FOREIGN POLICY FAKE, ARMS CONTROL POSEUR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-01448R000401580024-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 25, 2012
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: October 14, 1988
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/25: CIA-RDP99-01448R000401580024-5
Foreign Policy Fake,
Aims Control Poseur
COh~ m GC's ti'A r
By Paul C. Warnke
WASHINGTON
ow George Bush main-
tains his campaign
pose as a foreign
policy and arms con-
trol expert is a baffle-
Hment. The fact is,
he's more like the marginal baseball
player who has a "cup of coffee" in
the major leagues than the Hall of
Famer he'd like voters to think he is.
For example, he fails to understand
the limited role of nuclear weapons in
national defense. In a speech last
June, Mr. Bush criticized the empha-
sis placed by Gov. Michael S. Dukakis
on improving American conventional
forces. He asked "Is he proposing the
winnability of a conventional war and
... what's going to happen in defense
of the United States?" Is Mr. Bush
still proposing the "wnnability" of a
nuclear war? During his 1980 Presi-
dential campaign, he said he believed
that there could in fact be a winner in
a nuclear exchange between the
United States and the Soviet Union.
His infatuation with nuclear weap-
ons and a nuclear war-fighting capa-
bility is reflected in his Noah's Ark
defense strategy. He supports two of
every strategic system: two new in-
tercontinental ballistic missiles (the
MX and the Midgetman), two new
strategic bombers (the B-I and the
Stealth), two kinds of space weapons
(the Star Wars antimissile shield and
an anti-satellite system).
He has said repeatedly that he
would go slow on an arms agreement
that would drastically reduce inter-
continental-range strategic weap-
onry and that he would tie strategic
arms talks more closely to conven-
tional arms control negotiations.. In
contrast, the Secretary of Defense,
Frank Carlucci, and Adm. William J.
Crowe Jr., Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs, have opposed such linkage.
Paul C. Warnke was chief arms nego-
tialor of SALT ll in 1977 and 1978.
Mr. Bush has also charged that
Governor Dukakis "is anti-nuclear
weapons" and would try "to keep the
peace through conventional determi-
nants alone." It is clear that he
shares neither President Reagan's
enthusiasm for deep cuts in strategic
weapons nor the laudable, if unrealis-
tic, goal the President set at Reykja-
vik to eliminate missiles entirely.
Over all, the Vice President exhib-
its little familiarity with strategic nu-
clear issues. During the Iowa cau-
cuses, he referred to the Treaty on In-
termediate-range Nuclear Forces
first as reducing launchers and then
as reducing nuclear warheads. In
fact, the treaty's provisions apply
only to missiles.
On the Strategic Defense Initiative,
Mr. Bush told The New York Times:
"I am not at the point where I am pre-
pared to say, go forward this minute
with partial deployment." But he has
also said. "Already, the first phase of
a space-based technology is ready to
come out of the lab and begin demon.
stration." He predicts that, in a first
term, "I will be able to single out a
technology that will be' the answer."
His optimism is without informed
scientific support.
And in asserting that proceeding
with S.D.I. testing and deployment
"will not foul up progress on other
arms talks either," he forgets two
things. First, that it was concerns
about a possible Soviet strategic de-
fense deployment that prompted the
Nixon Administration to negotiate
limits on both strategic defensive and
offensive systems. Second, that for-
mer Secretary of Defense Caspar
Weinberger warned President Rea-
gan in 1985 that Soviet deployment of
a space-based defense would mean
that we would have to add to our
stockpiles of warheads and increase
our ability to penetrate Soviet de-
fenses. Obviously, deployment of a
territorial defense would derail talks
on major arms reductions.
Mr. Bush's record in foreign policy
The Washington Post
The New York Times X935
The Washington Times
The Wall Street Journal
The Christian Science Monitor _
New York Daily News
USA Today
The Chicago Tribune
Date 14 o c- - g~
is no more reassuring. He displays no
credentials to take over from Presi-
dent Reagan in dealing with Mikhail
S. Gorbachev. His response to the op-
portunities now open is to deny that
Mr. Gorbachev's Soviet Union is less
threatening or that it shows "that
kind of fundamental change, a turn-
ing Inward, a la China."
iQbLgYEar as Dir
tral Intelli ence A errnr U+?.
nnrnd Bush i
~^ Cen Mandel
w
~IIbIn>t Am rinnn m
tain information Ob-
a
bout AL me in-
LClli?ence eons his his almost eli y In
brief time as am-
bassador to the United Nations, he ap.
parently never realized that the real
work of that body does not take place
in the General Assembly and that
U.N. Peacekeeping forces can make it
unnecessary to send American troops
to ho
His t spots around the world.
States Liaison eOffiders in 1974 United
a and
1975 seems not to have Produced any
profound insights about relations
with China. He continues to deny that
arms were traded to Iran in return
for hostages and remains reticent
about his knowledge of the use of the
Proceeds to finance the Nicaraguan
contras. The embarrassing naTvetts of
his toast commending Ferdinand
Marcos's devotion to democratic
principles is a chilling harbinger of
his approach to the developing world.
Finally, as C.I.A. Director, George
Bush was responsible for bringing in
"Team B" in 1976 to seconteSg the
professionals responsible for intelli.
gence estimates of Soviet capabilities
and intentions. Team B was de-
scribed by The New York Times as
"a hand-picked unofficial panel of
hard-line critics of'recent arms con.
trot policy" Rav Cline
Deouty Director of the C 1 p former
aescrtbed b The Washin ton PWt _U
ost as
a_leadinr: -ckp.,.:,
estimaten
CONTINUED
Page 12 .
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/25: CIA-RDP99-01448R000401580024-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/25: CIA-RDP99-01448R000401580024-5
a.
George Bush accepted Team B's
findings of a Soviet
much military buildup
greater than Previously esti-
mated and then said that he had done
so because of new evidence. This new
evidence consisted of a separate re-
vised estimate of Soviet defense
spending, Published in October 1976.
What this report showed was not a
greater buildup than earlier esti-
mates but only a greater expenditure
to acquire the same forces. In the
words of the report. "It also implies
that Soviet defense industries are far
less efficient than formerly be-
lieved." But Team B's misleading
caricature of Soviet forces led to the
misapplication of much of the $2 tril-
lion spent on defense since 1980.
In evaluating Mr. Bush's claims of
a superior ability to deal with foreign
affairs and defense issues, it is not
enough to look at his resume. Voters
should also look at his record. p
I3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/25: CIA-RDP99-01448R000401580024-5