CONTROVERSY OVER "CZAR" FOR INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-00498R000300030028-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 15, 2007
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: February 6, 1978
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

orr PAGE U - Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP99-00498R000300030028-9 _ Z ,,, rt c t v~ :-.
Controversy
Over 'Czar" for
Intelligence
A sweeping reorganization of Ameri-
ca's crisis-ridden intelligence system
gives unprecedented powers to a con-
troversial Navy officer.
Adm. Stansfield Turner, an Annap-
olis classmate of Jimmy Carter, gets
wide authority over all spying activities
overseas in the reform plan unveiled
by the President on January 24.
As Director of Central Intelligence,
he will supervise spending on foreign
espionage activities by all Government
agencies-the Central Intelligence
Agency, which he heads, as well as the
Defense Department, Federal Bureau
of Investigation and Treasury.
Also, Turner will co-ordinate the
overseas intelligence-gathering oper-
ations of these agencies and play a key
role in setting priorities-for example,
whether American spies and recon-
naissance satellites should concentrate
on China's economic and political pros-
pects or its military potential.
Turner's new deputy, Frank Car-
lucci, a career diplomat, disclosed at a
January 27 confirmation hearing that
he will take over day-to-day running of
the CIA.
Ironically, the new reorganization
scheme that strengthens Turner's role
came amid speculation that the 54-
year-old Admiral actually was on the
skids as Director of the CIA.
The speculation surfaced the day be-
fore Carter announced the new setup.
The Detroit sews published a Wash-
ington report to the effect that
Turner's ouster was being sought by
National Security Adviser Zbigniew
Brzezinski and Defense Secretary Har-
old Brown with the tacit co-operation
of Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance.
Praise from Carter. Denials came
from all sides-Turner, Brown, Brze-
zinski and Vance. And the President
himself went out of his way to reaffirm
his confidence in the intelligence chief.
After signing the order expanding
Turner's authority, the President
praised the CIA Director for his "su-
perb" performance, adding:
"I want to express my complete ap-
preciation and confidence in Admiral
Stan Turner, whose responsibilities un-
der this executive order will be greatly
magnified."
Despite the denials, informed Wash-
ington observers say there is convinc-
ing evidence of a strong effort in the
Carter Administration to undercut the
CIA Director. The challenge first ap-
peared inside the Central Intelligence
Agency after Turner initiated a far-
reaching plan to tighten discipline and
shift emphasis from covert activities to
analytical intelligence. CIA veterans
complained that he was aloof and inac-
cessible and that he was surrounded by
a "Nagy mafia," a small group of offi-
cers appointed to his personal staff.
The grumbling reached a climax at
the end of last year when the CIA Di-
rector delivered dismissal notices to
820 officials in the Directorate of Op-
erations. This unit handles all clandes-
tine activities-both traditional spying
and "dirty tricks" of the kind that led
to a protracted scandal and a series of
official investigations.
Disgruntled clandestine operatives
charged that Turner was relying exces-
sively on technology at the expense of
traditional espionage methods. In the
interview appear in:; on these pages,
the CIA Director _.:.,?5'.,is views on the
purge and his new
The controversy-and the "dump
Turner" movement-extends beyond
the CIA into the White House and the
Defense Department. Key members of
Brzezinski's staff have put out hints
that Turner was alienating the Presi-
dent by attempting to act as an adviser
on policy as well as intelligence.
The strongest but least publicized
challenge to the intelligence chief has
come from Defense Secretary Brown.
For more than six months the Penta-
gon boss has fought a running battle to
limit Turner's control over Defense
Department intelligence operations. In
private, Brown argued that demands
made by the Director of Intelligence
would seriously impair his ability to dis-
charge his responsibilities for the na-
tion's defense, especially in a war crisis.
Top Pentagon officials say that the
President's executive order gives
Turner much but by no means all the
authority he sought. Carter himself
spelled out this definition of the ex-
panded role of the intelligence boss:
"Admiral Turner will be responsible
for tasking or assigning tasks to all
those who collect intelligence. He will
also have full control of the intelli-
gence budget and will also be responsi-
ble for analysis of information that does
come in from all sources in the foreign
intelligence field."
