OUT THERE IN LANGLEY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-01448R000301300001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 12, 1984
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/24: CIA-RDP99-01448R000301300001-1
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12 December 1984
Out There in Langley
WE PUBLISH on the opposite page today a
ringing endorsement of the analytical quality
and the political integrity of the CIA's intelli-
gence assessments. It comes from one who is in a
position to know a good deal more about this su-
premely important matter than the rest of us-Rob-
ert Gates, the civil servant in charge of the process
out there in Langley. He declares that the CIA has
paid systematic attention to creating intellectual and
bureaucratic conditions favorable to good intelligence
judgments. The hallmarks of its system, Mr. Gates
says, are rigorous review, an openness to criticism
and a devotion to professionalism
Except that we still can't really tell whether the
CIA is doing it right. Mr. Gates, as a professional
skeptic, might be among the first to acknowledge
that he has not put before the public the materials
for a trustworthy assessment-he is not free to.
For that we would have to know many other things
about CIA: what questions of analysis or policy it
had been asked to address, how it had handled the
evidence in different kinds 'of. cases, what had been
done when a hard-charging analyst felt stymied by
unworthy obstacles.
It seems unlikely to us that a simple lack of intel-
lectual or physical resources would be a major diffi-
culty, now. Raw politicization can perhaps be dealt
with. But there is a range of more subtle traps, bu.
reaucratic, intellectual and cultural. The question of
whether intelligence is designed not just to prevent
surprises but also to predict the course of events is
a continuing conundrum. Ferreting out or minimiz-
ing bias of various kinds is essential, but how do
you ensure or maximize insight? Is the team ap-
proach institutionalized in the American intelli-
gence community conducive to the play of minds-
to the play of a single mind-which produces the
major breakthroughs in other fields? We do not
rrean to trivialize Mr. Gates' account, but if we told
you that that is the way we write editorials, you
would be forgiven if you stopped reading.
Still, progress of sorts is visible. For the first
three postwar decades in which intelligence was a
central preoccupation of national policy, the work
was secret and what discussion there was of it took
place mostly behind closed doors. In the next dec-
ade, the debate went public and focused heavily on
clandestine intelligence operations. The main sub-
ject, however, has always been intelligence collec-
tion and especially analysis, and in recent years
enough questions about American performance
have been raised to bring this subject to the fore,
inside as well as outside the intelligence ccmmuni-
ty. W. Gates carries forward this essential inquiry.
. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/24: CIA-RDP99-01448R000301300001-1