MUM'S THE WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-106-1-22-8
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: March 10, 2010
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: August 1, 1973
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

TT__ AZ, A...Leif ;-r-% A
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-106-1-22-8
by Tad Szulc
Now, nearly four, years after the fact, we know that --
acting under President Nixon's persona/ authority, US
military units- engaged.in almost daily ground incur-
sions into Cambodia during 1969 as part of broad top,--
secret intelligence:operations -prnging,,over much of
Southeast Asia...
These incursions, known by the code name
House,- involved at. different tines US 'artny special.,-.
forces (Green Intelligence: Agencyf
operatives, SouthiNietnamese-Rangers;,-..1thnler Serei--;4-
detachmentst.oCethiliv.Cambodiansofrorit.Siauth
nam and.Chineae:Nhung rnercenariesilht*werecti-tt
ordinate& with secret 154.52 and tactiCisolAUS:air strikes-
against targetsiri;Camboolia that went on for /4 mon
in. ; 1969 and ,199:The'.:Pentagiwn-ad-,Ort-Olialeol
month ab6ntt.
-
Carribodian-kairiq-Stilikesiipto:::gietheiinpressionf
easons'-'th
about "Sal
conceated.intlfence
me in recetavsut
ceiving corroborating testimony last week from former
members- of ,Green Beret squads about clandestine
cross-border operations.
But new information obtained by The New Republic
shows that in addition to theCarabodian incursions, .
secret US operations in Southeast Asia included: -
11,- Training of Khmer Serei units (also known as
Forces).. at two CIA camps in Greece Khmers Serei
were flown to Greece in mid-1969 under the so-called.
"'doCtririe, of.plausible _denia1;7"meaning that. su
trainingi,..if suspected, could be credibly denied. It wa
under-_the.-same concept that the CIA earlierto:al
TibetAii.iiieiriflas, in Colorado At IlithseS;angate coni
inetioartle ?erings. on' July 3,... William B. Colby, the n
CIA.., direrton-7.1',acknowl
tome to--? .
. .
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-106-1-22-8
20
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-106-1-22-8 iE NEW REPUBLIC
Covert actions in Burma at the confluence- of Thai
and Chinese borders. The CIA statfori in Bangkok was
in charge of these activities.
The secret incursions into Cambodia were com-
parable to raids by US units into Laos, known as
"Operation Prairie Fire." The latter were kept up until
? 1972. A large-scale secret 1969 penetration in Laos, de-
signed to cut the flow of supplies over the Ho Chi
Minh trail, involved a sizable marines unit. "Salem
House" raids into Cambodia were no longer required
after US troops openly moved into that country during
the May 1970 offensive.
-Both the secret bombings and ground incursions in
1969 were M flagrant contradiction -to President
Nixon's statement on April 30, 1970, that prior to the
invasion US policy had been "to respect scrupulously
The neutrality of the? 'Cambodian people." Senior
Defense Department officials I privately confirming
the "Salem House" and 'Prairie Fire" operations, now
say they had been "cleared from the very top." Under
questioning, they admit sthat President Nixon had
personally authorized them as top-secret operations in
the same way in which he cleared the 3360 B-52 sorties
over Cambodia in 1969 and 1970.
Late in July the Pentagon hinted that special opera-
tions may have been conducted in Cambodia and Laos
when it announced that 121 US servicemen, officially
reported as having been killed in Vietnam, actually
died in the two adjoining countries.
Highly classified intelligence operations in South-
east Asia. in 1969 and afterward were run by a complex
secret command chain attached to the US Military
Advisory Command, Vietnam (MACV), in Saigon,
including representatives of the army, the air force,
the CIA and the National Security Agency.
NSA groups utilizing military and civilian elec-
tronic intelligence specialists worked covertly in
Vietnam and were known as Direct Support Units
(DSU). Their task was to coordinate intelligence and
combat operations on all levels with special emphasis
on targeting air strikes and ground crossings in Cam-
bodia, Laos and North Vietnam.
Cross-border operations into Cambodia were usually
conducted by a special. Green Berets unit identified as
?"B57" and. composed of Special 'Forces and CIA per-
GreenaBerets are divided into "A" and "B"
detachments?-tlie latter being operational. In so-called
. unilateral" ?operations, only US personnel crossed
into? Cambodia:,from a series ,of "B57" bases strung
.-,along the Cambodian border in Vietnam.
--"Bilateral" crossings involved Americans as well as
? Khmer Semi, South Vietnamese and-Nhung units. Bi-
lateral and unilateral crossings were also conducted in
Cambodia framThailand.
According to Winslow Peck, a former air force staff.
-sergeant who served in Vietnam as an NSA analyst and
liaison official with the Army Security Agency, and
lather intelligence sources, NSA "targeting" for Cam-
bodia began in February 1969. Peck, who now is a
member of a Washington-based organization known
as The Committee for Action Research on the
Intelli-
'gence Community (CARIC), said in an interview that
he was attached during 1969 to the Eighth Radio Re-
search Unit based at Phu 'Ba i in Vietnam, then the
headquarters of the Fifth Special Forces Group. The
Eighth R.R.U; svas part of the 509th Radio Research
Group which,- in tum, was controlled by the Army
Security Agency. .
CARIC, a private group of former intelligence
agents, is dedicated to public dissemination of infor-
mation about the doings of US intelligence agencies.
The 509th R.R.G. and the 'air force's 6994th Security
Squadron formed a joint operational office known as
ACC and located at the Seventh Air Force command in
Saigon. ? ACC was the top-secret electronic intelli-
gence operations center. Pentagon sources said ACC
stood for Airborne-Radio-Direction-Finder Coordina-
tion Center. It was staffed with sp.ecialists from the
404th Special Operations Detachment of the NSA, the
? agency's force assigned to Vietnam. NSA unite in
Vietnam?the DSlis? belonged to Bravo Group, the
special office in charge of Indochina operations ,m
? NSA's headquarters at Ft. Mead, near Washington.
