in the end, those of
us in government who are involved in protecting secrets
are not the ones to pass judgment on the actual choices
you make. It is the public who should and will.
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The recent court decisions on Farber and such may
indicate that neither the public nor the courts agree with
some of the premises under which you have traditionally
labored. Your unfettered right to print and disclose is
clearly being questioned; just as has.our indiscriminate
right to classify. Accordingly, we both, it seems to me are
in the midst of a reassessment of our roles and the way
we carry them out.
The Intelligence Community has been about this task
for several years now. I suggest that there is something to
be learned from our experience. I would not suggest
how you ought to resolve these issues as they affect your
ability to play your role. From my point of view, trough,
as this country's chief intelligence officer, what I expect
from the nation's media is a greater understanding of the
commonality of our problem of protecting sources; less
suspicion and reliance on inferences and more quest for
facts, especially about alleged improprieties; fewer headlines
about intelligence abuses of 25 years ago played as though
they were new revelations and more concern for today; and
more discretion as to what is relevant to our society's
needs and what is pure sensation. Yet I again acknowledge
that it is by no means easy for yo.u to strike these balances
precisely when you have only partial information. In the
final analysis we both serve the same master and will be
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judged by the same jury--the public of the United States.
Within the framework of our uneasy relationship, I
believe there is room for mutual respect and for us to
work closer together rather than farther apart. A
greater degree of communication and perhaps even trust
will benefit us both and will permit us jointly to serve
that American people more effectively.
- end -
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II
[Applause]
AUKOFER: Almost makes some of us want to sign up.
[Laughter]
AUKOFER: ...The first questioner alludes to your
reference to keeping secrets in court cases, and notes that
two federal court cases were stopped yesterday because of
secret information, would like to know what the CIA's policy
is on criminal trials that involve national security interests
when keeping those secrets may mean that people like ITT execu-
tives can't be prosecuted.
ADMIRAL TURNER: My policy is that I bear a legal
responsibility to advise the Attorney General if the release
of documents or testimony necessary for prosecution will in
my opinion endanger the national interest. Clearly, this is
a subjective judgment in each opinion. And in each case I
try to provide my view on how serious the damage would be.
I do not claim the privilege of withholding anything from the
courts. I claim the privilege only of insuring that those.
who make the release have had the opportunity to balance the
benefits of prosecution with the benefits -- or the detriments,
rather, of revelation. And I see nothing different in that
than in claiming privilege for Mr. Farber's notes in a case
of murder trials.
[Applause]
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AUKOFER: This question relates to classification,
in that you mentioned overclassification. The questioner would
like to know, is it safe for an individual to overclassify
rather than to underclassify, sort of to save his own neck?
And how important is this problem?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes, it's safer to overclassify than
underclassify.
To tell you a sea story. A few years ago I had what
I thought was a brilliant idea. I forwarded it through channels
for how the Navy could do something of great importance. When
I looked at it I said, "You know, that really, really isn't
classified." So I sent it forward in unclassified channels.
A couple of days later, it appeared in the Norfolk newspapers,
and the next day the Washington newspapers had 17 congressmen
complaining about this horrendous idea, which I believed was
great and could have been sold to them if it had come through
the proper channels. But because I couldn't hold anybody accoun-
table for this unclassified piece, I got burned by underclassi-
fying.
But it is a serious problem. The new presidential
directive on classification puts strictures against over classi-
fication. It's something that is endemic, it's something that
we have to each work at each day, and it just takes repeated
effort and emphasis.
As recently as two hours ago, I wrote a note to one
of my subordinates, who had written me and said, "We shouldn't
declassify this. There's not enough pressure on us."
I said, "That is not the policy. The question is, is
it reasonably declassified without hurting the national interest?
If it is, let's go."
AUKOFER: We have several questions about wiretapping.
And, somehow, I don't expect much of an answer, but...
[Laughter]
AUKOFER: How many -- there are two: Are you now or
have you wiretapped any law firms in this country? And how many
taps, if any, does the CIA have in operation in news bureaus,
outside and inside this country?
ADMIRAL TURNER: At the risk of destroying my friend-
ship with a friend who destroys me on the tennis courts regu-
larly, I have to say that any wiretaps in this country are out
of my province.
