REMARKS AT COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-00777R000302500003-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 30, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: December 12, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

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Remarks at Council on Foreign Relations
William H. Webster
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D. C.
December 12, 1988
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When I was first asked to speak to you tonight, I didn't anticipate that I'd be
privileged to be introduced by Howard Baker, for whom I have the very highest es-
teem, and with whom I was privileged to work for many months before he left of-
fice. His guidance to me, both in the Oval Office and on the Hill, was of
extraordinary value, and I deeply appreciate the common sense that he brought to
the White House and to our country. I would also like to say that we have
occasionally swung a tennis racket together. I would like to talk about how good
we both are, but Sam Hayes* is in the audience and he knows better-so I won't.
When I spoke to the Council in New York last December, I discussed the
role of intelligence in our society as I saw it-to provide timely and objective intelli-
gence to policymakers, and to do so with fidelity to our Constitution and to our
laws. A year later, I remain convinced that these two objectives are not mutually
exclusive. We are collecting information in every corner of the globe, and we are
providing finished intelligence to policymakers on hundreds of issues, ranging
from arms control to the earthquake in Armenia. Yet just as important, we are ob-
serving the rules of oversight and accountability that build trust between those
who have the intelligence responsibility and those who are the elected representa-
tives of the American people. It is that trust that makes it possible for us to oper-
ate with the confidence, the aggressiveness, the perseverance, and the resource-
fulness that we need to do our job. My good friend, General Vernon Walters,
former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and now our Ambassador to the
United Nations, describes a view held by many in this country about intelligence.
"Americans," he said, "have always had an ambivalent attitude toward intelli-
gence. When they feel threatened, they want a lot of it, and when they don't, they
tend to regard the whole thing as somewhat immoral."
With so much going on around the world that affects our national security, I
think the American people want a lot of intelligence. And tonight I'd like to focus
on three concerns that have and will continue to command the Intelligence
Community's attention. These concerns are the changes under way in the Soviet
Union, the proliferation of advanced weapons, and the narcotics problem. I could
only pick a few issues but I think these are three that are certainly going to be with
us in large scale. I'd also like to discuss the changes that have made it possible for
us to take on those challenges with the confidence of the Congress and the
American people.
'Samuel P. Hayes, a social scientist and educator, is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.
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As you might expect, those of us in the intelligence business have been
keeping a close watch on leadership changes and reform efforts in the Soviet
Union. Some of us were in New York last week watching that 45-car caravan ca-
reen around the streets of Manhattan, drawing attention everywhere, making
short stops and receiving occasional cheers. And then, of course, there was the
sight of the President-elect and Gorbachev standing with the Statue of Liberty in
the background. But there is a contrast to that that I think I should mention. A re-
port from Moscow just came in and it says this: "The smug, self-righteousness
once so characteristic of Soviets is far less evident today than a decade ago. They
seem strangely deflated. Aside from those lively souls who pen letters to the
editor, the truth seems to have made Soviet man more introspective than inspired.
Thousands of Soviets gathered recently in Gorky Park to witness an emotional,
well reasoned, and protracted debate between a self-styled 'moderate' who
supported perestroika in measured terms and a 'radical' who, espousing acceler-
ated change and 'pluralism,' was sharply critical of Gorbachev for dragging his
feet. The debate itself was fascinating but more riveting still was the total absence
of reaction from the passive, silent, uncommitted crowd. Gorbachev has clearly
experienced the frustration of the debaters in Gorky Park." I found that contrast
extraordinarily interesting.
Although the range of intelligence issues that we face today is broad, the
Soviet Union is-and will continue to be-the primary focus of our intelligence col-
lection and analysis. Its military capability, its efforts to increase global influence,
and its aggressive intelligence activities are still serious threats to U.S. interests.
Gorbachev's efforts to reform his country have not fundamentally altered
these truths. Arguably, they make the Soviet Union of even greater concern to
U.S. intelligence.
Like many of you, I have been fascinated by what is occurring in the Soviet
Union. Gorbachev has stirred up the stew-bringing new life and dynamism to So-
viet politics and pushing a series of reforms that none of us could have foreseen
five years ago.
The forces of democracy are making some political and economic inroads-
especially in the Baltic republics. Although the USSR certainly is not headed
toward democracy as we know it, today's Soviet leaders appear to understand
that their system is faltering largely because it has not given the people enough
breathing room-room to innovate, room to inquire, room to unlock creativity.
Change is occurring in the area of foreign policy as well. This Soviet leader
has signaled by word and deed that he wants the USSR to be a more active and
effective player on the world scene. He is more willing than past Soviet leaders to
reevaluate the costs and benefits of Soviet foreign policies and make decisions on
that basis. For example, the Soviets are leaving Afghanistan-although with some
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difficulty and with a bittersweet taste in their mouths. And they are eliminating a
whole class of nuclear weapons under the INF treaty-a process that includes
unprecedented on-site inspections of Soviet military facilities.
