ADDRESS BY ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER, DCI, TO THE ARMED FORCES COMMUNICATIONS AND ELECTRONICS ASSOCIATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-00498R000200120009-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 28, 2007
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: June 20, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2007/03129: CIA-RDP99-00498800020012000,9-1
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Address by Admiral Stansfield Turner
Director of Central Intelligence
Armed Forces Cor~munications and
Electronics Association
Sheraton-Carlton House,
Washington, D.C.
Wednesday, 20 June 1979
I am indeed pleased to be with this particular association because
there is such a close association between you and your industries and us
in the intelligence community. The challenges facing you throughout
your business life are very similar to those that beset the intelligence
community today. I suggest that one of your first challenges is to
adapt to the events in the world around us which are changing ail the
time. A second challenge you always face is to predict what science and
technology will bring forth that you can make available to your customers.
And a third challenge is to anticipate what those customers needs and
demands are going to be in the years ahead. I admire the way in which
you meet those three challenges. Let me describe how they are similar
to our challenges in the intelligence business of our country.
First, we must adapt to a different perception that the United
States has of its role in the world. Second, we must adapt to the
greater sophistication in the techniques of collecting intelligence
which you and others in related industries are making available to us.
Third, we must adapt to a much different attitude of the public of this
country that wants to know more about intelligence activities than ever
before. I would like very quickly to discuss with you how we are trying
to respond to these challenges.
First, let me look at the changing perception the United States
has of its role in the world. We are, I believe, in a state of tran-
sition in public attitudes towards foreign affairs. We are moving
away from an activist interventionist outlook to one which recognizes
more clearly the limits on our ability to influence events in foreign
countries. We are not becoming isolationists. Quite the contrary. 4Je
are gradually emerging from our post-Vietnam aversion to intervening on
the international scene and entering into a national vie4r of the world
which is much 'mare reasoned and balanced, Clearly, the United States
must continue to play a major role o-~ the world scene. What is dif-
-ferent perhaps is that in today's circumstances we must guage mare
care Fully what that role can and should be.
For instance, look at the difficulty today in simply deciding
,ywhom we are for and whom we are against in any international issue.
Traditionally, we always. were in favor of the fellow the Soviets
were against. Today, things are not quite that simple. In the last
year and a half there have been at least two international conflicts
in which two communist nations were pitted against each other with
the Soviets supporting one but not the other in each case. Neither
was a likely candidate for our support.
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Beyond that, today, it is not nearly so clear that the United-
States should take sides in every international issue even if the
Soviets are pressing for an advantage. The consequences of any nations
succumbing to communist influence is not as irreversible as perhaps we
once thought. Look back on Indonesia, Egypt, the Sudan, Somalia. All
came under substantial communist influence and all have returned to
independence. Now what this adds up to is not that eve are impotent on
the international scene, but that the leverage of our influence, while
still considerable, must be exercised more subtly. tde must be more
concerned with long term influences rather than just putting a finger in
the dike. And if we want to be able to anticipate rather than simply
react to events, the intelligence community must be able to recognize
and interpret the underlying themes and forces which we can expect to
influence events over time. This means a vastly expanded scope of
intelligence work. '
Thirty years ago the primary focus in intelligence was on Soviet
military activities. Today the threat to our national well-being comes
not only from the Soviets and from the military. We must be equally
concerned with politics, economics, food resources, population growth,
narcotics, international terrorism and technology transfer to name just
a few. These new areas of concern represent the expanding intercourse
among nations in an increasingly interdependent world. Many of you may
be involved in the questions of technology transfer. While I have
listed it here as a new concern, the first recorded instance of tech-
nology transfer problems for our country was in 1622.. Just south of
here, near Jamestown, a new colony of 200 settlers was almost wiped out
by an Indian tribe. The home company in England immediately dispatched
a ship with new military equipment so the settlers could defend themselves
against these Indians. They got body armor from the Tower of London, and
some of the most sophisticated crossbows of that day. When they arrived
near Jamestown they handed out the body armor although it was not much
use against Indians. But when they looked at the crossbows they realized
that to transfer to this continent the technology of a sophisticated
crossbow was more than they could possibly risk. They took them all
back to England. That is a true story. So technology transfer problems
are nothing new today, though I would suggest today that poor handling
of technology transfer can have a much greater impact on our country
than in the days of crossbows.
There is not an academic discipline, not a geographical area of the
world in whidh we in the intelligence community can afford not to be ..
well-informed if we are going to serve policy makers well. Thus, this
is a more demanding time perhaps than ever before for intelligence
and it is a time of vast expansion of the subject matter with which
we must be intimately concerned.
The second trend bringing change is the technological revolution in
the way that we collect information. It is a revolution that I hardly.
need detail to this audience. Thanks to you, our national capabilities
in the technical area--in overhead photography, in signals intercept--are
unequaled~in the world. Interestingly, however, rather than denigrating
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the role of the human intelligence agent or the spy, these burgeoning
capabilities in photography and signals intercept in fact heighten the
importance of the human intelligence element. The more information that
our technical systems provide to us the more questions are raised.
