MILITARY AFFAIRS AND THE NOMINATION HEARING OF ROBERT GATES TO BE DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-01448R000401650001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 24, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 15, 1991
• Content Type: MISC

STAT
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The Washington Pottt
The Now York Tim"
The WYhington Times
The Well Street Journal
The Christian Selena Monitor
NOW York Deny News
USA Today
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MEET THE PRESS
Topic: Military affairs and the nomination hearing of
Robert Gates to director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Guess: Sen. Saris Nunn (D-Ga.), chairman of Senate
Armed Services Caimittee, and former CIA-director-William
Webster.
September 15, 1991
MR. (TTLEY: This past week, Secretary of State James
Baker found himself at a strange place--inside the headquarters
of the KGB in Moscow having a friendly chat with the head of the
Soviet secret police--yet another sign of how times are
changing. And as the KGB changes, if the Soviet Union is no
longer the threat it was, what about the CIA? What is the need
for and the role of it? That's one of the questions that will
be asked of Robert Gates when he faces the Senate hearings this
week to be confirmed as the new director of the CIA.
And also what about the military--the amaunt of money
spent on it? Questions on that are being heard with greater
frequency.
we want to get some answers today from our guests--in
a mcment Senator San Nunn--but first from William Webster who's
just stepped down as director of the CIA. And Joining me at the
table today are Elizabeth Drew of the New Yorker and Andrea
Mitchell who's NBC chief congressional correspondent.
Mr. Webster, thanks for coming in. I guess you're
enjoying the post-CIA days relaxing right now. But let me ask
you sane questions about what you learned on duty there.
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As we just mentioned, a couple of days ago, James
Baker met with the head of the KGB in Moscow, Vadim Bakatin. And
Bakatin asked a very interesting question to Mr. Baker: who's
the enemy now? And if we aren't enemies, shouldn't perhaps the
KGB and the CIA stop spying on each so much? What's your
answer?
MR. WEBSTER: Well, I'll tell you the question of who
are our enemies is changing in a rapidly changing world. I
think the enemies are not necessarily going to be particular
countries but particular issues which, in a well-guided foreign
policy and in cooperation with the Soviet Union, we can both do
something about therm. And the issues that I'd suggest for
consideration are the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, biological, chemical, nuclear warheads, and the
missile delivery systems, for one.
MR. UTLEY: But specifically you talk about
cooperation--that's the word you just used with the Soviet
Union. If there is to be this cooperation which the Soviets
clearly want, would you agree that it is time that the CIA
reduce its espionage, its intelligence-gathering activities vis-
a-vis the Soviet Union and specifically the KGB?
MR. WEBSTER: Well, in this context, espionage is a
kind of a pejorative word. The function of intelligence is to
understand what is going on so that our policy makers can make
wise decisions in the interest of our country. I think now more
than ever we need to understand some very complex changes that
are rapidly occurring in the world. The shifts occur, the
diminution of the ground threat of the Soviet Union is clearly
cause for less input from the intelligence community.
Cn the other hand, the political, military and
economic changes require more.
MR. U'TLEY: I understand what you're saying but let me
try once more on the specific issue, what the head of the KCB
said--that the CIA should reduce its spying against the KCB, the
KGB should reduce its spying against the CIA. Do you agree with
that?
MR. WEBSTER: I think that remains to be seen. The
KGB is changing dramatically internally. The report that I have
is that there has yet been not dramatic change externally, and
externally means the United States and other places around the
world. we need
Now, to understand what they're doing.
intelligence
or in arms ott not. That control.
need to understand hetherthere'sacheating role
es
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from collection, whether you call it espionage or open source or
other methods. It's understanding through information.
MR. UTLEY: But let's be specific about this again in
your CIA position, there's been no diminution of KGB spying
against the United States, against--
MR. WEBSTER: Well, that's my understanding from the
MRS. DREW: When you say there are new issues, Judge
Webster, does this mean that we might need new kinds of people
and new kinds of expertise at the CIA--people, for instance, who
know more about science and technology and economics?
