GENERAL MINH AND THE 1971 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-10-5-38-3
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: December 24, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/27 : LOC-HAK-10-5-38-3
~~~~zdzoR~,NDVM
TH]C WHTTI~O~~~~~f~N OF ORIGINATOR OR ADOR SSEE'~J
wASngrrc~y~i~{~ UP ACTION, O4STR, OR pISTR16UTIOtV, ,,
INFORMATION
i
SECRET
MEMORl~,NDUM FOR:
THROUGH:
FROM?
SUBJECT:
Zz~.traductidn
December 24, 1970
DR, KISSINGER.
Richard T. Kennedy
Jahn Negroponte~
General Minh acid the 1971
presidential Elections
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS
APPLY
This paper d15CUSSes the farthcom9.ng presidential elections in South
Vietnam in ter~~.s of Creneral Minh's chances of winning. I plan to
write another paper on the cansequer?ces of a Minh victory although
the izxxponderables involved in that one make it a much more compli-
cated subject.
T have also attached an end-of-tour report prepared by political officer
Theresa A, Tull on Oci:ober 23. It is an excellent discussion of the
geh.eral political situation iri South Vietnax'ra. axed I recall that her
reporti~ag was about the best that came out of the em.bas sy durixa.g
her more than two and one half years there.
Minh's Chances of Winnixsg
.A.. Minh's Iaritentions
Ta ascribe Minh a chs.nce of winning the elections, one must ass~u~.e
he will run. Minh has nat formally declared his candidacy; nor are
there any signs that he is developing a campaign machiner We
have indirect indications. that Minh wi11 run,
SE No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/27 : LOC-HAK-10-5-38-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/27 : LOC-HAK-10-5-38-3
!,
SECRET - 2-
But Minh xxaay, in fact, have no such definite intention. Perhaps at this
stage he is just trying. to smoke us out. Minh may not run unless he
feels he has the nod from the U. S, government. Tn corx~.ing months,..
Minh and his followers will doubtless be watching carefully statements
by U. S. officialdom concerning; SVN's presidential elections lookixzg
for indications, .however far-fetched, that we favor one outcome or
another. Ta the Vietnamese it is inconceivable that the U. S, would
not have a preference.
B. ' Minh's Assets
If Minh runs, he will be the first credible opponent that any South
Vietnamese Chief of State has ever faced in an election. Aiem ran against
straw men. Thieu's opponents in 19b7 were on the whole stronger, but
there were ten of them., thus dividing the opposition vote and allowing
the Thieu/Ky slate to win by a 34. 8 per cent plurality.
The combined showing of the three closest contenders in 1967 (Diu,
Suu and Huong} represented 38 per cant of the vote. Today Diu languishes
in jail, Suu is dead and Huong is too infirrxl to run.
The field,. therefore, is relatively open to Minh. T can think of no dark
horses to be taken seriously. Ky might try a suicidal spailin~ operation,
but I doubt it because Ky, brinksman that he is, has in past crises always
come around at the last minute; and there are no civilians on the current
scene with stature anywhere approaching that of Thieu and Minh.
Wh~.t is more, Thieu is sponsoring a presidential election law which
would intentionally limit the number of candidates by requiring prior
endorsement by a n~.inimum of 4b legislators or 100 provincial and
municipal counsellors. With a total of 137 Lower House members, 6p
Senators, and slightly mare than 50q provincial and municipal counselloxs,
this would make far a theoretical xn.aximum of nine candidates. hut, in
fact,. if the bill. passes in its present form, Thieu will make an energetic
`effort to secure many more than the required minimum. of endorsements.
At the rate he is courting the country's elected officialdom, he xnay
well be hoping for a majority endorsement. Under such cixcuxx~stances,
Minh may be the only other presidential hopeful certain of acquiring the
m.inimurza number of endorsements. In any event, I feel certain that if
'the election law passes iii the form Thieu desires the field wi11 be
restricted to at most three candidates.
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/27 : LOC-HAK-10-5-38-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/27 : LOC-HAK-10-5-38-3
~ .~
SECRET - 3
?n the face of it, it would appear somewhat anomalous. that Thien is
favorizxg an election law which would permit the grouping of oppasitionist
forces behind Minh. Setting this anomaly aside rn.omentarily, Minh's
souxces of strength in a two or three way race would probably fall into
the fallowing broad groupings:.