Generally, a photograph or a signals intercept tells us something that
happened in the past. The policy maker then asks why it happened and
what may happen next. Discerning intentions, plans, incentives of
foreign individuals or nations is the forte of the human intelligence
agent.
Thus, today our challenge is not only to be able to absorb and
utilize the vast quantities of technically collected information
but also to be able to pull that effort together in an orchestrated,
complementary manner so that we can acquire the information this country
needs with minimum risk and cost. '
Now I am sure this sounds logical and simple, but as you all well
know, intelligence in our country is spread over a vast bureaucracy. It
is lodged in many departments and agencies, each with its own priorities.
We can no longer absorb and process this flow of intelligence efficiently
if we adhere to traditional, compartmented, parochial ways of doing
business. So, there has been some fundamental restructuring to accom-
modate these changes. A year and a quarter ago President Carter signed
a new Executive Order which gave to the Director of Central Intelligence
new authority over the budgets of all national intelligence organiza-
tions and authority to direct the way in which they collect intelligence.
The task of developing a true sense of teamwork among a myriad of
agencies, bureaus, and organizations is still in the process of evolving.
But, it is having a very substantial effect on the whole intelligence
apparatus.
The third element driving change today is the increased public
attention to intelligence activities ever since the investigations
from 1974 to 1976. Those investigations brought to American intelligence
more public attention than has ever before been brought to bear on a
major intelligence organization. The impact could not help but be
substantial and frankly, ~?~ithin the intelligence community, it has
been traumatic. The right kind of attention can be beneficial both to
us and to the American public. By the right kind I mean visibility
which gives the public access to information about the general way
we go about our business and why we are doing what we are doing, and
which also confirms that the controls which have been established over
the intelligence community are being exercised as was intended.
To achieve this right kind of visibility, the intelligence community
is more open. We pass more of the information which we gain and produce
to you, the American public, through unclassified publication of our
q, studies than ever before. We look at every analysis or an estimate that
we do and ask ourselves, if we take out that information which would
reveal our sources and that information which gives our policy makers a
special advantage in foreign policy, will the remaining substance
support the conclusions we have come to and is the topic adequately
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important to the public that we should publish it. .If the answer is
yes, we do. In addition, we answer questions from the press more; we
speak in public more, as T am privileged to tonight, we participate more
in academic conferences and symposia. I know that the intelligence
community is doing an honorable and a vital job for our country and it
is doing it well. I personally want you to know as much about it as is
compatible with our being able to continue to do that job well.
Still, some of the visibility that we have received in recent years
is definitely unwanted. Unwanted because it benefits neither Americans
nor our friends and allies. Here I am talking primarily about the
unauthorized disclosure of information that has been properly classified.
At the least, these disclosures have demoralized an intelligence service
that has traditionally and of necessity operated largely in secrecy.
Far more important is the destructive effect that such disclosures can
and do have on our ability to do the job we are mandated to do by the
President and the Congress. No foreign country or individual wil l
entrust lives or sensitive information to us if they do not believe we
can keep secrets. It is impossible to carry out the quest for information
in a closed society like the Soviet Union, if what we do and how we do
it ultimately becomes public knowledge. Improper revelations damage our
country's long term ability to know what is going on in the many closed
societies around the world.
Yet, let me hasten to add that in my view increased visibility
is a net plus. We do need the American public's understanding and
support. We must avoid possible abuses. Yet, at the same time we must
recognize that with visibility there are also minuses. There are
inhibitions on the actions we will take, on the risks that we can take.
The issue before our country today is how do we balance our desire for
privacy and propriety with the resulting reduction in intelligence
capability and covert action potential.
Congress is expected to give expression to this issue of balance
shortly. It will do so through the enactment of charters. Charters
which set forth what we are authorized to undertake, establish the
boundaries within which we must act, and create the oversight mechanism
to check on our activities. It is my sincere hope that Congress will
pass these charters during this present session. Written with care and
sensitivity to the kinds of problems I have been discussing with you,
charters could help to resolve some of these fundamental difficulties.
Overreaction either by tying the intelligence community's hands or by
creating no controls whatsoever would be a mistake. On the one hand,
emasculating .necessary intelligence capabilities, on the other, inviting
--abuse.
Let me assure you that in my view our nation's intelligence
capabilities are strong and sound. The intelligence community is under-
,? going substantial change and that is never an easy or a placid process
in a large bureaucracy. Out of this present metamorphosis is emerging a
new intelligence community. One in which the legal rights of our
citizens and the controls and restrictions on intelligence activities
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will be balanced with the necessity of gaining information essential to
foreign policy. This is not an easy transition. We are not there yet.
Sut, we are moving surely in the right direction. When we reach our
goal, we will have constructed a new model of intelligence, a uniquely
American model. One tailored to the laws and standards of our society.
As rve proceed toward this goal we need your understanding and support.
For that reason I am grateful to have had this opportunity to be with
you tonight. Thank you again for letting me be here and for all you do
for us. God bless you,