[Applause]
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ADMIRAL TURNER: And if I knew, I wouldn't tell you the
answer to those questions either.
[Laughter]
AUKOFER: That's kind of what I figured.
This questioner asks: Could you please comment on the
short-range benefits of the restoration of American bases and
communication centers in Turkey?
ADI1IRAL TURNER: I'd like to expand on that question,
because my last military assignment was commander of the southern
flank of NATO, including Turkey; and I think the long-term bene-
fits of this restoration of better relations between our coun-
tries is very, very important to us, as well as to Turkey and to
NATO. Turkey is that eastern anchor of the NATO alliance, a most
stalwart country in defense of freedom and a country in a geo-
graphical location of tremendous importance.
In the short term, there is no question that the return
to operation of our intelligence-collection bases in Turkey is
very valuable to us. In the years that we did not have those
facilities, we were able to route around and otherwise get some
of the information from other sources. You never can completely
replace something as valuable as those Turkish bases, and so we
had a very definite net loss. And the routing around is a
Peter-and-Paul situation, where, yes, you may pick up something
that used to be done in Turkey by some other means, but you
probably then lose something else that you were doing; the pri-
orities just have to shift down.
I can't quantify it for you, but I'm very, very happy
that this turn of events has taken place.
AUKOFER: We have a number of questions on Nicholas
George Shadrin (?), the Soviet defector who disappeared in
Vienna while on a CIA mission. One questioner asks: Can you
give us any assurance that he is not now in CIA custody? Another
questioner would like to know if he is alive and living in Aus-
tralia.
ADMIRAL TURNER: No, he is not in CIA custody. I do
not know if he is alive. I do not know if he is in Australia.
I have put a good amount of time onto the Shadrin case in my
brief tenure in this job, and I find no evidence of foul play
on the part of any American authorities, nor do I have any con-
clusive evidence or good clues as to just where Shadrin is. I
wish I did.
AUKOFER: Now that we've opened the Australia con-
nection, the questioner says: In 1977 the Senate Select Com-.
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mittee on Intelligence asked the CIA for a report on its activities
in Australia. Will this report ever be made public? Can you give
us an assurance that the CIA is not involved in activities designed
to influence Australian politics and organized labor activities?
ADMIRAL TURNER: I hope the report w i l l not be made
public because I think there is classified information in it.
It is up to the Congress to decide whether their reports are re-
leased.
Yes, I can give total assurance we are not in any way
trying to influence internal Australian labor or other activities.
AUKOFER: In that connection, what is the justification,
as a general matter, for interference in the internal political
affairs in other countries?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, now we are getting into the murky
waters of covert political action, as opposed to intelligence.
Intelligence is the collecting of information and its evaluation.
Covert political action is the effort to influence events in for-
eign countries without the influencer being known. Political
action is not an intelligence activity, but, since 1947, whenever
this country has authorized political action, it has been assigned
to the Central Intelligence Agency to carry out.
I would say to you that, in my view, there is less need
and usefulness for covert political action today than there was
at times in the past, at times when it has been very successful
on behalf of our country.
There are times, like when you want to frustrate a.
terrorist group, that it is useful to be able to infiltrate some-
body into it and get them to influence the course of events in
that group, where if they knew it was the United States doing
that, it would be use -- it would be meaningless, it wouldn't be
useful at all.
And so let's not kid ourselves. All of our diplomacy,
all of our economic power and pressure, all of our military
threat is here to influence other countries, to make sure they
don't do things inimical to us. Covert political action is
another tool in that quiver of arrows.
As I say, it is less useful and applicable today, and
particularly, as I mentioned in my prepared remarks, because of
the danger of exposure of it. But it is something that I sin-
cerely believe we must retain the full panoply of potential for.
One does riot know what 1985 or 1990 may bring.
[Applause]
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? 15
AUKOFER: In that connection, do you anticipate a
continuing shift to greater reliance upon electronic intelli-
gence?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes and no. Over the past decade
and a half, the capabilities of electronic and photographic
reconnaissance techniques have expanded remarkably. This is
part of the great strength of our country, in its marvelous
technical expertise and its ability to translate that exper-
tise into practical application. So today we are almost sur-
feited with information derived from what we call these tech-
nical intel l igence-collection sources, and they become more
capable at all times.