MR. WEBSTER: I think there will be some of that,
Elizabeth. I also think there will be some retraining, greater
emphasis on certain kinds of languages where we've been short
before because our focus was so intensely against the Soviet
Union over the years. But we've started those changes. Those
changes have been in train for a number of years, and we're
going to have to accelerate them as we go forward.
inside We're going to use outside people, not necessarily
people, to provide our information that adds to our own
analytical capabilities.
? DREW: Des that mean you might be able to reduce
your personnel?
MR. WEBSTER: Well, we've already seen signs that our
personnel will be reduced by the rather extensive cuts in the
defense budget. I think realistically that will happen over
time. But it would be, I think, a tragedy to lose special
skills in some kind of crash program.
MRS. DREW: Nov, your last answer to Garrick about
whether we should reduce spying or information gathering about
the KGB was "that remains to be seen-'' Does that mean that,
in your mind, it's not necessarily a settled that the Soviet
jnion or former Soviet Union is less of a threat than it was two
weeks, three weeks ago?
MR. WEBSTER: well, there are different kinds of
threats. And I think the Soviet Union has, over time, lowered
its threat as a military opponent, given that it still possesses
its strategic weapons. But the instability that is taking place
in the Soviet Union could be a threat to our national security,
if things go wrong. We need to be on top of those situations.
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We're always criticized for not having gauged the
precise moment when something dramatic happens. But it is
important for us to be on top of than and it takes time and
ability and effort to achieve and maintain that capability.
MS. MITCLL: Judge Webster, Bob Gates, you were his
boss, he was deputy, you've worked with him for many years. He
is described by everyone who knows him as an incredibly well-
organized person. How could he not remember that Richard Kerr,
now the acting CIA director, told him months before it was
disclosed about the Iran-contra diversion?
MR. WEBSTER: Well, I think Bob Gates can answer that
question for himself. I know from my own experience how much
information came across my desk each day, and how much more
actually came across the deputy's desk who had to screen some of
the information in order that the director could do other --
things.
MS. MITC ir.: Is it credible that he would forget
something of that kind of importance?
MR. WEBSTER: Let me put it this way. I have known
Bob Gates for close to ten years. I've worked with him directly
for four years. And if Bob Gates says he forgot it, I believe
him.
MS. MITC=: When he was your deputy, did you cut
him out of the loop as he indicates Casey did? Did you work
around him? Is that the way CIA directors work with their
deputies?
MR. WEBSTER: Well, I think each director has his own
style. And partly because of the issues that you've been
talking about, I made it a point to make my deputy a partner,
both Bob Gates and his successor, Dick Kerr. That's the way I
preferred to do it. I felt that I needed his wisdom and his
knowledge. But other directors don't always feel that way.
MS. MITCHaL: Quickly--one of the issues that is
going to be raised against him, particularly by Senator Bradley,
is that when he worked for you, he suppressed Soviet
intelligence reports to better fit his harsh view of the Soviet
Union. Did he slant or tailor these intelligence assessnents?
MR. WEBSTER: Certainly not to my knowledge. i do not
think that happened in any respect. You'll always have people--
because we encourage diversity of opinion, you'll always have
people who feel that their opinions didn't reach the top. But
we set in place very carefully--and Bob was my partner in this--
procedures in the intelligence camunity to be sure that I, as
director of Central Intelligence, and his as deputy director did
not influence the outcome.
It was like voting in the Supreme Court. We
established the terms of reference, but I did not declare myself
until every member of the intelligence camunity had
participated in that result.
I don't know of anyone who has said in the last four
years that the CIA was guilty of cooking the books. we did
everything that we could to achieve an objective result. Now
some may say that weakened it, but it was objective. And that
was important.
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MR. UTLEY: All right. Times have changed again.
