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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-01448R000301310024-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 22, 2013
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: May 21, 1987
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/22 : CIA-RDP99-01448R000301310024-5
i;7' ARNOLD BBICHIVIAN _ . ~, . ~.
T here is a narti_
'P6olishrtess. Which a 1' is
1 intellf t 1 -
n it come ~to
dealing with the problem of Intel
enc.. It is a belief that problems
isin from intelli enc. - cov
action. counterinte gene-. c1.-des
tine collection anal sis and esti-
? r a FF1GLla1
leeislation or by presidential
.gmdelmes of what is permissible or
imp& enc. activity True, some problems can be
solved by.legislation or give the ap-
pearance of having been solved.
Most difficulties, however, which
arise in the intelligence process are,
really beyond reach of legislative ac-
tion. If the .laws' are intended to in-
hibit what Congress might regard as
beyond the pale of acceptable activ-
ity in a democracy, they.will not only
inhibit specific activity but may well
lead to a ti; im mobilized intelligence
agency.
Forithe CIA. officer, it may. be
safer to do nothing-since there are
no satictibhs" for inactivity than to
doing=which might risk, even
retroactively, legal reprisal,
I t tev ifWas Abba Eban * bo
once said that if you insist on open
covenants openly arrived at you may
tt chieii .covenaqtA,atail-7:l_e,
Eban aphorism might well apply to
intelligence activity. There can be no
such phenomenon as overt covert ac-
tion or open clandestine collection,
anymore than there can be fried
snowballs. Yet our lawmakers insist
on the impossible.
Such seems to be the case with the
Senate Select Committee on Intel-
ligence headed by the redoubtable
Democratic !Sen. David L. Boren o
Oklahoma. The committee has announced, according to The Washing-
ton Post, that as part of its mon-
itoring of CIA covert action
programs it. will conduct "for the
Arnold Beichinan, research fellow
at the Hoover Institution, is a
founding member of the-Consortium
for the Study of Intelligence.
got a
risk-free
business
For a superpower to
be so disarmed
against its enemies. in
the Kremlin and in
Eastern Europe
means that American
security is at risk.
first time financial audits of secret
intelligence operations."
Republican Sen. David F Duren-
berger of Minnesota disagreed with
the new policy, arguing that the purl
pose of congressional oversight "is
to help intelligence, not to have an
audit team sitting on the back of the
[CIA] operations department" Mr.
Durenberger headed the select com-
mittee in 1985 and 1986.
Mr. Boren explained that there
won't be hundreds of auditors but a
mere handful on the Senate Commit-
tee staff "with the capability to
swoop down unannounced to spot-
check accounts in the covert action
field. It's more of a deterrent."
A deterrent to what? A deterrent
to covert action.
What are the auditors going to au-
dit? Money that changed hands se-
cretly between a CIA officer and an
"asset" - perhaps, the national of a
CIA-targeted country or some for-
eign government official.
Does the Senate Committee ex-
pect a signed receipt for funds re-
ceived from the recipient who, by
the laws of his country, may be guilty
of treason?. And are the auditors
then going to ask the identified re-
cipient whether he not only receive;
money but how much (and, please,..
show us your bank deposit slip) in '
order to make sure the CIA officer.
hasn't kited the receipt?
What CIA informant is going to be
stupid enough to sign receipts when
he knows there's going to be an au-
dit?
Acting CIA Director Robert M. '
Gates and NSC Adviser ran C.
Carlucci reportedly have agreed to'-,
the Boren auditing proposal. What
else could they do?
Yet both men, veteran intelligence
officers and administrators, know
well that meaningful U.S. covert ao'
tivities are really disappearing from
the U.S. intelligence arsenal. Per-
haps, such activities should disap~::
pear from what should be an integral'
and integrated part of American foil.
eign policy. Perhaps, a wide-open so~.:_
ciety like ours cannot really enjoy a`
covert-action component and that2
therefore, an attempt to develop a
covert capacity is doomed from the.'.
start.
I have long studied the problems'
of congressional oversight of intelli
Bence, a congressional function
which, while constitutionally autho-`
rized, may often- intrude on a presr''
idential prerogative in the formula='
tion of foreign policy. There are no.
easy policy answers in a democracy
to the problems of espionage aid
clandestinity The Boren proposal, however
safeguarded and seemingly harm-
less, in reality is another nail in tW.
coffin of American intelligence ca-'
pacity. The CIA itself hammered''
home some of those nails during ita,
heyday under Allen Dulles. But who
ever may be blamed for our inter,'
ligence collapse (and it haa.,
collapsed, especially counter'
intelligence), the intelligence crisi '.
has reached a point of insolubility..
For a superpower to be so dis-
armed against its enemies in the
Kremlin and in Eastern Europe
means that American security is at
risk. Bandaid solutions can only ag,
gravate the crisis.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/22 : CIA-RDP99-01448R000301310024-5