But when you look at this situation in its broad
aspects, you must appreciate that, as a generalization, what
you obtain from a photograph or a signals-intercept generally
tells you about something that happened some time in the past.
And as soon as I tell this to a policymaker, he looks me in the
eye and says, "Stan, why did it happen, and what's going to
happen next?" And there is where the human intelligence acti-
vity comes in. It is the forte of the spy to divine, to find,
to learn what other people's intentions, attitudes, plans, poli-
cies are.
And so, my view is, yes, electronic intelligence is
increasing, because the technical capabilities are continuing
to increa.se; but, no, it is not relatively more important,
because as you gain more technical inforration, you must have
more human information to complement it.
And, therefore, our emphasis is to have a balanced.
approach in this. And within last year, I have requested and
the President has directed the establishment, under Lieutenant
General Frank Kamm (?), who was introduced to you here, something
called a National Intelligence Tasking Center. And by that I
mean tasking technical intelligence, human intelligence, and
making it work as a team.
That is what is different today. We have increased
emphasis on the importance of bringing together, in teamwork,
all of the collection elements, be they technical or human.
AUKOFER: Occasionally we get a question that's based
on something I haven't heard about, but that's not important.
The questioner would like to know whether there's any truth to
the report that Soviet leader Brezhnev died in January and a
lookalike is substituting for him.
[Laughter]
ADMIRAL TURNER: If he has, he's fooled me.
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AUKOFER: This questioner would like to know whether
the CIA is looking for violations of the arms embargo to South
-.=r ica, anj , , .o, . hether it's found any.
ADMIRAL TURNER: Surely it is our responsibility to
understand the military posture of countries around the world
that are of concern to us, and that would include trying to
understand what the South Africans' capability is to obtain
and manufacture and handle their weapon systems. But I am not
in the business of policing the laws of this country and deter-
mining if Firm X or Y is avoiding a legal sanction against
sending arms to South Africa. That's over in the law enforce-
ment department.
AUKOFER: This questioner would like to know how
the intelligence community will be able to demonstrate to the
American public and the Congress that it can reliably verify
the provisions of the pending SALT II treaty.
ADMIRAL TURNER: This is one of our great challenges
in the months ahead, if a treaty is signed soon. And I'll be
frank with you. I doubt that I will be able to make a persua-
sive explanation of the degree to which we can verify in the
public forum, for the reasons we've been discussing so much
today. But I am confident that I can give a succinct, clear
statement of what those capabilities are and what they are not
to the Congress.
And I would also like to give you this assurance:
that as the SALT negotiations have proceeded, each term, each
proposal made by the Soviets or made by ourselves has come to
us in the intelligence community for scrutiny. And for each
one, I have gone back and said, "This is the potential for
verification that we see, with our intelligence sources. This
is how we think that capability may increase or decrease over
the years ahead. And therefore, in a sense, this is the risk
you are taking if you accept this provision. And here are some
suggestions for how you might write that differently that would
help us better verify it."
So I can assure you I am convinced that those who make
the decisions on what we should offer and what we should accept
are well possessed of the information that I have, in its grea-
test detail, about how well we could verify those provisions.
AUKOFER: An equal opportunity question. The ques-
tioner would like to know, are there many female citizens in
the United States acting as spies? And would you recommend
spying as a good profession for women?
[Laughter]
 Approved For Release 2007/03/15: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200100001-1
ADMIRAL TURNER: Definitely.
f_Lauahter,
ADMIRAL TURNER: In fact, I must admit to the ladies
that we have been remiss in the Central Intelligence Agency in
getting enough women into the clandestine side of our business.
And therefore there is greater opportunity for them, proportion-
ally, than for males, because we are anxious to redress that
shortcoming.
There are a few instances in which being in the clan-
destine business as a lady is not satisfactory. There are some
countries where you just can't walk out. on the street, as a
lady, and not be noticed as being unusual, because of their
culture and their society.
But there are, in my opinion, as many other instances
in which a lady might be even preferable to a man in doing the
kind of clandestine work that we have to do.
So the opportunities are there. We are stressing it
in our recruiting. We are getting wonderful applicants from
young ladies in our country, and we're just anxious for any more.
