THE FOLLY OF THE MX MISSILE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-00498R000300040001-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 28, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 13, 1977
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

For Relea$ 2007/03/01 : QIA-RDP99-00498p
P
RWit
h the compliments of
STANSFIELD TURNER
Suite 1200
2361 S. Jefferson Davis Highway
Arlington, VA 22202
[phone]
 or Release 2007/03/01 : CIA-RDP99-004981
,With ,the compliments of
STANSFIELD TURNER
Suite 1200
2361 S. Jefferson Davis Highway
Arlington, VA 22202
[phone]
 prov or~Rtetle 2007 3/ IA-RDP99
March 13, 1983
THE FOLLY OF THE
Our latest ballistic weapon, argues a former C.I.A. director,
makes sense only as the instrument of a nuclear war fighting
strategy whose adoption would threaten America's security. MX MISSILE
By Stanfield
Turner
The United States has
reached a watershed
in its nuclear defense
strategy. President
Reagan and Congress
are trying to decide
what to do about the
MX, the new inter-
continental ballistic missile
that is larger, more expen-
sive, more powerful and
more accurate than any-
thing in our. military ar-
senal. The issue, however,
goes beyond the costs and
proficiency of a new weap-
ons system. The question is
whether deploying the MX
would enhance our security
or detract from it.
For several years now, the
immediate problem with the
MX has been how to base it.
Placed in existing silos, it
would be vulnerable to sur-
prise attack by the Soviet
Union's beefed-up strategic
forces - just as vulnerable
as our present generation of
land-based missiles. There
have been various schemes
for making the MX less vul-
nerable, including the ingen-
ious "dense pack" notion of
placing them so close to=
gether that incoming Soviet
missiles would knock each
other out. These proposals
have all been fended off or
left in abeyance, largely on
the instinct, shared by Con-
gress and the public, that the
ideas made little sense.
Yet it is unlikely that any-
one will be able to find a bas-
ing scheme any more accept-
able than dense pack, not
even the special commission
of experts appointed by the
President to study the prob-
lem. Only two weeks ago, sev-
eral alternative basing
schemes that seem to be no
more practical than dense
pack were offered by the Con-
gressional Research Service,
an agency specializing in
analysis for Capitol Hill. One
of these was to place the mis-
siles in planes that can re-
main airborne for long peri-
ods. Another was to dump the
missiles into the oceans in
cannisters at times of ten-
sion, and to trigger them by
remote control.
It is apparent that any bas-
ing solution for this large a
missile is going to require
highly unusual procedures
and will be highly controver-
sial. In this circumstance, it
is only natural to ask whether
the MX missile is essential to
our national security. Are
there no alternatives? Reach-
ing a judgment on this life-or-
death issue, it seems to me,
involves two basic questions:
(1) What kind. of nuclear
capability do we need? Do we
want an ability to retaliate
against Soviet cities? Or do
we seek the capacity to de-
stroy the Soviet Union's prin-
cipal military targets?
(2) How large a nuclear
force do we require? Must it
be bigger than the Soviet
Union's, or about the same, or
can it be smaller and still suf-
fice?
How our leaders answer
these questions will deter-
mine whether we proceed to-
ward greater stability in the
"balance of terror" between
the United States and the
Soviet Union or toward
heightened instability, with
all the new dangers that
would entail.
types of delivery systems in
our nuclear weapons arsenal.
First, there are the inter-
continental ballistic missiles
(ICBM's) - large, land-
based, relatively immobile
missiles that travel to their
targets by leaving the earth's
atmosphere and re-entering
it on a precalculated trajecto-
ry.
Then there are the subma-
rine-launched ballistic mis-
siles (SLBM's), which follow
the same trajectory as the
ICBM's but are based in spe-
cially designed, nuclear-pow-
ered submarines.
Third, we have the bombers
range aircraft, such as the
B-52's, the core of our bomber
will never be a perfectly in-
vulnerable weapons system,
and trying to achieve one will
be progressively difficult in
the future. We must, instead,
count on making it so compli-
cated for the Russians to
knock out all our nuclear
forces in a short period of
time that they will never feel
confident of their ability to do
it.
