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April 10, 1976
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t '40 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-104-3-9-3 ? 01-..Ln?i-L CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON,D.C. 20505 Honorable Brent Scowcroft Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs The White House Washington, D. C. 20510 Dear Brent: 10 April 1976 Enclosed is a summary of the position I am taking o current impasse involving termination payments under the program. Hopefully, I will be given an opportunity to present it to the Defense Subcommittee prior to the Easter recess. In that connection, if the occasion presents itself, it would be most helpful if the President could cover this matter with any of the members of the Subcommittee. (Membership list attached). We are in the process of pulling together from our field stations the total listing of all obligations involved. A detailed report on our finding will be transmitted as soon as possible. In the event I am unable to persuade the Subcommittee of the merits of our position, it may be necessary for the Admini- stration to proceed without their approval. There appears to be no question of the legality of such action and it is imperative that we fulfill our obligations. I would welcome any suggestions on the attached draft. Sincerely, Enclosure As stated Geo Direc or MORI/CDF CO2436030 page 1 C03203925 Pages 2-6 May Contain Congressional Material ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY kie No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-104-3-9-3 25X1 25X1 6,como,v fc, 4- 0 tr, z 7743-191 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-104-3-9-3 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-104-3-9-3 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-104-3-9-3 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-104-3-9-3 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-104-3-9-3 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-104-3-9-3 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-104-3-9-3 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-104-3-9-3 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-104-3-9-3 11, IIP HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS DEFENSE SUBCOMMITTEE George H. Mahon (D., Tex.), Chairman Jack Edwards (R., Ala.) J. Kenneth Robinson (R., Va.) Jack F. Kemp (R., N. Y.) Elford Cederberg CR., Mich.) (ex-officio member) Robert L. F. Sikes CD., Fla.) Daniel J. Flood (D., Pa.) Joseph P. Addabbo CD., N. Y.) John J. McFall CD., Calif.) John J. Flynt CD., Ga.) Robert N. Giaimo (D. , Conn.) Bill Chappell (D., Fla.) Bill D. Burlison (D., Mo.) May Contain Congressional Material No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-104-3-9-3 No Objection to Declassification in Part2010/03/10 : LOC-HAK-104-3-9-3 .111: 111 es V."0.? De( - 3049 D I Lot. PM-REFUGEES 12-30 LUSAKA, ZAMBIA (UPI) -- REFUGEES ATTEMPTING TO ESCAPE FIGHTING BETWEEN CUBAN-BACKED GOVERNMENT FORCES AND REBEL GUERRILLAS IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA ARE FLOODING INTO NEIGHBORING ZAMBIA, HOME AFFAIRS MINISTER AARON MILNER SAID TODAY. 1 MILNER SAID NEARLY 16,000 BLACK ANGOLANS HAD FLED SOUTHERN ANGOLA SINCE FEBRUARY AND IF THEY CONTINUED TO ARRIVE SEEKING SHELTER, ZAMBIA COULD BE FACED WITH "A VERY SERIOUS REFUGEE PROBLEM." THIS MONTH, ABOUT 1,000 REFUGEES ARRIVED IN SOUTHERN ZAMBIA AND WERE TRANSFERRED TUESDAY TO THE MAKENI TRANSIT CAMP, SOUTH OF LUSAKA. AN ANGOLAN STUDENT, HUDSON PETEPEET, 21, TOLD REPORTERS WHO VISITED THE CAMP WEDNESDAY, "WE HAD TO FLEE BECAUSE FJGHTING IS STILL GOING ON IN OUR COUNTRY AND MANY PEOPLE ARE DYING." A GROUP OF ABOUT 700 BLACK TRIBESMEN FROM SOUTHERN ANGOLA FLED INTO SOUTH WEST AFRICA (NAMIBIA) THIS WEEK AND ALSO REPORTED CONTINUED CLASHES BETWEEN GOVERNMENT TROOPS AND GUERRILLAS OF THE NTIONAL UNION FOR THE TOTAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANGOLA. MORE THAN 8,000 REFUGEES HAVE BEEN HOUSED IN TENT CAMPS IN SOUTH WEST AFRICA IN THE PAST 10 MONTHS. SINCE FEBRUARY, UNITA GUERRILLAS HAVE BEEN FIGHTING A BUSH WAR IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA, WHERE THE GROUP HAS WIDESPREAD SUPPORT AMONG THE RURAL POPULATION, AND HAS VOWED TO CONTINUE FIGHTING UNTIL CUBAN TROOPS AND RUSSIAN ADVISERS HAVE LEFT THE COUNTRY. uN/TA, WHICH HAD WESTERN BACKING IN THE ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR, WAS DEFEATED BY THE POPULAR MOVEMENT FOR THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA FOR CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT FOLLOWING THE WITHDRAWAL OF PORTUGESE FORCES. THE SOVIET ADVISERS AND THOUSANDS OF CUBAN TROOPS BACKED THE MPLA. PETEPEET SAID THE GOVERNMENT FORCES WERE USING ARMORED CARS, TANKS AND HEAVY MACHINE GUNS AGAINST NITA FIGHTERS, WHO ALSO HAD "SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS." ANOTHER REFUGEE, A FORMER CIVIL SERVANT FROM MAVINGA IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA, SAID HE AND MANY OTHERS HAD TRAVELED ON FOOT FOR HUNDREDS OF MILES TO REACH ZAMBIA. THE GROUP HE WAS WITH LIVED MAINLY OFF WILD FRUIT AND KEPT AWAY FROM VILLAGES. "WE HAD TO BE CAREFUL BECAUSE WE DID NOT KNOW WHICH VILLAGES SUPPORTED THE GOVERNMENT," HE SAID. "VE WERE FRIGHTENED ALL THE TIME OF BEING STOPPED AND TURNED OVER TO THE SOLDIERS." UPI 12-30 07:00 AES r ? No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-104-3-9-3 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-104-3-9-3 Co/Oast:4ot Marque, who het to Cabe ill AS POW WO friesdle with 'Citation Fidel Cants has write& acmes* of Cuba's gold eased ea usonsroluu Clubs, An aerwred Mare" et one of Xotio Anterices. writers. Ifia -.Mak is, In e Coboo:oothorieed version. golos civil war. Yesterday Cuban sews coney diatributed amend it ie MOM, The Th. "frOshilOSolg