Gorbachev's announcement of unilateral troop reductions at the U.N. last
Wednesday illustrates his willingness to pursue radically different approaches
even as it highlights the challenges that these new approaches represent for the
Western alliance. The announced reductions, if fully implemented, will remove
some-but not all-of the Warsaw Pact advantages over NATO. In particular they
will substantially reduce the ability of Warsaw Pact forces to launch a surprise
short-warning attack. At the same time, this step was clearly calculated to put
pressure on Western governments for reciprocal steps and to undermine support
in the alliance for modernizing defense programs.
This and other initiatives that may well follow will complicate the task of
maintaining unity within the alliance as we approach the upcoming talks with the
Warsaw Pact on conventional arms reductions.
The dramatic nature of these policy changes clearly has provoked contro-
versy within the Soviet Union. A major power struggle continues between
reformers, who believe radical changes are necessary to make the Communist
system work, and conservatives, who fear such changes could destabilize the
very system they are trying to save. The outcome of this struggle will affect how
far and how fast reform progresses, the extent to which central authority is
relaxed, the general welfare of the individual, and how competitive the Soviet
system will be over the next few decades.
In late September, Gorbachev significantly strengthened his position in the
Soviet leadership-undertaking the most sweeping overhaul of the top party
leadership since Khrushchev ousted his chief opponents in 1957. The changes
made should allow Gorbachev to push his policy agenda at home and abroad with
renewed momentum.
While an important victory, this struggle to reform the Soviet system will go
on for decades, requiring Gorbachev and his successors to overcome enormous
political, economic, and cultural obstacles.
There are strong reasons to question whether a system designed to
centralize authority, maximize government control over its people, and concen-
trate resources on building up the nation's military strength can become more
decentralized and. democratic in its decisionmaking and more solicitous of its
people. Nationalist unrest is currently testing the Soviet system's ability to make
reforms work. Communal unrest in Armenia and Azerbaijan have forced Moscow
to put the region in a virtual state of martial law on a semipermanent basis. The
tragic earthquake that struck Armenia last week will temporarily divert attention
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from the nationalist struggles in the Caucasus. But the underlying problems will re-
main-the nationalist issues are not yet resolved. Just last month, the Communist
leadership of Estonia declared the republic "sovereign," an unthinkable develop-
ment even a year ago. While rejecting this declaration, Gorbachev has signaled a
willingness to compromise. It is by no means certain-and many doubt it-that
minority aspirations for independence can be squared with Moscow's need for
control.
But if the last three years have taught us anything at all, it is that Gorbachev
is a highly skilled politician, and we cannot rule out the possibility that he can, ulti-
mately, pull off a "revolution from above" that actually increases authority below.
The Soviet reform effort presents the U.S. Intelligence Community with
some formidable challenges. We must pay closer attention than ever to the
political struggles and issues being raised as Gorbachev challenges the established
interests of individuals and institutions within his country.
We must also help the policymaker sort out how reform will affect Soviet
military and economic capabilities and-even more difficult-how it may change
Moscow's foreign policy.
We must manage the information explosion that glasnost has produced
which, though welcome, challenges us to sort out what is important and what is
not, what is real versus what Moscow wants us to hear.
We must provide intelligence and analysis for U.S.-Soviet arms control
talks. As these negotiations progress, the Intelligence Community will be increas-
ingly asked to assess Soviet motivations and monitor Soviet compliance with the
provisions of agreements. And the amount of support required is tremendous.
The INF treaty has required the United States to monitor about 120 facilities
declared by the Soviets. Monitoring the START treaty, if we get one, could involve
as many as 2,500 weapon locations spread throughout the Soviet Union.
Yet whatever arms control agreements the U.S. makes with the Soviets,
our relationship is likely to remain essentially adversarial. Policymakers will depend
on the Intelligence Community to make quick and accurate assessments-and
even to anticipate Gorbachev's sometimes unorthodox and unexpected initiatives,
examples of which we saw in the United Nations last week.
But the Soviet Union is certainly not our only focus.
Another major concern is the proliferation of advanced weapons, particular-
ly ballistic missiles. By the year 2000, at least 15 developing countries will either
have produced or be able to build their own ballistic missiles. Although these
missiles may be somewhat crude and inaccurate, many of them will have
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capabilities well beyond battlefield range. And the high speed of ballistic missiles
enables an attacker to strike with little warning and makes it difficult for the
defender to destroy incoming missiles.
Ballistic missiles also convey important new political and military status those who acquire them. Many of the countries where these missiles are being de-
veloped are in the Middle East-an area where we have important security g
interests, and where regional tensions are highest.
