TEXT OF SPEECH AT HARVARD BY DEPUTY CIA DIRECTOR OUTLINING POLICY SHIFTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-01448R000301250002-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 14, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 26, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP99-01448R000301250002-6
A 11 VIM"' kirruirtra 26 February 1986
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Text of Speech at Harvard by Deputy CIA Director Outlining Policy Shifts
CAMBRIDGE, MASS.
? Following is the text of the speech
given by Robert M. Gates, deputy di-
rector for intelligence at the Central
Intelligence Agency. this month in a
panel discussion at Harvard Univer-
sity's John F. Kennedy School of
Government.
moving world events. He proposed
that the service "draw on the univer-
sities for experts with long foreign
experience and specialized knowl-
edge of the history, languages, and
general conditions of various coun-
tries."
President Roosevelt agreed and
created the Office of the Coordinator
I welcome this opportunity to of Information, later renamed the Of-
come to Harvard and speak about the
relationship between the Central In-
Donovan's leadership. The promi-
telligence Agency, especially its ana-
nent Harvard historian, William L.
lytical / research arm, and the aca
_ Langer, was recruited as the director
demic community. Recent events of research, and he in turn. recruited
here have again sparked broad dis- some of the finest scholars in Ameri-
cussion of both the propriety and ca for the o.s.s., many of them from
wisdom of university scholars' coop- Harvard, Yale, and Columbia Uni-
versities.
When C.I.A. was established by the
National Security Act of 1947, this
pattern was repeated. Langer re-
turned to establish the Board of Na-
tional Estimates. Robert Amory of
the Harvard Law School faculty was
named c.I.A.'s deputy director for in-
telligence in 1952, and served in that
capacity for nearly 10 years. Other
academicians who joined included
historians such as Ludwell Monta-
gue, Sherman Kent, Joseph Strayer,
and DeForrest Van Slyck; economist
Max Millikan. who organized the
economic intelligence effort; econo-
mist Richard Bissell. who later head-
ed the clandestine service; and even
William Sloane Coffin, who left the
Union Theological Seminary to join
C.I.A. for the duration of the Korean
War before becoming chaplain at
Yale. He is quoted as recalling that
he joined the agency because "Stalin
made Hitler look like a Boy Scout."
It was a common reason for academi-
cians to join the agency in the early -
erating in any way with American in-
telligence.
On December 3 of last year the
Boston Globe stated, "The scholar
who works for a government intelli-
gence agency ceases to be an inde-
pendent spirit, a true scholar."
These are strong words. In my view
they are absolutely wrong. Nonethe-
less, there are real concerns that
should be addressed.
My remarks tonight center.on two
simple propositions:
11.- First, preserving the liberty of
this nation is fundamental to and pre-
requisite for the preservation of aca-
demic freedom; the university com-
munity cannot prosper and protect
freedom of inquiry oblivious to the
fortunes of the nation.
Second, in defending the nation
and our liberties, the federal govern-
ment needs to have recourse to the
best minds in the country, including
those in the academic community.
Tensions inevitably accompany the
relationship between defense, intelli-
gence, and academe, but mutual, years.
need and benefit require reconcilia- Relations between the scholarly
tion or elimination of such tensions. community and C.I.A. were cordial
throughout the 1950's.
The cold war was at its height, and
faculty or students rarely questioned
the nation's need for the agency and
its activities. Some of the most noted
university professors of the time
served on a regular basis as unpaid
consultants, helping C.I.A. to form its
estimates of probable trends in world
politics.
These halcyon days were soon to
change.
There was some criticism on cam-
puses over c.I.A.'s involvement in
the Bay of Pigs expedition in 1961.
The History
of CIA-University Relations
In discussing the relationship be-
tween the academic community and
American intelligence, and specifi-
cally the research and analysis side of
intelligence, it is important to go back
to antecedents which, coincidental-
ly, have important links to Harvard.
In the summer of 1941, William J.