Post rights lts' This three extracts. In 1343, a feniale slave ? Carlotabad taken machete lead a slave umiak* at rato *ill, In tb andlion. tit 4101101de tts solidarity to Angola ation Carlota. It taitn with the for battalion made up of 850 men.' over a span of 13 tary Section of Jose Havana to the airport occupied by Port Their Weston sr offeedvs so the wouhf notlell into fore tiles keeir merits eanid But the men o were lure they and the ?nil bore the/ that trwy might be able lade. The fiest contingent lett* 4 Nov. 7, On a *Pedal 41.1t*Ctgettlit deAriscion, on one at the Bristol Sritania Boisa that the Baldish MatrAtfelltittt" with intellectual pursuits. So the fic. tion of Sunday civilians should not have seemed a novelty to them. But in their brief cases htesr carried machine pistols, and in the amp hold of the plane, instead of WPM* there Was a substantial load of light artil- les% mall arms, three 75 mar?crIallens and three 82 mm mortars. The only change that had been made in the Plane, Which carried two regular ste- wards, was a door cut in the floor so the weapons could be reached from the passenger compartment in case of tonerdetel- The fifth from ?1'fiteatta , to 1.411010.1 Was *edeltritX a stoPin-Banbadoi to take woo; al ths.intood ***lea Atom, and i five-hour stop In Guinea. Bissau, mainly' to wait for eight (Just as the first two planes arrived in Angola], three shies were leaving uba bringing an artillery regiment, a mechanized battalion and recoilless would land-in Angola ?Nrer. Gil the other hand, the columns of Heiden Roberto [head of the National /rent for the Liberation of Angola, a *iv& of the ultimately vieterieue Pop- ular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] were so oloee that only hours before they had shot and killed an old native woman who was ?UAW to reach the headquarters at Gran Fend, where the Cuban forces were &Amen- So the7nien arriving On the two pleats had no time tolest: They put on their oliVigreell indfireres, _Seined. the ranks' of the MPLA Pine PoPiliss Movement] and went into bottle. During nine months. the;mobiliza- ? tion of human and material resources was a drama of daring. The decrepit Britanias, patched up with brakes from Soviet-made liyushin 1St kept up a steady and almost unreal traffic. ? Although their normal load Is 000 pounds, they often flew with 194,000, which is of all the charts. The pilots, who normally fly 73 tours a month, sometimes. flew more, than 900. In general, emit af thetheste art- ludas in service etirrieeLtwe 'crests, who look L' but.. themost dangerous stretch, there was no alternative airport to fall back on. On top of everything else, the troops traveled with their weapons leaded and carried their artplosives without their pretictive wrappings to 'cut ? down on weight. .? The United States noted the Brita- ides' weak point: their range. When Washington got the Barbados to bar refueling stop., the Cubans set up a transatlantic flight from Holguin, at the eastern end of Cuba, to the le- land of Sal, in Cope Verde. It was a higlimire act without a net, for on the way out the planes arrived with fuel for Only bra more hours of flight and on the way back, because of headwinds, with only one hour's fuel left But Oen -that Orem Onto changed, "to avoid eildarigerbig fenseless cape Verde. Then the cabins, of the planes were itnalifiect 4o-take ferie supplementary gasoline tanks whieballevied nonstop flights but with 20 tewer passengers, from Holguin to Brazzaville. An intermediate solution, of making a stop in Goland., did not work out for two reasons: First, the runway was very short; second, Texaco, which holds the fuel contract in Guyana, refused to sell the fuel. Cuba tried to resolve this by sending a shipload of gasoline to Gu- yana, but through some incomprehen? sibie accident the fuel was contami- nated with water and dirt. ? Despite these bitter setbacks, the ? government of Guyana was firm in its solidarity toward the Cubans until the , sembeiesitinenf the United States, per. With, the ? bcark naranteenriathasetritettott of,''the cl port at Georgetown. Maibijiiksbee .d.ono in, less than half the usual time, and a :pilot,' res members flying without radar sesteral times; ifthaugh no one rdealls any in- strument failure. 'Under those incon- ceivable conditions, the Cubans made 101 flights until the end of the war. The sea route was no less dramatic. The only. two pas.enger ships, of 4,- 000 tons each, Wound up with dormito- ries in every open space, and latrines were set up in the lounge, the bars, the corridors. The normal loading ? of 226 passen- gers was tripled on some voyages, and ? cargo ships designed to carry crews of 80 eventually were loaded with more than a thousand troops with armored cars, weapons and explosives. Field kitchens were put up in holds and staterooms, and to save water dis- posable Altos were_ used and yogurt eontsdeete :Served as '? ,The Isilges were used for .waste, name e set up en :Steck. eItthery or the older glv out after Six shd this wee the _a the first troopi to come back: Their long-awaited return was delayed for several days because of clogged filters on the (Cuban troopship) Viet Nam Heroic?. `itie other ships in the convoy had to wait for bet-, and some of the pas- sengers then understood what Che Guevara meant when he said that the march of a guerrilla band is deter- mined by the slowest man. The problems were all the more an- noying because ships were the target of all sorts of provocations by North American destroyers, which followed (See INTERVENTWN, Pg. 11-F) tient ried Fidel Castro and Cube to launch a healthy look of t Caribbean sun. Their clothes, with no caeriet behrfainetil ports with their'real tification. The members ?, Ion, moo 41, nal litpttrii -Or flight. "There comes a paw') he said with no attempt at .nerniee, "that