GEORGE BUSH HAS BEEN ON THE SCENE OF THE BIGGEST POLITICAL SCANDALS OF THE LAST TWO DECADES.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-01448R000401580029-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 25, 2012
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: October 1, 1988
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/25: CIA-RDP99-01448R000401580029-0
George Bush
has been on the
scene of the biggest
political scandals of
the last two decades.
How does he
always get
out alive?
1
By Scott Armstrong
and Jeff Nason
I
PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES WERE EVALU-
ated by bipartisan panels of experts and cho-
sen for office as they might be admitted to a
graduate program in international affairs,
George Bush's national security resume would get him the
job just as surely as Michael Dukakis's would get him sent
back for remedial tutoring.
No other candidate has been exposed to so many facets of
the national security world. Bush has served as a congress-
man, ambassador to the United Nations, envoy to China,
and director of the Central Intelligence Agency. As vice
president, Bush headed National Security Council groups
on crisis management, drug interdiction, and terrorism.
But Bush's record is a double-edged sword. Not just impres-
sive entries on a resume, it invites closer inspection.
That record is no distinguishable track of accomplish-
ments. In fact, Bush's footprints are shallow when they are
visible at all. For most of his career, Bush has been rele-
gated to taking instructions rather than giving them, and his
achievements are largely those of the people and institu-
tions he served. His failures, too, reflect the failures of
others.
As director of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1976,
Bush became a Cabinet-level officer for the first time. For a
year, Bush called the shots as intelligence czar in the Ford
administration.
What happened during that year? And what did Bush do
at. the CIA's top man?
ComoaiwMan
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MOTHER JONES
- Orlando Bosch,
an anti-Castro
terrorist, was
arrested in Costa
Rica in 1976 when
it was learned
that he was
planning to kill
Henry Kissinger.
According to former aides and
a current high-ranking CIA
official. Bush helped restore
the CIA's damaged morale
and reestablish ties with for-
eign intelligence agencies. He
also effectively sheltered the
Agency from congressional
wrutir.y.
In the process, though,
Bush "virtually turned the
store over" to those he was
supposedly bringing under
rein. During Bush's tenure,
the message to the intelligence
community was clear: Bush
would look the other way, ig-
noring improprieties deemed
necessary to get the job done.
Covert operators learned that the way to deal with Bush a'
director was to keep him "out of the loop" for information
about operations that Congress might challenge. By the time
he left the CIA in January 1977, Bush had also learned that
..out of the loop" was a good place to be-especially if one
had presidential ambitions.
Top Spy. If the appointment of George Herbert Walker
Bush as director of the Central Intelligence Agency was not
preordained, neither was it entirely accidental. As often
happens in Washington. Bush's elevation to the post of the
country's chief spymaster was typical Washington-a prod-
uct, for the most part, of hardball partisan politics.
As Gerald Ford prepared to run for president in late 1975,
he was an incumbent with practically no record facing plenty
of obstacles. His pardon of Richard Nixon had turned into a
political tar baby. As if that weren't enough,
the House and Senate had set up competing
committees which were revealing, on an al-
most daily basis. news of abuses by the CIA.
White House political strategists had
been counting on a public relations break
from the sensational exposes swirling
around the CIA. William Colby, Ford's di-
rector of central intelligence, had been
lauded by congressional investigators for his
cooperation with them. But the result of
Colby's efforts-like attempts to shovel
during a snowstorm-turned out to be a
seemingly endless series of revelations: se-
cret drug testing, spying on U.S. citizens,
assassination plots against foreign leaders.
Even when these horror stories con-
cerned events that had occurred under Dem-
ocratic administrations, each revelation
seemed to taint Ford. Colby-a symbol of
past abuses-would have to be replaced.
Ford's aides sorted through a "final" list
of possible successors to Colby, but they
were unsure if any of the candidates could
sufficiently reassure both the public and
Congress. They approached Edward Bennett Williams. a
prominent trial lawyer and longtime Democrat, who turned
down the offer. They then decided to offer the position to
Elliot Richardson, whose reputation for independence and
rectitude had been mightily enhanced by his resignation as
attorney general during the Watergate scandal. Before Rich-
ardson could be offered the job, however, partisan politics
intervened.
Ford needed, after all, to be nominated before he could
turn his attention to the general election, and Vice President
Nelson Rockefeller was too liberal to carry a Ford ticket
through the Republican convention--especially with a
strong right-wing challenge already promised by Ronald
Reagan. Clearly Ford needed a conservative running mate,
but as soon as he settled on Robert Dole his advisers feared
that George Bush-already miffed at having been passed up
for the vice presidency when Rockefeller was selected-
could spoil their strategy.
Only five months after Bush had arrived as chief of the
U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing, some of the frequent visitors
he had hosted there began leaking word that his first year in
China would probably be his last. He had expressed interest
in the post of secretary of commerce, but Ford worried that if
Bush returned in such a domestically prominent role in Janu-
ary 1976, he would be free to challenge Ford or at least to take
a shot at the vice presidency.
The Ford White House was genuinely interested in getting
a Democrat or an independent Republican as director of
central intelligence, but that prospect paled before the oppor-
tunity of removing a partisan Republican from the 1976
electoral sweepstakes. If they gave Bush the job. he would be
forced to bow out of the 1976 race; so they decided to pull a
switch: offer Richardson the top spot at the Department of
Commerce and Bush the directorship of the CIA.