Donovan persuaded President Roo-
sevelt of the need to organize a coor-
dinated foreign intelligence service
to inform the government about fast-
But the real deterioration in relations
between and academe paral-
leled the wrenching divisions in the
country over the Vietnam War, de-
spite continuing academic coopera-
tion with the Directorate of Intelli-
gence.
The decline in c .1. A.-academia ties
accelerated with the February 1967
disclosure in Ramparts magazine
that C.I.A. had been funding the for-
eign activities of the National Stu-
dent Association for a number of
years.
Sensational allegations of wrong-
doing by C.I.A. became more fre-
quent in the media in the early
1970's, culminating in the establish-
ment of the Rockefeller Commission
and subsequently both the Church
Committee in the Senate and the Pike
Committee in the House of Repre-
sentatives.
Even the Church Committee, how-
ever, so critical of other intelligence
activities, recognized that C.I.A.
"must have unfettered access to the
best advice and judgment our univer-
sities can produce."
The committee recommended that
academic advice and judgment of ac-
ademics be openly sought.
The committee concluded that the
principal responsibility for setting
the terms of the relationship between
C.I.A. and academe should rest with
college administrators and other aca-
demic officials.
"The Committee believes that it is
the responsibility of . . . the Ameri-
can academic community to set the
professional and ethical standards ?f
its members."
This paralleled considerable de-
bate within academic ranks and nu-
merous articles about the relation-
ship between the universities and
C.I.A.
In response to a letter from the
president of the American Associa-
tion of University Professors, then?
Director George Bush replied
that the agency sought "only the vol-
untary and witting cooperation of in-
dividuals who can help the foreign
policy processes of the United
States."
The director stated that where re-
lationships are confidential they are
usually so at the request of the schol-
ars, rather than the agency, and he
refused to isolate the agency from
"the good counsel of the best schol-
ars in our country."
Continued
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Adopting this approach, Director
Stansfield Turner engaged in a long
and eventually unsuccessful effort to
reach agreement with President Bok
of Harvard on relations between this
university and the agency. (Ironic-
ally, at this time, another Harvard
professor, Robert Bowie, was my
predecessor as head of the analytical
element of the agency.) Some aca-
demic institutions adopted guidelines
similar to The restrictive regulations
established at Harvard; in most cases
less severe guidelines were pro-
posed. In a great majority of schools
where the issue arose, however, the
faculty and administration rejected
any guidelines, usually on the
grounds that existing regulations or
practices were adequate to protect
both the institution and individuals.
The agency's relations with the ac-
ademic world have improved in re-
cent years for a variety of reasons,
including developments abroad and
recognition in the academic commu-
nity that C.I.A., together with the De-
partments of State and Defense, has
been an important and useful sup-
porter of area and regional studies
and foreign-language studies in the
United States.
The agencies of the American in-
telligence community, as well as the
Department of State, have long been
a primary source of employment for
specialists in these areas. The aca-
demic community also consulted
closely with senior officials of the in-
telligence community in their suc-
cessful campaign to win support for a
Congressional-approved endowment
of Soviet studies. Intelligence agen-
cies informally strongly supported
this endeavor.
In some areas of research, such as
on the Soviet Union, our cooperation
for nearly 40 years has remained both
close and constant. This also has
been the case often in the fields of
economics and physical sciences. On
the other hand, there have been
much more pronounced ups and
downs in our relationships with polit-
ical scientists and allied social sci-
ences, particularly among those with
expertise in the third world.
Why CIA Needs Academe
There is, however, one constant in
the history of this relationship and in
its future as well: our need for your
help, and the opportunity you have to
contribute to a better-informed poli-
cymaking process by cooperating
with us. Let me describe how and
why.
In just the last dozen years, we
have been confronted ,with a large
number of new issues and develop-
ments and also have had to pay atten-
tion to problems too long neglected.