Caning back to the questions, many questions have been raised
about reorganizing the CIA, cutting its budget. Senator
Moynihan, for one, has gone to the extreme as saying get rid of
the CIA, incorporate it into other intelligence agencies, into
the State Department.
It's estimated that your budget is about $25 to $30
billion a year--it is a secret. Don't you think the time has
cane now to make the budget of the CIA public?
MR. WEBSTER: Well, the number that you're using is an
inaccurate one if you talk about my budget because a very
significant part of the budget was controlled entirely by the
Pentagon.
Is the question should we cut the budget? Oh,
cut
the bud
t and with the publicRas to what we are spendingeon the~CIA because open
now the Cold War is over. why not tell the people? e
MR. WEBSTER: I think everyone would like to see more
openness. The question from the standpoint of protecting
sources and methods--and that's the statutory responsibility of
the DCI, the Director of Central Intelligence--once you announce
in figures, the public has a right to say how did you get to
those in figures. And then, as you begin to peel the onion, you
cane dangerously close to disclosing sources and methods.
MS. DREW: Judge Webster, if, as reported, the CIA did
not predict the Soviet Union's release of the Eastern European
countries, did not predict the econanic collapse of the Soviet
Union, did not predict the collapse of caret-nism, is it a fair
criticism to say they missed sane big ones or are people
expecting too much of it?
MR. WEBSTER: It's important to understand that there
are limitations to intelligence. I don't concede all the list
that you gave, Elizabeth. Predicting precise manents is very
difficult.
MS. DREW: I didn't say precise moments, but tell us
if these were going to happen really soon.
MR.
WEBSTER:
I saw was entirely consistent with what was taking place the time you described it. The awareness of the movementl toward
the unification of Germany, the Soviet Union's inability--
Gorbachev's inability to challenge Eastern Europe at the risk of
glasnost--all those were carefully recorded. The movement from
the right was contemplated just a few days before it happened.
50#.
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MR. UTLEY: Let's talk about your role on the
Intelligence Camiittee. The Robert Gates hearings start now
this week. Will he be confirmed as you see it now?
SENATOR NUNN: I believe that the question on Mr.
Gates's confirmation depends on whether we conclude that he is
trustworthy--that's the bottcm line. I think he's well-
qualified, he's a professional; I've had a high regard for him
over the years. If he canes across as credible in terms of his
past activities and also of course projects the future role of
the agency for what I guess is now being called the post-Cold
war era, then I think he will be confirmed. If there is a
credibility problem, he could be in trouble.
MR. UTLEY: But you sound as if you are skeptical
about Gates right now on the eve of these hearings.
SENATOR NUNN: I'm not skeptical, i have a lot of
questions. There are a lot of questions that cane up when
you're in a high position in the CIA during Iran-contra and you
seemingly don't know what's going on. That raises all sorts of
questions. But I would like to be able to vote for him because
I have regard for him personally.
.MR. UTLEY: Andrea.
MS. MITCHELL: What about his credibility? How could
he not have done, how could he have forgotten this warning, a
series of warnings, at least four such instances when he was
alerted to the possibility of problems and a diversion of funds?
SENATOR NUNN: Andrea, that's what we'll have to
wrestle with next week. A lot of unusual things happened when
Bill Casey was director of the CIA. We do not know how much Mr.
Gates was in the loop and how much he was cut out of the loop.
MS. MITCHELL: Yes, but in this one instance we do
know that the acting director now, Richard Kerr, talked to him
in August of 1986 and Mr. Gates somehow can't remember that
conversation.
SENATOR NUNN: Well, that will be a good question, but
I'm going to reserve judgment on it until I hear fran Mr. Gates.
MS. MITCHELL: What about the other aspects of Iran-
contra? There were intercepts that he should have been seeing,
National Security Agency intercepts. Either he knew and was
covering up, or some would suggest he was not smart enough, too
insensitive to be confirmed as director. Aren't those the two
choices?