On paper, Bush was a reasonable, if political, choice. He
OCTOBER 1998
22
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MUTMER JONES
way a loyal Republican whose impressive dossier included
membership in Skull and Bones, the prestigious secret soci-
ety at Yak; a father who was a moderate Republican senator
from Connecticut during the Eisenhower and Kennedy ad-
ministrations; two terms in the House of Representatives
from Texas; an unsuccessful but not embarrassing campaign
against Lloyd Bentsen for a U. S. Senate seat in 1970; a tour as
ambassador to the United Nations, in which he encountered
every imaginable foreign affairs issue; yeoman service as
chair of the beleaguered Republican National Committee,
during the darkest hours of Nixon's agonized and gradually
deteriorating defense; and, following the RNC, the stint in
Beijing. where he was the visible manifestation of the slow-
motion U.S.-China courtship.
Only those who worked closely with Bush knew that in the
U.N. job he had deferred alternately to the State Department
and to his own career staff. He loyally obeyed detailed
instructions from Henry Kissinger as well. Similarly, only a
few insiders knew how completely irrelevant he had been to
U.S.-China policy. Every nuance of initiative had belonged
to Kissinger. Despite Bush's public persona as a world states-
man, until his job at the CIA he had actually been little more
than a messenger carrying out orders for the Nixon and Ford
administrations.
Kissinger cabled Bush in Beijing with the offer of director
of central intelligence on November I. 075. Bush consulted
his wife, Barbara. before quickly accepting the offer.
Oniy two weeks earlier, Kissinger had been in Beijing to
arrange for President Ford's December trip to China, but he
hadn't mentioned the coming offer. During the visit, Bush
got to accompany Kissinger to a meeting with Chairman
Mao Zedong, whom he had never met.
Bush was thrilled when Mao took notice of him. "This
ambassador is in a plight," Mao said, in apparent reference to
Kissinger's overshadowing presence. "Why don't you come
visit?"
"I would be honored:' Bush replied, "but I'm afraid
you're very busy."
"Oh. I'm not busy:" Mao said. "I don't look after internal
affairs. I only read the international news. You should really
come visit" Back at the liaison office. Bush asked his staff
whether they thought Mao was serious, but they told him
Mao was just being diplomatic. As usual, Bush deferred to
them and dropped the matter-only to wonder later if he had
muffed an historic opportunity.
By the time Bush returned to Washington, key Republi-
cans from the House and Senate had written asking him to
withdraw his name from consideration for vice president, to
prevent any implication of politicizing the CIA. As he pre-
pared for confirmation hearings in mid-December, he began
hearing from old friends that he had been "a damned fool to
say yes" and give up his own political future. His Yale
classmate and fellow Skull and Bones member Thomas
Ludlow "Lud" Ashley, a House Democrat at the time, asked
Bush, "What the fuck do you know about intelligence?"
"Ask me in six weeks," a confident Bush responded.
Going Home. In the next few weeks. Bush received a
crash course. As he waited for confirmation by the Senate,
the difficulties Colby had been confronting grew even more
OCTOBER 1984
21
dire. In early 1975, the Justice Department had opened a per-
jury investigation against former CIA director Richard
Helms over his sworn statement denying Agency involve-
ment in the 1973 military coup in Chile. Investigations of
additional CIA activities and of at least a dozen other officials
were already under way.
To counter the continuing congressional scrutiny and go
on the offensive with the press, the administration unleashed
Colby, who as outgoing chief had nothing to risk, on the
Agency's critics, while Bush worked to establish a new, more
cooperative relationship with Congress. The ammunition for
Colby's attack on Congress and the press arrived on Decem-
ber 23, 1975, when Richard Welch, chief of the CIA's Athens
station, was murdered on his doorstep. Colby immediately
denounced Counterspy magazine, which he claimed had un-
masked Welch.
The Agency's own internal investigation concluded that
Welch's position and local home address were well known,
and that he had been targeted in connection with his activities
in Cyprus and Lebanon. But Colby broadened his complaint
to include the "sensational and hysterical way the CIA inves-
tigations had been handled and trumpeted around the
world"-painting the congressional committees with the
same brush he had used, inaccurately, to tar Counterspy.
Moving In. Mean-
while, at the end of January,
Bush was confirmed by the
Senate. As he moved into
the CIA: Langley, Virginia,
headquarters, he took con-
trol of the most inbred bu-
reaucracy in government.
Room 7D5607 was an unat-
tractive, cramped. L-
shaped office. It had a
square sitting area with a
column incongruously
placed in the middle, a
cramped alcove housing the
director's desk, and picture
windows overlooking a pan-
orama of the Virginia
woods nwby.
In his first months on the
job. Bush turned his energy
away from the Agency. It
seemed easier and more
important, according to
former aides, to change the
CIA's relationship with
Capitol Hill than to alter
A boa.b awe by ChUren aerres
.Rrwb killed Miho.J Ma ff $r's
.o f ad 180b4 Lrr.M.r i h "band
in Risabi.iow, D.C., in 1976.
the Agency to satisfy the Hill. Bush's central charge would
be to keep the House and Senate intelligence committees at
bay.
The more hostile of the two, the House committee which
was chaired by New York Democrat Otis Pike. soon gave
Bush an unexpected opportunity. On February 11 and 18,
1976, the Village Win published a copy of the suppressed,
uncensored Pike committee report, later revealed to have
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MOTHER JONES
from Washington, he now sat at the Cabinet table But what
he brought to the table was largely what those deputies under
him recommended or insisted upon. There were few oppor-
tunities to exercise his own initiative. If Bush had been
deferential and loyal to his staff in previous jobs, he became
downright obedient to those he was supposedly overseeing in
the new job at Langley.