The oil embargo of 1973, the subse-
quent skyrocketing of oil prices and
now their plunge; the related dramat-
ic changes in the international eco-
nomic system; the growth of debt in
third world countries and now repay-
ment problems; revolutions in Iran.
Ethiopia, and Nicaragua; the final
passage of European colonialism
from Africa; new Soviet beachheads
and surrogates in the third world;
changing patterns in international
trade; and the growth of technology
transfer, international narcotics net-
works, and terrorism all have demon-
strated vividly that our national secu-
rity is greatly affected by develop-
ments and events in addition to the
number and capabilities of Soviet
strategic weapons.
Accordingly, the subjects we deal
with today are staggering in their di-
versity.
They include problems such as the
implications of the enormous indebt-
edness of key third world countries;
problems of political, economic, and
social instability and how to forecast
them; human rights; narcotics; the il-
licit arms market; the implications of
immigration flows in various regions
of the world; population trends and
their political and security implica-
tions; the global food supply; water
resources; energy; technology trans-
fer; terrorism; proliferation of chemi-
cal/biological and nuclear weapons;
changing commodity markets and
their implications for third world
countries; and others too numerous
to recount.
But nearly all of these problems
have something in common: while
C.I.A. has experts in virtually all sub-
jects of concern, there is a vast reser-
voir of expertise, experience, and in-
sight in the community of university
scholars that can help us, and
through us, the American govern-
ment, better understand these prob-
lems and their implications for us and
for international stability.
With this diversity of issues and
problems in mind, the Directorate of
Intelligence several years ago initiat-
ed an intensified effort to reach out
to the academic community, think
tanks of every stripe, and the busi-
ness community for information,
analysis, and advice:
to- Senior managers in charge of
each of our substantive areas were
directed to undertake an expanded
program of sponsorship of confer-
ences on substantive issues of con-
cern to us and to encourage participa-
tion of our analysts in such confer-
ences sponsored by the private
sector. Since 1982, c.I.X. has spon-
sored more than 300 conferences,
nearly all of them involving consider-
able participation by the academic
community and touching on many of
the issues I noted. In addition, we
have recorded more than 1,500 in-
stances of our analysts' attending
conferences sponsored by the pri-
vate sector?and doing so as openly
acknowledged C.I.A. employees.
10.- We have increasingly turned to
the academic community to test our
assessments in ways consistent with
protecting intelligence sources and
methods. We have helped scholars
get security clearances so that they
could examine the actual drafts of
our studies. A growing percentage of
our work is reviewed by specialists
outside the government?in the aca-
demic community and various think
tanks?and by retired senior military
officers, independent specialists, and
others.
ND- We have established panels of
security-cleared specialists from
business and the academic communi-
ty to meet with us regularly, not only
to help improve specific research pa-
pers but to help develop new re-
search methods, review perform-
ance, and help us test new approach-
es and hypotheses.
Pi- Our analysts are required to re-
fresh their own substantive creden-
tials and expand their horizons by ob-
taining outside training at least every
two years. This requirement can be
met through taking university
courses, participating in business or
other outside sponsored seminars
and conferences, attending military
training courses, and so forth.
Our involvement with the academ-
ic community takes several forms:
11," Consulting: This is the most
prevalent.
It can be formal, under a contrac-
tual arrangement in which the indi-
vidual is paid a set government rate,
or it can be informal and unpaid--an
exchange of views between interest-
ed specialists.
We are particularly interested in
ideas that challenge conventional
wisdom or orthodoxy. We know
what we think, but we need to know
what others think also.
Sponsorship of conferences:
We generally organize our own, but Continued
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occasionally we contract with others
to organize a conference for us. And,
of course. our analysts attend confer-
ences sponsored by business, aca-
demic and professional organiza-
tions, think tanks, and universities.
IP- Research: In some areas,
scholars in universities have the ex-
perience and expertise to carry out
basic research for us, for example, on
demographic and economic subjects.