All of the Third World missile development programs rely on foreign
technology to some degree. But much of this critical technolo g
gy is already diffus
throughout the world, is available for other purposes, or can e
asily be diverted ed
There is also extensive sharing of technolo
tries, and they are increasingly 9Y among Third World missile coun-
pooling their resources and technical know-how.
Another disturbing development we have seen is the outright transfer
complete missile systems from one country to another. This could become a way
for developing countries to leapfrog ahead of the competition, although most
countries will still seek to develop missile capabilities that they alone control. We
can also look for Third World countries themselves to become major exporters of
missiles and missile technology.
As threatening as the increase in ballistic missiles and the transfer of entire
missile systems may be, we must also be alert to attempts by developing nations
to arm ballistic missiles with chemical warheads. A major question we are now ad-
dressing is what lessons Iran and Iraq-and the rest of the world-have learned
from a war that involved the first sustained use of chemical weapons since World
War I. After the First World War, the use of chemical weapons was outlawed by
signers of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. During World War II-even during the most
desperate battles-both sides refrained from using chemical weapons-weapons
that Winston Churchill referred to as "that hellish poison."
The Iran-Iraq war ended that restraint and set a dangerous precedent for fu-
ture wars. The Intelligence Community has considerable evidence that Iraq used
chemical weapons against Iran and also against Iraqi Kurds. Iran, too, employed
chemical weapons against Iraqi troops.
Chemical weapons are thought to offer a cheap and readily obtainable
means of redressing the military balance against more powerful foes. Some see
them as the poor man's answer to nuclear weapons, and as many as 20 countries
may be developing chemical weapons. Our President, our Vice President, and our
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Secretary of State have all spoken out strongly about this problem, and I must say
that many of our friends in the Middle East see it not as a problem but more as a
practical opportunity. And therein lies a major diplomatic problem for us.
It also appears that the moral barrier to biological warfare has been
breached. At least 10 countries are working to produce biological weapons. And
this presents us with another intelligence challenge.
Along with assessing capabilities to develop and produce ballistic missiles
and chemical and biological weapons, we must make judgments about what could
prompt foreign countries to use them. This is one of our most important tasks,
and we will continue to provide U.S. policymakers with as much accurate and
timely information on this issue as we are able to produce.
The third matter of great concern to the Intelligence Community that I want
to discuss tonight is the narcotics problem. You heard a lot about it in the
Presidential campaign. And it is a real problem.
You are all aware of the alarming extent of narcotics abuse in our own coun-
try. Almost 40 percent of organized-crime activity in our country is related to
drugs, generating an income estimated to be as high as $110 billion.
On the international scene, we have documented ever-increasing rates of
drug production and trafficking. Narcotics activity has been accompanied by an
alarming increase in violence and intimidation-especially in Latin America. Drug
traffickers in Colombia routinely use violence. Judges and other government
officials, businessmen and journalists in that country have been the targets of
bribery, intimidation, and assassination. I suppose in the destruction of the Supreme Court building by drug dealers or terrroristscially
employed for that purpose who literally assaulted the Supreme Court building with
artillery.
The Intelligence Community collects and analyzes information on every step
in the operation of narcotics production, processing, distribution, and the launder-
ing of profits. Our efforts are designed both to meet immediate needs for
intelligence and to help fashion longer-term drug control strategies. And this is not
without its problems, because our interest in gathering intelligence and protecting
sources and methods is often inconsistent with the law enforcement community's
desire to use that evidence and then being required by the courts to furnish the
source of the information in criminal discovery.
We provide intelligence to the FBI, the Drug Enforcement Administration,
the Customs Service, and the Coast Guard to assist them in their drug interdiction
and enforcement efforts. We also assist foreign governments in their counternar-
cotics programs. Several Latin American countries are undertaking a major
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cooperative effort to destroy drug processing laboratories, airstrips, and chemical
holding areas. We are also supporting an interdiction operation at the southwest
border that involves federal, state, and local authorities in both countries.
Our intelligence can help foreign countries measure the extent of their own
drug problem. Using some of our intelligence analysis, U.S. diplomats were able to
show one foreign government the extent of environmental damage done by the
slash-and-burn agriculture of its narcotics growers. The government intensified its
eradication efforts and made a major dent in drug production. But the narcotics in-
dustry is resilient. In this case, narcotics production came down, but the country
has increasingly become a regional transit point for narcotics.
Intelligence is also used to help implement anti-drug laws. The Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1986 and the bill recently passed by Congress call for the United
States to withhold some foreign assistance from nations that are not working to
counter drug activity within their borders. To support such legislation, we monitor
the activities of the drug traffickers and analyze how well other countries'
counternarcotics measures are working.
