INTELLIGENCE PLAYED MAJOR ROLE IN THE GULF WAR, SAYS CIA DIRECTOR WEBSTER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-01448R000401660118-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 22, 2012
• Sequence Number: 118
• Publication Date: April 18, 1991
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/23: CIA-RDP99-01448R000401660118-2
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i HE /?r~E Zagrnf
Date
Intelligence played major role in the
Gulf War, says CIA director Webster
By BRADLEY GALKO
News Writer
Intelligence played an impor-
tant role in the Gulf War in
combating terrorism, enforcing
sanctions, selecting targets and
bomb damage assessment, ac-
cording to William Webster, di-
rector of the Central Intelli.
gence Agency (CIA).
Webster spoke to a packed li-
brary auditorium Wednesday
night as part of the Student
Government sponsored "Public
Forum on Contemporary is-
sues" lecture series.
"The global scope and use of
intelligence during the Gulf War
was extraordinary," said Web-
ster.
"Intelligence on issues rang.
ing from Iraqi military capabil-
ities to sanctions busting to
counter-terrorism. all helped
toward the International coop-
eration and resolve that we saw
William Webster
against Iraq's aggression," he
said.
"That activity wasn't around
ten years ago," added Webster.
it was just beginning to take
place, reminding that nations
can cooperate on important is-
sues such as this and that the
Intelligence communities can
work with each other to try to
make this a safer and better
CONT1NUGe
world."
Webster said that good intel-
ligence allowed the allies to
"develop the modus operandi"
of Saddam Hussein and prevent
many incidents of terrorism.
"I'm amused when people
talk about how we
overestimated the terrorist
threat," said Webster, "but we
know what we did to keep the
terrorist incidents from taking
place."
Enforcement of sanctions
against Iraq also required the
support of the world's intelli-
gence communities, he said.
Sanctions were only important
if we could make sure they
continued," Webster said, "and
in that respect intelligence
played an important role."
Human intelligence and signal
Intelligence (the monitoring of
radio and other signals) were
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both used in this capacity, he
said. "We tracked every one of
Saddam's ships anywhere in the
world."
Intelligence also helped the
President and other leaders de-
cide on the appropriateness of
military force early on in the
conflict.
"It was the uniform assess-
ment of the entire intelligence
community." he said, that
sanctions alone would not cause
Saddam Hussein to leave
Kuwait."
He added that "although we
were destroying his (Saddam's)
economy, the military would
only be affected marginally."
Intelligence also identified the
locations of chemical plants,
nuclear reactors, bunkers, fa-
cilities and infrastructure.
Webster said much of this was
based on the CIA's
"encyclopedic knowledge of the
hot spots of the world" that has
accumulated over many years.
"SMART weapons made the
difference in this war," he said,
"but they were only smart in
the sense that someone had to
tell them where to go . . . a
function of intelligence."
As to whether the CIA knew of
Iraq's invasion before hand.
Webster said "we had indica-
tors that said 'he's ready to go'"
within 12 to 24 hours. just prior
to the invasion.
Webster said the CIA is now
in the process of "second-
guessing ourselves . . . asking
how we could do it better if we
ever had to do it again." He
added that General Norman
Schwartzkopf has told him that
the Gulf War was the "best in-
formed war that was ever
fought" but that some informa-
tion could have been provided
"better or sooner."
"As we emerge from the Gulf
War" he said, "the United States
is in a stronger position to
foster greater international
cooperation in confronting the
global issues, particularly
weapons proliferation."
Webster warned of the spread
of so-called "weapons of mass
destruction" saving "all will be
attainable within time unless
international efforts to stop this
(proliferation) ... are taken."
On other issues, Webster dis-
cussed recent developments
within the Soviet Union. The
Soviet Union's instability "could
have a significant impact on our
own national security," he said.
He added that "while our re-
lations with the Soviet Union
have come a long way, we must
not lose sight of the fact that the
Soviet Union is now facing
severe international problems."
Webster said that as interna-
tional pressures mount, it will
be exceedingly difficult to re-
solve competing forces.
As to the internal conflicts
between the republics of the
Soviet Union and the central
government. Webster said "it
remains to be seen how much
room there is for compromise
between the government and
those pressing for greater
freedom."
"He (Gorbachev) appears to
realize," said Webster, "that a
return to the techniques of
massive repression and force
will only lead to a larger cycle
of violence and instability."
These internal Soviet devel-
opments will have a "ripple ef-
fect" on Eastern Europe in the
form of a "flood of immigra-
tion," he added. He said some
Eastern European leaders pre-
dict as many as four million
refugees from the Soviet Union
will enter their countries in the
next few years.
He also said that "the demo-
cratic prospects (in Eastern
Europe) look far better than
anyone would have ever imag-
ined a few years ago." He added
that their success depends upon
how well the countries learn
from each other.
"The longer the tough deci-
sions are postponed." he said,
the harder it will be to over-
come decades of communist
mismanagement."
CONTINUED
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"It's important that the
breakthroughs of the 1980's
don't become the breakdowns
of the 1990s- said Webster.
Responding to a question
concerning the extent of the
CIA's covert activities. Webster
who became the director of the
CIA in 1987, said that the CIA
spends only three percent of its
resources on covert activities
and only by request of thr,
President. However he said that
these activities account for "97
percent of the grief and suspi-
cion of intelligence."
"One of things we do not do,"
he said, is assassination ... we
cannot (by executive order
intentionally set out to cause
the death of a public figure."
Before becoming the directcr
of the CIA. Webster enjoyed q
thirty-year career as an attor-
ney and judge of various federal
courts.
He then became director of
the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation in 1978 until taking over
the CIA in 1987.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/23: CIA-RDP99-01448R000401660118-2