THE CONSUMMATE BUREAUCRAT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-01448R000301270074-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2012
• Sequence Number: 74
• Publication Date: February 18, 1987
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/10: CIA-RDP99-01448R000301270074-5
LYL YY 1VL.1~ ui+u. i?++..v
ART1"LE APPEARED 18 February 1987
ON PAGE C
4
ASItINGTON-The relief over "Mr. Gates," said Cohen, "you are an
W President Reagan's selection ambitious young man, a Type A person-
of Deputy CIA t Iity, climbing a ladder of professional
Gates to replace Willi-am Casey as'direc' success. ... You didn't conceive this
I Y d'd ' f
t
'
of Central Intelligence turned to
tor
dismay yesterday.
In a painful dissection by the Senate
Select Intelligence Committee, the man
who would be the President's chief
intelligence adviser was revealed as an
honest, intelligent and hardworking
public official-and, at the same time,
an unquestioning, uncritical, obedient
bureaucrat who never challenged his
superiors on the lran/Contra fiasco and
who deliberately shut his eyes to in-
formation that might have put his
career.at ,risk.
He -didn't want to know ,how money
was being funneled ,to the Contras. He
didn't think it was his job to :report on
possible lUegalities -by -the National
'Security Council. 'tie ,didn't even know
whether any CIA opecatlves were in-
volved. And tie wouldn't sign in
-opposition ?to misguided policies.
It was ,a sad show because ,Gates, 43,
in theory, : s the kind of ices ,the nation
is noamally ;proud to see In government
service. 'Sen. 'William ,Cohen (R-Maine)
listened,torhitn~teetify fora-day and then
quietly :and gently skewered ,him:
ran program. ou - n
conceive o
the whole funding mechanism for the
Contras. You didn't know the details.
Moreover, you didn't want to know the
details. You basically didn't want to
rock the boat.
"You're under Director Casey, a
strong personality. You've just been
sworn in (as deputy director), The pro-
gram has been in operation for several
months. You might question the wisdom
of It, but it's not your bailiwick. You
don't know the details. You don't want
to know the details. And basically
you're not prepared to lay your career
on ,the line fora program that you didn't
have much involvement with."
Gates tried to defend his perform-
ance as -deputy director. He said be
hadn't complained because he found no
reason to quarrel with the underlying
geostrategic policy .toward Iran.
"Wait, stop, stop," said Cohen. "Of
co se -there were reasons to quarrel
with It."
"It was a pocky judgment, Senator."
Cohen stopped Gates cold. It was not
policy. It was intelligence. Cohen told
Gates exactly what a CIA director is
supposed to do when somebody plots a
madcap scheme like arming Iran: Find
out who we're dealing with, who are the
middlemen, how would the deal be
financed, why are the arms merchants
also dealing with the Contras.
"I don't want to see you trying to
construct rationales that simply don't
hold up," Cohen said.
Again Gates tried to justify going
along with Reagan's policy: "I thought
the initiative to establish a dialogue
with Iranians made sense. I also believe,
as cynical as it may sound, that the idea
of an exchange of bona fides (i.e., arms
for hostages) leading to that dialogue
had merit as well."
"We -exchanged bona fides," Cohen
said icily, "when we lost 241 Marines in
Beirut. We didn't have to establish
another damned thing in terms-cif being
bona :fide.to
'Gates gulped. "I'm just saying I
understood the 'thinking that led to
that," fie said. "What the, were trying,to
accomplish .made sense.
"You thought it .made sense but you
didn't know the details," Cohen said.
Poor Gates: "I may be willing to
acknowledge that I didn't .want to chal-
lenge the program, but I believe I would
have had I become convinced that there
was wrongdoing or Illegality involved."
That's eeectly the wrong point. The
question is whether Gates, as director of
Central Intelligence, would challenge a
White House program on the grounds
that it was just plain stupid.
On the evidence of yesterday, the
answer Is no.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/10: CIA-RDP99-01448R000301270074-5