With the lingering odor of past abuses stifling support for
new adventures, Bush's year at the CIA was one in which few
new initiatives were undertaken in the covert operations
wing of CIA headquarters. "I doubt there were any covert
operations at all during Bush," one Agency veteran com-
ments, adding that Bush's tenure was "largely ineffective
aside from damage control. He didn't seem to have any
particular interest in intelligence."
One of the Agency's current ranking officials says Bush
"had no lead in directing the Agency, especially on the
operations side." In general. this official added, the director
is kept insulated from the operations side of Agency activity.
"The director spends so much time explaining to the people
that he has little to no time to look at what we, in the
operations division, are doing." (Bush would make 51 ap-
pearances on Capitol Hill during his year at the CIA.)
Some of the problems he'd inherited concerning covert
operations lingered on. The Senate committee wanted to
know more, for example, about what was going on in Angola,
since the Senate had prohibited any financial support to Jonas
Savimbi's rebel forces there.
Bush's greatest asset in successfully carrying the Angola
ball forward turned out to be his delicate balance of knowl-
edge and ignorance. In the beginning, he was able to honestly
report that, to his knowledge at least, the Agency was abiding
by official admonitions against further U.S. covert
involvement.
The CIA had narrowly averted an investigation the pre-
vious December, when Deputy Director for Operations Wil-
liam Nelson testified to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee that the Agency was sending arms to Angola,
which was the opposite of what the CIA had previously
claimed. Now, with Bush at the helm, the Agency assured
and reassured Congress that aid had indeed been cut off.
One continuing problem was the revelation of CIA manip-
ulation of public opinion in this country. Case officers from
the Lusaka, Zambia, station had planted false propaganda in
the U.S. press in late September 1975 that Soviets were in
Angola advising government forces. In fact, there was no
evidence for this claim, but the Agency continued planting
disinformation about Cuban soldiers committing nonexistent
atrocities. In February 1976, a CIA-sponsored free-lance
journalist reported falsely in the iihshing:on Pbst that South
Africans were not assisting Savimbi.
The CIA continued to deny to congressional committees
that arms were still being shipped to the Angolan rebels
when, in fact, they continued to be shipped. through allies in
the region. As each new detail about illegalities and improper
aid was revealed, Bush first denied, then admitted the CIA
wrongdoing, quickly adding that he had just learned the
news.
When Bush went to the Hill for closed-door briefings, he
shared only a portion of the little he had learned about the
OCTOBER 1988
24
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come to it through CBS correspondent Daniel Schorr. The
CIA argued that the report contained information that endan-
gered U.S. agents and seriously compromised the country's
intelligence-gathering capability.
Overnight the political landscape shifted from support for
investigations of the CIA to questions about the motives of its
critics. Bush took advantage of the shift.
As principal Agency liaison to Capitol Hill, Bush initiated
a friendly relationship with key Democrats and Republicans
on the Senate Intelligence Committee. According to its staff
director at the time, William Miller, Bush seemed coopera-
tive and forthcoming, a respected "member of the club" who
had regular access to the president. (In fact, according to
former aides of Bush, although he regularly briefed the presi-
dent, and had a permanent rotation in Ford's tennis four-
some, he exercised less influence over President Ford than
was often assumed on the Hill.)
On February 18, 1976, the Ford Wl;ite House was able to
catch the unsuspecting congressional committees by sur-
prise. By issuing Executive Order 11905, "to establish poli-
cies to improve the quality of intelligence needed for national
security (and] to clarify the authority and responsibilities of
the intelligence departments and agencies;' Ford preempted
a statute whereby Congress could tell the executive what to
do. Ironically. although this reorganization of the intelligence
community would become one of the historic hallmarks of
his service as the Agency's director, Bush had nearly nothing
to do with it. The arrangements had been worked out over the
previous six months by two Ford advisers.
The Senate Intelligence Committee, sensing that it lacked
sufficient public support for further extending its inquiry,
struck a secret arrangement with Bush and the CIA, accord-
ing to two of the committee's senior staff members. Rather
than move directly to a new oversight process, there would be
an interregnum during which the committee would neither
set specific reporting requirements on the Agency nor pass
binding legislation. Bush would share information with the
committee, with both parties understanding that a new, more
cooperative oversight relationship would evolve over time.
Moving On, From Bush's point of view it was imperative
to get the Agency back to business as usual. The most
pressing priority was to restore the confidence and morale of
the thousands of agents who felt that anything they did would
be examined and criticized by Congress and the press.
Bush "took pride in the morale-building sessions ... he
considers this one of his real accomplishments. (I find that] a
little strange," says his friend Lud Ashley, who spoke often
with Bush about his experience as director of the CIA. It is
unclear, however, even to his old friend, what else Bush did
besides cheerkading.
As he settled into the CIA job, Bush continued his pep
rally approach to personnel management. Bush's perception
of his responsibility was to deliver information to the presi-
dent, but not to implement policy or linger at the table as a
decision-maker. He considered himself "out of the loop" for
major foreign policy decisions. For those around Ford, this
role helped set up Bush as a buffer with the Hill; he was the
honest broker, not a player calling the shots.