~. The'.An. Quan~Buddhists: _
Tri Quan:g's Buddhists supported. Phan Khac Suu in the 1 q67 elections.
Their support was not openly declared but rather through the gxapevix~:e.
As a result of this low~key backing Suu carried the cities of Hue and
Danang and the province of Thua Thien in which Hue is located. Despite
traditional Buddhist strength in I Corps, however, the overall vats for
Thien/I~y in that region was 18q, 405 versus 172, 667 fox Suu. In II Corps,
'the coastal reaches of wku.ch have. also been $uddhist strongholds, Thien
wan 437,433 votes versus 114, 510 for Suu.
Gauging Buddhist strength an the basis of the 1867 elections may be some-
what misleading since they did not openly coix~rnit their organization to
Suu and they were stir. in a weakened conditi.an resulting from the failure
of their 1966 anti-GVN "struggle. "
f
They kxave since revitalized their organization. and in the Senate elections
of August 30, 1870, the Buddhist supported slate of Vu Van Mau came in
first. Assessing Buddhist electoral strength on the basis of .this election
is, however, complicated. Voters had the. option of casting up to three
ballots for their three preferred choices and while the An Quang Buddhist
leadership r.~portedly instructed the faithful to vote for only one slato,
Man's, we don't know if they really followed these instructions. We also
doxi't know what portion of Man's vote represents the second and third choices
of person's other than An Quang followers who, in a single ballot election,
would not have voted for Mau at all.
4, 301, 13q voters cast a total of q, $15, 372 ballots in the Senate election.
Of these, Mau received 1, 14$ , 073 ballots. The ,slate dad particularly
we11 in. traditional Tri Quang strongholds sweeping all but one province
of I Corps and all of coastal II Carps. Assuming far a rnoxnent that all
the votes for Mau were from Tri Quang Buddhists and that they cast
only one ballot each, then: Man's tally arnourits to about Z5% of the electorate.
These are, however, both unrealistic assumptions. It is probably more
realistic to split the ,difference between this 25% figure and the ratio of
votes for Mau to fatal ballots case (roughly 12~/n) L}.atzs co~.-x-aing ot~t tivith an
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/27 : LOC-HAK-10-5-38-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/27 : LOC-HAK-10-5-38-3
SECRET ~ ~4-
estimated A.n Quang Buddhist voting strength of 1$. 5?~0. This, in my
.opinion is an optimum figure, and in the fortlYCOming election the
estimated Buddhist vote would go to Minh, if the Buddhists openly de-
clared themselves in support of his candidacy.
At this stage Buddhist- intentions in the foregoing regard are by no means
clear. According to the officer in our Saigon Embassy charged with
following Buddhist affairs, the An Quang Bud.dliists are divided on whom
t[r support, if anyone, and how. It is .conceivable, and in my awn view,
probable, that because of internal divisions An Quang will not support
Minh overtly, thus reducing the likely Buddhist turnout in his .support.
2. The'U'rban Vote.
Discontent is highest in Vietnam.'s urban areas and so is the level of
voter sophistication. Thieu lost floe xnajar cities in the 19b7 elections.
Suu won Hue and Danang handily, while Trap Van Huong won Saigon by
a hair (he received 137, 9bz votes versus 135, 527,far Thieu out of 545, bll
votes cast}.
Urban discontent is likely to persist through the election period, and yell
beyon~., anal Minh is likely to inherit 5uu and Huang's urban constituencies.
So he ;should ca.xry the cities. Of course, the An Quang Buddhist and ux-
ban vote overlap substani-,ially in I Corps. In effect, what is added to Minh's
strength in this category is the likelihood of carrying Saigon.
The Protest Vote:
Fox lack of a better term., this was the one we used to describe the vote
for runner~up Truong Dinh )]zu in 19b7. To everyone's surprise Dzu
received 17. Z% of the total vote in 19b7. Dzu's .source of support in that
election. was. never definitively ascertained. He may have had tacit VC
backing in areas where they could influence the voting and his populist
style and "peace platform" neatly distinguished him. from. the other ten
slates. Ta many whoa voted far him, Dzu probably represented the only
real alternative to GVN policzes being pursued at the time.