The recent controversy at Harvard
and the media have focused on this
area of cooperation.
In fact, it presently is a very minor
element in our overall relationship
with the academic community. It is
hardly a program, as recently al-
leged, of "covert fees and fellow-
ships" with which we can "buy scho-
lastic priorities."
-sr
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source of pride and satisfaction. Con-
tributing to a better understanding of
some of the most difficult and occa-
sionally dangerous problems of the
- world, in my view, is responsive to
the scholar's highest calling.
4. Isn't prepublication review
tantamount to censorship of
independent ideas, opinions, and
judgments?
No. Our review is only to ensure
that no classified information is in-
cluded in a book or article and that
the text does not reveal intelligence
sources and methods. We have no
interest in altering the substance or
conclusions of writings we review
and take great care to avoid asking
for such changes. And the fact is: We
don't. Where a consultant has no ac-
cess to classified information, there
is no prepublication review.
5. What about the view that
engages in covert action, as
well as collection and analysis,
and a variety of "immoral" acts,
and therefore association with
any part of is unacceptable?
Activities at C.I.A. are carried out
within the law, with the approval of
appropriate authorities, and with the
oversight of the Congress. They are
activities mandated by the decisions
of elected officials in both the execu-
tive and legislative branches. As we
have seen recently, Congress can
and does deny funds for legal intelli-
gence activities with which they dis-
agree, thereby terminating such ac-
tivities.
The Central Intelligence Agency is
a foreign-policy instrument of the
elected representatives of the Ameri-
can people, just like the military,
u.s.f.A., or the Department of State.
If you find some element of the gov-
ernment's foreign policy or activity
inconsistent with your professional
judgment, I would encourage you
first to do all you can to test the valid-
ity of your position. You also can de-
cline to have any association with us
at all. But in the latter case, the deci-
sion whether to associate with us
should be left to the individual. One
individual's freedom of association
should not be denied because of an-
other's personal point of view.
A university steps on precarious
ground and itself endangers academ-
ic freedom if it starts making arbi-
trary rules about which organizations
a scholar may participate in or talk
with?and, I would add, especially if
one of those organizations is a branch
of our society's own democratically
chosen government.
Our Rules
Before I close, let me review the
rules and policies of the analytical
arm of C.I.A. for dealing with the uni-
versity community.
We continually review our regula-
tions and policies in the light of new
opportunities, new problems, and
new issues. For example, well before
the recent controversy at Harvard,
we revised our contract language
With respect to prepublication re-
view, narrowing that review?which
again, is simply to avoid the compro-
mise of classified information?to
the specific subject area in which a
scholar had access to classified infor-
mation. For example, if a scholar
consults with us about nuclear prolif-
eration and has access to classified
information, writings on unrelated
subjects need not be submitted.
We have again looked at our rules
and policies as a result of the contro-
versy here at Harvard, and this too
has produced some modifications.
For example, the Directorate of In-
telligence now explicitly tells any or-
ganization or individual organizing a
conference on our behalf that the par-
ticipants in the conference should be
informed in advance of our sponsor-
ing role. Quite frankly, because we
organize the overwhelming majority
of our conferences ourselves, this
problem had not arisen before.
Let me review four key policies of
particular interest to the university
community:
First, while the Directorate of
Intelligence presently has no con-
tracts for classified research at any
academic institution, we can and will
let contracts for classified research
where university rules permit, where
appropriate facilities and circum- ?
stances allow, and when a genuine I
need exists.
bi- Second, when we contract for
unclassified research, we spell out ?
explicitly for the scholar the condi-
tions governing use of that research.
In some cases, the research will be
done strictly for us, and we will be
the only recipient. In other cases,
once we have received the research
and assured ourselves that the terms
of the contract have been carried out,
we will acquiesce in a scholar's re-
quest to publish a book or article
drawing on that research.