The way to increase surviv-
ability is to emphasize mobil-
ity, numbers of weapons and
concealment. Bombers are
mobile, and reasonably safe
from attack when on airborne
alert. Submarines are mobile
and-readily concealed at sea.
Even if there should be a
breakthrough in submarine
detection - and no such
breakthrough is foreseeable
at present - submarines will
certainly remain more diffi-
cult to locate than ICBM's or
bombers. Cruise missiles are
mobile, and small enough to
be concealed, and we could
have large numbers of them.
Thus, for assurance that we
won't be. knocked out by sur-
force - car*ying nuclear prise, our intercontinental
bombs, nuclear forces should be built
Finally, there are those re- ' around these three systems.
cent additions to our invento-
ry, the cruise missiles - un-
manned small aircraft that
are transported to their
launch points on bombers,
submarines or trucks and
that fly at a very low altitude.
Of these four systems, the
land-based missiles are the
most vulnerable to a Soviet
attack a ad the submarines
the least vulnerable. We
should understand that there
Adm. Stanfield Turner,
U.S.N., retired, Director of
Central Intelligence from
1977 to 1981, is a consultant
and lecturer on international
affairs.
 Approved For Release 2007/03/01 : CIA-RDP99-00498ROO0300040001-7
What I am proposing,
therefore, is a shift of empha-
sis in our mix of nuclear
weapons - a shift away from
large ICBM's, like our
present land-based missiles
and the projected MX, to
small, multibased cruise mis-
siles.
Such a move would not only
make our deterrent forces
more survivable but would
serve to reduce the elements
of instability in the Ameri-
can-Soviet nuclear confronta-
tion. For the more we rely on
ICBM's, the more nervous we
will be about the threat of a
surprise attack on them; our
finger will have to be on the
trigger. And because the MX
- added to the capability of
our existing ICBM's - would
give us the potential for a sur-
prise attack on Soviet
ICBM's, it would make the
Russians nervous; their fin-
ger, too, would have to be on
the trigger. Cruise missiles,
on the other hand, are too
slow to threaten a surprise at-
tack and too small to be tar-
geted in a surprise attack by
the Russians. Hence, if the
United States shifted away
from ICBM's and toward
cruise missiles, both sides
would relax somewhat and
the nuclear balance would be
stabilized.
The same combination
would also give us as much
assurance as possible that
our weapons would penetrate-
any Soviet defense. The Rus-
sians would have to construct
both ballistic missile de-
fenses (against our subma-
rine-launched missiles) and
antiaircraft defenses
(against bombers and cruise
missiles traveling in the at-
mosphere). Both sets of de-
fenses would have to be
nearly impregnable.
It is true that because
cruise missiles are small and
easily concealed, it would be
very difficult to verify the
number of these weapons de-
ployed by each side. Because
of this, it is sometimes
argued that shifting to cruise
chances for a new strategic
arms-control agreement and
that is a specious argument.
T he key objective of
arms control is not
control of the number
of weapons but a less-
ening of the likelihood
of anyone starting a
nuclear war, either deliber-
ately or accidentally. The
critical step toward that goal
L is a reduction of the number
of weapons that put people on
edge by posing the threat of a
surprise attack - and those
weapons, by and large, are
the ICBM's. There is no rea-
son why ICBM's cannot be
controlled by agreement -
and bombers and submarines
as well - even if cruise mis-
siles cannot be counted.
The fundamental choice,
then, is not between weapons
of greater or lesser potency
but between greater stability
or less. The so-called nuclear
experts, however, are finding
it difficult to shed conven-
tional military thinking,
"superiority" in weapons and
holds that defeating the
enemy's military forces is the
end objective if war should
break out.
Such emphasis on the
power and number of weap-
ons is misplaced. The levels
of damage in intercontinental
nuclear war are likely to be so
high that most of the weapons
we and the Russians possess
will exceed any conceivable
usefulness. A common nu-
clear weapon today has an ex-
plosive power about 40 times
greater than the bomb that
killed 100,000 people in Hi-
roshima. The United States
and the Soviet Union each has
about 270 urban areas with a
population of more than
100,000. Imagine what several
hundred such warheads could
do to either country.