That seems close to the job descrip-
tion of an intelligence czar. But Penta-
gon officials say that is not how they
interpret the executive, order reorga-
nizing the system. They predict a con-
tinuing battle if Turner attempts to
take over functions that Defense Sec-
retary Brown deems indispensable. 0
V1,
Carter's man at the CIA is
under fire for purging
the "dirty-tricks department"
and reforming the whole spy
system. Here he explains what
he is doing-and why.
Q Admiral Turner, how do you answer
the charges that you're emasculating intel-
ligence operations overseas by getting rid
of 820 officials In the clandestine services?
A We are not cutting the clandes-
tine service overseas. We are not emas-
culating its capability to collect
intelligence for us.
The 820 cut is coming out of the
headquarters. Reducing overhead and
reducing unnecessary supervision of
the people in the field will, in fact,
have the reverse impact: It will in-
crease productivity overseas. .
Q If you're merely getting rid of super-
fluous overhead, why have the clandes-
tine services become so bloated?
A Because the mission of intelli-
gence in this country has changed over
the last 30 years, we have to adapt to
the change.
Thirty years ago, we were interested
primarily in collecting intelligence
about the Soviet Union, its satellites and
the few countries around the world
where they were trying to establish a
position. Today, we're interested in in-
telligence in a wide variety of countries.
Also, for most of the past 30 years, the
Central Intelligence Agency was called
upon by the nation not only to tell what
was going on overseas but to help influ-
ence events-for,example, in Guatema-
la, Iran, Cuba, Vietnam, Angola.
Today, we don't think that kind of ?
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CIA's Turner Shrikes Back...
EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW WITH U.S. INTELLIGENCE CHIEF
Adm. Stans$eiti Turner 54 11"" tulli to the nu- young people in their early 30s to get
man intelli
l
gence peop
e of the CIA for them to stay in this career. I am trying
an Annapolis classmate of President ?i those answers
. to remove enough at the top to create
Carter, left as commander, in chief So, contrary to the implication of more opportunities so that there will
of NATO forces in Southern Europe your question, the advent of better be young people coming forward with
to take over the crisis= ridden CIA n__] - ,,__. _ L_ I ,
-;.? .- -- IV leC.,v1, Has tea to greater adequate training and with an added
in February,:1977 A'"graduate- - - demands for the kind of collection incentive to make this a career.
of Amherst CollegeandaaRhodes which is done by the human intelli- I would rather have a short-term
Scholar at Oxford Universt
i ~Turnerr
Y~ Bence element.
morale problem among these disaf-
headed the Naval-War,, College Q What about the allegations that you fected people whom we have had to
from 1972 to-1974 ? alter
??-, r-w.C fit sure an gruntiea for a very short period of
abrupt manner? time than I would to have a long-term,
A There have b l f
ee
n ots o com- gnawing morale problem existing in
interference in other people's
PeoP govern plaints because nobody likes to be asked the bowels of this organization, where
ments-political action--is as useful a to leave. the future lies.
too] for this country. We're not es- My measure of basic morale, howev- Q Are you at all concerned about the
chewing it completely, but we're er, is that I see no drop in the dedica- possibility of any of these disaffected pea
downplaying it. tion, in the quality of the work of these pie compromising the CIA--or even engag-
These changes require a shift in the employes. They're a most dedicated, Ing in work with hostile groups?