you'. re so tired theryou draft' tire any more." The route from Haven to Luanda itempty and unused. At the Britanias' cruising altitudeOshetereen .18,000 and 20,000 feet?there is no information abolit winds *lids dorsi the jet. The pilots sit riff without knowing the weather eking their course, flying at unusual altitudes to save .fuel, and without the slightest idea, of landing Conditions. Between Braestiville and Luanda, 10-F No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-104-3-9-3 1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-104-3-9-3 Part 11 -- Main Edition WASHINGTON POST (PARADE) 9 JAN 1977 (10) WOMIWINE Pour women Members. of the U.S. Bevy have filed suit in a class action They allege that the legal'pro- hibition against their assignment to sea duty deprives them of ''the core experience of Navy life.'"" Navy Women are,Otrrently permitted to -serve on hos- pital ships and harbor vessels like tugboats but not on destroyers, cruisers, carriers and the rest, WASHINGTON POST (PARADE) 9 JAN 1977 (10) iffm The Soviet Union has been trying for months to pur- chase from Great Britain its most powerful aero- engine, the Rolls-Royce RB-211, which provides, 50,000 pounds of thrust to the jumbo jets. The Soviets are building their first wide-body airliner, the Ilyushin 86, which will seat 350 pas- sengers, and they want to study the RB-211. The British are willing to sell a flock of the RB-211's to the Russians, but they want to control their production under license by the Soviets. They don't want to sell two or three and then have the Soviets pirate the engine with modifications. In 1947 the British Labor government under Clement Atlee made the mistake of selling 55 Rolls-Royce Nene engines to the Soviets against the advice of its intelligence experts. The Soviets im- mediately began reproduc- ing the engine illegally for their fighter's sOd, bombers. It was *tette fighters and lOibers that. were subsequently sent to North Korea to fight against U.S. aircraft in the Korean war. The British are deter- mined not to make the same mistake again. If they sell Rolls-Royce engines to the U.S.S.R., they want to provide substantial orders to the British air- craft industry. Otherwise --no deal. 10 January 1977 Jack Anderson WASHINGTON 9 JA.NUARY 1977 (10) Ps . _ A Coup Against Mao's Memory HONG KONG?The struggle for power in Peking, apparently, had all the Ingredients of a Chinese opera. The par- ticipants in the drama behaved more as If they were engaged in the petty in- trigues of a bygone dynasty than in the power politics of a modern state. For an account of these fascinating events, we consulted Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and some of his top ad- visers. Then we flew to Hong Kong to talk to the China watchers on the scene. What appears to have happened, as we reported in an earlier dispatch, was a posthumous coup against Mao Tse- tung. The old revolutionary was an un- predictable ruler who periodically sought to purify his own government with disruptive, revolutionary cam- Indfam The most chaotic was the Cultural Revolution of 1966, a confrontation be- tween the Red Guards and the Old :lunch. Encouraged by Mao, young ide- lists mocked and mobbed senior gov- ernment leaders. Some of the most pow- erful figures in China were subjected to public humiliation. Mao evidently thought this was good for their revolu- tionary souls, but the experience report- edly left them deeply embittered. Mao used similar tactics to hold the military down. In 1971, he accused the former defense minister, Lin Piao, of plotting his overthrow. The army com- manders suffered a severe loss of public prestige. Thus, the senior bureaucrats and mili- tary commanders were left to stew in private. They would later join forces after his death. But meanwhile, in sub- tle ways characteristic of the Chinese, they resisted Mao's disruptions. They be- lieved that practical policies and orderly development, rather than sheer ideolog- ical zeal, would be best for China. By 1974, the bureaucrats had regained control of the government machinery. But Mao continued to crack the ideolog- ical whip through his wife, Chiang Ching, who exercised rigid, stifling con- trol of the nation's cultural activities. Some analysts believe the present Pe- king line that the ambitious Chiang ma- nipulated Mao. But our sources are con- vinced that the ideological impetus, at least, came from the incurable old revo- lutionary He also used Chang ati0100, the *et political officer of -4he *mod leseas,46 seep the military - under submiadOn, our sources report. The late Premier Chou En-lai, the wily old pragmatist, groomed Teng Mho- ping to be his successor. This would have left the government in the hands of the senior bureaucrats, including vic- tims of the Cultural Revolution and their sympathizers. Tong himself had been an ideological casualty. But Chou was outmaneuvered in the backrooms of Peking by Chiang and her cohorts. Again, it is uncertain exactly What role Mao played in these manipula- tions. Some observers believe he had grown too old and incompetent to call the shots. There is evidence, certainly, that he suffered lapses. But believe he was lucid enough control. In any event, they Chiang tried to carry out the mandate. Thus Teng was brought d and time. In his place, Mao Kuo-feng and sealed it with a ten note, declaring: "With charge, I'm at ease." The a prestige was too enormous fo to challenge the choice. The sudden, surprise selee last Amil, say our source,. triumph for Chiang. But it long. As Mao began to fade, room intrigues intensified. The top bureaucrats and, commanders, who had been by Mao in the past, began gather. The deposed Tong, to was consigned to a totsp outside Canton. Intelligence claim he get together there fense Minister Yeh Chien-ying. ' Mao had always