The United States has about
9,500 nuclear warheads and
the Soviet Union about 8,000,
all capable of being delivered
over intercontinental dis-
tances. Some of these war-
heads are powerful and accu-
rate enough to destroy
"hard" targets, like ICBM
silos, which are built of rein-
forced concrete. The remain-
der of these warheads are
only capable of destroying
"soft" targets, like cities, in-
dustries and basic military
facilities. Some of the sys-
tems could hit their targets
very quickly, because their
time of flight to the Soviet
Union is quite short and be-
cause the communications
link to them is swift and sure.
Others either have relatively
long flight times or, in the
case of submarines, are not
always within reach of quick
communications.
The advantage of the large
land-based missiles is that
they can not only hit "hard"
targets but get there fast.
Bombers and cruise missiles,
while also capable of destroy-
ing "hard" targets, would take
longer to reach their objec-
tives. And we cannot be sure
how long it will take for our nu-
clear-armed submarines to re-
ceive instructions and carry
them out; furthermore, sub-
marine-launched missiles are
not accurate enough to be ef-
fective against ..hard" tar-
gets. By about 1990, however,
the undersea system will be-
come as accurate as the other
three, and the principal dis-
tinction between the four sys-
tems, in terms of their striking
power, will be that bombers
and cruise missiles will take
longer to get there and subma-
rine-based missiles may take
longer to be launched. What
difference will that make?
The question is of funda-
mental importance. For the
answer determines which of
two basic nuclear doctrines
or strategies we adopt.
The first is the doctrine of
retaliation. The two premises
here are that we can deter the
Russians from attacking us
with nuclear weapons by the
threat of a devastating nu-
clear counterblow against
their urban and industrial
centers; and that if, against
all rational expectations,
deterrence fails, we require
only a limited capability to
fight an intercontinental nu-
clear war.
The second is the doctrine
of nuclear-war fighting. The
premises here are that we,
can deter the Russians only if
we are capable of waging and
"prevailing" in a nuclear
war; and that we require a
capability to outlast the Rus-
sians in protracted nuclear
war if deterrence fails.
The most critical point in
deciding between these dif-
ferent approaches is which is
the more likely to prevent the
outbreak of intercontinental
nuclear hostilities.
For many years, the United
States relied on the first doc-
trine - that an assured capa-
bility to retaliate with nu-
clear weapons provided ade-
quate deterrence. This view
rested on the enormous de-
structiveness of nuclear
weapons and the very high
probability that they would
penetrate enemy defenses.
Today, there is no meaningful
defense against ballistic mis-
siles and little against cruise
missiles; only bombers are
vulnerable to serious attri-
tion. Defenses will improve in
the future, but since. only a
few nuclear weapons need ar-
rive on target to do high
levels of damage, defense
will continue to be a difficult
proposition.
What this means is that any
Soviet leader contemplating
initiating nuclear war must
do more than estimate
whether his nuclear forces
could do greater damage to
the United States than ours
could do to the Soviet Union,
or whether he could destroy
all American nuclear forces
and still have some of his own
left. He must ask what might
be the absolute level of dam-
age to the Soviet Union. There
would be little satisfaction to
him in doing more damage to
the United States or eliminat-
ing our nuclear strength if the
damage suffered by the
Soviet Union were unbear-
able.
This kind of calculation -
that a preponderance of nu-
clear force is meaningless if
the opponent retains the ca-
pacity for massive retaliation
- is, of course, an entirely
new way of looking at wars,
and it is probably because of
its newness that it came
under challenge in the United
States some years ago. As one
 Approved For Release 2007/03/01
critic, Colin S. Gray, put the weapons we have if the Rus-
argument in an article last signs were to launch even a
fall, "Deterrence cannot be limited attack on our nuclear
simply based upon the ability
to bring on a holocaust."
"For a threat to be believ-
able, and thus an effective
deterrent," he wrote, "it has
to posit purposive military
actions, and those actions
have to be directed against
targets that are of very high
value to Soviet leaders."