While Bush had done little before but accept instructions
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Angola situation, and then only in generalities. Here, accord-
ing to those who mended the briefings, he was at his best-
sincere and cooperative. When necessary. Bush brought
along those of his aides who were more familiar with the
matter at hand. He soon found he was not easily second-
guessed by any of his audience on the Hill.
Offering committee members greater detail than they had
heard before, and patiently listening to their advice. Bush
worked to restore a foreign policy of secret consensus be-
tween the administration and key Republicans and Demo-
crats about a policy of containing Soviet and Cuban
expansion in southern Africa. One by one, the elected offi-
cials bought into the plan. According to two senior govern-
ment officials who were involved, limited actions in Angola
were on once again, justified as necessary to phase out the
larger. earlier operations.
By spring. Bush felt he had the Agency back on solid
ground with the congressional oversight committees, but
there was one lingering obligation-alleviating the residual
resentment in Congress toward certain Agency personnel.
Bush knew changes had to be made. but he decided to allow
the career bureaucracy to guide him in his appointments to
the upper echelon of the Agency. From the time of his
confirmation. Bush relied principally on E. Henry Knoche. a
CIA veteran who helped coordinate Colby's and Bush's
responses to the congressional committees.
Bush "relied on Knoche because he knew the place,"
notes one old hand. Knoche was considered the "general
manager of the store" Another career officer puts it differ-
ently; be no Knoche knew
"where the bodies were buried
or half-buried"
Bush also turned to Will-
iam VMdIs, a career covert op-
crator who had graduated a
few years ahead of him at
lltle. and made him the new
deputy for operations. A
month later, on VWlls's recom-
mendation, Bush appointed
Theodore Shackley to be asso-
ciate deputy director for oper-
ations. A third career covert
operator, John Waller, as-
sumed the post of inspector
general. the sensitive position
responsible for monitoring in-
ternal improprieties.
In Angola, 4
the CIA continued to
ship arms to the
rebels through third
parties, while firmly
denying involvement.
Bush worked hard to
restore a policy
of secret consensus.
Professionals in the ranks were split over the changes.
Some-particularly analysts and post-Vietnam War in-
house critics-thought the for had wan a new long-term
lease on the henhouse. Others, particularly those serving in
operations, thought the correct message was being commu-
nicated: covert actions are specialty items-it takes special-
ists to run them; it takes specialists to investigate them.
New Problems. Throughout the fall of 1975 and into
the spring of 1976, rumors and news (Continued on page 42)
OCTOBER 1988
25
a
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0
Angola situation, and then only in generalities. Hat, accord-
ing to those who attended the briefings, he was at his best-
sincere and cooperative. When necessary, Bush brought
along those of his aides who were more familiar with the
matter at hand. He soon found be was not easily second-
guessed by any of his audience on the Hill.
Offering committee members greater detail than they had
heard before, and patiently listening to their advice, Bush
worked to restore a foreign policy of secret consensus be-
tween the administration and key Republicans and Demo-
crats about a policy of containing Soviet and Cuban
expansion in southern Africa. One by one, the elected offi-
cials bought into the plan. According to two senior govern-
ment officials who were involved, limited actions in Angola
were on once again, justified as necessary to phase out the
larger. earlier operations.
By spring, Bush felt he had the Agency back on solid
ground with the congressional oversight committees, but
there was one lingering obligation-alleviating the residual
resentment in Congress toward certain Agency personnel.
Bush knew changes had to be made, but he decided to allow
the career bureaucracy to guide him in his appointments to
the upper echelon of the Agency. From the time of his
confirmation. Bush relied principally on E. Henry Knoche, a
CIA veteran who helped coordinate Colby's and Bush's
responses to the congressional committees.
Bush "relied on Knoche because he knew the place,"
notes one old hand. Knoche was considered the "general
manager of the store." Another career officer puts it differ-
ettdy; he says Knoche knew
"where the bodies were buried
or half-buried."
Bush also turned to Will-
iam Wills, a career covert op-
erator who had graduated a
few years ahead of him at
ale, and made him the new
deputy for operations. A
month leer, on Wells's recom-
mendation, Bush appointed
Theodore Shockley to be asso-
ciate deputy director for oper-
ations. A third career covert
operator, John Waller, as-
sumed the post of inspector
general, the sensitive position
responsible for monitoring in-
ternal improprieties.
Professionals in the ranks were split over the changes.
Some-particularly analysts and post-Vietnam War in-
house critics-thought the fat had won a new long-term
lease on the penthouse. Others, particularly those serving in
operations, thought the correct message was being commu-
nicated: covert actions are specialty items-it takes special-
ists to run them; it takes specialists to investigate them.
New Problestse. Throughout the fall of 1975 and into
the spring of 1976, rumors and news (Continued on page 42)
W *ola,
the CIA continued to
ship arms to the
rebels through third
parties, while firmly
denying involvement.
Bush worked hard to
restore a policy
of secret consensus.
O C T O B E R 1989 raoraotiaPwcod.Mcoy.wSYGMA
25
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M O T H E R J O N E S
ache dolma-rNA{' I~k?f LAPP"
BUSH
(ConlinutJ from page 21 1 stone,,
new strain of intelligence abuses urta, d
on Capitol Hill. This iime. the tt porrc;
abuses had been committed nor h) the ( I ',
but by intelligence agencies ,t regun
friendly to the United States A stansLu
feature of the internal-secunt) apparatu'
each of these allies-A rgenti na. C'h i Ie . 1 r .i r
Israel, the Philippines. South Afnca. Solar,
Korea. and Taiwan-had been their hare.,
ment of opposition figures. both dotest Ica I Is
and in the United States. Some of these c, iun
tries' intelligence operatives. especially the
Koreans, were courting members of (i ii
gress with campaign contributions. outright
bribes, and favors ranging from ersav an
tiques to party girls.