taught that power came out of the barrel So Chiang, according to our also sought the allegiance of th She made her play reportedly ' the chief political offiaer, chiao. According to one account, sh tried to use her daughter., Li N promise the army. Chiang complained to Defenee that her daughter had been Milt by an army man and d that his son marry Li Na. But by the time Mao died on Hua reportedly _recognized power was on the side of the reaucrats and military, actively joined the opposition Maoists, who had brought him to The contentious Chiang, a a reliable report, telephoned H. want to throw me out when Mao's remains have not yet cold," she complained bitterly, the way to show your gratitude kindness rendered to you by - Mao, who promoted your The coup came less than a after Mao's death. It was carried ' the Peking garrison on the night 6. Members of Mao's family, who been closest to Win; were arrested Thezkilitait.political 'officer, Clum-chiao, was arrested. So were other loyalists who, together with widow, have now been vilified China as the "gang of four." Our describe this group as Mao's true logical heirs. The move against say our sources, constittited a coup against the dead Mao. There was strong personal h they say, against the Maoists. The phant bureaucrats and army era,, therefore, sought revenge a the young party workers, who had militated them and, in seine cas placed them 10 years ago. OWMUWWIreatiaiMixikawhc .....????????.?????rsano. 9-P No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-104-3-9-3 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-104-3-9-3 IP 1111 -- Main Jattuary 1977 i0BOINgrai Pan -li MOM x977?u /1fripe- This is the second of three tetrads from an article by the noted Latin Aselleteset miter Gabriel Core= the fir0 Wile! Marques, a Cm* authorized awn* ride' Castro the smallest ? doff for ',0atth 'wettitcall at, the Colson& thefi,sPeeial foram flifht,, and drove hinfleviet-made int* every one of the Other, an envy for those going By then, there gola that he co land that he did and ,meticulously could cite any statitie, tog about Cuba. Ng to and its people lif P to date on M. was in the sen- ft *Ped he :theater of ent on the first of the Fdane in e that then and in Castro bad to hide tea war he could not be on the map of .nota elOrk of the heart fallow the So intensely war that he AngoLosto if he were, talk- Angeles tides, its ens- he had lived there all his At the start of. the war, w ep the situation was eePeetallY pressing, 1 tsd hi the genera staff Command roma it ls aa 14 hours at it? stretch, without eating or sleeping, as if hewer. on the cam- paign. Ile followed the progress of battles, using colored indicators on was in. constant tnefield high command* lot the,BopularAftelmientior aherldberatientii An- g&a, which Culla Nel% allied itself with]. Some of his NOON* daring those days of doubt reflected a certain* of victor, as when an UPLA a bridge to delaY the ed columns. bridges," Castro said in won't have any way to unit was forced,. advance of Sou - ? 'Doe blow message. ;pursue them." ; He was right: weeks later, the Ango- lan and Cu brigades had to repair is bridges in to jest& the retreating Invad- ers : , The difficulties December were due in the first place to the tremeidoas firepower of the enemy, which by this ved More than $50 mu- :lion in military *it *tan the Iletted stoles. In the *amend Pine% they Were *le to Angola's delay in 'auridng for help and the,Altoe it took to get the help :te_ttssgola. rinally, they were due to the miserable conditions and cultural backwardness left by half a millenium of Senile= That, even more than the first two -greeted obetaele to a de. Cuban troops and the -Ruors-a-TbienuottrAmbst lattlftituguese, were hostile to the white Cubans. Many times, especially In Cabinda. Cuban somas felt betrayed by the primi- tive tel of the talking drums, Whose thumpT tirehiP be heard or as sorb as 20 miles. South Africa's white trooPs, wit fired on arabu- lancet with 140 MM. cannons, threw up intake- screidni on the batti afield to - collect their, white deeds but left the black bodies for the vultures. Ist-Cuba. all the news coming from Angola was bed. On Dec. 11, iftHengo, where the NIPLA's armed Sahth African invaders; a Cuban armored car with four officers in it set out along a path where sante mines had been found. Atbough four others cars had already Passed tbrOtiell_ agar, the scouts ;advised against the route, atedch cut only a few unnecessary minutes off the p. Ignoring, the advice, the ear was almost in stoutly blown Up. Two special forces battalion corn- aliatelers were gravely wounded, and Centmandant Val4 MaZ Arguello--;commander of international mations in Angola, a hero of the struggle against tietn and a man widely loved in Cuba?died in- ? That was the bitterest news for the Cubans, but it as not to be the last. The next day came the dims- at Catofe, perhaps the worse set back of the en- 'tom wa ,r? . South African column had managed to repair a e under the cover of the morning mists and the Cubans; Who were in the Midst of "1- a Avithdralear The analysis of this defeat showed the* it Wavle* to an ewer on the Cabana' pert... hit Dec. 22; at the closing of the party congress, Cube gave its first official indication that it had troops In Angola. _Vie war was still not going well. Fidel Castro, in closing speech, reported that the invaders in tblnda had been defeated in 72 hours .that on the arern front the troops of Holden Roberto (leader e National Front for the Liberation of Angola) bad been only 15 miles from Luanda on Nov. l0 bad been forced to retreat to more than 69 miles. mean and that South Africa's armored columns, vihrett had advanced more than 490 miles, had been baked more than 120 miles from Luanda. The de- tailed report was comforting, but it. was far