More specifically, Mr.
Gray and others of his per-
suasion worry about what
would happen if the Soviet
leaders were to unleash a nu-
clear attack aimed not at
America's cities but at its nu-
clear forces. Their contention
is that no American Presi-
dent would be likely to imple-
ment the longstanding doc-
trine -of retaliation against
Soviet cities, because he
would know that this would
invite the devastation of
American cities by the Soviet
Union's remaining store of
missiles. Out of such reason-
ing the war-fighting doctrine
was born.
This doctrine says we need
nuclear forces powerful
enough not only to devastate
the Soviet Union's cities but
to destroy its intercontinental
nuclear forces, however long
it takes. Such a capability, it
is argued, would place the
Soviet leaders in the. position
of knowing that they could not
"prevail" if they were to
start a nuclear war with the
United States.
In my view, the doctrine of
nuclear war-fighting is wrong
in denying the credibility of
the threat of retaliation
against Soviet cities and in-
dustry. The argument, to re-
peat, rests on the contention
that the Soviet leaders might
well order a strike at our nu-
clear forces in the. belief that
the American President was
not likely to retaliate with a
blow against Soviet cities.
What this overlooks is the
great uncertainty as to how
anyone would react in such a
situation. There is no prece-
dent on which to base a judg-
ment.
Can anyone say with any
certainty that a President
would not launch all the
weapons sites? Rationality
may not prevail in such cir-
cumstances; or the President
may react before it is clear
that the attack is of a limited
nature; or he may act in the
belief. that the Russians had
launched a full-scale attack;
or he may believe that any
nuclear war is bound to esca-
late, and that our best move
is to go all-out right away and
hope to limit the Russians'
ability to strike a second
time.
Beyond guessing how the
President might react, the
Russians would have to
worry about a complete
breakdown in our chain of
command. What would- the
commanders of our nuclear
submarines do if, knowing
that the United States had
been attacked, they lost all
contact with headquarters?
Just half a dozen submarines
could place almost 1,000 nu-
clear warheads on the Soviet
Union.
In short, any neat calculi
lion as to how' the United
States might respond could be
wrong in so many ways that
no Soviet leader could feel
confident of the outcome of
his launching even a small-
scale nuclear attack on our
country. Even gamblers
grow cautious as the stakes
rise, and a Soviet leader con-
templating . a nuclear attack
on the United States would
know that he would be gam-
bling the very survival of his
society. In my view, only if
we were to push the Soviet
Union into a desperate situa-
tion threatening its existence
as a Communist state could a
Soviet leader conceivably de-
cide on the gamble of a nu-
clear attack on the United
States.
The war-fighting school
also argues that the Russians
are going ahead on their own
to build a nuclear war-fight-
ing capability; that this
makes nuclear war a likely
eventuality; and that the
Russians can be deterred
from initiating such a war
only if we demonstrate to
q&a PrQcL@Q4ty98R20o01d0040001-7
lya
successfully outfight them in
such a conflict.
There is ample evidence
that the Russians are making
very substantial investments
in intercontinental nuclear
forces, and that they are pay-
ing attention to all the compo-
nents of a war-fighting capa-
bility. There is a world of dif-
ference, however, between
preparing for the possibility
of nuclear war and preparing
deliberately to start one.
Nothing- I have seen per.
suades me that the Soviet
leaders' intention in building
their nuclear war machine is
to use it offensively.
In any case, we don't have
to go beyond a strategy of re.
taliation to be able to wage
war against the Soviet
Union's nuclear forces, if
forced to. We already have a
considerable capacity to -en-
gage in that kind of conflict.
As I have noted, all of our four
-nuclear weapons systems are
either capable of striking
hard military targets or will
acquire that capability before
long. A President, then, could
choose to - retaliate only
against cities, or only against
hardened targets, or against
both.
What he could not do with
the bombers, cruise missiles
and submarine-based mis-.
siles is to strike back rapidly.