SENATOR NUNN: Well, of course, as Director Webster
just said a minute ago, in his case the deputy sees a lot more
than the director, because one of the deputy's jobs under Bill
Webster has been to screen so that less gets to the director's
desk. Now, it may be that the opposite of that was true in the
Casey case--maybe he saw more than the deputy, but that gets to
the heart of the question.
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0*.
MS. MIM : Are you concerned, though, that the
agency is so demoralized by the indictments of former officials
and that there is a lot of anger against Gates, in fact, from
inside the agency among a certain group? Is he the right man,
then, to take over an agency that is in deep trouble?
SENATCR NtJNN: The confirmation will probably turn on
his credibility, but the real future in the CIA is what we ought
to be focusing on more than anything else. What is the role in
the post- cold war era? It's not enough to have satellites
flying over the Soviet union when there are now all sorts of
republics with separate problems, separate ethnic problems, all
sorts of minority problems, and massive economic problems.
We can't tell about the world anymore today by simply
technical means than we can tell about the
__~.
rosy
product of the United States by technical means, so we're going
to have to change the nature of the agency. That ought to be
our primary focus, of course, along with the credibility
question.
MR- UTLEY: Elizabeth.
MS. DREW: Another criticism of Mr. Gates, before we
move off that, is that he tailo
d
re
the information or
intelligence to his own point of view about the Soviet Union, a
point of view which some would say has not been borne out by
events. Do you think that that is an appropriate role for a
high official of the CIA?
SENATCR NUNN: No. The main thing we need the CIA
is independence because they don't have line responsibility like
the Pentagon, and the reason the CIA was created to begin with
was to give us an independent group of people who are su
to give us objective facts and not be colored b posed
ideology. That will be a very serious est y policy or
But there is another side of tha1-011 t~sto
a fine young man on my Armed Services staff the ~'' we jusg had
Doug
George who died of cancer. He was the top CIA aearyste and
intelligence gatherer on strategic weapons s for s when end
controversies were raging. years wthe
he died that Bob Gats never er ever in anyewayy asker im to tilt
any assessment other than factual. So we
.
One. have two sides of that
MR. UI'LEY: Back now, Elizabeth and Andrea. I think
most Americans have this sort of fuzzy image of the CIA. We
know the three initials, we know they do a lot of spying,
analysis--and not much more about then.
But what have you picked up over the years as to what
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I
the CIA really--it's condition today, its problems and what it
needs to became?
MS- MITCHELL: I think, Garrick, first of all, the CIA
is only one part and not even the biggest part of our
intelligence gathering. It is an agency, though, in deep
trouble right now. The indictments of former officials has
really sent out a signal to the people in the agency the
are in conflict with their mission as they saw it, which atis to
protect secrets, and the other legal obligation to tell Congress
what they're doing.
So there is terrible demoralization. Pat Moynihan of
course has said let's get rid of the agency.
MR. LTLEY: That's in the bureaucracy, but in terms of
what it does, Elizabeth, and what it's going to have to do in
the future, Senator Nunn said, hey, we have to look at this
again.
MS. DREW: I'm not sure you can separate the question
of mission from the question of the bureaucracy. This is a
point about Washington, not just about the CIA. It's one thing
to sit on a Sunday morning show and say we have to change its
mission, we have to look at this and look at that very, very
hard to take an organization this big that's been functioning on
a certain set of assumptions for nearly 50 years,
fellas, think differently, let's get rid of same de d say, okay,
let's bring in a whole new group of people'
building, additional just buildinlgi,You eyo-' a brand new enormous
gley--
MS. MITCHELL: It's not going to happen, and in fact,
the reformers in Congress they cant break through that
bureaucracy--
MR' MM: Hard to change the old habits.
MS* MI t: --that the military and civilian
agencies will keep fighting with each other, and they have very
little prospect of changing.
MR. UI'LEY: Bureaucracies have a way of living on.
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