from a victory Caen aid reached such a level that at one point there were 15 Cuban ships on the high seas bound for Luanda. The unstoppable offensive of the NIPLA 461k11 fronts turned the tide Once and for always, in Its favor. , In January, it was conducting opera- tions originally Planned for Mull.. ? ? (With a great disadvantage in air power) Angola did these a acitiati Of ,3407# With Cuban butse were he in reserve by the high military command to be used only for the defense of LAM** Mkr Meech, ,thelieuth African troops began The ful, modern r lo live in, with grass bul1dlng stores with loge electric Bios. But these wieWelthes **whiten like those the grin-, 'gm; built arottitit Obi Havana . Beneath the Mask .civilitathou lilt a v4tat and rich land of misery: ;The natives',sta4ar4 of living was one of the low- est4n the .plidated TheAu- woldd superstitions net only com- a hindred the war effort. convinced that bullets te shin, they feared the refused to go into the were fielY for the dead. . * which one had to watch to for mercenaries? as much Cuban Contmalidatc Into an elephant trap. ans, conditiened by gener- trending. mut for Ist the At of *elle commandant Lee,poido Charge Pries arrived the darnat Rau- cans, neat to the ehicken-wire fence marking the frontier with Namibia. An hour and a quarter later the SOW* African governor of Namibia, . . accompanied by two of his officers, asked permission to cross the border to beggin talk, with the ltfl3LA. Commandant Vintraa' Tries received them in a wooden shed in the 4litYard444e neutral strip be- tween the OM conadidlie,,n7d the two groups gath- ered around a large di* table . . Agreement took only two hours to reach, but the meeting lasted longer, for the South African gen- eral ordered a sucealent dinner, prepared on the side. As they dined, he offered several In beer See CASIliCIS ADVICE, Pg 12-P) 11.-F No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-104-3-9-3 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/03/10: LOC-4K-104-3-9-3 Part II ? Main EditiOtt ?,.11 January 1977 MINIM SCIZNCE VIONITOR - 7 JANUARY 1977(11) Pg 3 re '??keeps. Jabbing at tabri.0 ? OILS,. alliancesH ? $y Seaga C., lime The biggest , challenge facing the United States and- Its friends and alba &Nag the year ahead, will continue to *So- viet pressure On the fehdc of the Ow* If anything, that pressure Is like* to Increase in scope aril in intensity. The litaddatleel of the alliance, by whatever means, Is Otir Aohollf the Ad* *wear rewlid Meet Ube to have hapites... Were It to bliPPoo, Moscow would to king of the castle. It. will would be the strewed single thing in the world. . But if the aRiance grows in vitality and security Moticow will continue to be what it is now, merely the second power In the world ? and a fairly poor sec- ond at that. After all, it has no willing friend Or ally any- wherein the wield. ? The United States is at the hub of a network of sued- aliens, friendships, and al- liances which embrace all of the Americas except for Cuba, the lion's 'share of Africa, most of Islam, the Philippines, Jarmo, and, for the moment at least, China. Strong* sr waiter The serious question is whether the fabric of that system of associations, Mandeb** and alliances will grow stronger or ,weskorfkote&IP-Thooelitirfhe-noidail*PuitAtt, ^ oval ittralfobliOloritti itc41.ft*? torkii? sann * year ago. Preident-Elect Carter has, been handed the task of carrying.on the good watt of preserving and strengthening it. still farther. The WWI of pressure most obvious at the moment is the continued buildup of Soviet weapons. Most milked by Eu- ropeans is the enmity increase in the number of Soviet tanks deployed In Eastern Ear* and presumably available for a possible thrust across the north German plain. Naval authorities notice the steady rime in number of attack submarines which could in theory be used to cut the sea-lanes vital to American support of its allies in Western Europe and PATTEN OF DIPLOMACY in Asia. Ballistic missile* Strategic warfare specialists notice the continued deploy- ment of new types of long range ballistic missiles. These in- clude many presumably aimed at 'targets in Western Europe, The Seders are also beginning to dealloY Movable CASTRO' S wan - corTimED Afterward, the program of the withdrawal of Cu. ban troops from Anpla was agreed to by Castro and (AgostinholNeto [leader of the 12PLA1 during their meeting in In Conakry, after Victory would 55 nflate OHM* as 74 needed would- remain in Angola as long as needed to build a modern and strong army, able to guaran- tee the future internal security and independence of the country without outside bele ? ? ? ? For security reasons, the Cuban press had not published any mention of the participation in An. gola. But. as usually happens in Cuba, even with military subjects as delicate as this, the operation was a secret carefullykept by a million persona. The first congress of the Cuban Communist Party, which was to be held late in December and which was a sort of national obsession all year, took on a new dimension. , ? The volunteer units were formed was private mes- sages to members of the finit reserve, made op of all males between 17 and 25 and those who had been And there is much discussion over the extent to whit Imes built Up defenses -epithet nuclear attack. ' Solna of the hint* American experts insist:. Fortieth's** can protect, most of their working ,against MOW u?oapons. II true dde would mann that, on the nay len "first strike" capability. v1 ? Perbsnectbelnest-daanerens, thing about the. up is -thai dinibt it'sowshiBa Modica the. allies about icon ability sad willineimis to defend them. Is Moser* log neapons with an adttakeyerto war, or as a form O chological warfare which could in theory give themth without a single ,blow being struck? If it is the 1st