way the operations of the di t
rec
t
b
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ora
e capa
le lot of people. I have not seen a A I'm not at all concerned about
of operations is organized and run. I drop in the quality of the work. When these people who have been dismissed
believe that we needed to reduce the you make as many changes as I believe being traitors to their country. They're
size of that organization-and I find are necessary in our over-all intelli- dedicated, loyal people who have
::nobody out here who's informed who gence operations today to adapt to the served well for their country. Two
disputes the fact. times-to modernize-you're bound to thirds of them have served long enough
Q Are you "going overboard" in your have grumbling. to retire, and will be pensioned imme-
reliance on technology rather than tradi- I am totally convinced that there is diately upon leaving the Agency. I can't
tional spying to do the job, as some critics wide consensus in the Central Intelli- imagine those people being disloyal or
have complained? gence Agency that these changes are subjecting themselves to the danger of
A Quite the reverse. Everything I generally needed.. I don't say that ev- conducting treason.
am doing is designed to emphasize im- erybody agrees on the exact form and I am most disappointed, however, at
proved human intelligence collection. the exact timing and so on, but the idea the lack of professionalism that some of
One of the things that I have done in that we must move forward into a new them have shown by going to the me-
the past year is to stimulate increased concept, a new age of intelligence, is dia with their personal complaint
interest and attention on the part of universally accepted. against me and against the fact that I
the top policy makers in the Govern- Q But aren't spies and people operat- have had to bite what is a difficult and
ment in what human intelligence col- ing undercover abroad a special breed unpleasant bullet in carrying through a
lection can do for them. And they're who require special handling? retrenchment. That is unprofessional,
giving us lots of support in that direc- A They certainly do. They're a won- and it reflects the worst fears of the
tion, and more guidance as to what derful group. But we must have a new American public about the Central In-
they want. and modern personnel-management telligence Agency-namely, That its
That's what helps to make good clan- system here-and this reduction is part operators will not respond to duly con-
destine intelligence collection. You of a move in that direction. Very frank- stituted authority.
want to collect what people need, not ly, it's long overdue.
And I am pleased that, if we had
what you think is important. We have not in the past planned a ca- people like that in the Agency, they
Now, the advent of new technologi- reer progression to insure that we will are gone, because I will not tolerate
cal means of collecting intelligence is have new blood coming in to replace people who will not follow the duly
one of the factors that is creating these dedicated, marvelous people who constituted leadership. This organiza-
change in the process of intelligence are leaving. We had a wonderful influx Lion must be under full control at all
in a very substantial way. The trouble in the late '40s and early '50s of most-ca- times. Before this planned reduction, I
is that, in a general sense, technical pable, dedicated people. Two things fired five people because they were
intelligence tells you what happened are different today: not under control. The minute I found
yesterday. First, these people have gone out about it, they went out the door.
Ever since the Battle of Jericho in through the system, and we've not pro- There's no mincing words on that one
Biblical times, the human intelligence gramed their replacements. with me.
agent has helped you to find out what's Secondly, they came into the Agency Q As you see it, Admiral Turner, how
likely to happen tomorrow. I find that in a period of cold war-a period of does the reorganization announced by the
the more technical intelligence data I great dedication after World War II- White House on January 23 strengthen
give to the policy makers, the more and they were willing to sacrifice and our intelligence system? -
often they ask me what is going to hap- work. Today I think you have to give A It's a major step forward for the
pen tomorrow-the intentions of the better incentives, better rewards to country. It emphasizes that the policy
 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP99-00498R000300030028-9
makers must get involved with the in-
telligence process in terms of setting
the priorities for what we should do.
Beyond that, it gives to the Director
of Central Intelligence enhanced au-
thorities to insure the adequate co-ordi-
nation of the entire intelligence
apparatus of the country, because there
are a number of agencies and quite a
few people involved. Particularly with
the changes in the ways we collect in-
telligence today, there is a great need
for better co-operation.
Under this new executive order, I
will be permitted to task all the intelli-
gence-collection agencies of the Gov-
ernment that are funded in the
national-intelligence budget. This will
exclude intelligence activities funded
in the defense budget-such as an
Army lookout on a hill,,or a tactical
airplane, or something like that.
Secondly, I am given authority to
put together and present to the Presi-
dent the single national-intelligence
budget and to make the recommenda.
tions to the President on what we
should be buying, how many people
we should have, how much operating
funds that we need for the entire in-
telligence community.
