REACTIONS TO A US COURSE OF ACTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-105-12-2-9
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: March 5, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 20, 1969
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/05: LOC-HAK-105-12-2-9
S-E-C-R-E-T/SENSITIVE
C E N T R A L INTELLIGENCE A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
20 February 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: Reactions to a US Course of Action
THE PROBLEM
To estimate various reactions to US air and/or ground
attacks against VC base areas in Cambodia.
ASSUMPTIONS
A. The VC/NVA Forces launch major offensives against
urban areasincluding Saigon, Hue, and Danang.
B. In retaliation, US air and/or ground forces attack
several identified VC base areas in Cambodia.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
do`-mgrading and
'S-E-C-R-E-T/SENUITIVE declassification
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S-E-C-R-E-T/SENSITIVE
1. The reactions of world opinion and of-the various
parties directly concerned would be primarily determined by
the general context in which the attacks against Cambodia
occurred: whether they were accompanied by other US actions
pointing to a severe escalation of the war and a major change
in US policy, or whether they appeared as isolated and limited
acts of retaliation. In addition, Sihanouk's response would
be largely governed by the location and duration of the operations
in Cambodian territory.
2. Cambodian reaction. Sihanouk appears presently inclined
to warm up his relations with the US, and will probably react
positively to the recent US initiatives, doubtless with some
bargaining. He may have begun to hedge his bets on the outcome
in Vietnam,, or at least to change his views on the length of
time it will take the Communists to achieve their objectives.
Retaliatory attacks on targets in Cambodia in, the near future
would therefore come at a delicate juncture in US relations
with that country.
S-F_- C-R-E-T/SENSITIVE
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If the attacks were directed against bases in populated
areas, or conducted over a wide area or repeatedly, they would
wreck any chance of reconciliation with Sihanouk for some time
to come. Whether or not the US Government announced its action,
it could not take place on any considerable scale without being
made public knowledge by the press and radio. Considerations of
"face" alone would lead Sihanouk to assume a flamboyant anti-
Americanism. Probably he would publish any private correspondence
from the President and cry shrilly of US duplicity.
4. Yet Sihanouk is not eager to exacerbate his relations
with the US. There is a good chance that one or two US air
strikes in the remote and virtually unpopulated areas of the
northeast part of Cambodia would evoke no more than a perfunctory
protest from him; he might even ignore them altogether.
He could
not ignore or fail to protest a strike delivered in the populated
area of the south, where several of the Communist bases are
located. And he would have to react if the Communists made
vociferous propaganda about the attack, wherever it was delivered.
.5. Ground operations would appear as a more serious violation
of Cambodian territory. They would run a considerable risk of
involving Cambodian forces in clashes with US troops. Sihanouk
S-E-C-R-E-T/SE)SITIVE
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 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/05: LOC-HAK-105-12-2-9
S-E-C-R-E-T/SENSITIVE
would also be distressed and angered by the prospect of having
VC/NVA forces withdrawing more deeply into his territory. He
could do little to stop this and would blame the US for his
predicament. He might take his case. to the UN and would cer-.
tainly try to activate the ICC to expose the US transgressions.
6. North Vietnamese and VC Reaction. The Vietnamese
Communists would expect to pay some price for attacking outh
Vietnamese cities and thereby vidlatiri"the "understanding
made at the time the bombing of North Vietnam was stopped; they
would probably anticipate some air strikes against the North,
and would be prepared to accept an interruption of the Paris
talks. They have almost certainly taken account of such
possibilities, and an intensive assault on major South Vietnamese
cities would indicate that they believed the potential impact
of their offensive would more than offset possible US military
retaliation.
7. The Communists could be hurt militarily, depending on
the scale and duration of the US attacks, and especially on the
extent to which ground action was involved. They would recognize
that the US had changed its policy significantly,-that it-was
S-E-C-R-E-T/SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/05 : LOC-HAK-105-12-2-9
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willing to take new.action as necessary to support its military
position, and that it was no longer confined by past restrictions.
8.
on the other hand, the Communists would see propaganda
advantages in claims that the US was expanding the scale and
area of conflict, endangering the Paris peace talks, violating
Cambodian sovereignty, and killing civilians in a country claim-
ing to be neutral. They would certainly press these consideration:
on the attention of world opinion.
9. The Paris talks. The postulated attacks, in the context
of communist attacks on south Vietnamese cities, would raise the
noise level of the exchanges in Paris. But we do not think that'
because of these attacks the Communists would break off the Paris
talks for good, though they might threaten to do so, or perhaps
bring about a temporary suspension of meetings in an effort to
rally world opinion against the US and US domestic opinion again;
the government. Hanoi would indeed probably calculate that US
attacks on-Cambodian territory, with their attendant publicity,
would increase US domestic pressures for an early end to the war.
S-E-C_R-E-T/SENSITa VE
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/05: LOC-HAK-105-12-2-9
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5_E-C-R-E-T/ SENSITIVE
There is a good chance that vigorous
Communist attacks on Saigon and other major cities in South
Vietnam would prompt the GVN to walk out of the Paris talks.
Its disposition to do so, or to demand that the US break off
the talks, would be. diminished by a US retaliatory attack on
Communist bases in Cambodia.
11. China and the USSR would join vigorously in the
Cambodian and North Vietnamese propaganda assault on the USE.
Peking would welcome the prospect that negotiations might break
down and heavier fighting be renewed. Moscow would be disturbed
by the turn of events but would probably judge that the US merely
meant to make a strong response to an attack on Saigon, and was
still primarily interested in seeing an early conclusion to the
war. It would probably use its influence to prevent any complete
breakdown of the Paris talks.
12. other Reactions. Clearly the world at large -- except
for the Chinese Colisaunistn-.. hopes that the war in Vietnam will
soon end. There would be widespread disappointment and disapproval
of further escalation of the fighting, and of the extension of it
into new areas. We are assuming, however, that US attacks would
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No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/05: LOC-HAK-105-12-2-9
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be in retaliation for a substantial previous escalation by
Communist forces. If the Communist attacks on cities were on
a large scale and produced destructive results, the US would
not be solely blamed for the new development. There would be
a great deal of criticism, of appeals to the US to exercise
restraint, to refrain from an extended campaign in Cambodian
territory, and to make a new effort in the Paris talks. Vari-
ous governments would probably lend support to Cambodia's
cause in the UN; some would try to bring about formal UN con-
demnation of the US action. In short, we do not believe that
the postulated US action could be undertaken on any very
effective scale. without political repercussions.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
ABBOT SMITH
Chairman
S-E-C-R-E-T/SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/05: LOC-HAK-105-12-2-9