American hawks are playing directly into the hands of , otot Proluielmdloto, Europeans, listening to the "biotin aster" enthusiasts of Washington hawkdom, must sire an lnclinetion to head for Moscow to make what te Can. . A Ong way to go . The dominant opinion both in Washington and lb m Dance capitals is that the Soviets are a long way "first strike" capability and have a long way to go to match the overall strength of the United Sties and its However, there Is no doubt that Soviet inferiority turned into effective superiority overnight if the alliance to ton *art either from neglect, or from internal dine or fromlitar?frear is perhaps the greatest single danger; ? pensive B-1 bomber and bagel another super aircraft Or should it start balding fleet of fast, small ships de to defend the sea-lanes and put its main reliance for rence on "cruise" missiles, The "cruise" mantle is manned, long-range, self-directing rocket which can c ther conventional or nuclear warheads. , Confidence of the allies in the ability and will of the States to support the alliance system will certainly be financed by the sounded* And convincingness of Mr. C moves. To be effective they must express both ftronnesa prudence in military matters, and a proper awareness of nomic factors as well. Thealliance could be destroyed bY nondc folly as quickly as from insufficient weaponry. It it therefore a .good first step that the year has .opened with the graining of a loan to the British. This is tended to tide them over until the flow of North gee ail redress their imbalance In trade. members, of. the Revolutionary' An/1011E0race, were summoned hat telegoira to report loa the oriole military comnettees, with no word of they were called. /he reason was so bvicus everyone Who helietTSSlo tarY hisinnedin hit Itar* nits order. Insofar as the emergency permitted, selection cri ria were quite stringent: Not only were grata goolidestlotte allict Ordeal and mom; condi taken into account, bat also work background a political education. Nevertheless, there wore innumerable eases volunteers trYing to weak through the filter promo. A qualified engineer tried to Om hints off as a truckdtiver, a high official pretended to a mechanic, a Wallin almost got away With passi herself off as a recent any recruit. A youth whoa itined without his father's p slop met his father 111 Angola, because his fa had also gone without telling his family. 124.17` No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-104-3-9-3 ,olyw -111W .711ve; 40419"411"114, No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-104-3-9-3 This Is Ow lest from an. article by Americas loiter end proinaierne-Cones meeirt 6abriel Garcia ?illediguez?. gas - mg the first Cavineetthertaid of the Angolan civil wen Cuba's act of tiolidinike With Angola was far from a emitter* ive act, but rather the coutinuons policy troeMet Africa by the Cuban revolutko, ^ There was only Me:Or k element in this This time it was not only :et-question et sending What Ed it mead, bt# ink- on a large nvout 6,000 miles from ite WY, With the cast in b ure Incalculable and cense- quences unf The possibility States might intAwv than through arid for of the a t least about OST 2,JANUARY 1977 Pg 12 he Planted IMRE (110.10AUSig . uth Afrita sLIme time, was eat disturbing analYsls sugg a*bingLon dOgao It had juatfre,. aditilat ram of Vietnere scendia. It had a elected. The CIA Congress and. opirtion.The avoid seerain of African no the eyes of Arnerloall,(` itself with racist, all this it was las tion remPainn year. Flirthermare, could count on aid frOM the Sedalia Mon also aware Of ? Might held peaceful comistetele detente. It NM.* sequences, too be resolved in the leadersin Party of Cuba decide, and it hag, in a ig 3. Far froai said, it was a sign act of C sion Was raed vie* Union Contdet (ion and the the Liberation boon very In gen vara fo ,he CO IOLA leadiE wit went to Endo, the APIA, who .hen . In May mere getting Y tfrican eel Tao WashinstoO Post Where Angolan guerrillas were trained to on Nov. 'been 'skiver' e deci- was the SO' revolu- for LA) had first be. In at to him- by of the d in the Portainime 1,1,9 their ffi help asked riber more Commandant vifisa Cu- ban delegation to Luanda three months later. Nato was more precise ? He asked Cuba to selul imbuc. tots to open and ren four military tndning camps. _ Although the IOLA, *high began 1956,' was Anugotees older liberae tion rooirement and the only one with broad popular bask and although it offered a? .social, political and eco- prigram that exited the coup- * conditions, it was nonetheless the one in the weakest military posi- tion. It had SmaA arme? but lacked trairred'to use theft). There was no assurance that the Portuguese military wanld let the Cu- - ban instructors cliseinbark. Only on July 16, "WM when Cuba had received the first aid request from the liePLA, did Castro tusk Portugal's c 01. Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho (then a leftist master Of the. junta in Lisbon) to at- range- Portuguese ion fin. Cu- ban aid to Angola. that visit to Havana, Carvalher premised to see to It, but his answere had not let erri- ved. So when the (Cuban he/Op/tip) Viet Nam Iterate? arrived in Puerto Am- beim at 6:30 a.m. Oct. 4' and the Coral Island arrived on the 7th and the La Plata at PIMP -*ere on the 11th, they docked **EA ..fineanies.Permls. Eon ? but also;orittiont anyone's op- potation. The cusikothoitreetere were met by the liPLA and hinisedittely set up the four training (waters: one in Del- atando, which the Portugurese had called Salazar, 100 utiles east of Luanda; the second in Benguela, the Atlantic seaport; the third in San- rime, formerly Enrique de *wrath% in the remote deserted eastern pray- lime of Lunde, where the Portuguese had had a milltterY llWie that On de' stroYed before abandoning