And if whoever wrote the question wi I I send me an address, we'll
get you a recruiter out there right away.
[Laughter]
AUKOFER: This questioner refers to President Carter's
austerity program, announced yesterday, about reduction of federal
employees; wants to know whether this will affect your operating
capacity and will we get a subpar intelligence program because of
this, and do you propose to request relief from President Carter's
edict?
ADMIRAL TURNER: I don't believe, at this time, it will.
But I must confess to you that we have to wait and get the inter-
pretations, the exact rulings from the Office of Management and
Budget, in particular, as to how the President's directive is to
be carried out. But at this point, in the clandestine service
we have just been talking about, we are overstrength to where we
expect to be at the end of this fiscal year.
You will recall that, with some controversy, a year ago
next week I ordered a 820-position reduction in our clandestine
service. We're still in the process of executing that. So we
have some slack here. If the employment levels go down, it won't
hurt us.
Let me explain to you too, in response to the pre -- in
connection with the previous question about balance between elec-
 Approved For Release 2007/03/15: CIA-RDP99-004988000200100001-1
tronic and human intelligence collection, that this 820 reduction
was by no means indicated -- or, intended to reflect a change of
nriphasjS. It was simply a recognition of a very long-standing
fact: that we were overstaffed; and that, to me, was very inimical
to the long-term interests of our country and of the Central Intel-
I igence Agency.
We have outstanding young people who have come in, even
during the intensity of criticism of the CIA. And if I am going
to challenge them and inspire them to stay in this organization
and be the backbone of it in 10, 15, 20 years, we must challenge
them today with a full and meaningful job. And if we're over-
staffed and they are underutilized and oversupervised, we'll never
make it.
AUKOFER: We have several questions on the Freedom of
Information Act: How does it affect the operations of the CIA?
Do you see any prospect of repealing the Freedom of Information
Act, and would you like to?
ADMIRAL TURNER: No, I would not like to. I think the
Freedom of Information Act has provided a very valuable service
to our country. It consumes, however, over 100 man-years of
Central Intelligence employee time, and much, much of that is
wasted. We have so few requests that we can fulfill, with
respect to the number that come in, because of the classification
point of view, that we spin our wheels having to be conscientious
and review document after document, and turning them down.
We hope there will be some relief in the Congress-from
the procedures which are required here.
We have -- Jack Blake, our Assistant -- Deputy Director
for Administration is sitting down here.
Jack, how many man-years did we consume with just ful-
filling Mr. Agee's requests alone?
JACK BLAKE: About nine man-years so far, sir.
ADMIRAL TURNER: We've consumed nine man-years just
responding to one American -- I hate to call him an American --
citizen's request, one person.
And every time we issue anything or we have anything
appear in the press, we get requests from certain organizations
in this town, one after the other; and we have to go through
these in infinite detail.
It just is an unreasonable situation and cost to the
taxpayer today. And I think it can be mitigated by some modi-
fication. But I think the basic principal of giving the. public
 Approved For Release 2007/03/15: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200100001-1
access to things that need not be classified is a very good one.
n'J:O'=ER: AdriiraI Turner, art thank you very much for
appearing here today, and we have for your our National Press
Club certificate of appreciation and a National Press Club tie.
And I have one final question for you, asked of you
in your dual capacity of Director of Central Intelligence and
as a former football player for the U.S. Naval Academy. The
Washington Redskins won their first game, it was said, because
they had a game plan report from the other team. Now that
they've lost two in a row, what can the CIA do to help them
get game plans in the future?
[Laughter and applause]
ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, I'd like to help the Redskins
in the worst way, but the only thing I can do is to quote my
football mentor, the man who meant a great deal to me in ny
life, who's sitting right in front of me here, E.E. "Rip" Miller
of the Naval Academy coaching staff. And I still remember the
day when after three tries from our six-inch line Notre Dame
failed to cross the goal line, the whistle blew and the game
ended. We all went running into the locker room, jumping and
shouting. And as we got in there Rip looked at us and said,
"Gentlemen, long after those deeds have been forgotten, the
score w i l l be remembered. You tied."
[Laughter]
ADMIRAL TURNER: Thank you.
[Applause]