ACC in Saigon, according to Peck and other former
intelligence specialists, provided intelligence support
0/03/10: LOC-HAK-106-1_29_a and,
"Your - 4,,rnerative. He died
No
Objection to Declassification in Full 201
_
the Studies and
Ot:servAtio- tervn under MAC/V'sNo Obie tp.n_to_ Declassification in Full
rneCti3On. It Wa..7 ;A...Cr)
MAC/V-SOG was divided into three separate seg-
ments: Command and Control North, Command and
Control Center and Command and Control South.
Each SOG command was responsible for cross-border
operations in its area. SOG/North infiltrated teams
into the Demilitarized Zone and North Vietnam.
SOC/Center and South were in charge of "Salem
House" raids in Cambodia and "Prairie Fire" in Laos.
Most of the Cambodian incursions were directed by
SOC/Center in Kontura. Targeting for air strikes and
ground operations was the responsibility, of Peck's
NSA unit based at Phu. Bai and Kontum. Peck said in
the interview that his function was to serve as NSA
analyst for air reconnaissance missions over north-
eastern Cambodia which was known as "Variant 12."
The air missions were code-named "Combat Cougar."
A Combat Cougar mission was usually flown by a C-47
aircraft jammed with highly sophisticated electronic
radio direction finding gear and carrying NSA experts.,
When an NSA controller aboard a Combat Cougar
plane spotted a North Vietnamese or Vietcong unit or
depot, he radioed the information to the nearest NSA
Direct Support Unit, on the groundinlyis,?etriam or in
the air. The NSA unit? in turn, passe;i.on-its intel-
ligence to ACC in Saigon. The ACC informed SOC
and a determination was, made whethairazt air strike,
artillery fire- or- a. 1357 ground
NSA experts in the guise of DireCtruPport Unit per-
sonnel were attached to each airdeti*inis;s to serve.':-- -
as electronic intelligence advisak7gicheplottes used in
- these missions .over-CarhbocliaiAiii*Iisy..-used the
Konttun airfield cuoixic:Tiditer.ltits*natiort in
NSA channels forcomnuuucataonsred'
Cambo-
dian air and gro
Peck said that.
designed to fin&
which were NortleVi
food depots
sions were knowri as
late Mission).Oti
-
patterns of Communist-,
inside Cambodia4,
was another mission of the BSliumtst Pentagon offi?
cials described all these irdsafie*
operations when they were aStvadlitafiveek about the,,?
1%9 incursions. -
of 121/Yes-
2010/03/10 : LOC-HAK-106-1-22-8 F?rces and CIA
agents wore North Vietnamese uniforms or "sterile"
? fatigues, uniforms without any unit or rank insignias.
They went into the Cambodian jungles with their
faces greased black, commando style.
? Peck and others said that during 1969, there were 23
? separate types of intelligence flights in Southeast
? Asia. Since the US withdrawal from Vietnam, Combat
Cougar missions have been switched to the Rarna.sun
NSA-CIA base near the Udorn Air Force Base in Thai-
? land_ Other sources say these missions are still being
flown in support of the US bombings in Cambodia.
? Rarnasun is the present headquarters of the Seventh
Radio Research Field Station that earlier operated at
Phu Bai. The air forcers 6994th Security Squadron has
moved to the Nalcom Phariona base in Thailand.
According to Peck and other intelligence officers
who served in Indochina, plans were afoot in 1969 to
mount. a ,coup agmst Sihanouk, arid that the Khmer
Serei Forces" were being trained in Laos,
.?South_Vietnam. and Greece for that purpose The pro,
posed coup, coordinated by the CIA, was known in,
the intelligence community. as "Operation Dewey?
Canyon IL" Earlier covert operations in Laos by US%'.;.,
nviiitary units, including elements of the Ninth marine
' division, were- code-named-Dewey Canyon I. Officials
. in, Washington refuse to discuss- the reported plans -.....-
aussu*i"ras
_required.; say why it was can--,
usuallp
ban tran
g arms and, --
1357
fciieck the,
,movements:
ist areas t-
In all cases, Peck said,. the inclusions into Cambodia
and Laos?sometimes on foot am4 sometimes by heli-
copter? were guided by Combat. Cougar flights that
fed electronic intelligence to ACC and SOC. Peck and
other former intelligence specialists involved in these
operations said in.interviewsthat the-crossings inta
Canthodia and Laos were far from successful and that
357 units often suffered heavy losses. He said a Com-
bat Cougar C-47 was shot down in 1969 with the loss
March4months before, the .US invasion
.;; new,....:clisClosurei, of secret,
,ppitintfrititilrizto,Cambodii, have sex
that';thei,,Naxcrz. administration sys
?fashion had beenl
i.soeitsince 969, whil
Feifksr-Pp, _Augu-.E=
derJomproiniseresolution worked out in July
Senate and. the" WbiteHbuse. US
powes..0a:itd its- intelligence support facilities ?r
iiv-Thid and surely the adrnini.Stration mu
tSniptt+tfl use it some fashions alter this we
Clead14,747bL4e certainly is precedent forc
enterPOses:
aziadavit filed with the. Supreme Court o
August 4 seeking a stay of a lower court order for am;
immediate: cessation of the bombing, Secretary Of
State William F. Rogers said that Cambodian forces
would be redeployed after the deadline "from exposed
positional? positions where they can defend them- -
?
selveeand, be resupplied in the absence of US corribat,,,
suppo0?...r.Thait *as the most intriguing phrase .of
theweele
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-106-1-22-8