it; and the fourth in the enclave ed.Cabinete. Holden Roberto's troops of the oln g-F No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-104-3-9-3 Posing National Front (FNLA) were then so close to the Angolan capital, that a Cuban artillery instructor giv- ing his lAtdents their first lessons at Delatan4,.. saw the armored cars of the rnerchanized brigade of regular South African troops crossed from Namibia, and three days later they had occupied the towns of Sa da Bandeira and Idocamedes without meeting any resistance, It was a Sunday stroll. The South Africans had tape casettes of lively music in their tanks. In the north, the leader Of a mercenary column di- rected operations from a Honda sports car, beside a blonde who looked like a movie actress, They advanced as if they were on holiday, with no scouts out ahead, and they probably knew where the rocket came from that blew the car into bits. In the Woman's overnight case there was only a party dress, a bikini and an in- vitaidon to the victory. party Holden Roberto was already planning in Luanda... By the end of the week, the South Africans had penstrated more than 350 miles into Angolan territory and were advancing toward Luanda at the retool more than 40 miles a day. On Noe. 3, they attacked the WAIF man- ned training camp for recruits in Ben- Plebe The Cuban instructors, there had to break off their classes to lead their appreetice soldiers against the Invade" teaching them during lulls in Battle ? , The 3IPLA leaders, prepared for guerrilla war but not for largeecede conventional battles, then understood that their combined neighbors, equip- ped with the most rapacious and dev- astating resources of Imperialism, could not be beaten without an urgent appeal to international solidarity. By then there as not a Angie Aft!- can liberation movement that had hot counted on the- solidarity of Cuba, sometimes in the form of arms and war materiel and other times in. the form of training for military and civil- Jae technicians and sPecialists. MO- zambique since 1963. Guinea-Bissau since 1666, Cameroon and Sierra Leone all sought and received some expression of solidarity and aid from the Cubans at one time or another. Guinean President Sekou Toure threw back a mercenary landing with the aid of a Cuban unit . . When Neto called on Angolan students in Portugal to go and study in socialist countries, Cuba welcomed many df them. All of them are now involved in the construction of socialism in An- gola, some in very prominent posi- tions (including ,the finance nihnster, head of the military academy, etc.). _ Nothing demonstrates more clearly the length and depth of the Cuban presence in Africa than the fact that Che Guevara himself threw himself into the battles of the Congo at the peak of his career. On April 25, 1965, he gave Fidel Castro a farewell letter resigning his reek as a commandant and everything (CUBA IN AFRICA, Pg 10-F) lmi---x471111114 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-104-3-9-3 ' Part Friend!' Would Would Cost Carter No Main Edit int Attot1.2*Jattua BY MOT CONINE Reports keep cropping up that the Castro government in Cuba would like to reduce its role in Angola and concentrate on solving severe economic difficulties at home. If this is true, the stage may soon be set for a resump- tion Of efforts to normalize U.S. relations with Cuba. The two countries were edging cautiously toward negotiations until the Cuban dispatch of several thousand troops to Angola in the autumn of 1975, and Washington's understan- dably stiff reaction stopped the movement in Its tracks. In the context of time and circumstances. the U.S. embargo on trade with Cuba and the attempt to isolate the Communist regime from normal contacts with other countries in the hemisphere made sense in the early 1960s. As time went on, however, it became ob- vious that. the Castro government would not go away; that danger from Havana-supported guerrilla movements in other Latin American countries was fading, and that U.S. policies actually were forcing Cuba into an ever great- er dependence on the Soviet Union. The Castro regime, for its part, could not es. cape the economic facts of life. The estrange. ment was denying Cuba advantageous access to American marketoand-Anierieratieclmoloo. gy that was needed for its development ef- forts. The first signs of a thaw came in 1972, when Washington and Havana negotiated an agreed ment providing for the extradition of Ameti. can skyjackers landing in Cuba. But the real breakthrough came in the first eight months of 1975. Premier Castro, on the occasion of a visit by Sen. George McGovern (D-S.D.) and a party of U.S. newsmen, talked a tough line?but made it ummistakably clear that he would welcome better relations. In his words, "We wish friendship. We belong to two different worlds, but we are neighbors. One way or an- other, we owe it to ourselves to live in peace."' Within weeks thereafter, the United States joined 15 other members of the Organization of American States in voting to remove the organization's collective sanctions against Cuba, and eased the restrictions on tales to Cuba by foreign subsidiaries of American 'companies. Realists. didn't expect that normal trade and diplomatic ties would be restored overnight, but it did appear that the two governments were nearing direct negotiations. Then came the revelation that 15,000 or more Cuban troops had landed hi Angola to insure the victory of the Marxist-oriented, So- viet-backed MPLA in that country's bloody, three-cornered power struggle. President Ford called Castro an "interna- tional outlaw" for intervening in Angola, and warned that continued Cuban meddling in Puerto Rico would be considered an "un. friendly act." Castro called Ford a "vulgar liar," and announced his intention of extend- ing military and political support to "progres- sive" movements wherever and whenever he chose. In October, professing to believe that the United States was involved in the bombing of a Cuban airliner in which 73 people were Ernest Conine is a Times editorial Writer. ~mow kilted, Castro announced his intention of int up the antiskyjacking agreement. point out, however, that in that very speech the Cuban leader was 'careful to suggest an interest in discussing a new agree- ment with Washington this year. Earlyin De. ember, Raul Castro?minister of the armed forces and Fidel's younger brother.'