.Minh could doubtless benefit from some of Dzu's legacy. But it would
be quite a balancing act to appeal to the hard coxe protest vote and still
win some of the more "respectable" support that accrued to Suu and Huang
in '1.967. if Minh postures himself as outlandishly as Dzu, his .urban boor-
geois 'and more conservative Buddhist vote will fall off. Moxeaver, the
"protest" vote which accrued to Dzu in the countryside in 196? has probably
SE C RE'1'
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/27 : LOC-HAK-10-5-38-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/27 : LOC-HAK-10-5-38-3
SFCI~FT ~ -5-
fallen off substantially an view of .improved security conditions and the
weakened VC apparatus. For example, Dze. wan more than 2Q% of the
vote in T'V" Corps in 19b7. Tt is inconceivable to m.e that if he ran again.
he could get anywhere near that large a vote in that region.
My guess is that if Minli runs on a m.aderate platfaxm he will get about
half of the votes (i. e. $ 1 /2%) which went to Dzu.
Thieu's Assets
This section deals with what could interchangeably be called Thieu's
assets or Minh's liabilities.
Thieu is the incumbent. He has shown that he is pxepared to use the
administrative xxxachinery to proxz~ote has electoral campaign. He is
assiduously cultivating support of elected officials from the national dawn
to the hamlet level. In contrast Minh has no apparent ca~x~.paign machinery.
Thieu has a solid record of achievement to paint to. The countryside is
more peaceful, the G"~N is stronger and less dependent on U. S. combat
faxces and the "V'G axe weaker. Testifying to increased xural security
is the fact that the nuxnbex of registered voters in the 1967 presidential
election was 5. S million; it will be over 7 million in 1971.. More than
l/2 million of this increase will be in 1V Corps.
Thieu's regional sources of support will be as follows:
~1, T_ he _Delta: He made a strong showing there in 1967 despite the fact he
is ~. Cexy.tral ~Tietnamese anal some Saigon based politicianb alleged to us
that regionalism was a significant factor in voter behavior, (lt clearly was
not in '67. Thieu and Dzu combined, bath Central V'ietnam.ese, got close
to 60% of the vote in 1V Garps. The combined N Gorps showing of Suu
anal Huong, bath Southerners, was less than 15%.)
So Thieu twill do at least as well in the Delta as four years ago and probably
xxauch bettex. Security has improved substantially and by all accounts. the
Delta is more prosperous than it has been in years with higher productivity,
subsidized rice prices and. low taxes. The benefits of these factors, .plus
the increased voter registration, wall for the most part accrue to Thieu.
Tlzi.s prognosis is barn out by the fact that in the Senate elections the Thieu
supported slate of Senator Huynh Van Gao won in. 11 of lb provinces and
placed second in two otlaers.
SEC3'~,FT
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/27 : LOC-HAK-10-5-38-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/27 : LOC-HAK-10-5-38-3
~,
SECI~.ET -6-
2. Greater Saigon and the Catholic Regions of III Carps: Thieu may
lose Saigon itself but he can probably count on the Chinese vote in Cholon
to make it a close race. Ixi the greater Saigon region he can count on
solid northern refugee Catholic support. Again, improved security should
redound to his favor and I dau.bt he will have any difficulty buildang his
.1967 base of roughly 33% of the vote in III Gorps, counting Saigon, into
a healthy majority in 1971.
3. The Ili~hlands: Minority groups generally vote with the government
in Vietnam and this will likely hold true again for the mountain areas of
Ii .Carps in 1971.
Thieu's overall showing in II Corps in 1967 was strong, higher than his
national average. (His nationwide showing was 34. 8%.. Ito. II Corps he
won 45?jo.) With open Buddhist support Minh m.ay give hixn a run far his
money in coastal II Gorps, particularly ,Binh Dinh, .Phu Yen and Khanh
Ho a, but it is d ubtful it would be enough to ,~t e 1967 45% figure far
II Corps X50 o in 1971.
4. I Carps: Qn a regional basis Theeu made his poorest showing in 1,967
in I Corps where he only got 189, 405 out of 75$, g51 votes case (roughly
25Pfo). Suu was a close runner-up with 172, 667. In a two way race with
Minh, I think Thieu would lose I Corps.