But policymakers recognize that intelligence, important as it is, does not
provide a solution to the narcotics problem. Intelligence can illuminate an issue-
track, clarify, and predict an outcome. But the only real solution-in this country
and worldwide-is a reduced demand for narcotics, coupled with a real reduction
in supply. My own sense is that this is going to be a major problem for us at home.
Present machinery, including the recently enacted law, will require much fleshing
out by Executive order if we are really, this time, to mount effective campaigns
against drug problems.
It is encouraging that international cooperation in fighting the drug problem
has increased considerably. In 1987, 23 nations joined the U.S. in eradicating drug
crops-in 1981, there were only two.
Supporting our national fight against drugs will continue to be a major
priority of the Intelligence Community.
I've talked thus far about three of the major concerns that will continue to
be at the top of the Intelligence Community's agenda-Soviet affairs, weapons
proliferation, and narcotics. Now I'd like to talk. a bit about the changes that have
occurred over the last 19 months-changes that have strengthened the Central
Intelligence Agency and have helped to build a higher level of confidence in us and
in our work.
You may recall that at this time two years ago, the CIA was at the center of
a storm that threatened to destroy confidence in our role in American life and to
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shatter the trust that is so indispensable to our mission. Throughout 1987, we
were subjected to the most searching inquiry into our part in the Iran-Contra affair.
At the end of last year, I sent a note to all CIA employees that said: "If ever
a time in the 40 years of the Central Intelligence Agency required the talent and en-
ergy of those who serve, this has been that time." And a year later, I can report
that our people have responded, and we have together taken the Agency through
one of the most challenging eras in our history.
We have, I believe, restored public confidence in the CIA and greatly
improved our relations with Congress. And we have done this by establishing
clear guidelines-guidelines that are workable and well understood and have been
scrupulously followed.
We have established policies to ensure that our intelligence assessments
remain objective and that analysts are protected against the pressures of political
influence. As Director of Central Intelligence, this insistence on objectivity may be
the most significant contribution that I could make in galvanizing a cohesive
Intelligence Community without compromising the integrity of the individual
analysts and program managers. And I am proud to say that in the time I have
been at CIA I haven't heard anyone accuse us of "cooking the books."
I'm also proud of what we have done to strengthen the review of covert ac-
tivities. These activities are the focus of the greatest congressional and public
attention, but I think it is worth pointing out that only about three percent of the
Intelligence Community's resources are spent on covert action. Under the guide-
lines I have established, the Agency's senior managers must review all proposed
covert action findings and related documents that are to be forwarded to the
National Security Council. They must apply tests designed to ensure that each pro-
gram can be done, is consistent with our declared foreign policy, and if exposed
would make sense to the American people. And as I have consistently stated in all
my public statements, we must have this capability. It is a vital extension of our
national foreign policy and we need to protect its availability. We do this through
the professional measures I've just mentioned.
Because I know of the need to be absolutely candid with Congress, and the
responsibility that intelligence professionals have to protect sources and methods,
I have established guidelines governing our dealings with Congress. And I have
made it clear that in dealing with Congress there is no excuse for deception. There
have been some questions that Agency officials who brief on the Hill-and we've
briefed a thousand times this year-have had to refer back to me. They've been
authorized to demur rather than skirt issues that they were not authorized to
discuss, and we have worked out arrangements with the Congress. Sometimes
the questions have come all the way up to me, and sometimes I've lost the issue.
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But we have not left Congress feeling that in some way anyone in the CIA has
been disingenuous with them. As a result, our relationship with Congress has.
improved, and I believe it will continue to improve without "giving away the
store."
There is another point I want to make about our work, and it is that the intel-
ligence we provide to policymakers on the Soviet Union, weapons proliferation,
narcotics and many other issues is not easy to come by. In fact, it sometimes
comes at great cost to the men and women of American intelligence. And I think
of that every time I walk through the main foyer of our Headquarters building,
where stars have been carved for those who have given their lives in the line of
duty. And,.I am reminded that it is the creativity, the determination, the brilliance,
and the courage of our people that spells the difference between success and
failure.
A German poet was once asked how the medieval Germans ever built their
lofty cathedrals. He replied, "Men in those days had more than just an opinion,
they felt a commitment."
I think our people show a similar commitment, and I hope that we continue
to attract those best suited to carry out our mission. We are looking for people
who are risk takers, but not risk seekers. People who are dedicated and
responsive to our law. People to whom fame and fortune are not a necessary part
of their lives, but who can find in our important work an avenue to pursue their
highest aspirations for a safer and a better world.
With such people we can continue to provide the intelligence that policy-
makers need, observing the rules of oversight and accountability that both the
Congress and the members of the Intelligence Community have a right to expect.
This is what you would want of us, what all American people would want of us,
and we are doing our very best to supply it.
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