ADDRESS BY ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER, DCI, TO THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-00498R000200140016-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 27, 2007
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: November 19, 1980
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2007/03/27: CIA-RDP99-00498R000200140016-1
4.
Address by Admiral Stansfield Turner
Director of Central Intelligence
to the United States Coast Guard
Ft. McNair, Washington, D. C.
1200, Wednesday, 19 November 1980
Good afternoon. I want to keep my remarks short, hope that you would ask Questions or
or give me some suggestions. I would like to cover two things with you briefly.
One is some feelings I have about the prospect this country faces as we move on
into the 1980s. Second is the some thoughts about how we in the world of United States
intelligence can better support you in what I believe may be growing responsibilities
in the United States Coast Guard. Those responsibilities will grow in part out of
the change in prospect I see for the United States in the decade ahead. The think
the 80s are going to be a more difficult period for our country than were the 60s or
the 70s. First, because it will be for the first time that the Soviet leadership
has not felt militarily inferior to the United States, and this is bound to affect
the way we do business in the world, particularly with the Soviet Union.
Obviously it is going to effect what we do with our own military programs, but my
concern is no matter what we do with those, for the better part of this decade
the perception of the Soviets, and the perception of a better part of the world
is going to be military parity at the best. That means you can't bludgeon the Soviets,
it doesn't mean we have to give into them or lull over or that we are going to be in
a weaker position inherently than they, but it does mean that we have to adapt our
tactics, we have to be better informed, we have tabemore understanding of the forces
that are driving them and driving the rest of the world.
The second factor that is going to make the 80s more difficult is that I
do not believe the advanced economic countries, the developed countries of western Europe,
Japan and ourselves can in the 1980s expect the same continued high rate of economic
growth we have known in the past. For instance, in 1980 the OPEC countries are going
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to cream off the top of world trade ?10 Hllion, that is after they have sold everythinn
they sell to us, they have bought everything, they can buy from us, they are noinc to.
have $110 billon left over. Now, billions are just numbers - now let me put it into
perspective, that same number in 1978, 2 years ago was $2 billion. Why? It goes back
to the 3 1/2 fold increase in the oil prices of 1973 and 1974 that the OPEC countries
imposed on the rest of the world. That shot their balance of trade up very much,
$50-60 billion dollars in 1974, but by 1978 it warmed down to $2 billion. First, because
they were buying more from us, but secondly because of inflation we ate away their profits
through inflation. In 1979, having gone all the wax down to $2 billion they started pushing
the price back up again, they are now at $110 billion net profit and they are not going
to let us eat that away with inflation, they are going to index the price of oil to the
price of inflation to the rate of inflation and to the rate of growth of our economy
in the west. So, we are going to be faced with the prospect of finding ways to recycle
that money. You can imagine the impact this kind of surplus has on the rest of the world.
It means that the money the rest of us we-e receiving is now doing there instead and it
particularly impacts the lesser developed countries and their economies.
Another reason the economic forecast for the 80s does not look good for us,
is that there will be constraints on the amount of energy we can have. We predict at the
Central Intelligence Agency that the best ire can expect is a one or two percent in annual
growth in the rate of energy supply over the better part of this decade. That will not
sustain 3, 4, 5 or 6 percent growtht of overall national product in the major developed
countries. There is going to be a limitation here when we get out of the recession
as to how much we can expand and revive our economy based on how much we can find new energy.
The third problem for the 80s that we must consider is that our allies are not
going to managed and worked with in the same way as in the past. NATO, Japan, these countrie
are sound politically, they are prosperous economically an perhaps more than ever since
all the crises in the Middle East they recognize that they have not to have a say in those
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things that effect their vital national interests, like the oil supplies on which they surviv
Now I am not trying to say to you that the alliance is going to break down or that NATO
is going to be weaker, but I am saying to you that we are going to have to have a more
participatory management, they are going to want to have their points heard in all the
counsels of the alliance, even more than in the past. It is not easy to make an alliance
of these many countries work smoothly unless you really make a big effort at it.
To make that effort to find out how to recycle the petrol dollars, to find out how to
adjust to the mental perception around the world of military parity between us and the
Soviet Union, I think there is only one answer and that is to be better informed.
We have got tobe more astute. We have got to be able to look ahead and forecast
events. We have got to be able to understand the problems and cultures of other societies
with whom we deal even more, and from my parochial point-of-view that means better
intelligence. It means we must strengthen and continue to build on the fine intelligence
organization that we do have in this country. Over the recent_.-- years, the intelligence
community of our country has been characterized by two major changes. One has been the
burgeoning technical collection capabilities that the technological capabilities, the
inventiveness of the industry of America has given us. The satellite, the signals
listening capabilities, and so on. We have just great quantities of information
coming to us today, more than we have ever had before and the prospect is how to
absorb what we get in the future. It doesn't put the human intelligence,the espionage
business any lower on the priority list, in fact it even heightens it, because you
know more. What you don't know, you know pieces of it from the technical side
but you don't know things like why did they do that and you now target your espionage
activity on that.