A growing number in the posi.\ ilter-
gate Democratic Congress found this pas
tiche of human rights abuses and influence
peddling particularly unatlr ii.C Conlin
ued unrestrained activities of these foreign
intelligence services threatened to undci
mine congressional and public confidence
in the Agency once again.
To make matters worse, reports had
been forwarded to Bush about pr paratit in,
by Cuban-American veterans of the CIA's
Miami station-including some who re
meined on the informant pasrofl--to at
tack pro-Castro targets. Previously viewed
as freedom fighters, these Cuhan-Amen
cans had become reckless terrorists. user
whom the CIA had lost all control.
In June, four Cuban-American orgini
zations joined together to firm CORP. or
the Command of United Revolutionary Or
ganizations. CORU was formed to build
political support for overthrowing Castro.
:lnd its members began working directl\
with the intelligence agencies of the right
wing regimes in Chile. Paraguay. and
Nicaragua.
After a CORU meeting at Bonao. a
mountain resort in the Dominican Repute
lie, consistent reports of planned bombings
and political assassinations filtered back to
the CIA. Within six weeks. bombs ex
plodcd at the Cuban United Nations sus
son in New Yolk. and at tour other
locations in the hemisphere The first ter
rorist war in the Americas as under was,
and it was being waged by agents trained
and paid by the CIA.
The CIA had never acted to restrain
"friendly" intelligence agencies and s.as
reluctant to preempt Cuban-American anti
Castro activity. The acts- including illegal
ones-were occurring mostly outside the
United States. And even when these act,
were plotted inside the United States. the'.
were officially the FBI's responsibilit\
Besides, unless the Agency continued to
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/25: CIA-RDP99-01448R000401580029-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/25: CIA-RDP99-01448R000401580029-0
look the other way, it would be forced to
open a Pandora's box of more congressio-
nal investigation. Hoping to avoid months
or years of additional inquiry, Bush's clos-
est aides arranged to keep him as free as
possible of "irrelevant details," thus maxi-
mizing his ability to deny there was a prob-
lem. Reports of Cuban-American activity
were handled routinely as FYI items within
the bureaucracy below, and rogue opera-
tions were seldom reined in. There were,
however, exceptions to this rule.
In February 1976, the CIA blew the
whistle on Orlando Bosch, a Miami pedi-
atrician and anti-Castro organizer. Bosch
was detained by Costa Rican police for
plotting to assassinate Henry Kissinger.
The plot was reportedly organized because
Kissinger had been conducting negotia-
tions to improve relations with Cuba.
The CIA also intervened when officials
learned the Chilean Intelligence Service
(DINA) was planning to use Cuban ex-CIA
agents to assassinate Chilean exiles in Por-
tugal and France through a regional coun-
ter-terrorist organization known as
Operation Condor. Headed by Chile, Oper-
ation Condor included agents from Argen-
tina. Bolivia, Paraguay, Brazil, and
Uruguay dedicated wracking down "sub-
versives" throughout the hemisphere. The
details of the plot were passed to the CIA's
intelligence liaisons in Portugal and
France, and they squelched it.
In these cases, Bush's CIA proved capable
of averting attacks planned by its friends.
Unfortunately for targets of similar plots. the
Agency did not develop any systematic way
of dealing with such terrorist threats.
Assassination Abroad. On June 16,
1976, U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon
Francis E. Meloy, Jr., his driver, and the
embassy's economic counselor were assas-
sinated on their way to a meeting with
Lebanese president-elect Elias Sarkis.
President Ford converted an emergency
meeting in the White House Situation
Room to focus on the potential danger to
other Americans in Lebanon.
the crisis group--Ford. Bush,
Kissinger. National Security Adviser Brent
Scowcroft, Deputy Defense Secretary
William Clements, Jr., and Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff George Brown-
was convened four times in the next four
days.
On this rare occasion. Bush moved be-
yond the role of information-provider, feel-
ing that the murder meant a "new, more
dangerous level of terrorist activity in Bei-
rut." This would warrant ordering Ameri-
cans to evacuate, a move Kissinger
opposed. Ford agreed with Bush; a navy
task force moved in and evacuated 166
O( TOBER i 1,'M 8
4 i
the CIA had less and less to share with its
counterparts abroad.
The information Bush wanted could he
obtained, the CIA's clandestine operators
assured him, but only if Bush made it clear
that the CIA would not crack down on "co-
operative" intelligence Agency acts. ities
and report their plans or the information
they shared to the FBI.
At that point, according to a stiii-acme
CIA official. Bush made a tactical judg-
ment, one of the few clear choices of his
career. He wanted to concentrate on col-
lecting more information on terrorist act iv-
ities around the world. But in order to get it.
the CIA had to cooperate with friendly
foreign agencies operating in the United
States. No further pressure would be
brought to bear on rogue operations of "co-
operative" intelligence agencies. He would
try to find ways to help them rather than to
curtail their activities.