-made a speech extending what was regarded as an olive branch to the incoming Carter adminis- tration. These cautious signasif they are indeed signals?coincide with reports of severe eco- nomic difficulties growing frmn a disastrous drop in sum prices to little more than a tenth of the level prevailing two years ago. Despite attempts to diversify the economy, sugar ac. counts for 86% of Cuba's -> earnings. The consequences are. felt in the form of tighter ratkidrig, drastic 0,, on inrigetti also-called lam grade and a dragandelido (Went Plans. The economic situation is Went to be creating pressures for a withdrawal $t least a big reduction?of the Oho MOO* II, southern Africa. It is assumed that the Soviet Unbaa footri most of the bill, in money terms, for moisten+ ance of 14,000 to 1000 Cuban soldlen roughly 10% of the Cuban army?In Mark But thaw soldiers possess4echnissilakille, Oar* though extremely valuable to the new Iratelti-g goverranent in Angola, are badly needed ha* home. All the talk about a significant redaction fa the Cuban role in Africa could turn cat to ha poppycock, of course. Cuban soldiers may yet end up fighting' in Rhodesia or South.West Africa, in which case U.S.-Cuban relations will obviously become worse rather than het* ter. It could turnout, to that while Cohn uinely wants improved Mations and theses. 110Mie advantages that such a movement would bring, he wants normalization only on his own terms. If taken at face value, -soma Cuban pronouncements me? just that. The Commission on United States-1410i American Relations, a )Jigh-level group that in a recent report urged Army Carter to seeic better ,relations with the Castro regime on a CUBA IN AFAICA corm= else that tied him to the government of Cuba. On that same day, traveling alone, he took a commercial flight, us- ing a false passport and a false name but not altering his aPPearenee carrying with him an attache ease filled with literary worts and Inhalers for his incessant asthma, and killing his empty hours in hotel mem With interminable solo games of chess. Three months littok 10 the Congo, he joined 200 Cuban troops who had traveled from Havana in an arms ship. Che's mission was to train Suer. rillas for the National RevolutionarY Council of the Congo, then battling 1Vioise Tshombe, the puppet of the old Belgian colonists and the baterna- tional mining companies . . . For greater security (Che) was not listed as the head of the mission so he was known by the noodleirm;rre of Tatu, Swahili for the number 2. Che Guevara stayed in the Conga from April to December 1005, not only training guerrillas but also directing 10-F 12 JANI.1 GROUPS A TO BAR B-1 WASHINGTON, Jan. II (u national organizations asked crout today to blockadditional the supersonic 8-1 bOmber, all the Defense Department and ) had faield to satisfy an enviro pact study required by law. The suit, in District Court, environmental-impact statement by the Air Force did not consid fives to the controversial bo gave only superficial attenti n plane's impact upon ' air qualit levels and ozone levels in the sphere. The Administration anno month that it was going ahead liminary contracts on the born the understanding that Presi Carter will make the final deei the plane's fate when he takes offl The court order sought by thre ronmental organizations and fon groups could force suspension of merit spending for Ihe project a the awarding of additional contra t The suit was filed by the Environ Action Foundation, Americans fo cratic Action, the Federation of A Scientists, the Oil, Chemical and Workers International Union. Fri the Earth, council on Economic P and Environmental Action Inc. gradual and reciprocal note. ? Havana, theum ttued to expect Wastdngton to lift embargo and curb the activities of mg terrorists based in this cotintry. In however, the United States has a right peat the Cubans to restrain their ventioniiii appetites?both in Africa Western Hemisphere. It isn't clear what priority Carter wilt to an easing of the Cuban si deed, to Latin America generally. Mating the long - -"At at the States and cube is itt interest of country. The new President would lose risk nothing by *Veil letting Castro I that his administration is readicinal LLand. work sten by stalk toward a .1 Then the next signal 14+10 in Holm them in battle and, fighting slough them,. His personal ties with , Castro,'about which there, has mach speculation, did not at any time. The two kept up and cordial contacts through very dent systems of eommuniention. When ktoiseTshombe was der the Congolese asked the '; Cubans withdraw, to make the armistice ler. Che Guevara left as he had caul without fanfare. , He took a commercial flight Dar es Salaam, capital of Ta haying his face in a book of che problems during the entire six bouts of flight. In the next seat his Cuban adjutan was kept buoy entertaining, the Political ecantnissar of the army o Zanzibar, Who was an old admirer Che and spoke tirelessly of hi throughout the flight, asking for latest news of him and saying over and over how much he would like to see him again. That fleeting, anonymous passage of Che Guevara through Africa planted a seed that no one could uproot. No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-104-3-9-3