The second change, however, and one that comes close to you is the expanding
arena of interests of America which our intelligence community must support. We started
out after the war largely focused on the Soviet Union and its client statesand on their
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military capability. We have been expanding ever sin,,, rn in economics, much more
political and into many, many more of 150 pdd countric:: ;.hrouohout the world where
we do have important interests. In addition, the topics in which we must be concerned
are rapidly expanding. Today I am expected to predict the Soviet grain harvest within
a few bushels. A columnist once mentioned when we missed it by 10%, "Turner can't
predict the Soviet grain harvest, how can he tell how many missiles they have got."
I wrote back to him that I can see a missile a lot easier than I can an ear of corn.
We have to know the psychology, the health of world leaders around the world
we are concerned with the trends in population growth, societal change in many lesser
developed countries in the world. Then we are concerned in a number of topics that
really do impact the United States Coast Guard. International narcotics flow, the
and developm nt
Law of the Sea and all the ramifications of fishing and oil exploration/an mining t~ia
come from it, International terrorism, search and rescue. Humanitarian issues like
refugees and emigres. Here, your field, I need not tell you, is expanding in all of
these areas. I know the problem you are facing. Your resources are stretched thin
and the needs are growing, the interest of the country in these fears is increasing.
I would suggest to you there is more we can do working together as a team.
Narcotics, for instance. I don't know precisely how much effort you are required to
put on stopping the narcotics flow into this country, I personally hope it is large
because I think it is a pressing problem one that must be arrested.
We working in international intelligence, foreign intelligence, of course
are looking at where the narcotics are originating, how they are flowing, whose doing it
what the route processes are. I would suggest that we need to be sure that we are
tying this together with you and what efforts you are trying to make to arrest that
flow directly into the continental United States. I hope so, I hope that we can
provide something of assistance here that can make your stretched resources go a little
further.
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On the Law of the Sea, I am sure you envisage that all these 200 mile limits,
renulations that are going to come soon about mining and off-shore development that these
will stretch your resources very thin as to patrol requirements and to check on these
laws and so on. Here again, we have our photographic satellites there is no reason
they can't be turned to your advantage and to supplement your patrols in aircraft and
ship requirements. We need to know what you need to know, we need to know where and
how often and so on. I think much can be done here to supplement your resources and
to help you.
Fishing. We keep track of foreign fishing activities in our waters.
We have ideas about where they are fishing and the extent of it. I am sure you do
very much the same. I am sure if we complement our activities and dovetail them better
we can each benefit.
Prospective mining. Development of oil resources off-shore. We are very
involved in knowing who is involved in this and where. I think there is no necessity
in the long run as this area develops much more for the Coast Guard to have to go
out and investigate each instance. We may be able through both satellite photography
and other techniques to be able to tell you without leaving your headquarters a good
bit about what is going on.
Terrorism. We put a great deal of effort on trying to blunt international
terrorism. We put out an unclassified study once a year on the trends in international
terrorism. I have to tell you that we are predicting that the rate of terrorist
incidents involving U.S. businesses and business people is going to increase, and with
it very possibly your interest and involvement too. I would not be surprised
if one of these days we had a renewal of the incident of a number of years ago of
ship-jacking. Something that would very much involve you. But, here again I believe
the work we do in foreign countries to penetrate, understand and know about foreign
terrorist organizations, sometimes we help thwart their plans and intentions right there.
Other times we don't have that capability, but we can give clues as to intending
that may impinge on areas of national interest that you keep surveillance over.
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Of course, one of the things that first got me thinking in these i sections
was the day I sat in the White House with Admiral Costello here on the ouEStion of
the Cuban flow from Mariel to Florida and realized that he had information that I needed
and didn't have and that I had information he needed and didn't have. Jack, I hope
we are working to smooth that out, I know I have given instructions to that end if it
hasn't worked see me afterwards.
The whole sensitivity of the world and of this country to humanitarian problems
like the flow of emigres from Vietnam which absorbed some of the U.S. Navy's resources,
the flows from Haiti and Cuba which are absorbing yours is going to grow, is isn't
something that is going to diminish. There is, because of mass communications today
so much more public opinion and.interest in events like this there is no way you
will be able to avoid the repercussions on the use of your resources. I hope that if
we share with you more we can be better in predicting when these things are likely to
occur and helping you to.monitor them as they go along.
The same is with search and rescue efforts, perhaps in some instances there
our capabilities are such that they assist you or either make your allocation of
resources less or more efficient. What I am saying to you, is I think the prospect
ahead is exciting for you and for me. I am saying that in 30 some years as a naval officer
I frankly had very little interplay.with the United States Coast Guard. I think in.the
future you are going to have to be much more involved, much more integrated with all
of the military and many of the non-military elements of our government and particularly
with the intelligence community and I think that is going to make your involvement
in the international affairs of this country more important, more decisive and your
lives and your careers more exciting and I hope that the closer connection should and
must be vowed, in particular in my present responsibilities in the intelligence world
and your responsibilities off the coast of our country is going to help both of us.
Make both of our lives, both of our contributions to our country more interesting and
more productive. Wd stand ready to support you, your responsibilities to -'our country
are going to grow in the years ahead, I hope we can help you with them. Thank you.