That was the backdrop when the U.S.
ambassador to Paraguay, George Landau.
cabled the CIA on July 28 to say that he had
just issued special U S. visas to two Chil-
ean military operatives who had been is-
sued fake passports by Paraguayan intel-
ligence officials. The two c rimed th:y
were heading to Washington to meet with
CIA Deputy Director Vernon Walters.
among other things. In a separate courier
pouch. Landau sent photocopies of the
passports to Walters. Back from the CIA
came a "service message" acknowledging
receipt of his cable and stating that it had
been "delivered to George Bush, the direc-
tor of the Central Intelligence Agency ...."
(In a 1980 interview with one of the au-
thors. Bush denied that he ever saw this
memo, claiming he had been on a trip to
China at the time.)
On August 4, the CIA forwarded a re-
sponse on behalf of the recently retired
Walters to the U.S. ambassador in Para-
guay, stating "that he was unaware of the
visit and that his Agency did not desire to
have any contact with the Chileans." The
ambassador revoked the visas. Two, d ys
later the CIA sent the photographs accom-
panying the visas back to the State
Department.
This series of transactions meant little to
anyone in the CIA except those in the clan-
destine service who had followed Opera-
tion Condor, the counterterrorism program
that the Agency would block later that year
from assassinating Chilean exiles in Portu-
gal and France The cooperation hetween
intelligence operatives of two, member na-
tions-Paraguay and Chile-meant they
were probably gearing up for an action in
the United States.
The situation became even more omi-
nous when the CIA learned from a tele-
phone call in late August that the two
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Bush was thrilled with his expanded
role. He went back to the Agency, anxious
to follow through with more information.
For the first time in his career he was really
a center-stage actor on a par with Kissinger.
Bush wanted to know what the Agency
could do to react to this new terrorist threat.
The analytical side of the CIA had little
that could help Bush. The National Secu-
rity Agency had soaked up millions of con-
versations from special listening posts arw;
satellites around the world, and it was be-
ginning to process all this material through
its new Cray advanced computers. But the
results were largely useless, according to a
ranking intelligence official at the time,
because Bush and his predecessors had not
heeded warnings that the expanded techno-
logical take of signals intercepted would be
left unprocessed if the funds for analysis
were not vastly increased.
Bush, who had been granted the addi-
tional responsibility-for the first time in
CIA history-to control the budgets of all
intelligence agencies, had deferred this de-
cision, like so many others. There was vir-
tually nothing the Agency analysts could
immediately do to assess, or help combat,
the terrorists in Lebanon.
So Bush turned instead to the clandes-
tine operators who routinely collect human
intelligence abroad. Within the clandestine
service side of the Agency, the Meloy assas-
sination raised serious questions Most in-
telligence fr,Mi Lebanon came from three
sources: Mossad. Israel's intelligence ser-
vice; SAVAK, Iran's intelligence service;
and a limited group of Lebanese Phalan-
gists and assorted rightists who had been
managed out of the Athens CIA station by
Richard Welch.
In general, the ability to keep up files on
opposition parties, dissidents, and expatri-
ate political factions in any country de-
pends largely on the cooperation of the host
government. With Richard Welch's murder
the previous December, the Agency had
become more dependent than ever on infor-
mation from Israel and Iran.
U.S. intelligence officials felt they
needed to be able to reciprocate to get ef-
fective cooperation. The Korean CIA was
interested in Korean dissidents in the
United States; SAVAK wanted to know the
movements of the Shah's opposition;
Mossad wanted every available piece of in-
formation on Palestinian political maneu-
vers in Washington; the Philippines secret
police needed reports on anti-Marcos
forces; and so forth.
As a result of legislation and the intel-
ligence reforms of the previous year,
though, the CIA was flatly banned from
conducting any domestic surveillance, in-
cluding watching foreign opposition move-
ments based in the United States, In short.
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agents were in Washington But under the
guidelines for dealing with "cooperative"
Intelligence organizations, there was no re-
porting mechanism to track this informa-
tion and alert the director
Ilirect (:IA Invuhenrent. Meanwhile,
other ominous information was circulating
in.ide the CIA. On September 7. 1976. a
former CIA officer named Kevin Mulcahy
had called Theodore Shackley, the associ-
ate deputy director of operations. Mulcahy
reported that another firmer CIA agent,
h.dwin Wilson, was training Libyan terror-
fists in explosives and was providing the
timing devices for detonators. Wilson was
getting the devices from William Weisen-
burger, the CIA's technical expert. and
from an Agency supplier. Scientific Com-
munications. Wilson and another former
CIA officer were shipping firearms to Li-
ht, a. and they were planning to ship Redeye
missiles. Most significantly. Wilson was
coordinating his clearly illegal activities
through Thomas Clines, Shackley's firmer
,uhord;natc in several CIA assignments.
Shackley knew Wilson well and had used
the intelligence Wilson derived from his
trips to I.ihya. Shackley filet: w memo with
his bons. William Wells. describing in flat
terms what Mulcahy had said. Wells turned
the matter over to the CIA's inspector gen-
eral, John Waller, who then dispatched a
deputy, Thomas Cox. to see Mulcahy.
Cox was troubled M Wilson's activities
Active CIA personnel we-t im,olved, and
former agents were still using their contacts
in the commission of illegal acts. Mulcahy
and others believed the activities had been
authorized or semiofficial "oft-the-books"
activities (for which the Agency went out-
side normal channels, using private opera-
tives who maintained it lower level of
accountability and increased deniability).