I think that- this new authority will
still leave independence where it's
needed within the intelligence com-
munity, but provide centralized con-
trol where it's been lacking.
Q Under the reorganization, will you, in
effect, become the "intelligence czar"?
A As Director of Central Intelli-
gence, I will have greater authority
than that position has had before. At the
same time, there are clear limits on that
authority-particularly, there are limits
over the interpretation of intelligence.
The last thing that any of us wantisa
single individual who can determine
what the interpretation of the intelli-
gence data is to be.
When it comes to interpretation of-
intelligence, the Defense Intelligence
Agency and the State - Department's
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
are quite independent of the Director
of Central Intelligence. We meld inter-
pretations together and see where we
differ. But I have no authority to tell
them how -to interpret-how to ana-
? lyze the information.
Q What Is being done to guard against
the kinds of abuses by the intelligence -
community that have been so widely pub-
licized in the past few years?
A Well, I think abuses have existed
but have been grossly exaggerated.
Over the last several years, we have
established. in this country some very
fine controls. They amount to what I
call "surrogate public oversight " The
problem is that the public cannot over-
Admiral Turner listens as President Carter announces an executive order that expands
the CIA Director's control over foreign-intelligence operations. --
see the intelligence agencies as it does charters establishing statutory controls
the Department of Agriculture or the over our activities. The degree of detail
Department of Commerce or other in those charters will be very impor-
agencies that work in a more or less tant to our future. -
unclassified atmosphere. - I anticipate a spirited but friendly
So, instead, we have oversight in the and co-operative debate with. the Con-
executive branch by the President and gress over the next few months in just
the Vice President and by the National how those charters are drafted.
Security Council, which, under the Q Admiral Turner, given the enormous
new executive order, has certain over- amount of money that this country pours
sight responsibilities-for instance, Into intelligence activities, why did the CIA
preparing -an annual report on how underestimate the Soviet grain crop by -
we're doing and what we're doing. such a wide margin?
Then there is the Intelligence Over- A First of all, we're not perfect, and
sight Board-three distinguished we're not Avis-we're No. 1, but we're
American citizens-appointed by the still trying hard. -
President to look into the legality and It is not unusual for the Department
the propriety of our intelligence ac of Agriculture to miss the long-range
tivities and to report directly to the forecasts of the American grain crop by
President. 5 per cent. We missed the Soviet crop
Outside the executive branch, we by 10 per cent. Because of reasons of
have the oversight of two committees classification, I can't tell you. all the
of the Congress dedicated just to intel- .. reasons we missed it by 10 per cent.
ligence. They're a big help to us. They But I can assure you that getting de
keep us sort of in tune with the Ameri- tailed information in a country that
can public. I think that's where the hides something that is really of global
intelligence community has gone importance and impact--as the Soviet
astray before: They were a little bit too grain crop is--is not easy. It is particu-
isolated. Going up and testifying on larly difficult when, in the last month of
Capitol Hill regularly keeps you from the season, they had a very bad weather
being isolated. situation there, which we think is large
Q Can you run an effective Intelligence ly what tipped the difference. - -
organization when you must tell so much Let me say, though, that we did prey
to congressional committees? diet that the Soviets were buying grain
A Yes, I believe we can. and would continue to buy grain, and,
The committees have shown a tre- as a result, the market did not jump
mendous sense of responsibility-a tre- markedly or significantly after the an-
mendous sense of restraint-in not nouncement was made of what their
getting into such operational detail harvest was going to be. So we think
that would endanger lives of people or we did serve the American public even
the ways we do things, but stilt getting though our prediction was wrong.
into adequate detail to conduct the We'll always miss one here or there.
kind of oversight that they need. If those are the worst that we missed,
The next year or so will be very im- I'm reasonably happy. But I don't want
portant as we and the Congress work to say that I'm happy that we didn't do
out the next step in this process after well on this.. We are certainly going to
the executive order-that is, legislative- try harder and harder.
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