Summer Analysis of Minh's Chances Against Thieu
The foregoing analysis is replete with irnperfect-ions. We d.on't know that
much about the anatomy of tl:e Vietnamese electorate. ThieuTS mast ob-
vious sources of support by ethnic, religious and occupational breakdown
are the ethnic minorities, Northern Catholics, the Army and the Civil
Service. These are difficult to quantify because of extensive averlappiz~g.
Qn a regional basis, Thieu will likely lose I Carps, perhaps draw even in
II Carps and win decisively in III and IV Gorps.
Having a handle on the administrative apparatus gives Thieu an incredible
advantage and one which he .presumably knows how' to use. Without :actually
. manipulating the ballots themselves, he will be in a position to stimulate
a high voter turn out in remote areas where he is strong (e. g. IV Corps
and the Highlands of II Corps) and to let voter tur~.out follow a more natural
.course in areas of weakenss such as the cities.
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/27 : LOC-HAK-10-5-38-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/27 : LOC-HAK-10-5-38-3
~.
SECRET - 7-
The very fact that Thieu himself is ~spansaring a presidential election
law which might effectively reduce the field to tiro ax three candidates
suggests that he views the forthcoming elections with confidence. He
also clearly wants to move into his second term with a majority mandate
which would better enable hint to deal with the other side as representa-
tive of the South Vietnaxn.ese people..
Should Minh win it will b~ because of miscalculations in Thieuts rural
votixzg strength in TJl and N Corps and because officials down the line
turn out n.at L-a be as reliable in delivering, the vote in the countryside to
Thieu as Thieu expects them. to be . But m.y guess, based an an estimate
of a 7q% vote far Thieu in IT.I anal lV Corps, 5q% in ri Carps anal 30% in
I Corps; is that Thieu will win about 60% of total votes cast.
SECRE T
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/27 : LOC-HAK-10-5-38-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/27 : LOC-HAK-10-5-38-3
~?L7TH VT~T-Neg.:--- ~'nt
COI~t~'::~ DI~N~~'I:AL
ressa.o.ns of Political k~ros
eft
Pro~pects__~'or overall Survival.
S ?lef~ South Viet-Nam .in na:id-?5eptember 1.7.0
considerably more con~ideirzt about .that countxy's
chances for survival in anon-Communist form than
,~ was shortly after my arrival.. there in January
1.968. Two and a .half .years afi:er the Tet 1968
: offensive South Viet-Nam.a.nd its constitutionally-~
elected go~r~rnment is~ uery mt~.ch a going Concern.
!l~hare are sera:ous problems:, of course? the economic,
situ.atir~n being the most obvious and critical.' of
t~~xese, but these problems: do not appe~.r ix~surmauntable.
?~t is my -impression ths.t if United States policy
remains. constant, South `.Viet--Nam can absorb the adds:-
~~tianal burdens of Vietnamizat~.on without lasing
sagni~a.cant ground to the' enemy, and gill ;eventually
`~be aa].e to sustain the entire military manpower load,
cif:: a dragged-out, though considerably da.ma:na.shed, ;way.
Sizeable 'economic inputs by the United States or .
other allies will kie necessary, .however., kith a
constant. US po~:icy, the fx?agi.le South Viet-Nam con~ti~-
tutior~al framework, wh~.ch 'has the potezitial to
pro~ra:de abases for ~s.tabi'lity and' orderly change of
gavernmentr has a good. chance of. survival as we~.1.
~o~aever,? should the US attempt to impo.s~ ar coer'ce
the GVN into accepting a ccialition government with the'
Communists, .it zs in my opinion doubtful that the
,present...canstitutianal system, ox anon-Communist
South Viet--Nam a.n any form= could l?ng surva:ve. Even
i~ the present GVN' caul.d be- convinced to risk such a
course, which a~s unl:ikely, there wou~.d be sevex~
opposition to such a m?ve from those e~.ements which
form .the bases o~ present GVN strength --- the militar~i,
the Catholics, and o~.her hardlixxe~s. Should.~hieu
Therese A: Tu~:l
Viet-i~am V7~arking Gxoup
October 23