The key difference between
the war-fighting concept and
the retaliatory strategy
hinges on whether we need an
ability to retaliate quickly. If
we do, ICBM's are clearly es-
sential and cannot be re-
placed by cruise missiles. In
my view, rapid response, in
the event that deterrence
breaks down, is not essential,
and is even dangerous.
I t is a natural military in-
stinct to want to counterat-
tack as rapidly as possible,
in the hope of slowing the
enemy's offensive. In nu-
clear war, however, a
rapid response would have
the opposite effect. If the Rus-
sians were to launch a nu-
clear attack against us, they
would certainly be on the
alert for our response. If we
were to strike back at their
nuclear forces, especially
their vulnerable land-based
missiles, they would have the
option of launching those mis-
siles while our attacking
force was still in flight.
It would make no difference
whether we counterattacked
with ICBM's that could get to
their targets in 30 minutes or
with cruise missiles that took
as long as 12 hours (including
the time it took to transport
them to within launching,dis-
tance). The Russians would
see us . coming and have
ample time to launch their
missiles while ours were on
the way. There is no way to..
gain surprise once the nu-
clear genie is out of the bottle.
By setting an objective of
attacking the Soviet Union's
remaining nuclear weapons
after a Soviet surprise attack,
the war-fighting school would
confront the Russians with '
the alternative of launching
those remaining weapons
quickly or seeing them de-
stroyed. Yet the last thing we
would want to do in that kind
of situation is force the Rus-
sians to launch even more
weapons against us. Instead,
our objective should be to re-
taliate not by going after just
their remaining missiles but
by hitting both military and
civilian targets intensively
enough to demonstrate that
continuing this war would
lead to escalation and disas-
ter,_ __
The object of our counterat-
tack would be to persuade the
Soviet leaders to absorb the
blow and negotiate. That-
would not be an easy decision
for them to make. It would be
more difficult to make in the
130 minutes' warning they
would have of an attack by
our ICBM's than in the four to
12 hours it would take our
'cruise missiles to reach their
targets.
Thus, it would be prefer-
able to conduct such a coun-
terattack with "slow" cruise
missiles or bombers and give
the Russians as much time as
possible to make their deci-
sion. In fact, we would want
to use that time to let the Rus-
sians know exactly what we
 Approved For Release 2007/03/01: CIA-RDP99-00498R000300040001-7
were doing - that a counter-
attack of the same proportion
as their attack on us was irre-
trievably on the way; that we
hoped they would absorb it
and then negotiate; and that
if they fired one more missile
at the United States, our en-
tire remaining arsenal would
be immediately launched in a
devastating blow. This would
provide more margin for rea-
son to reassert itself than
would the momentum of a
war-fighting strategy, which
would propel us both into suc-
cessive rounds of nuclear ex-
changes and would probably
lead to mutual, if not global,
destruction.
It is folly to talk, as the war-
fighters do, of prolonging in-
tercontinental nuclear ex-
changes, until the Soviet side
was exhausted. Of what value
would it be to us to have some
nuclear forces left after 8,000
nuclear warheads have been
fired in each direction? Nei-
ther nation would be thinking
of "victory" after sustaining
8,000 nuclear blasts, each 10
to 100 times ' more powerful
than the one at Hiroshima. In
fact, long before - anything
like- 8,000 weapons had been
exploded, a nuclear war
would become entirely un-
manageable. It is interesting
to note that prior to his recent
retirement as chairman of
the joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen.
David C. Jones said publicly
that he did not consider pro-
tracted nuclear war feasible.
It is largely civilian nuclear
theologians like Colin Gray
who do.
There is another line of rea-
soning put forward by the
war-fighting school that may
be paraphrased as follows:
necessary. Hence, these in- it may seem curious that a
tercontinental forces of last war-fighting theory with such
resort must be capable of , lapses in logic should have
war-fighting, including quick gained such credence in the
response." United States, and that, as a
of a nu- result, we are on the brink of
in the the pure
If istry. The If, argument
clear f, attack event athe a e going ahead with the MX mis-
lear
United states, the President's Bile and at at great great risk finanofcial cost
nucleat
readiness to retaliate against instability. Yet the nuclear
Soviet cities lacks credibility, are not hard to identify.
as the war-fighters contend, Perhaps the main reason is
what makes them believe that war-fighting theorems
that the President would at- are in accord with normal
tack the Soviet Union with nu- military reflexes in war,
clear weapons in retaliation which are to strike quickly at
for a conventional attack on the enemy's military forces.