And Tom Clines, himself suspected of
wrongdoing. had conducted two interviews
as part of the investigation. A record of
serious compromise was building. Clearly
a larger investigation was called for, but
Cox was put on hold
In consultation with Bush's office, the
inspector general's office made a strategic
decision. On September 17, they turned
over the preliminary information uttered by
Mulcahy and those they had interviewed to
the FBI.
Clines, along with other CIA officials,
knew that Mulcahy had gone to the FBI On
September 20, Clines reported that a Cu-
ban-American former CIA agent still used
from time to time by the Agency, Rafael
-Chi Chi-' Quintero, had sought Clines out
the day before. (Quintero would reemerge,
along with Clines, as a participant in the
Iran-contra scandal. ) Quintero complained
that Wilson had recruited him ','or what
service of the rime
Within a week, the F fit
South America's southern
classified cable about Uprr.,~
The cable, which was share,!
and the State Oepartmcu,
distinct possibility that the
sination was an Oper.,-,. 1
and made reference to ,hc pr& t i
her countries dispatching
do each other's dirty work
Eugene Propper. the assi?,t: tit
ney in charge of invesugat1n,?
asked for a meeting with the r 1
surprise, he discovered that he w,wi,1
ally be meeting with CIA Ogre, toc (,o, Bush himself.
On October 4. 1976, l':oppcr n.l
J. Stanley Pottinger, the assistant Atom,
general for civil rights, not w tlh Itu.n in,
his general counsel, P,nthons I .Liam
"Look:' Bush told them, accoi,img t-, 1'r?1,
per's account in Labs'ioih. i h-* h,
wrote with Taylor Branch. "I'm appall',t
by the bombing. Obviousl-, wt , in' ilL,w
people to come right here into the
and kill foreign d.plomats and ',rncnc,u.
citi.:ens like this. It would he a hidc,iu
precedent. So. as director- I want to help
you. As an American cit,/en I want i? help
But. as director, I also know that the
Agency can't help in a lot of situations like'
this. We've got some problems loafs, tell
him what they are." Bush said, turning th,
conversation over to his handpicked general
counsel, who had been at the
mere four months.
The first bar to CIA ,ooprrat
Lapham told Propper. was that the Aecn,%
couldn't afford to have sources pulled mt,?
court as witnesses Secondly. "sse Poll t n
to pieces last year tord,,mestic intelligt n,
so now everybody over here is gun shy
about reporting on Anicrieans or an ae!i
ists in this country. We cant do it I hat
strictly out. The liberals don t hose sore.
things we do and the conscrs,rtnes done
like others, and the way the rule h,1ok ;
now, we stay clean by keepir;_ on' it , i iii
nal stuff and domestic stuff lose se Cot
murder here in the States 1-hat s Moth I h..'
makes it tough.
Lapham allured that it the lase wcr,
security matter" it would he different tit.;
to determine that it was the, would have t,
investigate it as a domestic erotic I aphan'
convinced Propper that they needed in es
change of letters between the i,'IA di re,to?
and the attorney general that would put :h:
('IA on firm legal grounding And btu'.!,
concluded the meeting by adding. "11 s,
two come up wiih something that Ioi
thinks will protect its, well he all right
For Bush, iiicre were lamer takes in
agreement. He still had tither mtorniaiwi,
about Wilson to disclose it he did not te!i
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Quintero had thought was it) he an Agency
hit on the international terrorist "Carlos "
Like Mulcahy. Quintero had assumed that
the CIA was simply "going off the hooks-
When Quintero and three other Cuban-
American former agents went to Geneva to
meet with Wilson, they learned the target
was to be an expatriate Libyan. Quintero
stalled so that he could check with Clines
Clines reported the Quintero visit to In-
spector General Waller. Wilson. notified of
this report by ('lines, returned to Washing-
ton to put his own memo on record com-
plaining of the unreliability of Mulcahv's
charges
Despite Wilsn's protest. these new al-
legations about proposed assassinations
using present and former ('IA agents. and
about :urrent CIA employees and contrac-
tors providing explosives, were too dra
matic to sit on. A full internal investigation
was needed to determine how exposure of
Wilson's activities might damage the CIA's
other operations.
Both Shackley and Clines knew about
Wilson's activities and could expose his
role in Libya. But this was precisely the
downside to an internal investigation into
"off-the-boks" activities; they would also
he required. in any honest investigation, to
nose around a raft of related "oft-
the-books" activities, including Wilson'.
support for extraordinarily sensitive pro-
grams such as the navy's undersea surveil-
lance of Soviet submarines. The results of
the entire internal inquiry would surely
have to he reported to Congress.
A new round of damaging self-examina-
tion was not a pleasant prospect for Bush.
He had recently spoken publicly about the
Agenc%"s success in overcoming its advei-
sarial relatioiship with Congress. "How
we can ferret out corruption has given way
to the more serious question of how we can
get better intelligence." Bush said on
ABC's 1.i.sue.s and Answers. Oversight,
Bush said, was no longer to see if "every-
body at the CIA is a bunch of crooks:' but
to improve the quality of the job the intel-
ligence agencies were doing. Bush dreaded
the prospect of having to watch the adver-
sarial relationship reemerge. Any indica-
tion that the CIA was operating "off the
books" would surely spawn precisely that
reaction
ANioaxi6itint ion At Home. On Sep-
tember 21, a devastating bomb (of the type
the FBI believed Wilson was selling) cx-
pkodcd under the ('hevelle sedan of former
Chilean Ambassador to the United States
Orlando Letelier. killing Locher and Ron-
nie Moffitt, a colleague from the Institute
for policy Studies, where Letelier worked
By the end of the day, institute spokespeo-
ple were accusing the Chilean intelligence
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/25: CIA-RDP99-01448R000401580029-0
the FBI soon and conduct his own internal
in%estigation. he ran the risk of earning
himself a scandal for covering up.