We do not commission or contract
for books or articles. We are realistic
about pressures on scholars to pub-
lish, however, and, in order to attract
some of the best people to work with
us, we try to accommodate their de-
sire to draw on unclassified research
they have done for us for publication
for their own 'purposes.
And, finally, there are cases where
we allow research done for us later to
be published under the scholar's
name without any prepublication re-
view on our part.
But in any of these circumstances,
our review is simply to ensure that
the work we contracted to be done
has been done, meets appropriate
standards of quality, and does not
contain classified information. Tax-
payers justifiably would be dis-
pleased if we were not to ensure that
we had received true value for their
money.
Third, we also have looked
again at the question of whether our
funding of research that is subse-
quently used in a publication by a
scholar should be openly acknowl-
edged. There are several good rea-
sons that argue against such an ap-
proach, including the possibility of
difficulty with a foreign government
by virtue of acknowledged C.I.A. in-
terest in its internal affairs; the possi-
bility that acknowledged C.I.A. inter-
est in a specific subject?such as the
financial stability of a particular
country?could affect the situation
itself; and, finally, concern that read-
ers might assume-the scholar's con-
clusions were, in fact, C.I.A.'S.
As a result of the controversy here
at Harvard and expressions of con-
cern about this policy, we re-exam-
ined this issue with considerable
care. In the first place, there are cer-
tain circumstances under which dis-
closure of our funding of research
may be required, and we of course
comply. Beyond this, we have decid-
ed that our interest in obtaining the
cooperation of this country's schol-
ars and allaying the misunderstand-
ings and suspicions that have grown
out of our earlier approach warrants
at least some change in our policy.
Accordingly, C.I.A. will henceforth
permit acknowledgment-of our fund-
ing of research that is later indepen-
dently published by a scholar unless
(1) the scholar requests privacy or (2)
we determine that formal, public as-
sociation of with a specific top-
ic or subject would prove damaging
to the United States. Any acknowl-
edgment of C.I.A. funding would be
accompanied by a statement to the
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effect that the views expressed are
those of the author and do not neces-
sarily reflect the views of C.I.A. or of
the U.S. government. I assume, of
course, that universities also will
press hard for public disclosure of
other sources of funding for re-
search.
sp. Fourth, we expect any scholar
or individual who consults or works
with us to abide fully by the rules of
his or her home institution in terms of
reporting the relationship with us.
But, in our view, it is, in the first
instance, the responsibility of the in-
stitution to set such rules and to en-
force them, and the responsibility of
the scholar to comply.
Conclusions
The world is increasingly complex.
The challenges to the security and
well-being of the American people
are increasingly diverse and subtle.
Director [William J.r Casey and I,
and others in the executive branch
and our Congressional oversight
committees believe that contacts
with universities and others in the
private sector are imperative if we
are properlyand effectively to carry
out our mission of informing, im-
proving understanding, and warning
the government about developments
around the world?the same mission
identified by General Donovan and
President Roosevelt. Our ability to
carry out our mission, as in the days
of Langer and Donovan, depends on
voluntary cooperation between those
of us who carry this responsibility in
intelligence, and those in the univer-
sity, business, retired military, and
others who can help us understand
these challenges better and forecast
them more accurately. Our country
is the ultimate beneficiary.
Consultation and cooperation with
C.I.A. on the problems this nation
faces abroad do not threaten academ-
ic freedom. However, I believe that
freedom of inquiry is limited, a desire
to render public service sometimes
tragically thwarted, and our nation
disadvantaged, by those who would
deny a scholar's willingness to work
with the American intelligence serv-
ice in assessing the world around us.
The government cannot coerce
any scholar to cooperate or work
with the Department of Defense. De-
partment of State, or C.I.A. By the
same token, no scholar should be
prevented by academic institutions
or colleagues from doing so. And
none should have to worry that his or
her reputation will suffer because of a
public-spirited, patriotic willingness
to help us better understand and fore-
cast developments abroad affecting
our national well-being and the
forces that threaten our freedom.
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