Western Europe? The United
States certainly should not Another explanation lies in
Air
and would not expose its own Force sees interservice the MX politics: The missile as
cities to nuclear devastation Force
a means of preventing its pre-
in order to compensate for dominance in the interconti-
NATO's weaknesses in con- rental-nuclear field slipping
ventional forces. It should be away to the Navy. And there
clear that if the West's con- are, undoubtedly, the usual
ventional defenses in Europe I pressures from the military
-
h
ere
ever reach the point w
they cannot stand on their
own, the Russians will soon
detect that, and we can ex-
pect troubles that- a "nuclear
war-fighting capability"
could not counter.
industrial community to con-
tinue production of weapons
under contract today.
Another factor, in my view,
is that, over the years, the
uniformed military in our
country have virtually abdi-
^ cated the formulation of nu-
This examination of our clear doctrine to civilians.
strategic problems leads, I After all, military men can-
suggest, to the following con- not claim operational any particular
expertise with
l: nuclear weapons that has
We ions need
W weapons with a .
d to civilian spe-
d
high degree of invulnerability
to enemy attack, so that a
t
e
em
been
cialists. It is good to have
civilians thinking in all areas
the final dgment on
whether we need the MX mis-
sile. Of course, there are
many technical details and
some secret matters that
must be left to the experts,
but the broad purposes of ac-
quiring or forgoing specific
nuclear weapons like the MX
are quite within the public's
ability to comprehend. In no
other area today is it more
important for the principle of
public control over public of-
ficials to be exercised. ^
, -
large part of our deterren
can be depended on to survive ! of military endeavor, but that
a Soviet strike of no matter F there should be so few mili-
what intensity. These weap- tary men who can hold their
ons should be able to retaliate own in debate on these mat-
in a deliberate, preferably ters is disturbing. Unrealistic
slow, manner against either concepts like that of nuclear
hard military targets or soft war-fighting are a direct con-
targets, including ordinary sequence of this lack.
military installations, as well Finally, the war-fighting
as cities an4 industries. We doctrine has made inroads
should have enough of these into official policies because
weapons to be certain of it has not had to stand the test
being able to inflict an unac- of full-scale public scrutiny
ceptable level of damage on and debate. This deficiency is
the Soviet Union, but not nec- being corrected: The Ameri-
essarily to match the Rus- can public displayed consid-
sians weapon by weapon. erable skepticism over the
In other words, we must re- dense-pack scheme, and the
commit ourselves to a doc- Congress, properly respon-
trne of assured retaliation, sive to the public's views,
relying principally on subma- voted in December to post-
rine-based missiles, bombers pone any decision on the MX.
and cruise missiles, and re- Now, with the subject coming
jecting the MX as unsuited to up for resolution, a still more
our needs. And we must re- difficult test of our demo-
ject the nuclear war-fighting cratic process is at hand.
uuctrine as misconceived and It is doubly important for
dangerous to our security. the oublic to involve itself in
"The forces of NATO and
the Warsaw Pact that face
each other in Europe are
armed with conventional
weapons, and our side has al-
ways been outgunned. We
have tried to compensate by
placing short-range 'tacti-
cal,' or battlefield, nuclear
weapons behind our conven-
tional forces, in case we
needed to make a special ef-
fort to turn the tide of battle.
In turn, we have always
backed up these tactical nu-
clear forces with the threat
that our ICBM's in the United
States would enter the fray, if
 Approved For Release 2007/03/01: CIA-RDP99-00498R000300040001-7
Our latest ballistic
weapon, argues a
former C.I.A.
director, makes
sense only as the
instrument of a
nuclear war
fighting strategy
whose adoption
would threaten
America's
security.
A prototype of the
MX missile undergoes
a launching test
Its deployment has been
held up by a search for
a new basing mode.