Two days later, a Cubana Airlines jet en
route to Kingston exploded shortly after
takeoff from Barbados's Seawell Airport,
killing all 73 people aboard, including 24
members of the Cuban fencing team. Fidel
Castro immediately blamed the CIA. In
Miami, a man with a Hispanic accent
called the Miami Herald saying he repre-
sented Operation Condor and claiming
credit for the bombing. A Miami radio sta-
tion also received a call from a woman who
claimed the bombing had been carried out
h~ CORU, the violent Cuban-American
group bent on overthrowing Castro.
Within two days. Venezuelan police ar-
rested two CORD leaders. Orlando Bosch
and Luis Posada Carries, in connection
-A iih the bombing. Confessions from two
other men who admitted planting the
hornh, in addition to evidence gathered at
Posada's v]1a, had led to the capture of the
CORC leaden. (Bosch was the Miami pe-
diatrician who had been arrested the pre-
ceding February to squelch a plot to kill
Henry Kissinger. Posada would reemerge
in 1985 in a CIA counterterrorism opera-
turn in El Salvador. That operation would
he headed by F:lix Rodriguez. who was
originally recruited for the job through
Vice President Bush's office.)
CIA operatives knew, from information
supplied by several former agents who were
now members of CORD, that the charges
Here accurate. But if the CIA conducted a
lull-scale investigation of CORU. or even
pulled together all the information it had
as ai lable. it would certainly lead to another
sear of hearings about the operation of the
,'IA's Miami station-a hubof Agency ac-
tistts --rot to mention the Wilson and Le-
tclier matters, both of which appeared to
have CORU links.
I.apham followed up quickly with Prop-
per over the next few days to iron out a
ooperative agreement with the Justice De-
partment. The attorney general, having
found indications in the criminal investiga-
tion that foreign agents might have been
involved, requested that the director report
on an aspects of the murders that might
relate to the security of the United States.
In addition, at the CIA's request the
agreement stated that if the Agency found
amthing indicating criminal activity, it
ssould turn that information over to the Jus-
tice Department, as required by law. The
CIA would provide "relevant" informa-
tion Justice could not use this information
in court unless it could he independently
obtained from a second source. If some-
thing from the CIA was crucial to the Jus-
tice Department's case, the president
would decide whether it could be used.
The provisions of this new agreement
ensured that the CIA would not investigate
in the field or pull together information, but
would, instead, turn over discrete bits of
information for the FBI to pin down. There
was, however, no language which required
that the CIA tell the FBI or Justice Depart-
ment what the details meant. And the CIA
knew that the FBI's institutional pride
would not permit it to ask the Agency to
explain things very often.
This seemingly benign addition to the
agreement appeared to Propper to be a
minor afterthought. Of course the Justice
Department should investigate criminal ac-
tivity: that made sense. What Propper had
no way of knowing was the extent to which
this agreement would be treated, inside the
Agency, as an escape hatch.
The implication of the suggested lan-
guage had shifted from a bland dictum that
the CIA "turn over" indications of criminal
activity to a more resolute proclamation.
Now, the CIA would not itself investigate
matters that might involve criminal activ-
ity: it would instead hand over its raw data
about bewilderingly cornplicat"d cases to
the FBI and the Justice Department.
The impact of this agreement in the
wake of the assassination and bombings
was enormou. By simply turning mate-
rials over to the FBI and the president's
Intelligence Oversight Board, the CIA
could avert an internal inquiry. By ducking
the responsibility to investigate internally.
Bush and Lapham assured that the least
amount of information harmful to the
Agency could possibly surface. (Lapham
claims that his only intention was to clear
the way for CIA cooperation with the attor-
ney general.)
The effect of these developments was to
ensure that investigations slowed to a slug-
gish pace. In the Letelier murder investiga-
tion. for example, the CIA lid not tell
Justice Department investigators anything
about the Chilean agents, or their stopover
in Paraguay, for more than two years.
In his 1987 autobiography, George Bush
doesn't explain these developments, mak-
ing only an oblique reference to four Latin
American nations which he reports ceased
their cooperation with the Agency when
stories about the existence of Operation
Condor first surfaced. There is no reference
to the harassment, surveillance, and vio-
lence directed by "friendly" intelligence
agencies at people living in the United
States. There is no explanation for the fail-
ure to control CORU. or for stalling tactics
in the Wilson case. And there is no justi-
fication offered for the CIA's refusal, until
after Bush left office, to significantly assist
in identifying and capturing those respons-
ible for the assassination of Orlando
Letelier.
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 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/25: CIA-RDP99-01448R000401580029-0
m.,.nrn.J.,,.r,
Bush was
not happy when he
learned that the
attorney general had
declined, for the
second time, to
prosecute Bob
Woodward of the
Washington Post.
Leasing The CIA. Bush's tenure at
the CIA would end at Carter's inaugura-
,ion, but until the end Attorney General
Inward I esi continued pursuing criminal
rases against CIA officials and demanding
CIA documents Most disturbing to the
Agency was the accumulated evidence to
he used in a possible pro